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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Everything in the world happens according to a plan 
It is the early Sunday morning right after the November 13 2015 
attacks in Paris when I receive an email from one my sources stating 
how these cruelties allegedly carried out by militants of the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) militants are not what they seem:  
 
Everything in the world happens according to a plan. Also 
in Paris on November 13: 
x The intelligence agencies CIA, Mossad, MI-6 and 
DGSE gathered on October 29 2015 to coordinate 
future events. 
x The authorities “coincidently” planned on that 
same day a large-scale disaster drill featuring 
attacks on multiple places. 
x Paris Match predicted in its October 2nd issue ‘a 
French 9/11’ that was ‘impossible to prevent’ 
because IS is an ‘army of terrorists with unlimited 
resources’ against which no defense is possible. 
x Francois Hollande knows immediately who is 
behind the attacks, even before the passports are 
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found, something which the perpetrators always 
seem to leave behind ;>ee Harvey Oswald, 9/11, 
<oauchi on ϳ/1, etc.Ϳ. 
x A nationwide state of emergency is immediately 
declared ;first time since May 1961Ϳ and the 
borders are ‘closed’ ʹ general repetition for the 
definitive beginning of a police state͍ 
x The press is in immediate overdrive: ‘France is 
cruelly attacked because of its noble humanitarian 
fight against the terrorists in Syria.’ 
x All terrorists blow themselves up or are killed: no 
need for investigations nor for any litigation. 
 
The official version is thus again very professionally 
consolidated as Truth, and whoever asks Ƌuestions is a 
conspiracy theorist. The seeds for the tar on Terror are 
sowed once again, this time in Paris. Soon they will bring in 
the harvest1 
 
This email does not stand alone: over the course of that weekend I 
have been directed through several of my other sources on Facebook 
to a number of articles and postings similarly questioning the official 
reading of 11/13. In The Paris Attacks: What You Really Need to Know I 
read about the 
concern from the conscious community – who have woken up to the 
reality that shadow power moguls have infiltrated our governments, 
media and international bodies with the agenda of instituting a one 
world government – that the latest Paris attacks are purposely 
designed and implemented to further their aim2 
The author of the article What’s Really Going On With Paris Terror 
Attacks Summed Up In 4 Minutes tells us how: 
[T]his event resembles other incidents which the media labels 
‘terrorist attacks’ and I am equally skeptical about the motivation 
behind this one. As University of Ottawa Professor Emeritus of 
Economics Dr. Michel Chossudovsky has argued: 
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“a criminal undertaking at a global level … and there is an ongoing 
war … The global war on terrorism … which is fake, it is based on 
fake premises. It tells us that somehow America and the Western world 
are going after a fictitious enemy, the Islamic State, when in fact the 
Islamic State is fully supported and financed by the Western military 
alliance … They say Muslims are terrorists, but it just so happens 
that terrorists are Made in America. . . . The global war on terrorism 
is a fabrication, a big lie and a crime against humanity [link to 
original source].” 
 
When it comes to the terrorist attacks in France, Chossudovsky wrote 
that  
 
“the media coverage of these tragic events was casually linked up with 
the war in the Middle East, highlighting France’s commitment—
alongside its allies—in waging a ‘humanitarian war’ against the 
terrorists. The attacks were described without evidence as an act of 
revenge and retribution against France for having bombed ISIS 
strongholds in Syria and Iraq as part of Obama’s counter-terrorism 
air campaign […] The political discourse is in some regards 
reminiscent of the 9/11 attacks and the statements of George W. 
Bush et al. The media immediately started comparing the November 
13 attacks in Paris to 9/11, intimating that France was at war and 
that the alleged Islamic State attack was from abroad, i.e. the Middle 
East” [link to original source].3  
The alternative news sites that I visited on a daily basis since I started 
my fieldwork similarly feature articles with myriad doubts about what 
really happened in Paris. These articles have headlines such as: Analyst: 
Attacks in Paris Possibly False-Flag Operation4; VIDEO: This Interview About 
the Paris Attacks You Won’t Find on Television5; Historian: Attacks in Paris 
Carried Out by Professional Commandos6; German Minister: Syrian Passport 
Perpetrator Paris Possibly False Flag to Scare People for Refugees7. These 
articles make one thing abundantly clear: the official explanation 
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offered by our authorities of what happened on that November night 
are not believed by (what are commonly called) conspiracy theorists8.  
These messages are consistent with what I have found over 
five years of following a continuous stream of articles, emails, 
exposés, videos, Facebook posts, and other reports of hidden truths 
and deceit. Besides the abovementioned doubts about the official 
explanations that arise each and every time a tragic event occurs, 
there are many more less acute instances of (what are generally seen 
as) conspiracy theories. Such explanations of social phenomena 
involving the secret actions of some people trying to bring about a 
certain desired outcome, to provide a provisionary definition, are 
indeed numerous. When delving into the world of conspiracy 
theories, one is made aware of the covert machinations of the world’s 
largest multinationals who do everything in order to satisfy those who 
profit from their profits: bribe government officials, direct public 
policy, manipulate scientific research, evade taxation, infiltrate 
regulatory bodies, dishonor human rights, destroy nature. Or one 
will hear about secret societies and the Illuminati in particular who 
covertly control the music and film industry and force artists, if they 
want to be successful, to sell their soul to the devil. It is easy to see 
who did so, just look for the display of satanic symbols (rain, snakes 
and triangles) in their music clips which expresses their dark loyalty. 
And those unwilling to be pawns in the game of the Illuminati are 
merciless eliminated, think of Marilyn Monroe, Bob Marley, Tupac 
Shakur and of course, Michael Jackson. Other difficult persona are 
similarly taken away by this global elite before they could make a real 
change. John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Princess Diana did 
not succeed, now you know why. Banking dynasties are frequently 
mentioned, such as the Rothschild’s who are said to have profited 
from all wars and upheavals in history by consistently financing both 
fighting parties will surely pass. Never a losing game. And, of course, 
UFO’s, aliens and other signs of extraterrestrial life are, so we are 
told, consistently covered up by our governments. Next to the real 
truth behind tragic events consistently framed as terrorist attacks, 
there is a plethora of other things they don’t want you to know about.  
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Conspiracy theories do not just come in many shapes and 
sizes, but are hugely popular as well. According to many opinion 
polls, both in the United States and Europe, significant segments of 
Western populations adhere to one or more conspiracy theories. 
Gallup, for example, has shown that fifty years after, a majority of 
Americans “still believe JFK was killed in a conspiracy”9. A 2013 
survey by Public Policy Polling finds that “28% of [United States] 
voters believe that a secretive power elite with a globalist agenda is 
conspiring to eventually rule the world through an authoritarian 
world government, or New World Order” and another fifteen 
percent believes “the US government to control our minds through 
television”10. These are numbers that account for tens of millions US 
citizens and similar figures are found across the pond. A 2012 survey 
conducted by Opinion Matters in the United Kingdom claimed that 
“52 percent believe UFO evidence has been covered up because 
widespread knowledge of their existence would threaten government 
stability”11. Survey research in the Netherlands concluded in 2015 that 
almost forty percent believe that “the pharmaceutical industry can 
cure serious illnesses, but has more interest in keeping people sick so 
they can sell more pills” and about twenty percent “believes the US 
government to be behind the attacks of 9/11, or at least had concrete 
foreknowledge about it”12. These public opinion surveys have recently 
been corroborated by social scientific research. J. Eric Oliver and 
Thomas J. Wood (2014) claim that a similar twenty percent of U.S. 
citizens hold their governments responsible for the attacks of 9/11. 
They also claim that ten percent believes that the “vapor trails left 
behind by aircrafts are actually chemical agents sprayed in a 
clandestine program directed by government officials” (2014: 956). 
When millions of people in Western democracies adhere to 
conspiracy theories, it is fair to say that it has become a true mass 
societal phenomenon. 
Conspiracy theories figure rather prominently in popular 
culture as well (e.g. Kellner, 2003; Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000). 
The TV-series The X-Files (1993-2002) centered on two FBI agents 
who investigate unsolved cases of supernatural and other unexplained 
phenomena. The skeptical Agent Scully and the gullible Agent Mulder 
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stumble over the years upon government cover-ups of extraterrestrial 
life and what seem even greater conspiracies to colonize Earth. Trust 
no one, the series’ iconic slogan, became a cult theme featuring widely 
in today’s popular culture. The 1997 Hollywood blockbuster 
Conspiracy Theory skillfully plays with common stereotypes: Mel 
Gibson may have started off as the paranoid cab driver who lives in an 
New York apartment-turned-fortress with steel walls, floors and 
ceilings, and locks everywhere, even on the fridge, but along the 
movie it becomes clear that his feelings of persecution were not that 
paranoid after all. And what about the widely acclaimed science 
fiction thriller The Matrix (1999) which propagated the (conspiracy) 
idea that the world as we know it is one big lie, one giant illusion, one 
enormous simulated reality constructed in order to fool the masses 
into believing that they are free while in effect they are slaves for the 
system. Who wasn’t mind boggled by the thesis it put forward: how 
to tell, after all, if we aren’t really living in that simulated reality we 
all believe to be real? The best-selling novels of Dan Brown (and the 
movies based on them) delving into the dark undercurrents of the 
Vatican such as the Da Vinci Code (2003), similarly popularized 
conspiracy theories about secret societies and the Church for a larger 
audience. The more contemporary TV-series like 24 (2001-2010), 
Homeland (2011-present) and House of Cards (2013-present) all play 
with the themes of conspiracy theories: political intrigues, 
government cover ups, clandestine operations by secret services and 
so on. In sum, the logic and rhetoric of conspiracy features abundantly 
in today’s media culture and has, as such, helped institutionalize 
conspiracy theories as a broad based cultural phenomenon.  
Yet, despite this popularization and normalization of 
conspiracy theories over the last two decades, strong moral opinions 
and normative judgements towards the subject matter remain 
prevalent. The notion of the conspiracy theorist as an obsessive, petty 
minded, militant and paranoid loner is widespread. The belief that 
conspiracy theories will do harm is just as common: they are seen as 
dangerously delusional ideas that pose serious threats to Western 
democracies. To give an example of this moral presumption towards 
conspiracy theories, I will go back to the Paris attacks, because just as 
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conspiracy theories can be expected to proliferate after such an event, 
so too are the newspaper articles alarmingly reporting about the spread 
of conspiracy theories in our societies. This “important piece”, as 
another of my sources wrote to me by email, appeared a few days 
after the Paris attacks in one of the major Dutch newspapers, Het 
Algemeen Dagblad: 
 
‘Conspiracy Theorists Are Often True Little Cult Leaders’ 
They appear after every 
disaster. Also after the horrific 
attacks in Paris. Conspiracy 
theorists. They see in every 
shocking event a conspiracy 
of the government or “the 
elite” to impose their will to the 
citizenry. But how does a 
conspiracy theorist think? 
And why? The idea that 
conspiracy theorists form a 
small minority only is 
outdated. Websites about 
conspiracies have a large fan 
base who read everything 
faithfully. A recent video on 
YouTube about the 
conspiracy surrounding the 
attacks in Paris has been 
viewed almost 300,000 times. 
 
 
Attention 
According to secretary Jan 
Willem Nienhuys of Skepsis 
(the organization that looks 
critically at “exceptional” 
statements) conspiracy 
thinking is predominantly 
about getting attention. 
‘People who spread 
conspiracies are all little cult 
leaders. Often they are 
people with a low social 
standing who look in this way 
for attention. Sometimes they 
are societally disappointed 
and look for a larger plan or 
greater power, to blame 
others for their failure’. 
 
Obstinate 
Nienhuys speaks about the 
enormous obstinacy with 
which conspiracy theorists 
keep believing in the 
impossible. Like people who 
think that airplanes spread 
substances in the air to 
influence our psyche, the so 
called chemtrails. ‘There are 
no such substances that have 
any effect at that height and 
with that nebulization. Let 
alone that it is possible to 
orchestrate such a thing with 
so many people. But they 
keep believing in it’. 
 
Jews 
The chairman of Skepsis do 
wants to warn for the danger 
of conspiracy thinking. ‘It 
certainly is not harmless. 
514059-L-bw-harambam
d, dZhd, /^ Khd d,Z 
ϴ 
Look at the conspiracy theory 
that led millions of Germans 
in the nineteen thirties to 
believe that it was a good idea 
to fight the danger of the 
-ews’. Psychologist and 
associate professor Jan-
Willem van Prooijen at the 
Free University of Amsterdam 
researches conspiracy 
thinking. ‘<ou can set your 
watch by it after the attacks in 
Paris. That same evening 
posts were made on the 
Internet. Conspiracy thinking 
has everything to do with 
feelings of threat, with our 
sense of safety. People want 
to explain and understand, 
and some people simply have 
a strong sense of distrust’.  
 
Loonies  
9an ProoiMen doesn’t want to 
psychologize conspiracy 
theorists right away. 
‘'issemination does depend 
on low self-esteem and low 
status. But some theories are 
adhered to by large parts of 
society. Conspiracy theorists 
are no loonies. There are 
simply too many’. 9an 
Prooijen also sees the 
danger ‘it could undermine 
the trust in democracy and it 
can also lead to violence, we 
know that conspiracy thinking 
is related to radicalization. 
Conspiracy theorists are often 
extremely left or extremely 
right. And what you think, 
simply directs your behavior. 
It undermines trust in the rule 
of law and democracy’. 
 
Hitler 
Van Prooijen also mentions 
the Second World War as an 
extreme example where 
conspiracy thinking can lead 
to. ‘+itler enabled the 
Holocaust largely on the basis 
of the conspiracy that the 
Jews were responsible for the 
losses of the )irst :orld :ar’. 
British research showed 
remarkably enough that 
conspiracy theorists 
themselves have low morals. 
Conspiracy theorists often 
dream, according to the 
University of Kent, of cheating 
the public as rulers. What 
happens, according to 
researchers Karen Douglas 
and Robbie Sutton is 
‘psychological proMection’ the 
proclivity to attribute their own 
morals to others. Their 
research showed that people 
with ‘low morals’ are more 
often adherents of conspiracy 
theories than people who are 
honest by nature. The 
conviction “they did it” 
appears to be motivated by 
the perception “I could do it”. 
According to the British 
psychologist Patrick Lehman, 
who also did research on 
conspiracy theories, do these 
crazy theories provide in the 
need for security and 
predictability ‘for those who 
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cannot really live with an 
instable environment’.  
 
The Netherlands  
The most famous conspiracy 
theorist of the Netherlands is 
publicist Micha Kat. The 
former employee of NRC 
[another major Dutch 
newspaper] regularly writes 
on his website that an "elite" 
wants to establish a New 
World Order to continue 
abusing children with 
impunity. Kat also published a 
story about Paris in which he 
wrote that there were no 
casualties at all. Kat was 
convicted in the past for 
making bomb threats to the 
Ministry of Justice and 
Security. He was recently 
sentenced to ten months in 
prison for libel and resides 
momentarily in Ireland 
because he is afraid to come 
to the Netherlands. Because 
of this recent conviction, the 
public prosecutor wants his 
DNA and Kat is frightened in 
his own words that the Public 
Prosecution Services will link 
him to “murder”. One of his 
former lawyers, Gerard van 
der Meer, stated during a 
public hearing in court in 2013 
that Kat faces serious anxiety 
problems. 
 
Danger 
Conspiracy thinking can in 
extreme cases lead to serious 
harm. Anders Breivik recently 
showed that again. Breivik 
was convinced that Marxists 
started to take over the 
political elite in order to 
destroy Christian values and 
norms. European rules would 
conspire with the Arab world 
to give Europe away to the 
Islam. This delusional idea 
led Breivik to kill 76 innocent 
youngsters. They became the 
imagined enemy of this 
disturbed individual. 
 
This particular article is exemplary of the way commonly is spoken, 
written and theorized about the prominence of conspiracy theories in 
Western societies, both inside and outside academia. A first 
important characteristic is the moral alarmism virtually always 
present in discussions of conspiracy theories. Linked with political 
extremism (or in more contemporary terminology, with 
radicalization), conspiracy theories are said to pose sincere threats to 
democratic societies. Throughout the text above there are numerous 
and quite literal references to the dangers of conspiracy theories: they 
are said to lead to violence, murder, terrorism and more generally 
undermine (the trust in) democracies. Even the Holocaust is brought 
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into the discussion as an extreme consequence of conspiracy 
theorizing. As such, this article is a clear example of the moral panic 
surrounding the contemporary popularity of conspiracy theories (cf. 
Bratich, 2008; Cohen, 2011; Knight, 2000).  
A second important characteristic is the unambiguous denial 
of the plausibility of conspiracy theories, and consequently their 
blanket pathologization. The denial is at some points in this article 
quite explicit (“they keep believing in the impossible”, “there are no 
such substances”, “this delusional idea”), but at most other points it 
happens more implicitly as the implausibility of conspiracy theories is 
the working assumption of most texts covering conspiracy theories. 
Scholars and journalists alike simply assume that conspiracy theories 
are flawed understandings of how reality works, and start their 
analyses and interpretations from that assumption. Although in recent 
years people refrain from calling conspiracy theorists literally 
psychologically disturbed for believing in supposedly delusional ideas 
(“there are simply too many”), a strong tendency to pathologize them 
remains. Both psychological and cultural factors are put forward to 
explain why apparently “normal people believe in weird things” (cf. 
Bratich, 2008: 18). In this article as well, the image is constructed of 
the conspiracy theorist as a petty minded, insecure, socially 
disenfranchised, distrusting, militant, authoritarian and stubborn 
narcissist looking for attention and control in a complex and 
unsettling world.  
What is, however, completely absent in such discussions of 
the role of conspiracy theories in Western societies are the actual 
people dealing with conspiracy theories themselves. While there is a 
need to understand the “mind” of the conspiracy theorist (“how does 
he think, and why?”),  no one seems to be inclined to actually engage 
with those “loonies” to find out who they are and why they believe 
the things they do, not the journalist and neither those psychologists 
cited in the article. Instead, the journalist makes a more common 
guilt-by-association charge when he writes about the particular cases 
of the Dutch conspiracy theorist Micha Kat and Anders Breivik: 
because some disturbed extremists hold conspiracy theories dear, all 
conspiracy theorists must be disturbed and dangerously extremist as 
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well. But this pars pro toto reasoning—the part is taken for the 
whole—obscures the diversity that can be expected to exist among 
conspiracy theorists, and leaves us with uniform stereotypes but no 
real understanding of the contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories. 
Of course, one may object that this is a newspaper article rather than 
a proper scientific study, yet this way of dealing with the subject 
matter at hand is just as present in much academic writing.  
 
1.2 Academics on Conspiracy Theories: The Pathological 
Other 
Whereas the subject of conspiracy theories was addressed by social 
scientists after World War II (Popper, 2013[1945])  and in the height 
of the Cold War (Hofstadter, 1996[1964]), it was only in and after 
the 1990’s when conspiracy theories became a true mass phenomenon 
that the academic knowledge production on this matter substantially 
expanded. Scholars from a wide range of different academic 
backgrounds – political science (Michael Barkun, Chip Berlet, Robert 
S. Robins); anthropology (George Marcus); (political) history (David 
Aaronovitch, Dieter Groh, Kathryn Olmsted, Daniel Pipes, Elaine 
Showalter); (political) psychology (Jovan Byford, Ted Goertzel, 
Jerrold M. Post); cultural studies (Peter Knight, Timothy Melley); 
law (Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule) and philosophy (Steve Clarke, 
Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden) – have since then started to write 
about conspiracy theories: what they are, where they come from and 
how they are to be understood. The early works of Sir Karl Popper 
and Richard Hofstadter have, however, firmly set the scene for 
subsequent research by making conspiracy theories epistemologically, 
psychologically and morally suspect. In the following I will show how 
their founding texts have helped establish that pathology model as the 
dominant frame to understand conspiracy theories/ists in academia. 
Three corresponding pathological diagnoses stand out: conspiracy 
theories as bad science; conspiracy theories as paranoid politics; and 
the combined result of these two, conspiracy theories as societal 
danger. 
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1.2.1 Pathology Number One: Conspiracy Theories as Bad 
Science 
I shall briefly describe a theory which is widely held but which 
assumes what I consider the very opposite of the true aim of the social 
sciences; I call it the conspiracy theory of society; [It] arises from the 
mistaken theory that whatever happens in society – war, 
unemployment, poverty, shortages – is the result of direct design by 
some powerful individuals and groups.  
—Popper, 2013: 306 
Academics writing on conspiracy theories conventionally start from 
the assumption that they are flawed understandings of reality. They 
follow Sir Karl Popper who argued in his The Open Society and Its 
Enemies that “the conspiracy theory of society cannot be true” (2013: 
307) because it opposes modern (read: scientific) understandings of 
how the world works. This is firstly so because conspiracy theorists 
are said to have an outdated, premodern, worldview: they are “some 
of the last believers in an ordered universe” (Keeley, 1999: 123), “a 
universe governed by design rather than randomness” (Barkun, 2006: 
3). This, Popper argues, is “a typical result of the secularization of a 
religious superstition. The Gods are abandoned. But their place is 
filled by powerful men or groups – sinister pressure groups whose 
wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from” (2013: 
306). It may have been logical in earlier times to believe in powerful 
agents orchestrating worldly affairs, but today, with the rise of 
modern science and rationality, we should know better, “as nobody 
– not God, not us, not even some of us – is in control. The world is 
uncontrollable [and] without broad meaning and significance’, but 
that is something ‘the conspiracy theorist refuses to accept” (Keeley, 
1999: 124). Conspiracy theories are thus unwanted remnants of a 
religious past.  
Obviously, these academics argue, conspiracies do happen, 
“they are typical social phenomena” (Popper, 2013: 307), but to 
“regard a ‘vast’ or ‘gigantic’ conspiracy as the motive force in historical 
events” is simply not how reality works (Hofstadter, 1996: 29; cf. 
Pipes, 1997: 43). Social life is far too “brittle” and “resilient” to be the 
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active result of the planned design of certain powerful groups of 
people, if only because action “creates many unforeseen reactions, 
some even unforeseeable” (Popper, 2013: 307). Conspiracy theories 
are thus implausible because they “reduce highly complex phenomena 
to simple causes” (Barkun, 2006: 7). At the same time, however, the 
exact opposite argument is made: “conspiracy theories require a chain 
of deception so complex, an intelligence so formidable, and a cast of 
accomplices so large that the whole scheme collapses of its own 
implausibility” (Pipes, 1997: 39; cf. Byford, 2011: 34). In order to 
preserve their “virtue of unified explanation,” conspiracy theorists 
bring into their narratives all kinds of “unwarranted” explanatory 
excursions (Keeley, 1999:  119). Occam’s razor, or the scientific 
imperative of parsimony, is now used to point to the epistemological 
frailty of conspiracy theories (Aaronovitch, 2010: 5; Barkun, 2006: 
7). Conspiracy theories are thus at once too complex and too simple 
to be true.  
 Moreover, conspiracy theorists make bad use of facts and 
evidence making their allegations of conspiracy erroneous. Whereas 
such scholars all recognize their “heroic strive for ‘evidence’” 
(Hofstadter, 1996: 36), they argue that conspiracy theorists “suffer 
from a ‘crippled epistemology’” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009: 212) 
and “inhabit a different epistemic universe, where the usual rules for 
determining truth and falsity do not apply” (Barkun, 2006: 187). For 
example, conspiracy theorists are not interested in falsification, but 
“indiscriminately accept any argument that points to conspiracy” 
(Pipes, 1997: 41), making them “highly selective in their approach to 
evidence” (Byford, 2011: 92). Moreover, because conspiracy theories 
are “the only theories for which evidence against them is actually 
construed as evidence in favor of them” (Keeley, 1999: 120), they are 
“resistant and in extreme cases invulnerable to contrary evidence” 
(Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009: 223). This self-sealing quality renders 
“conspiracy theories at their heart unfalsifiable. No matter how much 
evidence their adherents accumulate, belief in a conspiracy theory 
ultimately becomes a matter of faith rather than proof” (Barkun, 
2006: 7). Conspiracy theories are the product of a flawed 
epistemology and fraudulent research practices.   
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The problem, according to these scholars, is that “the 
commonsense distinction between fact and fiction melts away in the 
conspiracist world” (Barkun, 2006: 29). Whereas scientists have 
fought a long way to separate facts from those from other claims on 
truth (e.g. myth, fiction, belief, superstition, etc.), conspiracy 
theorists “obscure, deliberately and cleverly” such important 
boundaries with their exposés (Byford, 2011: 13). They may often 
“begin with certain defensible judgments and with a careful 
accumulation of facts”, but always end up making that “curious leap 
in imagination” by adding larger elements of fantasy (Hofstadter, 
1996: 36). This “muddying of the waters” (Pipes, 1997: 30) is 
aggravated by mimicking mainstream scientific scholarship: 
“conspiracy theorists flaunt with academic credentials (professor, 
Dr., MD, etc.), publish books with scholarly sounding titles and 
adopt a style of writing that mimics mainstream academia” (cf. 
Byford, 2011: 89; cf. Pipes, 1997: 33-4; Barkun, 2006: 28). With all 
of “their forged scientific practices” (Showalter, 1997: 206), 
conspiracy theorists make a parody out of science, and make it 
difficult for the general public to “distinguish between the committed 
researcher and the careless loudmouth, the scrupulous and the 
demagogic” (Aaronovitch, 2010: 335). Conspiracy theories are 
therefore not just wrong, such scholars argue, they are the 
pathological Other of modern science.  
 
1.2.2 Pathology Number Two: Conspiracy Theories as 
Paranoid Politics 
We are all sufferers from history, but the paranoid is a double 
sufferer, since he is afflicted not only by the real world, with the rest 
of us, but by his fantasies as well 
—Hofstadter, 1996: 40 
Academics secondly conceive of conspiracy theories as the delusional 
thoughts of disturbed minds. They are said to be the product of 
people’s “imaginative power” (Showalter, 1997: 11), or as Daniel 
Pipes puts it, “a conspiracy theory is the fear of a nonexistent 
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conspiracy” (1997: 21). This tendency to pathologize conspiracy 
theories by framing them as the expression of paranoia is widespread 
in popular culture, and features similarly in much scholarly work on 
the subject. Byford argues in this respect that “the link between 
conspiracy theories and paranoia has become so strong that the two 
terms are now treated as almost synonymous” (2011: 121).  
The academic association of paranoia with conspiracy 
theories has its origins in the work of historian Richard Hofstadter. In 
his most famous essay on American politics he coins a certain style of 
doing politics paranoid, “simply because no other word adequately 
evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and 
conspiratorial fantasy that I have in mind […] in the paranoid style, 
the feeling of persecution is central, and it is indeed systematized in 
grandiose theories of conspiracy” (1996: 3-4). Writing in the early 
1960’s, Hofstadter is worried about the polarized political climate of 
his time13 and warns against the Manicheanism (a dualistic (religious) 
world view based on the notion of an ultimate conflict between light 
and darkness) that informs their thought: exponents of the paranoid 
style “bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotiable 
interests, into political action” which are “by nature not susceptible to 
the normal political processes of bargain and compromise” (1996: 
39). “The paranoid is a militant leader” (1996: 21), Hofstadter argues, 
and by going against his preferred political virtues of moderation, 
deliberation and consensus, they do no good politics. 
Although Hofstadter is at pains to make clear that he is merely 
“borrowing a clinical term for other purposes” (1996: 3),14 his usage 
of the term, however, “has the tendency to slip from the realm of 
metaphor to the original clinical meaning” (Byford, 2011: 122).15 
Many of his followers have similar difficulties separating the clinical 
and the metaphorical meaning of paranoia when discussing conspiracy 
theories. Daniel Pipes states, for example, that “political paranoids 
need not suffer from personal paranoia,” yet in the same breath he 
says that “often the two go together and mutually reinforce each 
other” (1997: 24). Robert S. Robins and Jerrold Post (1997) similarly 
oscillate throughout the book between literal pathological diagnoses 
of the great paranoids like Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot and metaphorical 
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analyses of the spread of political paranoia into mainstream society. 
Elaine Showalter (1998) speaks of “epidemics of hysteria” that have to 
be challenged, because they function as false metaphors to mask the 
real psychic problems that underlie the (mass) cultural expressions of 
paranoia she studies. Even more concrete is the work of political 
psychologists Marvin Zonis and Craig M. Joseph who argue that the 
“deficits that predispose an individual to conspiracy thinking are 
similar to those involved in the etiology of paranoid psychosis” (1994: 
50). What becomes clear is that all of these scholars use the clinical 
understanding of paranoia to describe and explain the existence of 
conspiracy theories on a societal level.  
This association of conspiracy theories with paranoia has 
received its fair share of criticism for it is unclear what explanatory 
work it actually does unless one wishes to argue that large parts of 
Western populations are mentally disturbed (e.g. Byford, 2011: 126-
8; Bratich, 2008: 25-50; Knight, 2000: 14-18). Yet, the 
pathologization of conspiracy theorists persists in various degrees in a 
burgeoning experimental research tradition of social psychology (see 
for a discussion Swami, 2010; Bost, 2015). Some scholars do this very 
explicitly and argue that “conspiracy belief is strongly associated with 
paranoid ideation and schizotypy” (Darwin et al., 2010: 1292; Barron 
et al., 2015), while others look for more general psychological factors 
or personality traits that would lead certain individuals to endorse 
conspiracy theories (e.g. Bost, 2013; Douglas and Sutton, 2008, 
2011; Leman and Cinnirella, 2013; Swami, et al. 2010, 2011; 2014). 
Hofstadter’s assertion of paranoia as a relevant analytical category in 
the understanding of conspiracy theories is, however, never far away 
as a recently edited volume testifies. In their foreword, Jan-Willem 
van Prooijen and Paul A.M. van Lange ask themselves “how often are 
citizens paranoid, perceiving immoral behavior and evil conspiracies 
when in fact there are none?” (2014: xiii). And they dedicate then a 
third part of that book to “investigate the psychological processes that 
lead people to be overly suspicious of power holders” and argue that 
“a substantial portion of these beliefs can only be misplaced paranoia” 
(2014: 4-5). The idea that there is something mentally wrong with 
conspiracy theorists thus remains. 
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However, instead of regarding conspiracy theories more 
neutrally as dissenting forms of (political) knowledge or practice, they 
are commonly framed in academia as the delusional and extremist 
allegations of paranoid minds. The discourse and rhetoric of these 
academic works carries, despite their disclaimers, clinical notions of 
mental illnesses and psychological disorders.16 Mark Fenster rightfully 
argues therefore that “the ‘paranoid style’ framework continues to 
cast a long shadow, by [using] conspiracy theory as a means to enforce 
a normative definition of political belief and practice” (2008: 25). The 
point he makes is that these scholars do not just say that conspiracy 
theorists are paranoid, but that their thought and actions are the 
opposite, the pathological Other, of good politics.  
 
1.2.3 Bad Science + Paranoid Politics = Societal Danger 
Given their framing as bad science and paranoid politics, many scholars 
warn for the societal dangers if conspiracy theories proliferate and 
paranoia thrives. Whether “the danger lies less in such beliefs than in 
the behavior they stimulate or justify” (Barkun, 2006: 169) or 
whether “the belief is harmful in itself” (Aaronovitch, 2010: 15), they 
all agree that conspiracy theories are a threat to the health of the body 
politic.  
Starting with Popper (2013) who warns against the prophetic 
ideas of some (Plato, Georg W. Hegel and Karl Marx) that history 
unfolds according to a master plan or universal laws for they bring 
forth and support totalitarian regimes, many other scholars similarly 
hold conspiracy theories to be indebted to the disastrous course 
history took, especially in the twentieth century. In their historical 
analysis of what they call the great paranoids (Joseph Stalin, Adolf 
Hitler, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Ayatollah Khomeini but also Senator 
Joseph McCarthy and President Richard Nixon), Robins and Post 
(1997) hold their paranoid thought responsible for the worst of their 
violent excesses. Pipes makes a similar historical argument as he links 
conspiracy theories to virtually all the horrors of the last two centuries 
(1997: 173). He even devotes a whole chapter to “conspiracism’s 
costs” and explains how it leads to “violence,” “extremism,” 
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“totalitarianism,” “wars,” and “mass-murders” (1997: 171-185). 
Byford argues in line that “conspiracism has been the staple ingredient 
of discriminatory, antidemocratic and populist politics, a trademark 
of the rhetoric of oppressive regimes, and a faithful companion to 
antisemitism. Conspiracy theories remain the refuge of every dictator 
and authoritarian leader in the world” (2011: 144). Based on the 
characterization of certain historical figures as dangerously paranoid 
people, such scholars argue following a pars pro toto reasoning that all 
conspiracy theorists must be similarly dangerous. 
Hofstadter’s aversion to political extremism reverberates 
through many academic works. Scholars commonly point to US right 
wing militias, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, and radical Islamist 
movements like Hamas and Al-Qaida which are all thought to draw 
ideologically from conspiracy theories (e.g. Barkun, 2006: 18; Berlet, 
2009: 3; Byford, 2011: 15). These militant groups embody, following 
such scholars, in very concrete ways “the paranoid style” Hofstadter 
(1996) wrote about: they envisage politics in Manichean terms and 
see the destruction of the enemy as the only solution. In all of these 
cases, a direct connection is made between conspiracy theories as a 
form of thought/knowledge and violent extremism as a practice. For 
example, Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule state that 
“conspiracy theories create serious risks […] they create and fuel 
violence” (2009: 226), while Chip Berlet argues that “conspiracy 
theorists contribute to dangerous social dynamics of demonization 
and scapegoating — dynamics which are toxic to democracy” (2009: 
7). Following Hofstadter, these scholars believe that the proliferation 
and popularity of conspiracy theories are serious political and cultural 
threats for they fuel an extreme polarization which is unlikely to be 
resolved by deliberation only (Barkun, 2006: 189; Van Prooijen and 
Van Lange, 2014: 10).  
 
1.2.4 What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories as the 
Pathological Other? 
This most dominant strand in the academic study of conspiracy 
theories thus conceives of conspiratorial forms of knowledge in rather 
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uniform ways as implausible and flawed understandings of how reality 
works, as the delusional thoughts of paranoid or psychologically 
disturbed minds, posing sincere threats to democratic societies. 
Conspiracy theories are, in other words, framed as the irrational and 
extremist opposite of modern science and of democracy. They are, in 
the eyes of such scholars, our pathological Other.  
But this academic stance towards conspiracy theories is rather 
problematic for two main reasons. First of all, it can be seriously 
questioned how delusional and paranoid the belief in conspiracy 
theories actually is. While it is okay to accept that conspiracies are 
typical social phenomena (the history of mankind is dotted with such 
instances of hidden plots and deceits by the powerful), to believe that 
they drive history is to have an outdated world view, these scholars 
argue. The conspiracy theory of society in which everything is connected 
into one master scheme  of explanation is simply not how reality 
works. Skip Willman argues, by contrast, that its conceptual opposite 
– the contingency theory of society – similarly “constructs an 
ideologically coherent social reality rooted in social fantasy” (2002: 
21). The belief that history unfolds purely by chance and random luck 
is, after all, just as fantastic as the idea that conspiracies drive it: “they 
represent two sides of the same coin” (Willman, 2002: 25). Peter 
Knight similarly goes against a straightforward condemnation as he 
argues that conspiracy theorists’ “faith in the fundamental 
connectedness of everything is also taken for granted in a host of other 
ways of making sense of the contemporary world that are seen as quite 
sane. Everything is Connected could function as the operating 
principle not just for conspiracy theory, but also for epidemiology, 
ecology, risk theory, systems theory, complexity theory, theories of 
globalization, boosterism for the internet, and even poststructuralist 
literary theories about intertextuality” (2000: 205). As Timothy 
Melley rightfully argues, “until we discover some magically 
unmediated access to reality, conspiracy theory cannot simply be 
pathologized in one sweeping gesture” (2000: 13). Moreover, in the 
last half century we have witnessed a great number of such paranoid 
accusations turning out to be actually true (think of the Watergate 
scandal, the CIA mind control program MK-Ultra, FBI’s counter 
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intelligence program COINTELPRO, the Iran-Contra Affair, the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, and more recently the LIBOR scandal 
and the NSA intelligence operations revealed by WikiLeaks and 
Edward Snowden). It is therefore simply untenable to argue that the 
belief in conspiracy theories is by definition delusional and paranoid 
(cf. Coady, 2006; deHaven-Smith, 2013; Knight, 2000; Olmsted, 
2009). Such unwarranted assumptions should not therefore not guide 
social scientific analyses. 
Some scholars hold it therefore necessary “to tease apart 
claims of conspiracy that are based in reality from those that are 
spurious” (Byford, 2011: 24; Bale, 2007; Heins, 2007; Keeley, 1999; 
Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). They argue to differentiate between 
“demonstrably false conspiracy theories, such as the various 9/11 
conspiracy theories, [and the] ones that are true or whose truth is 
undetermined” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009: 206). But such efforts 
are easier said than done. If determining truth and falsity would be 
that straightforward, conspiracy theories would not be that popular. 
And who decides what is true and what is false, the scholar? The same 
counts for paranoia: how to empirically distinguish between what 
some academics have called “healthy” or “critical paranoia” and 
“pathological” or “excessive” paranoia (Harper, 2008; Kellner, 2003; 
Robins and Post, 1997)? And what about the (alleged) dangers of 
conspiracy theories? Yes, paranoid beliefs may very well result in 
disastrous atrocities: the historical evidence these scholars put 
forward is both convincing and terrifying. However, reading Theodor 
W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2010[1944]), Hannah Arendt 
(2006[1963]), and Zygmunt Bauman (2000) one could easily make 
equally convincing arguments that rational science and instrumental 
reason are just as perilous to democratic societies. The emphasis on 
the dangers of conspiracy theories is, in other words, selective and 
informed by moral considerations. Max Weber (2009) argued long 
ago that sociologists can and should not determine what is rational and 
what not, what is healthy or insane, and what is good or dangerous. 
Yet, this imperative is not really heard in the academic study of 
conspiracy theories. 
514059-L-bw-harambam
ϭ͘ /EdZKhd/KE 
Ϯϭ 
But even plain empirically speaking, it is rather difficult to set 
conspiracy theories unambiguously apart as distinctively implausible, 
paranoid and dangerous. In a world where intelligence agencies spy 
on presidents and ordinary citizens alike, where the mass media 
parrot the powerful and manufacture consent, where politicians lie 
about the reasons for going to war, where multinational corporations 
have a strong hand in the writing of legislation and the production of 
scientific knowledge,17 conspiracy theories about those in power 
simply may not be that paranoid anymore. “As popular wisdom has it,” 
Knight argues, “you now need to be a little paranoid to remain sane” 
(2000: 2). There are, in other words, good arguments to make both 
in favor and against the irrationality of conspiracy theories. The tables 
can therefore easily be turned, as Jack Bratich intelligently does when 
he “analyze[s] the discursive practices that channel, shape, incite and 
deploy conspiracy theories as meaningful” (2008: 7). Just like 
conspiracy theories are objects worthy of study, so too are the 
scholarly works for whom conspiracy theories are a concern. The 
question then becomes “who is interested in defining, problematizing, 
subjugating conspiracy theories” (Bratich, 2008: 16), and why, I 
would add. The construal of conspiracy theories by these scholars as 
implausible, paranoid and dangerous warrants, in other words, more 
sociological scrutiny as the existence of conspiracy theories alone 
cannot explain their production as a pathological Other. As Melley 
argues, such scholarly “diagnoses of paranoia are themselves political 
statements reflecting particular interests” (2000: 13). A good 
sociological understanding of conspiracy culture can therefore not 
stay insensitive to the definitional practices construing conspiracy 
theories as deviant forms of knowledge, a point that I explore at 
length in chapter seven. 
 But even more important for my argument  is that discarding 
conspiracy theories as illusory, paranoid and dangerous does not help 
in any way to understand the huge appeal they have for many people 
living today. Unless one wants to contend that we are surrounded by 
a bunch of delusional and angry minds set out to destroy us (and 
regress in a conspiracy theory of one’s own), this rather dominant 
approach gives no sociological grip on a cultural phenomenon as 
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prominent as conspiracy theories are today. If we are to grasp what 
they are about and why so many people nowadays engage with these 
alternative forms of knowledge, then we need to go further than 
merely dismissing these ideas as pathological. Then we should explore 
the reasons  people have to follow conspiracy theories without the 
need to disqualify or compare them to certain moral or 
epistemological standards. When the objective is understanding, what 
else should we do than engage with the people actually following 
conspiracy theories to find out why they find these alternative 
explanations of reality more plausible than those offered by 
mainstream epistemic institutions, such as science, media, politics, 
religion. This is then exactly what I set out to do with this 
ethnographic study of, what can be called, the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu: to see the world from their perspective and to grasp their 
motivations, practices and products. The real sociological question is 
not whether conspiracy theories are right or wrong, rational or 
delusional, good or bad, but the matter at hand is one of exploring 
the meaning these forms of knowledge have for all those concerned, 
and how they influence people’s everyday lives and their societies at 
large.  
 
1.3 Conspiracy Theories: Making Sense in/of a 
Complex World  
I am not the first to argue for a disinterested study of the cultural 
meaning of conspiracy theories in contemporary societies. In the last 
decades more scholars have criticized these pathological accounts of 
conspiracy theories. Such scholars refute their moralism and argue 
that it is neither fruitful nor possible to “disprove those weird beliefs 
by a dogmatic insistence on the proper version of events” (Knight, 
2000: 13), that “understanding requires more than labeling it as 
pathological Other” (Fenster, 1999: xiii) and that dismissing it as 
paranoid “with their sense of marginal and insane interpretive activity” 
cannot aptly describe this “broad based phenomenon” (Melley, 2000: 
8). Instead, they take a more detached stance and emphasize the 
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relevance to “explore the meaning of conspiracy culture for both 
those who produce it and those who consume it” (Knight, 2000: 22). 
Mostly coming from the field of cultural studies, such scholars dissect 
and analyze the many forms in which the themes of paranoia and 
conspiracy theory surface in Western culture, think of popular stories 
of UFO’s and other alien invaders, the highbrow tales of Kafkaesque 
bureaucratic entrapment in postwar literature, cinematic 
reconstructions of the Kennedy assassination and both feminist 
literature and black music about white/male domination. “The task,” 
Knight argues, “is not to condemn but to understand why the logic of 
conspiracy has become so attractive in so many different areas” (2000: 
8). And, Melley adds, “to assess [their] cultural significance” (2000: 
14).  
 What sets these scholars apart is that they normalize 
conspiracy culture by relating it to the complexities of living in a 
globalized and risk-saturated world. In contrast to Frederic Jameson 
original critical conception of conspiracy theories as “the poor 
person's cognitive mapping in the postmodern age” (1988: 356), these 
scholars show the apparent rationality of such efforts in this postmodern 
age by bringing “paranoia [back] within reason” (Marcus, 1999: 5). 
Knight argues, for example, how “contemporary conspiracy thinking 
can be a necessary and sometimes even creative response to the rapidly 
changing conditions of America since 1960’s” (2000: 8). For Melley 
too are the “paranoid” suspicions he explores (the “intense anxieties” 
about human control he calls “agency panic”) “logical responses to 
technological and social change” (2000: 14). Jodi Dean, then, argues 
that “UFO, aliens, and abduction provide ideal vehicles for accessing 
the effects of these changes on American society” (1998: 10), and that 
“conspiracy theory, far from a label dismissively attached to the 
lunatic fringe, may well be an appropriate vehicle for political 
contestation” (1998: 8). Fenster adds a similar political dimension18 
and speaks about conspiracy theory as “a tactical response from the 
insignificant […] for whom politics is inaccessible” (1999: xiii). “As a 
mode of populist logic,” he explains, conspiracy theories “can in fact 
play the role of a productive challenge to an existing order – albeit one 
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that excessively simplify complex political and historical events” 
(2008: 90) (all my italics). 
Deploying a discourse of conspiracy is according to these 
scholars, thus, a broad cultural attempt to grapple with the 
complexities, anxieties and inequalities induced by large scale social 
developments (globalization, mediatization, technocratization, 
corporatization) and the autonomous workings of opaque systems 
(e.g. bureaucracies, capitalist systems, mass-communication 
technologies). It is demonstrated how “he idea of conspiracy offers an 
odd sort of comfort in an uncertain age: it makes sense of the 
inexplicable, accounting for complex events in a clear, if frightening 
way” (Melley, 2000: 8). Or, in the words of Knight: “conspiracy 
thinking […] provides an everyday epistemological quick-fix to often 
intractably complex problems” (2000: 8). Such authors bring the 
distress and alienation of living in postmodern societies to the fore. 
These widely expressed feelings, “anxieties about technologies, social 
organizations and communication systems,” should explain “the 
recent surge in conspiracy narratives” (Melley, 2000: 7/11). Knight 
argues: “in a world in which the triumph of laissez-faire capitalism has 
come to be taken for granted, for many people there is no way of 
framing an analysis of what is happening or registering their 
dissatisfaction other than in the ‘crackpot’ rhetoric of the conspiracy 
theorist” (2000: 37). Dean holds similarly that “paranoia responds to 
anxieties surrounding what can be assumed to be real or certain in 
today’s high-tech television culture” (1998: 17). Knight concludes 
therefore that “conspiracy theory becomes a routinized defense 
strategy, a provisional but ever present way of making sense of the 
world and giving narrative shape to fears that are more a reflection of 
the society at large than one’s own personal psychopathology” (2000: 
230). From this perspective then, conspiracy theories – half soothing, 
half unsettling – become some sort of cultural coping mechanism to 
deal with a complex and uncertain world. 
Such cultural analyses of the role and function of conspiracy 
theories in contemporary Western societies are a far cry from the 
overt dismissals and pathologizations discussed earlier. These authors 
explore in much detail the many contemporary manifestations of 
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conspiracy theory without measuring against any yardstick of 
normality and theorize with great ingenuity about their meaning in 
complex, risk saturated postmodern societies. Their works are an 
important intervention in the academic study of conspiracy theories 
and are therefore worthy of praise. It is therefore all the more 
unfortunate that the pathology frame appears hard to break from. 
After all, when the deployment of conspiracy theories becomes some 
sort of coping mechanism to deal with a complex and uncertain 
world, albeit reasonable, such scholars seem to reinvent on a cultural 
level the deficit theories they so rightfully refuted before: isn’t the 
paranoid just too easily exchanged for the anomic? Of course, any 
cultural belief system—religion, science, mythology—is in some way 
a coping mechanism to deal with an essentially meaningless world 
(e.g. Weber, 2002; 2013). And I may be nitpicking here, but when 
these ways of sense making are described with words such as anxiety, 
defense mechanisms and fears, and when conspiracy theories are casually 
referred to as weird beliefs or simply wrong and simplistic, I cannot help 
but perceive the all too familiar pathology discourse again. I believe 
social scientists can easily do without such tainted language. We 
should write about conspiracy theories in ways that leave normative 
judgments to the reader and not weave them into our texts. 
Moreover, despite such efforts to explore the cultural role of 
conspiracy theories in contemporary Western societies, the reliance 
of these scholars on conspiracy texts (books, films, social theory, music 
lyrics, newspapers, urban legends, TV-series, etc.) leaves a blind spot 
for diversity in the conspiracy milieu. Yes, they show and analyze the 
multiple manifestations of conspiracy theory, but as these empirical 
instances are all seen as expressions of dealing with the uncertainties 
and complexities of a postmodern world, they inevitably fail to 
explore the possibility that conspiracy theories can mean different 
things to different people who engage with them in different ways. 
Moreover, because these works in cultural studies take as their 
research objects conspiracy texts, we are left with their interpretations 
of the meanings of conspiracy theories. Texts do not talk back, after 
all. There is therefore little room in their analyses for the variety of 
people, meanings, practices and experiences that can be expected to 
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exist in the conspiracy milieu, let alone for disagreement, opposition 
and conflict within that subcultural world itself. An approach that is 
sensitive to the empirical richness of everyday life is called for.  
 
1.4 A Cultural Sociological Approach: Meaning, Diversity 
and Relationality 
In this work I build forth on the aforementioned cultural studies of 
conspiracy theories, but depart from them by sociologizing the study 
of conspiracy culture. This means, firstly, that I will explore it as a 
culture in its own right: I research the ideas, experiences and practices 
of people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu without the need to 
compare or measure them against certain (unquestioned) standards of 
normality. While refraining from reifying conspiracy culture as a 
distinct, uniform and historically stable whole (cf. Bratich, 2008), 
“round and hard like billiard balls” (Wolf, 1982: 6, cf. Clifford, 1988; 
Wagner, 1981), I take seriously the particularities of how conspiracy 
theorists see themselves, others and the world around them, if only 
because these ideas are real and meaningful to them. Such cultural 
frameworks may then be multi-layered, dynamic and structured by 
meaning-making practices (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966; Weber, 
2013), they also “possess relative autonomy in shaping [future] actions 
and institutions” (Alexander, 2003: 12; cf. Houtman and Achterberg, 
2016: 228). Culture, to put it in another way, plays a powerful role 
in shaping our worlds. I approach conspiracy culture therefore not as 
something stable in need of explanation by structural or harder non-
cultural variables, as both neo-positivists and critical sociologists 
would have (cf. Latour, 2005; Houtman, 2008), but instead as 
something productive in and of itself: it embodies categories of 
meaning that inform and direct behavior and has as such empirical 
consequences.  
In taking (conspiracy) culture seriously, I follow an 
ethnographic approach and research the actual people engaging with 
conspiracy theories. Who are these people? What do they think and do? 
The explicit goal of this study is to get into the lives of these people: 
to understand their worldview, their ways of making sense of reality, 
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and their experiences of being in this world. To get there, I immersed 
myself in their social worlds for about two years. During that long 
period of fieldwork, I spoke with many different people, got 
acquainted with their ideas, websites, and biographies, and 
participated in their social get-togethers, like movie screenings, 
political party rallies, and public performances of famous conspiracy 
theorists. This effort towards verstehen is largely absent in the 
academic study of conspiracy culture, but is a central feature of the 
interpretative tradition in the social sciences that runs from Wilhelm 
Dilthey, Franz Boas, George Simmel and Max Weber to the many 
scholars thereafter who have taken people’s own understanding of the 
world seriously. Their point is, like mine, that if we want to 
understand them, we need to start from what Clifford Geertz 
famously called “the native’s point of view” (1983: 55-73). Social 
scientists need to start with describing the world as they see it, before 
we let our own categories and classifications do any interpretative 
work. Obviously, both “experience-near” (or emic) understandings 
of reality and “experience-distant” (or etic) interpretations of those 
realities are crucial for any good ethnography (Geertz, 1983: 57). In 
this study too, I make central the interpretative movement between 
descriptions of the world as my informants see them and the analytical 
elaborations of those ideas that are my own19 (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Charmaz, 2006). My goal is not to advance nor to condemn 
conspiracy theories, but to arrive at a sociological understanding of 
conspiracy culture that is honest and meaningful to both insiders- and 
outsiders. 
This brings me to my overall research questions: what 
does conspiracy culture look like empirically? What are the ideas, 
practices, biographies and products of the people making up this 
subcultural world, and how are these related to what I provisionally 
call the mainstream? And secondly, how can the contemporary 
popularity of conspiracy theories be explained? To answer these 
research questions, I draw on my ethnographic fieldwork in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu. There are many more specific research questions 
that I address in each of the following chapters. But for now, let me 
further specify what my cultural sociological approach entails by 
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advancing three conceptual moves that should lead towards a more 
complex and empirically rich understanding of this phenomenon.  
Move no. 1: From pathologizing conspiracy theories towards 
exploring their meaning. The first and foremost problem in the academic 
study of conspiracy theories is thus the consistent and unambiguous 
pathologization of these forms of knowledge and the people who 
adhere to them. In this study I move away from the aforementioned 
pathological assumptions,  because it is not relevant for a cultural 
sociological study whether conspiracy theories really are illusory, 
paranoid or dangerous. Just like it would be irrelevant in the 
sociological study of religion to be bothered by the question whether 
god or other supernatural phenomena actually exist (e.g. Berger, 
1967), or how it would make little sense in the anthropological study 
of non-Western cultures to measure their beliefs and practices against 
our own conceptions of causality, truth and reality (e.g. Geertz, 
1973; Taussig, 1987), so too is it for the understanding of conspiracy 
culture not important whether conspiracy theories are right or 
wrong, true or false, rational or delusional. What is relevant to study 
– and empirically feasible –is what people (and in this case conspiracy 
theorists) think and do in their everyday lives, in other words, how 
they make meaning in an essentially meaningless world (cf. Alexander, 
2003; Berger and Luckman, 1966). That is, after all, all that there is: 
there is no deeper or truer reality behind the relational webs of meaning 
that we carefully (re)construct everyday (cf. Elias, 1978; Weber, 
2013; Houtman, 2008). This focus on meaning-making is exactly 
what I will do in this study as I address how people active in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu construe and understand themselves (chapter five 
and six), others (chapters six and seven) and the world around them 
(chapter three and four). 
Move no. 2: From uniformity towards diversity in conspiracy culture. 
A second problematic characteristic of the contemporary study of 
conspiracy culture is its portrayal in uniform terms. Besides 
reproducing the pathological image of the conspiracy theorist as 
paranoid militants, scholars commonly construe the idea of a uniform 
conspiracist world view. This idea—whether termed “the paranoid 
style” (Hofstadter, 1996), “conspiracism” (Pipes, 1997:22), or 
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“conspiracist ideation”20 (Swami et al, 2011)—groups together and 
homogenizes a multitude of different beliefs, practices and outlooks 
under one uniform header. Time, place and topic do not seem to 
matter, according to these scholars: conspiracy culture is, in essence, 
always the same (e.g. Byford, 2011: 4).21 Now of course conspiracy 
theories may have similarities or historical continuities, and these may 
be illuminating to point out, but a sole focus on their (alleged) 
uniformity obscures the diversity of conspiracy culture that can and 
should be of great interest to anyone set out to understand this 
phenomenon. Academic talk about the conspiracy theorist as a deviant 
figure with certain immutable characteristics, about conspiracy 
theories as a distinct category of knowledge or style, or about 
conspiracism as a unified worldview, ideology or culture, just makes no 
good sociology. Instead, it creates stereotypes and enables processes 
of Othering (cf. Bhabha, 1983; Pickering, 2001; Weis, 1995). By 
contrast, I explicitly set out in this study to explore the diversity of 
conspiracy culture following my ethnographic approach: what variety 
in discourses (chapter three), epistemologies (chapter four and six), 
biographies (chapter five), practices (chapter six) and people (chapter 
five and six) is there in the Dutch conspiracy milieu? 
Move no. 3: From an isolated towards a relational understanding of 
conspiracy culture. Conspiracy culture is typically seen in academia as 
an aberrant cultural phenomenon, as our more or less pathological 
Other. Because it is framed as something radically different from the 
mainstream, scholars have typically studied conspiracy culture in 
isolation: focusing on their alleged inherent properties. Conspiracy 
culture is in this way reified, taken out of its social, political and 
historical context and analyzed as a rather peculiar and idiosyncratic 
sociological problem or curiosity. Even those culturalist studies that 
are more sympathetic to the subject mainly focus on the particularities 
of conspiracy theories: their narrative characteristics, rhetorical 
tropes and other inherent properties (cf. Bratich, 2008: 17). This 
broad academic tendency to regard conspiracy culture in sharp 
isolation is problematic because it ignores and obscures the multiple 
relations (of both conflict and affinity) conspiracy culture has with the 
rest of the world, most notably with media, politics and science. 
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Conspiracy culture does not exist on its own in some kind of cultural 
vacuum, but is shaped and formed by the interactions with these 
meaningful others. To miss these, is not just sociologically wanting, 
but insensitive to the dynamics of power that are at play here (cf. 
Bratich, 2008; Fiske, 1996; deHaven-Smith, 2013). Indeed, precisely 
the notion of what a ‘conspiracy theory/ist’ is, can hardly be 
understood by its inherent or substantial characteristics, but only by 
the fact that it has been labelled as such (cf. Bratich, 2008: 3; Coady, 
2006: 3; Knight, 2000: 11). Moreover, the conspiracy theory/ist 
label is a serious and effective derogatory rhetorical weapon – a true 
mot de combat – in any polemic to discard an argument and to exclude 
an opponent from the arena of legitimate discussion (cf. Husting and 
Orr, 2005; Knight, 2000: 11). In this study I conceptualize 
conspiracy culture therefore in full relational terms (cf. Elias, 1978; 
Emirbayer, 1997; Latour, 2005). This means that I pay attention to 
the definitional practices framing conspiracy theories/ists as deviant 
categories of the social (chapter two and three) and focus on the 
strategies of resistance towards those (chapter six), I situate people’s 
lives (chapter five) and practices (chapter four and seven) in their 
social, historical, and cultural contexts, and show the affinities and 
conflicts with other epistemic cultures (chapter four and seven). The 
coupled emphasis on meaning, diversity and relationality should all 
add to the understanding of the broader research question that guides 
this cultural sociological study.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Book 
Besides this introduction, there are another seven chapters in this 
book plus an epilogue. The next chapter, Methodology, speaks about 
how I carried out this study: I explain what I precisely researched and 
how I demarcated my research object in relational terms, I explain 
from which empirical sources I draw (e.g. websites, social 
movements and organizations, performances and documentaries, and 
people), and I explain how I analyze my empirical material in order 
to develop theory. Because this clarification of research practices 
contains much empirical information about the Dutch conspiracy 
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milieu itself, it is relevant for the understanding of the rest of the 
chapters, and may as such be of interest for all readers, not just the 
methodology minded. 
Chapter three, Contemporary Conspiracy Discourses: How a Power 
Elite Controls Our World, aims at providing the reader with a clear and 
concrete understanding of what contemporary conspiracy theories 
are about. Based on a content analysis of seven prominent Dutch 
conspiracy websites (which are recognized as such by both in- and 
outsiders), I offer a systematic categorization of the conspiracy 
theories most popular today based on their thematic content. As such, 
I try to formulate a comprehensive answer to the question of what 
these narratives of collusion and deceit look like, in other words, what 
themes and what actors are addressed. The theoretical backdrop of 
this chapter is the premise that conspiracy culture has radically 
changed: from the scapegoating of an exotic Other to more diffuse 
suspicions about enemies from within (cf. Goldberg, 2001; Knight, 
2000; Aupers, 2012; Melley, 2000, Olmsted, 2009). 
In the subsequent chapter, From the Unbelievable to the 
Undeniable: Epistemological Pluralism, or How David Icke Supports his 
Super-conspiracy Theory, I analyze the 2011 performance of David Icke, 
one of the main and most popular propagators of what Michael 
Barkun calls ‘superconspiracies: conspiratorial constructs in which 
multiple conspiracies are believed to be linked together’ (2006: 6). 
Icke is a true conspiracy celebrity and widely popular (and contested) 
in the conspiracy milieu. He is most famous, or notorious, for his 
reptilian thesis: the idea that shapeshifting alien races secretly control 
our world. The superconspiracy theory that he detailed that day is, 
however, even more extraordinary as he draw that thesis together in 
one master narrative involving banking scams, energetic schisms, 
multidimensional universes, and institutional forms of mind-control. 
In this chapter I take that performance as a strategic case-study to 
research Icke’s discursive strategies of legitimation in more detail. 
Chapters five and six delve deeper into lives of the people 
active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu. In the former, Breaking Out of 
the Matrix: How People Explain Their Biographical Turn to Conspiracy 
Theories, I explain the contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories not 
514059-L-bw-harambam
d, dZhd, /^ Khd d,Z 
ϯϮ 
by an appeal to some psychological or cultural condition, but by 
studying people’s auto-biographical accounts of how they got 
involved with conspiracy theories. Although respondents draw on a 
culturally shared awakening narrative, the analysis of their distinct life-
stories showed more complexity: people speak about different 
experiences, leading to multiple motivations for engaging with 
conspiracy theories. Some of them look for larger frameworks of 
meaning are drawn to alternative explanations of life on Earth 
involving alien races, while others focus on the more mundane 
matters of corruption and deceit in an unfair world. What unites 
them, however, is that they situate these biographical trajectories in 
larger cultural developments: biography, society and history are 
fundamentally connected (cf. Elias, 1978; Mills, 2000[1959]). 
In chapter six, “I Am Not a Conspiracy Theorist”: Relational 
Identifications in the Dutch Conspiracy Milieu, I empirically study 
people’s own self-understanding instead of imposing external 
categorizations and show how they deal with the pejorative image of 
the conspiracy theorist generally ascribed to them. Following a 
relational approach to identity formations (cf. Becker, 1963; Elias 
1978; Jenkins, 2014), I focus in this chapter on the different ways in 
which these people make distinctions between self and other, in other 
words, on how they associate with some and disassociate from others. 
I show that people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu resist 
definitional practices of exclusion and stigmatization by reclaiming 
their rationality as critical freethinkers against a gullible mainstream. 
Despite a common opposition towards the cultural mainstream, 
considerable self-assigned variety exits in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu. Different ideas of what conspiracy theories mean and what to 
do with that knowledge in one’s daily life enact three distinguishable 
subcultures of the conspiracy milieu: activists, retreaters and mediators.  
In the last empirical chapter, Contesting Epistemic Authority: 
Conspiracy Theorists on the Boundaries of Science, I situate conspiracy 
culture in a broader context of knowledge contestations. I study how 
and why people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu challenge the 
epistemic authority of science, and, following a symmetrical approach 
(e.g. Bloor, 1991[1976]), I analyze here as well how academics 
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pathologize conspiracy theories for the simple reason that those works 
operate as de facto strategies of boundary work (Gieryn, 1999). More 
in particular, I focus on the rhetorical strategies deployed by both 
parties in efforts to secure/attack the bastion of science and study as 
such the arguments and tropes they use to delegitimize each other’s 
claims on truth. I show that conspiracy theorists challenge the 
epistemic authority of science by attacking its public image as skeptic, 
objective and egalitarian, while these academics defend the 
boundaries of science through the stereotypification of conspiracy 
theorists as modernity’s dark counterpart.  
I come back to my research questions in the Conclusion where 
I briefly summarize my findings and elaborate further on what I 
consider to be most crucial in the understanding of conspiracy 
culture, namely the contested status of mainstream epistemic 
institutions and the knowledge they produce. I argue that these 
historical developments feed on a cultural logic, a hermeneutic, of 
suspicion which is characteristic of conspiracy culture but has a 
broader intellectual history that I discuss in more detail. These three 
topics all direct attention to the fact that objective or unequivocal 
truths (as offered by these institutions) have become for many people 
quite implausible today. The truth of any situation is now always 
contested. Based on my analyses of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, I 
contrast here two ideal-typically opposed ways to deal with the 
difficulty of living in an age of epistemic instability, a historical context 
where the truth can no longer be guaranteed by one epistemic 
authority, institution, or tradition, while its consequential relativism 
and ambivalence cannot fully be embraced either. It is with that topic, 
by situating conspiracy culture in an age of epistemic instability, that 
I will conclude this study. 
Finally, I reflect on my position as a scholar on conspiracy 
culture in the Epilogue: Whose Side Am I On?. Starting from my 
argument to stay agnostic in this study about the truth of conspiracy 
theories and neutral in the battles for epistemic authority conspiracy 
theorists are embroiled in, I ask myself whether such a position makes 
both theoretical and practical sense. By reflecting on the strategies 
other sociologists have proposed, I question whether that bracketing 
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sufficiently works in my efforts to maintain autonomous in my 
analyses of conspiracy culture so that I need to position myself more 
overtly. I pick up Weber’s moral imperative for a value-free sociology 
through the works of Alvin Gouldner (1962, 1968) and Howard 
Becker (1967), and navigate through similar discussions in the social 
studies of science sparked by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch’s (1979) 
study of the paranormal world (cf. Hess, 1993; Mulkay et al. 1983; 
Scott et al, 1990). After advancing three scenes which illustrate the 
empirical difficulties of staying neutral, I explicitly formulate my own 
position in these contentious debates to prevent being hijacked by this 
or that political campaign. Instead of taking sides, I explain how I 
adhere to our most cherished procedure to settle disagreement 
peacefully—democracy—as a way out.  
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Now that I have introduced this sociological study of conspiracy 
culture, I will discuss more precisely what I studied; my reasons for 
selecting my sources; and how I gathered and analyzed the empirical 
material. Although these are methodological matters, the following 
elaboration of the places, events, and people that are part of my 
research contains significant empirical information about 
contemporary (Dutch) conspiracy theorists, and is therefore 
informative for those without prior knowledge of this subculture.  
 
2.2 The Field 
The emphasis that I put in this study, and which informed my 
decisions of what to study, has been on the actual people engaging 
with conspiracy theories, including their ideas about reality and their 
meaning-making practices. For this reason I decided to do 
ethnographic fieldwork in the world of Dutch conspiracy theorists, as 
I believed it to be necessary that I personally got to know the people 
involved, in order to see the world from their perspective and to 
understand their motivations. Ethnographic fieldwork draws from a 
collection of methods (e.g. participant observation, in-depth 
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interviews, content analyses) to bring the experience and worldview 
of those researched to the fore (cf. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; 
Denzin, 1997; Smith, 2005; Wolcott, 2008), and is therefore well-
suited to my research objectives and ethical considerations. Between 
October, 2011 and June, 2014, I fully immersed myself in the social 
and cultural worlds of Dutch conspiracy theorists, during which I got 
acquainted with a range of people, attended many social gatherings, 
built rapport with community members, and was recognized by 
insiders as a trustworthy person. I read their posts, articles, and 
books, and I participated in the (political) activities they organized. I 
also watched their documentaries and stayed connected and informed 
through social media—especially Facebook, which throughout this 
time was a crucial tool for organizing and disseminating information. 
All these observations and interactions changed me as a person and 
influenced my worldview: they made me question my assumptions, 
think critically about the things I took for granted, and showed me 
sides of reality I did not afford much attention to before. Eventually, 
as I had gathered enough empirical material, and understood that the 
time has come to distance myself from this subculture again, I brought 
down my interactions to the point that I no longer feel part of that 
world anymore. I nevertheless maintain good rapport with some of 
my contacts: we exchange emails and keep each other updated about 
world and personal affairs. Before I detail the exact places, people, 
and events that were part of this study, let me clarify a bit more the 
field I went into. 
Anthropological fieldwork conjures images of tribal peoples 
in distant lands. Unlike those distant tribes in places far away, the 
social and cultural life of conspiracy theorists is not embedded in a 
particular location, but is spread over multiple places and manifests 
in multiple forms (e.g. Appadurai, 1991; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). 
Borrowing Colin Campbell’s notion of the cultic milieu who describes 
the “cultural underground of society” in terms of its united opposition 
to “the dominant cultural orthodoxies” (2002[1972]: 14), I call the 
relatively stable, yet always fluid, network of people, places, and 
positions involved with the oppositional forms of knowledge 
commonly known as conspiracy theories, the conspiracy milieu. Like 
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the cultic milieu, it is characterized by a heterogeneity of people, 
beliefs, practices, and ideological orientations, yet united by an 
opposition to the cultural mainstream. To capture this fluid and 
spatially diverse cultural milieu that transcends one bounded locality, 
I loosely follow the methodological approach of the multi-sited 
ethnography to get a hold of the field I am interested in (cf. Falzon, 
2009; Hannerz, 1998; Marcus, 1995). This approach starts from a 
similar relational understanding as mine to emphasize that local 
cultures are fundamentally entrenched in global structures and, more 
importantly for this study, that an insistence on one bounded locality 
does not capture the multiplicity of materializations of contemporary 
cultural phenomena. The conspiracy milieu, to make it concrete 
again, exists in such multiplicity. It exists as the everyday life of 
conspiracy theorists who write blogs, prepare their food, or design a 
petition against the powers of the banking industry. And despite their 
digital, and thus apparently ephemeral nature, the websites where 
conspiracy theories are disseminated and where contested topics are 
discussed are similarly the materialization of the conspiracy milieu. 
Likewise, we can speak of the performances, the documentaries, and 
the social movements produced by conspiracy theorists as empirical 
instances through which the conspiracy milieu becomes visible. But 
where does the field that I call the conspiracy milieu start, and where 
does it stop? To put it differently, what sources qualify to be included 
in this research and which should be omitted? 
At first blush the answer seems obvious: go to the places 
where conspiracy theorists gather and where conspiracy theories are 
shared and disseminated. Yet the first thing I found is that what counts 
as a conspiracy theory is far from obvious, and people who engage 
with these discourses do not usually identify as conspiracy theorists 
(see chapter 6). As I argued in the introduction, substantive 
definitions do not adequately cover what is commonly meant by 
conspiracy theories and theorists. Explanations of reality with an 
appeal to a conspiracy as the causal factor can, after all, include official 
explanations like that of 9/11 (where a group of evil minded men [Al-
Qaeda] conspired against the US with their terrorist plans) and 
unofficial explanations (where the US government would conspire 
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against its people by orchestrating those attacks). Although many 
scholars have searched for essentialist criteria to set conspiracy 
theories apart as a distinct category of knowledge (e.g. Barkun, 2006: 
3; Byford, 2011: 32; Pipes, 1997: 38; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009: 
206), such efforts do not work well in practice (Coady, 2006: 2-3). 
As Knight argues, “there is no fixed set of inherent qualities that 
makes something a conspiracy theory, since in many cases a view 
becomes a conspiracy theory only because it has been dismissed as 
such” (cf. Knight, 2000: 11). The question then is, of course: by whom? 
Who has the power and authority to categorize, and thereby dismiss, 
certain forms of knowledge/thought as conspiracy theory? Or as 
Bratich argues from a Foucauldian perspective: “conspiracy theories 
are defined not merely by their strictly denotative, inherent 
properties, but by their discursive position in relation to a ‘regime of 
truth’” (2008: 3). 
Given the fact that the conspiracy theory/ist label is thus 
fundamentally relational, and a serious instrument of power, 
demarcating my research field is far from a neutral activity. After all, 
when we scholars start to define what conspiracy theories are—i.e. 
designate some forms of action/thought as such—we inevitably 
immerse ourselves in the power games about truth and reality that we 
instead should trace and analyze. Even ostensibly neutral assessments 
of conspiracy theories are therefore always political and inevitably 
bound up in these public battles for epistemic authority. Bratich 
rightfully draws attention therefore to “the slipperiness and the 
political stakes in defining conspiracy theories as an object of study” 
(2008: 4). A few other scholars have paid attention to the (rhetorical) 
practices that frame certain forms of thought as a distinct and deviant 
category of knowledge called conspiracy theories (cf. Birchall, 2006; 
Fiske, 1996; deHaven-Smith, 2013). Following the relational 
imperative, I therefore sociologize the demarcation of my object of 
study: instead of defining the contours of the conspiracy milieu 
myself, I follow what is seen and labelled as such (cf. Becker, 1963; 
Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). I began by following what outsiders 
consider to be part of the conspiracy milieu, but I was aware to 
incorporate what insiders themselves believe to be part of their world 
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as well. Although I do not assume that these two understandings of 
what counts as the conspiracy milieu (that is, outsider and insider) 
neatly overlap, my goal with this relational approach has been to 
circumscribe my research object in a way that is both 
methodologically sound and politically sensitive.  
To make this relational approach more concrete, I will 
explain in detail how I demarcated the Dutch conspiracy milieu. To 
find out what outsiders consider as part of the conspiracy milieu, I have 
used the general mainstream media (primarily newspapers), the 
Dutch skeptics organization Skepsis, and an anti-conspiracy theory 
wiki. The latter, HoaxWiki22 is a Dutch chapter of the collaborative 
internet-based content (knowledge) producing network for popular 
culture, Wikia23 Its aims, according to the site, are corrective: “to 
show how ridiculous many conspiracy theories are by giving correct 
information so that people can come to the logical conclusion how 
absurd they are.” The wiki is comprised of “sceptic” and “sarcastic” 
articles on the many “hoaxes, conspiracy theories, urban legends, 
pseudoscience and quackery that wander the internet”. But they also 
provide lists of both conspiracy theorists24 and conspiracy theory 
websites25 that I have I used as a basis for the outsider’s categorization.  
Similarly, I have drawn from the articles posted on the 
website of Skepsis, the Dutch organization of skeptics that purports to 
“critically assess extraordinary claims, pseudo-scientific theories, 
dubious therapies and paranormal convictions.”26 Skepsis is a not-for-
profit organization run by volunteers and is financially fully dependent 
on donations and memberships.27 Along with the website, they 
publish the quarterly magazine Skeptor, hold lectures, organize a 
yearly congress on related topics (which, in 2010, was fully dedicated 
to conspiracy theories), and are often present in the media (as the 
newspaper article in the introduction testifies). Finally, I have used 
mainstream media outlets as pointers to what constitutes the 
conspiracy milieu. By reading newspaper articles in the most 
important Dutch newspapers, and by watching television segments 
on conspiracy theories, I got an idea of what the mainstream media 
regarded as constituting the conspiracy milieu.  
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In contrast, I have also used demarcations of what those who 
are active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu consider to be a part of their 
subculture. At first I obtained such an insider’s perspective by 
tracking the references of people I encountered: every person I met, 
I asked what websites they use as sources of news and information; 
which conspiracy theorists they follow; which Facebook pages they 
connect to, and what conspiracy theory groups or organizations they 
support. This snowballing procedure obviously had to begin somewhere, 
and the few uncontested conspiracy sites (such as David Icke and his 
2011 performance in Amsterdam, and the Zapruder and Niburu 
websites) were my official starting point. Although most of the sites 
included in this study are widely recognized as real parts of the 
conspiracy milieu, some explicitly position themselves on its edges. 
These organizations and websites are not deep in the cultural 
underground, rather, they try to connect to cultural mainstream.  
In the course of conducting my fieldwork, I came across a 
conspiracy website, called New Media News,28 which is fully dedicated 
to giving an overview of all the Dutch conspiracy-minded websites. 
According to this site, the difference between new media and old 
media is that the former “do pay attention to news that question the 
integrity and sincerity of government, multinationals, mainstream 
media and royalty.”29 The simple looking website offers links to the 
five newest items of forty-one new media websites, and has a list of 
178 links to various new media news sources, blogs, online radio 
stations, and so on. The site urges visitors to “always use your own 
capacity of discernment when reading both mainstream as new media. 
Never uncritically assume anything.” Whereas New Media News helps 
interested people to navigate through the myriad conspiracy theory-
minded websites out there, it provides me with a formalized insider’s 
perspective of what counts as a conspiracy theory website. 
I have selected empirical materializations of the conspiracy 
milieu as recognized by both insiders and outsiders. However, I did 
not newly enter the field after this selection procedure, rather, my 
understanding of the Dutch conspiracy milieu gradually took shape 
over the course of my fieldwork. Little by little, I got a grip on the 
Dutch conspiracy milieu, and I became more sensitive in 
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understanding which people, websites, and organizations make up 
this subcultural world. As I formalized my notes, the abovementioned 
actors proved helpful allies in circumscribing this field. My selection 
of sources is, however, by no means a comprehensive delineation of 
what can be called the Dutch conspiracy milieu, if only because that 
field is an organic network with new material becoming part of it and 
others dropping off. There are undoubtedly more sources that I might 
have included, however, all selected sources are recognized by both 
insiders and outsiders as unmistakably part of the Dutch conspiracy 
world. As a sociologist, I am more interested in this communal 
verification than on following a set of formal criteria for inclusion.  
 
2.3 The Sources  
The conspiracy milieu appears in different empirical forms which I 
have attempted to capture in its diversity. This means that I draw in 
this study from a number of different sources as my empirical 
material. Whereas I started off in the early 2011s following 
established conspiracy websites and visiting their Facebook pages as a 
daily routine, it took a number of months before I began to attend 
social activities and to meet and interact with the people I was 
following online. Steadily I got more of grip on who is who and what is 
what in the Dutch conspiracy milieu. Throughout that period of my 
fieldwork, I consistently wrote down my observations, experiences, 
and personal reflections. These field notes, ranging from descriptions 
of the ordinary everyday practices that I witnessed on one side of the 
spectrum, to the recordings of my own thoughts and feelings about 
what I had seen and learned on the other side, form the basis of my 
empirical material (Emerson, 2011). They are the most raw building 
blocks of this study and are the product of my own sense-making 
practices in that cultural world. From the start, my guiding questions 
about this milieu centered on the basics: what do people say and do, 
and what does that tell me? The objective throughout that period (and 
in this study in general) was to capture as accurately as possible the 
way that people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu experience 
themselves, others, and the world around them. Given the centrality 
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of meaning in my study of conspiracy culture, these field notes have 
the quality of what Geertz famously coined “thick description” 
(1973). That is, they are detailed accounts of my observations and 
experiences in the field, but are always socially and historically 
contextualized so that they are meaningful to outsiders as well. More 
than mere factual descriptions of what happens, they are meant also 
to include my reflections and interpretations of these happenings.  
 In the following section, I explain in further detail the sources 
from which I have gathered the empirical material of this study. In 
order to categorize the sources I have consulted, I distinguish between 
websites, social movements and organizations, performances and 
documentaries, and people. Nor do these distinctions exclude each 
other: all of these social movements also have websites, and some 
documentaries are products of these social movements. Therefore, I 
organized my sources by how I have used them in this study.  
1. Websites. About thirty-five conspiracy theory websites 
feature on both of the aforementioned directories (HoaxWiki and 
NewMediaNews). In the course of my fieldwork, it became clear that 
several of these websites were important players in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu. I continuously asked the people I talked with about 
which sites they visited to stay updated on alternative news so that I was 
sure to be following the correct sites and to not miss current 
developments within the milieu. Whereas some of these websites 
have a wide audience, others are less mainstream but attract a 
particular subculture of the wider conspiracy milieu. Not all 
conspiracy websites are the same: some are serious, others satirical; 
some are spiritual, others factual. Following my emphasis on diversity 
in the conspiracy milieu, I wanted to include many different websites 
serving the different crowds of this subculture.  
Basing myself on empirical relevance (e.g. the most popular 
websites) and analytical saturation (capturing diversity), I ultimately 
selected seven key websites to base my analysis on. This empirically-
grounded selection of the more comprehensive lists of conspiracy 
websites strives to represent the broader Dutch conspiracy milieu. I 
recognize, however, that any totalizing attempt is bound for failure, 
if only for the ever-changing nature of the internet. But given the 
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broad thematic scope of these seven websites and the fact that they 
act as curators for a much larger set of sources (via linked summaries), 
it is unlikely that I missed a significant genre of websites that would 
alter my analysis in any meaningful way. In other words, there may 
be legitimate reasons to make another selection of these two lists, but 
this would most likely not yield a significant, alternate conspiracy 
discourse.30 Moreover, in terms of content and style, I am confident 
that these seven websites represent what conspiracy theories have to 
offer in the Netherlands. 
Zapruder Inc. 31 Zapruder is one of the oldest and most popular 
conspiracy websites of the Netherlands. It is a weblog that started in 
2006 and is dedicated to “alternative truths and awakening news.” 
Despite the rhetoric of veracity, the site claims that it is not always 
serious, if only to encourage skepticism, as the site says, “that is an 
explicit part of the formula: think for yourself!” The site covers topics 
ranging from alternative histories, corporatism and terrorism and 
war, but it got wide recognition by promoting the 9/11 truth 
movement in the Netherlands. Other main topics are climate change, 
known as the CO2 hoax, Peak Oil, and the HIV-AIDS controversy (in 
which they support the dissident standpoint and aligned themselves 
with the Rethinking AIDS Movement). The site has nearly 4,000 articles 
and over 66,000 comments, and most articles have links to other 
websites that offer more information on the subject. It is visited by 
over a hundred thousand people monthly (an average of 3,087 per 
day), and at its peak the site had 9,482 original visitors 
simultaneously, making it one of the biggest weblogs in the Dutch 
blogosphere.32 In 2008 Zapruder won the “Dutch Bloggie” award for 
the best political weblog. On a weekly basis it is cited as the source of 
a short news item on national radio channels. The articles posted are 
written by a small staff of permanent writers, but most are 
contributed by freelance writers. They also have a zaplog, where 
visitors can post freely, content from which may be picked up by the 
writing team if it is considered suitable. This discussion area is popular 
and intensively used, and they claim that they have a loyal community 
who regularly show up at gatherings and demonstrations.  
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Niburu.33 Niburu started in 2003 as an information website 
around chemtrails, UMTS frequency bands, radiation, and 
vaccinations (about “what the elite does to keep people small and 
ignorant”), but the site also concerns itself with the “revelation of 
worldwide contact with civilizations from outer space, and UFO 
activities.” The website is named after the supposed tenth/twelfth 
planet (Nibiru) in our solar system. This planet is unrecognized by 
mainstream scientists but very much alive in the alternative-science 
works of, for example, Zecharia Sitchin. Its offspring NineForNews34 
(founded spring 2014) is supposed to supplant it as a successor, and 
indeed seems more active, but both websites are still online (as of 
February 2016). The format, however, is more or less the same: they 
offer daily “revealing and awakening” news items in order that, as they 
say, “people can release themselves from the shackles governments 
and shadow-governments have put on them”. In many cases they 
feature items from other (alternative) news agencies, often translated 
or re-written in Dutch but with links to the original article. Beneath 
postings there is a comments area in which people react and discuss, 
which is often very active. NineForNews “publicizes news that the 
mainstream media do not” and aims “to present information in such a 
way that everyone can decide what ‘truth’ is, that it begins with being 
well informed and envisioning matters from different perspectives.” 
Those different perspectives, they hold, are made available on their 
website. It is ultimately up to the reader, they argue, to “assess what 
feels good to them or what fits their convictions.”35 Besides regular 
columns by authors whose works connect the scientific with the 
spiritual, and a web shop to order “many products for conscious 
people,” there is also a UFO-hotline to report sightings. The Dutch 
political party Sovereign Independent Pioneers (SOPN) that I will discuss 
below was derived from this site. NineForNews is consistently highly 
trafficked (about 4,000 unique visitors a day), and they have over 
4,000 followers on Twitter and about 8,400 friends on Facebook. 
We Are Awakening.36 We Are Awakening is a collaborative project 
of Marcel Messing, who is a prominent and influential person in the 
Dutch conspiracy milieu. Messing studied anthropology, philosophy, 
and religion studies, and is author of 25 books and many articles in 
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which he connects esotericism with science, religion, art, and poetry. 
After working in the Dutch higher education system, he got involved 
in the alternative news circuit. In his own words, after years having 
delved into the hidden powers behind the world stage, he realized 
that the spiritual evolution of humanity was seriously threatened and 
decided to write a book about it (Will We Awaken?).37 One of the 
threats Messing sees is the increasing technologization of life, which 
he says will keep people docile and will prevent us from achieving our 
true potential. He is a fervent anti-transhumanist. The web site 
contains a growing body of articles about such threats to the evolution 
of humanity (currently numbering over two thousand posts). Topics 
that the site covers includes information on climate change, health and 
nutrition, radiation, body chips, the new world order, supernatural 
phenomena, pharmacy, religion, spiritual texts, and literature and 
film. There is also his spiritual bent, such as a discussion of “the 
immortal light being that transcend the material world and reveals 
our true being.” The articles are written by a mostly permanent team 
of writers, or else have been translated from their source language 
into Dutch by the site’s own “translators collective”. In all cases, links 
to the original sources are included.  
Argus Eyes.38 An online media platform run by volunteers, 
Argus Eye’s credo is “a new look on society” and proclaims “unity in 
diversity.” They hold the commonly shared “awakening process” to be 
central to their objective, which is to provide “conscious-making and 
inspiring information based on open source.” This objective is seen 
through by readers who post their own op-eds and articles, and is also 
supported by informative contributions of cooperating partners. 
Together, Argus Eyes hold, these will show the promised unity in 
diversity. With their website, they “want to offer a dynamic and 
versatile platform that occupies itself with the conscious creation of 
the future. A future that belongs to all, after all. In total freedom.”39 
The site was very popular a few years ago, then went offline for half 
a year, and is now back online. They have a Facebook page, are a 
Twitter account and a YouTube account on which they post 
recordings of their weekly radio transmission. The topic of their site 
is broad but articles are categorized as health and well-being, society 
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and politics, myths and mysteries, and science and technology. There 
are links to other sites in the Dutch conspiracy milieu categorized by 
the same index.  
Want to Know.40 Want to Know is “a platform for people with a 
mission to serve their fellow humans with providing information that 
contributes to our awakening.” This “leading website about 
everything you won’t hear about in mainstream media” offers news 
items written by a small group of editors on the usual subjects: health 
and nutrition, politics, economy and society, and UFOs and 
extraterrestrial life. It is a spin-off or local continuation of the 
American site wanttoknow.info of Fred Burks, which promotes itself 
as being “for those who want to know the truth: reliable and verifiable 
information on major cover-ups and a call to work together for the 
good of all.” Want To Know’s objective is “to empower people, to help 
people achieve their potential. This is hindered by forces working 
behind the curtains whose interests are not with the empowerment of 
people. It is therefore important for people to be informed about 
these machinations.” The editors encourage visitors to help them 
achieve this by generating content (suggesting interesting articles, 
writing op-eds and book reviews) and through the dissemination of 
information to other sites. Underneath each article there is a space for 
discussion, which is widely used by members of the site. It receives 
just over 3,000 unique visitors every day. 
Normal News.41 Normal News is a website that offers weekly 
news items that are written by a handful of (guest) editors, or 
translations/copies of news items from other websites. The site 
started out of a “discontent with the way the news is currently 
portrayed to us by the established news agencies.” They argue how 
the news is brought to us in a very particular way that benefits those 
owning the news corporations, namely private banks. “And they 
don’t hesitate to twist the facts, to manipulate those or to deliberately 
leave certain facts out.” This has led them “into resistance and strive 
for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and safeguard from 
manipulation, because how free are we actually?” The articles 
primarily concern (geo)political news and are categorized in their 
archive as politics, economy, foreign affairs, science, and health. 
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Articles are mostly written from a personal perspective with 
subjective interpretation and opinion, and often lack precise 
references to original sources, so the veracity of the news items are 
often called into question in the comments section. It nevertheless 
attracts over 3500 unique visitors a day, with a Facebook page that 
has over 5,000 friends.  
Anarchiel. As the site name suggests, Anarchiel is an anarchist-
inspired website that describes itself as “promoting self-
determination” through the facilitation of discussion and the 
distribution of information: “our goal is not to evangelize, our only 
wish is to stimulate free thinking and to provide access to matters not 
(evenly) discussed in the mainstream media.”42 Although Anarchiel 
offers links to current news items, the emphasis of this website lies 
more in their depository of files on a number of different subjects 
written, selected, and edited by a team of about fifteen people. These 
“masterly articles about societal problems and political perspectives 
have been written from the personal feeling and vision of the authors,” 
but are nevertheless well documented and mostly have good 
references to original sources. The topics are diverse and range from 
international agreements like ACTA, PIPA, and SOPA include 
discussions ranging from aliens to hallucinogenic drugs. All share a 
dedication to “explore the concept of freedom in all its facets.” In 
addition to this library, they have a so-called dump, their user blog 
section, a place where all members of the site can freely publish 
thoughts, comments, and links. In line with their digital 
culture/hacker rhetoric, the site values freedom and privacy, 
including explicit mentions of its own use of cookies, caching 
protocols, and data storage policies. Moreover, all site statistics are 
available on the website itself, which reveals about thousand unique 
visitors a day.  
These seven websites of the Dutch conspiracy milieu with 
their frequent publishing of articles and their heavily-visited fora and 
discussion pages have proven a true portal for me into that subcultural 
world. By visiting them on a daily basis, I was able to see what was on 
the minds of these people, which ideas, thoughts, and theories were 
shared amongst them, what real world events caused a spike in posts 
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and articles, and which topics generated disputes and controversy 
within the milieu. But these websites also directed me to real world 
events and social activities, and gave me easy access to the people 
actually engaging with conspiracy theories. I could chat, talk, and 
recruit them for the in-depth interviews that I eventually did as part 
of my study. And finally, these websites and their contents were the 
basis of my analysis concerning what contemporary conspiracy 
theories are about (see chapter three). 
2. Social Movements and Organizations. It is common to think of 
conspiracy theorists as lone wolves, searching for hidden truths in the 
private confines of their homes. Although many people in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu engage with conspiracy theories independently, 
there are nevertheless all kinds of ways in which they come together 
and form new collectives. What often unites them is the desire to do 
something with the knowledge gained; they share a wish to bring 
about societal change.  
One of these initiatives bringing conspiracy theory-minded 
people together is the newly established political party, Sovereign 
Independent Pioneers Netherlands. SOPN ran in Dutch national 
elections in 2012 and has its origins in the Niburu/Ninefornews 
websites. The people behind those websites founded a political 
movement, which is, in their own words, “no ordinary political party. 
Politics, after all, means for a long time favoritism, backroom politics, 
and ostrich politics”.43 SOPN is different, they say, because they are 
“a people’s movement, a participation party’, doing ‘politics not for 
the people, but by the people.” They “are the only party daring to 
point to the root of our problems: the rule and domination of banks 
and multinationals.”44 Their political program consists of many 
different propositions, of which the main priorities are described as,  
an unconditional basic income for every Dutch citizen, maximal civil 
participation in public governance, total transparency about 
everything in the public domain, respectful tolerance to all 
perspectives on all terrains, liberalization of health care and 
education, tax equality for citizens and companies alike, monetary 
stability through a fixed value currency. 45 
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Despite all these different political aims, SOPN was dubbed in the 
media as the UFO-party, in light of their demand for government 
disclosure on UFOs.46 A closer look at their party program shows that 
their goals are far broader: SOPN calls for structural societal reforms 
drawing on socialistic, democratic and libertarian ideals. Like the 
many populist parties popular today in Western Europe (cf. Mudde, 
2007; Taggart, 2004), they defy as such an easy left/right 
categorization. SOPN managed to receive 12,982 votes in the 2012 
national elections, roughly a fifth of what is needed for one 
parliamentary seat.  
Another important player in the Dutch conspiracy milieu is 
Frontier World.47 This non-profit organization aims “to collect and 
disseminate information of the fringe sciences.” They argue that 
“established science often has no explanations for certain facts or 
phenomena, and silences these subjects.” They, on the other hand, 
“take on these subjects and shed light on them from multiple 
perspectives.” Such subjects include, in their words, “odd or 
unexplained phenomena, alternative history and archeology, ancient 
civilizations, politics and conspiracy theories, aerospace, 
extraterrestrial life, alternative science and technological 
developments, spirituality and (para)psychology, alternative health 
and futurology.” They have a weekly internet radio show and they sell 
“hard to get” books, magazines, and DVDs in their shop in the center 
of Amsterdam and via their website. They are most famous for their 
magazines, one in Dutch (Frontier Magazine, 6 times a year, since 
1995) and one in English (Nexus Magazine, 6 times a year, since 2011). 
In addition, they organize numerous events (lectures, workshops, 
etc.). The one that I attended, called Frontier Symposium, is the largest 
and best known of their yearly gatherings. Started in 2001, the annual 
symposium has become a landmark event for the organization, but 
also for the cultic milieu in general. The 2012 symposium that I went 
to was set up like a scientific conference, including keynote speakers 
and a series of smaller lectures by people active on the fringe side of 
science. Some of these people are famous in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu, like Marcel Messing, but others are generally less known.  
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 WeAreChangeHolland 48 is a local chapter of the global network 
WeAreChange.org and they describe themselves as a 
nonpartisan, independent media organization comprised of 
individuals and groups working to expose the lies of governments and 
the corporate elite who constantly trash our humanity […] is 
comprised of independent journalists, concerned citizens, activists, 
and anyone who wants to shape the direction our world is going in.49 
This local Dutch chapter participates in journalistic efforts to confront 
those in power, in their words, “we don’t present (conspiracy) 
theories but rather ask questions.” On YouTube they have their own 
channel where one can clearly see how they perform their citizen 
journalism.50 With a small video-recorder, they attempt to interview 
many different Dutch politicians, about issues such as failed policy or 
on subjects like the Bilderberg conferences, but these efforts are often 
to no avail: questions are hardly, if at all, answered. To outsiders, the 
citizen-journalists of WeAreChangeHolland are seen as radical 
conspiracy theorists.51 
The Zeitgeist Movement is another group active in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu, which brings together people seeking to advance 
and implement their political ideas in everyday life. Inspired by the 
Zeitgeist documentaries, this grassroots “sustainability advocacy 
organization conducts community based activism and non-violent 
awareness actions” all over the globe. It currently has local chapters 
in over sixty countries worldwide, including the Netherlands.52 Since 
2008, they have organized a yearly global event called Z-Day, which 
aims to “increase public awareness” by hosting lectures, screenings, 
and interviews. This main event is complimented with about three 
hundred local, self-organized events at chapters worldwide. I 
attended two of the local Z-Days in Amsterdam, the first in 2010 
when the Dutch chapter was founded, and the second in 2014 when 
more established speakers were invited. The Zeitgeist Movement is a 
non-profit organization “striving for a new economic model [because] 
solutions cannot be expected to come from the system itself.” Like 
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the Zeitgeist documentaries from which they ideologically draw, these 
activists are viewed in the mainstream media and by others on the 
internet as conspiracy theorists.53 
 Over the course of my fieldwork I attended some of their 
meetings, symposia, demonstrations and other get-togethers in order 
to observe what they are about, who is involved, and what they 
actually do on a day-to-day basis. Although I do not directly use my 
experiences with these movements in the analyses of the chapters that 
follow, they have informed my understanding of how this community 
comes together and organizes itself on the basis of a discontent with 
our current societal order. Conspiracy theories do not only separate, 
but also bring people together. However, because quite a number of 
the people I interviewed are part of these social movements, the 
ideologies and practices of these social movements inevitably come 
back in my analyses, since my respondents speak about their 
motivations and experiences with them. Moreover, most people 
active in the conspiracy milieu know about these organizations and 
relate in one way or another to them. Either by following or opposing 
them, these social movements and organizations feature in the lives of 
those who are active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu and therefore find 
their way into the chapters that follow. 
3. Performances and Documentaries. A key part of the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu are the many presentations, videos, and 
documentaries that are shared over the Internet. These visual-textual 
sources are often the work of foreign, most notably UK and US, 
actors who exert as such considerable influence on the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu. In this study, I pay special attention to David Icke, 
one of the most popular and best known conspiracy theorists today, 
who came to Amsterdam in 2011 for a performance at the RAI 
convention center. Icke is a true celebrity in the conspiracy milieu 
internationally, and holds these performances in large venues all over 
the world for crowds of thousands. He is also the author of more than 
twenty books, which are read in twelve different languages, and he 
owns a popular website with extensive videos and interviews, and that 
features a fairly active discussion platform (with more than 100,000 
registered users).54 His motto is “exposing the dream world we 
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believe to be real,” and he is most famous, or notorious, for his 
reptilian thesis, which is the idea that reptilian human-alien hybrids 
secretly rule the world. But he is also known for his synthesis of 
seemingly different systems of thought: in his superconspiracy theories, 
he brings together New Age teachings with apocalyptic conspiracy 
notions of a coming totalitarian New World Order (cf. Barkun, 2006; 
Ward and Voas, 2009). Icke’s fan base is diverse, including various 
spiritual seekers, political anarchists, members of the alternative 
medicine circuit, and members of the anti-government populist right. 
All of them, however, share a discontent with the current societal 
order, and more precisely with the way mainstream epistemic 
institutions (i.e. science, politics, religion, media) work. In Chapter 
Four, I analyze the content of his show to understand how he supports 
his extraordinary claims, but Icke comes up in the interviews with my 
informants as well. Many, if not all, people in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu know about him and he engenders considerable traction with 
his militant activism. 
 In addition to Icke’s work, there are two other visual-textual 
sources important to discuss here. Two documentaries in particular 
play a powerful role in bringing people into the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu, as a number of my respondents explained. The three-part 
Zeitgeist series (Zeitgeist: The Movie; Zeitgeist: Addendum, and Zeitgeist: 
Moving Forward) convey a number of what outsiders commonly see as 
conspiracy theories,55 mostly about the way financial system of 
fractional reserve banking works and how that turns societies and 
people into economic slavery. A greater part of these documentaries 
is, however, reserved for the development of an alternative socio-
economic model, arguing that our current neoliberal and capitalist 
one is reaching both social and natural limits. Their alternative, a 
“resource based economy,” puts environmental friendliness, 
sustainability and abundance as fundamental societal goals and affords 
an important role to technological innovations as ways to achieve 
them. These documentaries are created by independent filmmaker 
and activist Peter Joseph, and have been watched by millions of 
people all over the world, thus sparking the aforementioned social 
movement. 
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 The documentary Thrive: What On Earth Will It Take? performs 
a similar, if minor, role in the Dutch conspiracy milieu. Most people 
I met had seen this film or at least knew about it. Like the Zeitgeist 
documentaries, Thrive starts with a promise to lift “the veil on what's 
really going on in our world by following the money upstream, 
uncovering the global consolidation of power in nearly every aspect 
of our lives,” but moves then to “real solutions and bold strategies for 
reclaiming our lives and our future” by “weaving together 
breakthroughs in science, consciousness and activism.” 56 According 
to its critics, “the film smashes together pretty much every modern 
conspiracy theory, [features] pseudoscience stars [and] is a not-so-well 
disguised libertarian propaganda piece.”57 The documentary is the 
product of Foster Gamble (allegedly heir of the Procter and Gamble 
company) and his wife Kimberly Carter Gamble. It has been viewed 
over 35 million times and is available in 27 languages. Like Zeitgeist, 
it encouraged a corollary activist movement so that people “can thrive 
together,” but it has much less local support than other groups, at least 
in the Netherlands. In the summer of 2011, I attended a local 
screening of Thrive with about thirty others people in a small 
community center in Amsterdam. After the movie, there was a 
discussion in which people shared opinions about the film and then an 
informal gathering over drinks where people mingled and discussed 
with each other the issues that the film raised.  
Both documentaries are exemplary of the contemporary 
fusion of science and spirituality that is so characteristic of the cultic 
milieu and very present in much of the contemporary conspiracy 
milieu as well. For myself, they have proved a true eye-opener when 
I first saw these movies in that they are professionally crafted, 
exhaustive, and compelling, but mostly they gave me insight about 
the world from the perspective of conspiracy theorists. They testify 
to the power of film (especially documentary film) in the 
dissemination of conspiracy theories. For many, these documentary 
films have been a substantial influence in their turn to conspiracy 
theories. Although these documentaries are not the main objects of 
the analyses done in this study, their presence in the lives of people 
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active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu makes them present in the 
chapters nevertheless.  
4. People. Along the course of my fieldwork, I made contact 
with many different people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu. 
Some are rather active participants of this subculture and organize 
various civil initiatives or run websites, whereas others merely 
browse the conspiracy websites occasionally in order to get a different 
take on the news. However fascinating most of these interactions 
were, I wanted to go into more detail with a smaller number of people 
about their own motivations and experiences. I selected therefore 
twenty-one people during those months for the in-depth interviews I 
wanted to undertake. The most important criteria I used when 
choosing my respondents was that of diversity: I tried to get in contact 
with as many different people as possible, because I wanted to grasp 
the sheer variety of standpoints, practices, and biographies that make 
up the conspiracy milieu. Besides selecting people at different sites, I 
often used physical clues as a shortcut to diversity, seeking out young 
and old, male and female, lower class and upper class, individuals and 
groups, provincials and urbanites, Dutch natives and (children of) 
immigrants, and so on. Although this approach of selecting people on 
the basis of external clues obviously draws on prevalent stereotypes 
and assumptions, it nevertheless proved an adequate additional 
strategy to capture the diversity I was aiming for.  
On my first real in-person encounter with the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu, which was Icke’s 2011 performance, I invited 
numerous people to follow-up for interviews, out of which three 
eventually took part. That day, during the breaks in Icke’s seven-plus 
hour show, I had ample opportunity to talk to the a variety of 
attendees. I stumbled on a number of people who told me they were 
part of Marcel Messing’s group. After some questions about my 
intentions (why was I interested in them, and what did my research 
look like?), they told me that they regularly work with Messing and 
write articles for WeAreAwakening. Two of them eventually gave me 
their contact details, and I managed to complete an interview with 
one of them. During another break, I spoke to a group of men who 
appeared working-class, in their late thirties, who were smoking 
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rolled cigarettes outside. They turned out to be a group of close 
friends from the south of Holland. One of them knew Icke well and 
suggested that his friends come along, who were only peripherally 
engaged with conspiracy theories. I took the contact details of the 
former with whom I did an interview a few weeks later. Finally, right 
before I decided to go home, I saw a posh looking couple in their 
forties sitting not far from me in the auditorium. They were happy to 
talk and curious about my research. The tickets for Icke’s show were 
given to them by an angel medium who was Icke’s personal assistant 
that day. They knew about Icke, but they also told me that they would 
not have come if they were not supplied complimentary tickets. Some 
weeks later I am doing an interview with the one half of the couple, a 
man who worked for an agricultural import/export company.  
 These were typical of the sort of encounters I had during my 
other in-person engagements with the Dutch conspiracy milieu. At 
the screening of Thrive, I had a good conversation with a young female 
professional in the media industry who was thrilled about the positive 
message in that documentary and its call for societal change. She 
agreed to have a more thorough talk about her ideas and experiences 
in an official interview. I also met a former activist who I spoke with 
during at Z-Day a year earlier. He told me that he is working on 
multiple fronts in the conspiracy milieu to bring that subculture more 
into the mainstream. When I tell him about the details of my research, 
he is enthusiastic about cooperating, and a few weeks later I visit him 
at his house. At a SOPN election rally, I made contacts with four 
people: a young frat boy sort, who caught my attention during the 
presentation of the party leader for posing some critical questions 
about the financial solidity of their plans. It turned out that he is a 
student of economics at the university where I work and I met him a 
few weeks later in my office in Rotterdam. A young woman in her 
early thirties joined our conversation about the party program and 
their objectives. She volunteered for a newly-established political 
party in the Netherlands called The Party for the Animals.58 Doubts 
about which party to volunteer and vote for occupy her, and we 
talked in more detail about her views in a later interview. I also saw a 
guy who I knew from my childhood, a cousin of a former neighbor 
514059-L-bw-harambam
d, dZhd, /^ Khd d,Z 
ϱϲ 
friend. I had not seen him in years, but he had not changed much, still 
the friendly-faced Suriname kid I remembered. He told me that he 
has read all of Johan Oldenkamp’s work and was intrigued by what 
this party was about. He even coaxed his father along for the event 
that night. We were both excited to meet up again to talk in depth 
about how he got involved with Oldenkamp and conspiracy theories 
in general. At the end of the evening, the party secretary asked me if 
I wanted to help SOPN register in Amsterdam. She was in her late 
thirties, spoke with a local accent, and was the regional coordinator 
of the party responsible for getting SOPN on the city’s election list. 
She needed multiple people in each district in Amsterdam to confirm 
their support for the party at the municipality. I explained my 
research and we agreed on an interview instead.  
 I recruited an additional group of people via the discussion 
forums of the internet sites that I have been following,. Attracted by 
her comments on Argus Eyes, I set up an interview with a woman in 
her fifties who runs her own coaching and counselling therapy 
practice for people with soul problems. Somewhat coincidentally, I met 
her again at the Frontier Symposium a few months later. I got in touch 
on that forum with a father on welfare in the city, who has 
experienced personal issues with the medical establishment; a woman 
in her thirties who just completed a pilgrimage to Santiago de 
Compostela during which she experienced the peacefulness and 
solidarity she wishes to see in the rest of the world; and a former 
squatter who now lives in a vacation house in the woods where he 
subsists on the small permaculture garden he recently installed.  
Through links and comments on the key websites I used, I 
found some people who ran their own conspiracy-minded websites. 
Given their active participation in the conspiracy milieu, I recruited 
four of them for interviews: the owner of the most visited Dutch 
website on 9/11, Truth911.nl; a retired “independent researcher” 
who takes a stance against the ‘financial dictatorship’ of the banking 
industry by “revealing the secrets behind money”59; a father of two 
children who is a nutritional counsellor and runs a conspiracy website 
mostly dedicated to health issues called AreYouStillAsleep; and a student 
of philosophy who started his own discussion site about conspiracy 
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theories called SeekTheTruth. From that latter site, I recruited two 
active forum participants, one, an employee of a green energy 
company who is active in a local chapter of the Zeitgeist Movement, 
and the second, a man in his early thirties who just opened his own 
tile shop at which I conducted his interview.  
One of these informants directed me to a peer in her network 
because she felt he would be relevant to interview. And indeed, that 
man, a former mayor of a small town who now runs a citizen’s 
platform for governmental discretion and societal change, proved an 
interesting source. He is quite well known in the conspiracy milieu, 
is befriended by many and garners much support for his political 
activities. Months after our interview, I met him again at the Frontier 
Symposium where he introduced me to other active participants of 
the conspiracy milieu. And finally, through my own personal network 
I got in touch with an additional two people. The first, the brother of 
a family friend who was heavily involved with conspiracy theories and 
the second the mother of a friend of a friend, who is similarly engaged 
with these alternative ways of knowing. I first met her at an Occupy 
Amsterdam rally and later returned to her house for a formal interview.  
All in all, I have managed to collect from these different sites 
a wide variety of people active in the conspiracy milieu: from the 
young to the old (23 through 67 years, median age 42), male and 
female (12/9), lower to higher educated (International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 0–3: 5; level 4: 7; levels 
5–6: 9), provincials (9) and urbanites (12); Dutch natives (18) and 
(children of) immigrants (3), and others, totaling 21 people.  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with this diverse 
group over a twenty month period of fieldwork. These were mostly 
done in the safe atmosphere of people’s own homes. This gave me a 
unique look at the way they lived their daily lives, and gave them a 
comfortable setting to speak at their ease. Often they invited me for 
lunch, and I stayed over for much of the day. If the situation 
demanded otherwise, we did the interview at my office at the 
university in Rotterdam, my own place in Amsterdam, or on one 
occasion at a public cafeteria. The interviews ranged between one-
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and-a-half to five hours, and a few times I continued the interview 
with a gap of a few weeks.  
Given the exploratory nature of my research, the interviews 
were only loosely structured around certain themes so as to let my 
respondents freely associate and discuss what was on their mind. I 
asked them general questions on the following topics: their personal 
biographies, how they turned to conspiracy theories and what their 
current reasons and motivations are, their thoughts on the most 
popular conspiracy theories today, how they assess knowledge and 
truth in a mediatized world, which sources of information they use 
and which they avoid and why. I asked them about their ideas of and 
experiences with mainstream epistemic institutions like politics, 
media, religion, medicine, and science. I also asked them to describe 
their role in the Dutch conspiracy milieu, including, how they see 
themselves and others in that subcultural world, how they deal with 
the stigma associated with it, what activities (if applicable) they 
undertake, and about their interactions with others. These interviews 
have all been recorded and transcribed into written documents. I 
draw on this empirical material throughout, and analyze it specifically 
in chapters five, six and seven. 
 
2.4 The Analyses 
Because qualitative or ethnographic studies of conspiracy culture are 
relatively rare, the analytical approach that I took towards my 
research object and the interpretation of the empirical material is an 
inductive one (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Silverman, 2013). This 
means that I went into the field with minimal preconceived ideas 
about what I was going to find. Obviously, one never confronts reality 
without prior conceptualizations and knowledge of the world, so I 
merely let my theoretically-informed intuition, what Charles Wright 
Mills calls “the sociological imagination” (2000), guide me. As such, I 
came across texts, people, and events I had not previously considered, 
and I often ventured into territories I had not foreseen, both online 
and off. Sometimes these sidesteps were theoretically or empirically 
productive, and other times I traced aspects of conspiracy culture to 
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their dead ends, at least for this study. In other words, my fieldwork 
period was characterized by uncertainty and capriciousness, but I 
always tried to stay as close as possible to the lives of the people I 
researched. Put differently, I pursued an inductive research strategy 
with the aim of developing novel, contextual theoretical frameworks 
for understanding conspiracy culture, instead of testing for 
preconceived hypotheses.  
 During that long period of fieldwork, I collected a wide range 
of empirical material: written accounts of how Dutch conspiracy 
theorists see the world (i.e. contents of popular websites); my own 
observations of their practices (i.e. performances, blogging, and 
collective actions); personal narratives and life experiences via 
interviews. These different types of data have all consistently been 
organized with the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti 7 in 
order to systematize my inductive process of theory building. Based 
on a close reading of this empirical material and continuous 
discussions with my supervisors, I first developed rough analytical 
categorizations. To explain and make more concrete how this 
analytical process of inductive theory building took shape during the 
course of my research I will make use of one particular example, 
namely how people explain their turn to conspiracy theories (which I 
treat in depth in chapter five), but note that this exemplification is 
similar to all other forms of theory building present in this study. 
In this first process of open coding, frequently-occurring 
observations, recurrent topics, and primary aspects of the stories 
people told me were given solidity and coherence by giving them an 
analytic name, or code. To put it differently, I reduced and organized 
the richness of my empirical material with analytical categories that 
emerged from the data (e.g. Erlandson, et al, 1993: 118). This 
process of dividing up my empirical material into meaningful 
categories yielded, in the early phases of empirical research, many 
different codes. For example, when assessing the stories people told 
me of how they got involved with conspiracy theories, I initially 
distinguished relevant excerpts with codes such as historical events (e.g. 
9/11, war in Iraq, etc.), personal crises (death of loved one, burn-outs, 
birth of children, etc.), media distortions, travels abroad, education, 
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spiritual longings, political discontents, documentaries, discomfort with the 
church, the internet, supernatural experiences, and so on. In other words, 
my interviewees offered me many different explanations of why they 
turned to conspiracy theories, which I then analytically separated out 
by constructing such distinct categories. 
Through the duration of my fieldwork I adapted and fine-
tuned these analytical categories through the constant comparison of 
such categories with the empirical material they are supposed to 
contain (e.g.  Glaser and Strauss, 1967). I reassessed my empirical 
material several times during that period to explore in further detail 
the categorizations I had made, asking, do they still fit the data, should 
I amend the properties and dimensions of these analytical constructs, 
or develop entirely new ones? What do they actually mean in light of 
some theoretical perspective? In this analytical phase, fewer and fewer 
new analytical categories were constructed and instead existing 
categories were reassessed, brought into connection with each other, 
and sometimes merged into more abstract, or higher order, 
categories. This process is often called axial coding (e.g. Corbin and 
Strauss, 2015; 239-241), in which the idea is to think about the 
empirical material in increasingly abstract terms and to relate distinct 
categories with each other in a coding schema or tree.  
For example, when thinking about how to organize and 
associate the abovementioned categories, it struck me that people 
explain their involvement with conspiracy theories as developing 
either along gradual, incremental lines or else by abrupt, life-changing 
moments. There were, in other words, patterns in the stories people 
told me. I constructed then two coding trees in which the different 
categories were assigned to their respective axis (gradual or abrupt). 
The idea was that I could differentiate two distinct careers of how 
people became conspiracy theorists. However, as much as I tried to 
assign the original categories to either of the axes and develop two 
distinct pathways, my empirical material resisted. To put it 
differently, the theoretical idea that I started to develop did not work 
with the stories people told me, and this approach then began to strike 
me as too formalistic too account for the variety of experiences I 
encountered. I therefore decided to go back to my original categories 
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and to reassess the interview material again. With a new look on my 
empirical material, I started to see how my respondents 
contextualized their own private experiences of turning to conspiracy 
theories within larger societal developments. I then decided to change 
course by categorizing these personal experiences by the historical 
currents they conveyed. This way of organizing my empirical material 
proved not only more empirically just but also theoretically more 
rewarding, and the conclusions I draw in chapter five are the product 
of this move back to my original data. 
Similar re-evaluations of and adjustments to the analytical 
categories I was ordering and interpreting my empirical material with 
were made along that period of field research (and on a continual 
bases after). Sometimes this led me to go back into the field so that I 
could compare and assess my newly-developed analytical categories, 
and to possibly adapt them once more. For example, when I attended 
the performance of David Icke, I observed and made notes of his 
performances with an open mind: I merely wanted to be taken along 
by his argumentation. When I firstly analyzed his show systematically 
(with the help of video recordings), I focused on how he brought 
together all many different facets of his superconspiracy theory into 
one coherent narrative. This resulted in a number of different 
analytical categories with which I continued my formal analysis. 
However, along the process of making theoretical inferences from 
analytical categories, I realized that is was theoretically more 
interesting to shift focus from how he connected the dots to how he 
empirically supports these different claims, in other words, to focus 
on the different sources of epistemic authority from which he drew 
(see chapter four). This readjustment of my theoretical perspective 
led me to completely re-analyze his show and to build new analytical 
categories from those subsequent viewings.  
This continuous movement between the empirical material, 
analytical concepts, and theoretical interpretations is a central feature 
of a grounded theory approach (cf. Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Charmaz, 
2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The analytical frameworks that are 
developed and portrayed in this study and the theoretical conclusions 
that I ultimately draw, are all the product of this iterative procedure 
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of data-driven theory construction. My goal is, however, no totalizing 
grand theory as with modernist traditions (cf. Lyotard, 1984; Ritzer, 
1997; Seidman, 1994). Instead, I set out to provide in intelligible and 
meaningful “local knowledge” (Geertz, 1983): contextually bound 
small narratives which are meant to inform us about parts and 
perspectives of worlds hitherto under-explained (cf. Bauman, 1987; 
Toulmin, 1990; Latour, 2005).  
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3. Contemporary Conspiracy 
Discourses: How a Power Elite 
Controls the World 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Given the contemporary ubiquity of conspiracy theories, most people 
have an idea of what they are. Some would speak of 9/11 and the 
widespread suspicions of the official account, while others would talk 
about the assassinations of important figures like John F. Kennedy. 
But conspiracy theories come in many shapes and sizes. The sheer 
scope of conspiracy theories warrant a more thorough exposition. In 
this chapter, I will therefore explore in greater detail the many 
conspiracy theories that circulate in the Dutch conspiracy milieu. It 
is, however, not my intention to provide a complete overview of all 
conspiracy theories out there; others have already made such attempts 
(cf. McConnachie and Tudge, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Vankin and 
Whalen, 2010). Neither is it my intention to identify certain 
rhetorical characteristics or epistemological tropes inherent to all 
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conspiracy theories. These quests to find “the nature of conspiracy 
belief” (Barkun, 2006) or to dissect “the anatomy of the conspiracy 
theory” (Byford, 2011) are informed by essentialist notions of the 
conspiracy theory, the problems of which have been addressed in the 
introduction. Instead, I would like to provide a systematic 
categorization of the conspiracy theories popular today so to clarify 
the body of knowledge that I refer to when I speak of conspiracy 
theories in the chapters that follow.  
There are many ways to do so. An often-applied criterion in 
academic studies to categorize conspiracy theories is plausibility.60 As 
the introduction showed, scholars often distinguish real from false 
conspiracy theories, albeit in many different ways (e.g. Bale, 2007; 
Byford, 2011; Keeley, 1999; Pipes, 1997; Sunstein and Vermeule, 
2009). Others categorize conspiracy theories by scope. Pipes, for 
example, separates “petty” from “world” conspiracy theories: the 
former are “limited in ambition, however dangerous in consequence” 
whereas “world conspiracies aspire to global power and to disrupt the 
very premises of human life.… [T]he unwarranted belief that rivals 
are at work ganging up on you is a petty conspiracy theory; fear of 
Jews’ or Freemasons’ trying for global power is a world conspiracy 
theory” (1997: 21-2). Michael Barkun distinguishes three types in 
ascending order: “event”, “systemic” and “superconspiracies” (2006: 
6). The first refers to conspiracy theories about a single event like the 
Kennedy assassination or the attacks of 9/11. Systemic conspiracies have 
sweeping goals, like world domination, but refer to a rather simple 
notion of cabals: the Jews, the Freemasons, the Communists, the 
Capitalists. Superconspiracies are those in which all other conspiracies 
come together in one nested framework of conspiracy, where “at the 
summit of the conspiratorial hierarchy a distant but all powerful evil 
force” (2006: 6). David Icke’s reptilian theory, which will be further 
discussed in the next chapter, is a clear example of the latter.  
In contrast to the more common categorizations of scope and 
plausibility, which I believe are too general and too much guided by 
the need to discredit conspiracy theories, I will discern conspiracy 
theories here by their thematic content. This emphasis on thematic 
content, on meaning instead of truth, follows logically from the 
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cultural sociological approach that I take. The guiding question of this 
analysis is a simple one: what precisely are contemporary conspiracy 
theories about? What do these narratives of collusion and deceit look 
like? Who are the figures that are (allegedly) involved, how do the 
conspiracies work, and what, generally speaking, is their argument? 
The source of the data I use for this content analysis is the repository 
of articles housed on Dutch conspiracy websites. These materials 
provide an empirically-grounded selection of the narratives that are 
most popular today. Following the definitional approach to my 
research object, I selected those websites labelled as conspiracy 
websites both by people inside the milieu and by (critical) outsiders 
(see section 2.2). I will explore the variety of contemporary 
conspiracy theories with a theoretical argument in mind related to the 
specificity of the historical context. This is the premise that 
contemporary conspiracy culture has radically changed: from the 
scapegoating of an exotic Other, to a more diffuse suspiciousness 
about enemies from within (cf. Goldberg, 2001; Knight, 2000; 
Aupers, 2012; Melley, 2000, Olmsted, 2009).  
 
3.2.1 Modern Conspiracy Theories: Scapegoating an Exotic 
Other 
Conspiracy theories are obviously not a new thing. Allegations of 
conspiracy, political manipulation and deceit are as old as the way to 
Rome. Literally. The political culture of the ancient Romans was rife 
with concerns about conspiracy, argues Byford, and he calls the 
assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BC “the paradigmatic ‘inside-job’” 
(2011: 43). The writings of the old Athenians contain similar 
discourses of plots, intrigues, and conspiracies (Roisman, 2006). But 
also the alleged Jewish plot against Jesus, and the anti-Semitic ideas 
that haunted Christianity ever since, are prime examples of 
conspiratorial rhetoric in times long ago (Cohn, 1967; Pipes, 1997).  
Despite these early origins, most academics lay emphasis on 
the late eighteenth century as a significant period in the history of 
modern conspiracy theories (e.g. Byford, 2011; deHaven-Smith, 
2013; Hofstadter, 1996; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Pipes, 1997; Wood, 
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1982). These grand moments of political turmoil and rapid cultural 
change around the French and American revolutions have, following 
such authors, been strongly characterized by conspiratorial thought 
and allegations. But more than being mere historical contingencies, 
Wood explains in a compelling historical analysis, why and how 
“conspiratorial explanations became a major means by which 
educated men in the early modern period ordered and gave meaning 
to their political world” (1982: 411). To summarize, Wood argues 
that in the age of the Enlightenment, the concept of conspiracy fitted 
people’s modern understandings of political reality. When there is no 
longer a place for the random happenings of chance or of the 
supernatural, all effects must have their causes. No longer did God 
have a hand in how the world works, but causation came to be 
centered squarely on people. The idea of conspiracy resonated well, 
in other words, with the modern epistemology of mechanistic 
causality that was then gaining traction. Three types of conspiracy 
theories have since then been particularly prominent: secret societies, 
powerful factions, and Jews.  
Conspiracy theories about the machinations of secret 
societies are the most obvious group considering their prevalence in 
popular culture. Ever since ideological and political critics of the 
French revolution proclaimed that this political upheaval must have 
been the result of conspiring groups like the Freemasons, the 
Jacobins, the Philosophes, and, of course, the Illuminati, secret 
societies became the hallmark of modern conspiracy theories 
(Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011; Hofstadter, 1996; Pipes, 1997). As 
these exclusionary organizations promoted a radical and progressive 
Enlightenment agenda, such scholars argue, they became obvious and 
attractive scapegoats for counterrevolutionaries to blame for all the 
changes that were going on. Supported by the supposedly-scientific 
works of Augustin Barruel (1797) and John Robison (1797) which 
proved the existence of such conspiratorial plans behind this 
revolution, the belief that secret societies were orchestrating the 
course of history gained currency, and influenced not only future 
conspiracy theorists (Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011: 45) but also wider 
reactionary movements throughout Europe and the United States 
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(Hofstadter, 1996; Pipes, 1997: 71). Conspiracy theories about 
secret societies remain widespread and hugely popular.  
Today the Freemasons and the Illuminati still inform much 
conspiracy discourse—and their symbolism features notoriously in 
popular culture—while other types of secret societies increasingly 
compete for conspiratorial attention. I mean here the transnational 
clubs that emerged in the twentieth century: the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral 
Commission, and the Bilderberg Group. Although these are more 
exclusive and elusive organizations than secret societies, they all have 
an inner circle of powerful men pulling the strings of world affairs, or 
so the conspiracy theory goes. 
The idea that certain powerful factions or interest groups rule 
the scene of world politics is a second major category of modern 
conspiracy theories. Historians like Bailyn (1997) and Tackett (2000) 
start with the revolutionary days of the eighteenth century when the 
founding fathers of the newly established United States of America 
were convinced of the conspiratorial plans and actions of old-world 
powers to destabilize the new republic. These were even put to 
paper, as the Declaration of Independence is full of conspiracy 
accusations towards hostile powers, and in particular towards King 
George III of Great Britain who was thought to plot an “absolute 
tyranny over these states” (DeHaven-Smith, 2013: 7/53-76). 
DeHaven-Smith states, therefore, that “the United States was founded 
on a conspiracy theory” (2013: 7). Moreover, its “constitution was 
designed within the expectation that public officials are likely to 
conspire to abuse their powers and undermine popular control of 
government” (DeHaven-Smith, 2013: 58). James Madison contended 
in one of The Federalist Papers (a series arguing for the ratification of 
the United States Constitution) that the greatest threat to the 
constitutional order was coming from factions, that is, groups with 
political aims against the interest of other citizens or the community 
(Federalist 10). Conspiratorial suspicions were an intricate part of the 
political culture in these new sovereign states, DeHaven-Smith 
argues, and “for the next hundred years, American statesmen 
regularly voiced suspicions regarding antidemocratic conspiracies 
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when circumstantial evidence suggested hidden intrigue” (2013: 64). 
Madison’s fears of the hidden plots and schemes of certain powerful 
factions frequently reappear in the history of conspiracy theories and 
today. Interest groups like the military-industrial complex, 
communists, the pharmaceutical industry, the intelligence 
community, religious institutions, and, of course, international 
finance are all good examples of such factions said to conspire against 
the good of some or all.  
The faction of international finance is strongly linked to a 
third strand of conspiracy discourse, which is the enduring suspicion 
of a “Jewish world conspiracy” (Cohn, 1967). Anti-Semitic 
conspiratorial talk has a long history in the West, but it was not until 
the emancipation of the Jews in the nineteenth century that the notion 
of Jewish world domination became popular (Poliakov, 2003). In 
contrast to the medieval demonology that characterized Jews as 
pawns of Satan, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories transformed in the 
modern age of secular politics and Enlightenment philosophy into 
more mundane but nevertheless malevolent accusations (Byford, 
2011: 48). Jews were believed to use their money, knowledge, and 
influence to secretly rule the world behind-the-scenes. Such ideas of 
a Jewish world conspiracy fell on fertile ground in Europe since 
democratic revolutions benefited Jews when they were suddenly 
granted citizenship and property rights—“so they must have had a 
hand in it” (Cohn, 1967).  
The proliferation of one specific document was a turning 
point in the persistence of beliefs about a Jewish world conspiracy: 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This pamphlet purports to be the 
authentic minutes of a congress of Jewish leaders at the turn of the 
twentieth century, in which a detailed plan is laid out of how a Jewish 
world domination should be established. Although rather quickly 
exposed as an anti-Semitic hoax and a forgery of different bits and 
pieces of art, satire, and literature (e.g. Byford, 2011: 55), the 
Protocols gained massive popularity in the early twentieth century and 
was conveniently used in opportunistic politics and “agitation 
propaganda” throughout the world (Ellul, 1965). Russian tsarists and 
other opponents of the Bolshevik revolutions spread the document to 
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scapegoat the Jews (Pipes, 1997). It was an instant best-seller in post-
WWI Germany and became the Nazi’s “warrant for genocide” (Cohn, 
1967). And in Britain, Winston Churchill was not alone in holding 
Jews responsible for “the overthrow of civilization,” and Henry Ford 
helped to spread the document massively throughout the US by 
funding the printing of 500,000 copies (Byford, 2011: 53-54). 
Although most contemporary conspiracy theorists disassociate 
sharply from an overt anti-Semitism taking up the rhetoric of anti-
Zionism, some scholars argue this is simply a smokescreen, and 
continue to emphasize the enduring and inescapable relation that 
conspiracy theories have with anti-Semitism (e.g. Byford, 2011; 
Pipes, 1997). This is a complicated matter, considering that being 
called an anti-Semite may be an even more powerful disqualifying 
label than that of a conspiracy theorist, and these rhetorical dynamics 
warrant research of their own. I hope it suffices here to have shown 
the historical presence of the idea of a Jewish world domination in 
many conspiracy theories, and leave the question of whether and how 
such anti-Semitic notions endure in the contemporary conspiracy 
culture for future research. 
 Despite the markedly different narratives, rhetoric, and 
histories, what these three strands of conspiracy discourse share is 
their cultural meaning and social function. By scapegoating a concrete 
and identifiable enemy, conspiracy theories can bolster a strong sense 
of collective identity. This is what Knight calls “secure paranoia” 
(2000: 3-4). They may engender a sense of peril, but as the cabal is 
made known and their sinister objectives made clear, such conspiracy 
theories paradoxically generate a state of reassurance, of stability and 
order. This type of conspiracy discourse has often been deployed by 
those in power in various countries and of various political affiliations 
to unite a troubled people through the construction of a dangerous 
enemy. The Red scare in twentieth century United States or the anti-
Semitic/anti-Zionist conspiracy theories found in many Arab countries 
today are useful examples of this type of conspiracy theory. Given 
these characteristics of secure paranoia, of establishing order and 
stability in a chaotic world, and considering the underlying 
epistemology of mechanistic causality (Wood, 1982), I conceive of 
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such conspiracy theories as utterly modern products. They all imply, 
after all, a course of history that is manmade, where every effect has 
an identifiable cause, and every event an intentional agent. In other 
words, these conspiracy discourses keep it simple and predictable: all 
that moderns ever wanted (cf. Latour, 1993a).  
 
3.2.2 Postmodern Paranoia: Enemies from Within 
In recent decades, some critics have argued that alongside these 
historically-entrenched narratives based on scapegoating an allegedly-
dangerous Other, there has emerged a new type of conspiracy 
discourse which operates in different ways, performs other social 
functions, and taps different cultural repositories (e.g. Aupers, 2012; 
Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000, Olmsted, 2009). Basing themselves on 
popular culture (postwar literature,61 TV series, movies, 
documentaries, journalism) and certain case-studies (e.g. JFK 
assassination, 9/11 truth movement, computer viruses, gangster rap, 
the AIDS-crisis), such scholars contend that the logic of conspiracy 
has migrated since the long sixties from the extremist-fringe to the 
main stage of (American) culture. And with this movement to the 
center, conspiracy theories have transformed into a more general 
concern about the institutions that govern everyday life. “Paranoia is 
in bloom,” Aupers argues, “[it] has become a veritable sociological 
phenomenon,” and “evolved over the last decades from a deviant, 
exotic phenomenon to a mainstream narrative that has spread through 
the media and is increasingly normalized, institutionalized and 
commercialized” (2012: 21-24). Melley states that Americans (but 
Europeans just as well) “now account for all sorts of events—political 
conflicts, police investigations, juridical proceedings, corporate 
maneuvers, government actions—through conspiracy theory.” 
Melley sees this “broad cultural phenomenon” as a “pervasive set of 
anxieties about technologies, social organizations, and 
communication systems” (2000: 7). Knight confirms that “the images 
and rhetoric of conspiracy are no longer the exclusive house-style of 
the terminally paranoid. Instead, they circulate through both high and 
popular culture, and form part of everyday patterns of thought. 
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Conspiracy has become the default assumption in an age which has 
learned to distrust everything and everyone” (Knight, 2000: 3). In 
short, the logic of conspiracy has become both mainstream and widely 
popular: “we’re all conspiracy theorists now” (Fenster, 2008: 1, 
Knight, 2002: 6). 
The most important change in the discourse of conspiracy 
theories, these scholars argue, is that they are no longer about an alien 
power like the British, the Jews, the Communists, the Capitalists, or 
any other demonized Other threatening a stable us, but rather, as 
Goldberg (2001) puts it, the enemy now comes from within. 
Olmsted, for example, argues how “American conspiracy theories 
underwent a fundamental transformation in the twentieth century. 
No longer were conspiracy theorists chiefly concerned that alien 
forces were plotting to capture the federal government; instead, they 
proposed that the federal government itself was the conspirator” 
(2009: 4). Melley broadens the scope and argues that “the rhetoric of 
conspiracy is deployed to imagine the controlling power of private 
enterprise, of regulatory discourses and systems, and of the state, or 
of some bewildering combination of these entities” (2000: 9). Aupers 
picks up on this point and reasserts that “contemporary conspiracy 
culture is different: it is less about scapegoating a real or imagined 
‘Other’ but can be characterized as paranoia about the human-made 
institutions of modern society itself” (2012: 24).  
Indeed, people now hold the omnipotent state responsible 
for all kinds of tragic events; we tend to distrust the operations of 
scientists in pharmaceutical laboratories; we do not readily believe 
political representatives to be serving our interest nor that of the 
public good, and we are often suspect about new technologies 
propagated by giant corporations whose health effects are unknown. 
“Popular conspiracism,” Knight concludes, “has mutated from an 
obsession with a fixed enemy to a generalized suspicion about 
conspiring forces. It has shifted, in effect, from a paradoxically secure 
form of paranoia that bolstered one’s sense of identity, to a far more 
insecure version of conspiracy infused anxiety which plunges 
everything into an infinite regress of suspicion” (2000: 4). But more 
than a mere turn inwards, these new forms of conspiracy theories no 
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longer address a temporary disruption of the normal way things work, 
but increasingly “express a not entirely unfounded suspicion that the 
normal order of things itself amounts to a conspiracy” (Knight, 2000: 
3). Or, as Melley proposes, a common thought today is that “many of 
us are being influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in 
the patterns of our everyday lives” (2000: 1). Conspiracy is, in other 
words, everywhere and always around us.  
The cultural meaning and social function of conspiracy 
theories have changed accordingly. Whereas before, Knight holds, 
they “functioned to bolster a sense of an ‘us’ threatened by a sinister 
‘them’, more recently, however, the discourse of conspiracy has 
given expression to a far wider range of doubts, and has fulfilled far 
more diverse functions” (2000: 3). He refers, for example, to the 
growing distrust of the traditional epistemic authorities such as 
science, media, religion, and politics. In highly mediatized societies, 
in which scientific disputes are played out in the open, it becomes 
increasingly difficult, Knight argues, to know “which expert to 
trust—and how to decide whether someone is indeed an expert?” 
(2000: 95). The rhetoric of conspiracy articulates such doubts about 
the unstable nature of truth in postmodern societies: “they stage a 
contest over reality” (Melley, 2000: 20) and assume a “vertigo of 
interpretations” (Knight, 2000: 99). Aupers similarly recognizes that 
“this epistemological swamp is a fertile ground for the bloom of 
conspiracy theories: scientific truth claims are increasingly challenged 
because of the inconsistency of information, giving way to alternative, 
more private interpretations of the truth” (2012: 318). The modern 
culture of conspiracy is therefore not only about a distrust of 
established (epistemic) authorities, but involves all kinds of amateur 
investigative initiatives that seek to interrogate the veracity of such 
authorities. Whether it is the 9/11 truth movement, filmmakers like 
Oliver Stone, or the biomythography of gangster rap, all kinds of 
ordinary people increasingly set out to find the real truth behind the 
often-dubious course that history takes. “Interpretation,” Fenster 
argues, is “conspiracy theory’s key practice and source of pleasure” 
(2008: 14). Aupers speaks in this respect of conspiracy theorists as 
“prosumers”: “they read, negotiate and rewrite history and, in doing 
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so, they often produce an ever expanding patchwork theory of what 
‘really’ happened” (2012: 27). What these critics emphasize is that 
contemporary conspiracy theories are not so much spread by (state) 
elites to unite a people, but can better be seen as the popular and 
bottom-up practices of ordinary people looking, researching, and 
interpreting a variety of consequential events. 
Contemporary conspiracy theories do not only channel 
discontents about the workings of societal institutions and the 
knowledge they produce, but also give expression to the more diffuse 
feelings of uncertainty and anxiety induced by living in 
hyperconnected-yet-alienating technological societies. 
“‘Conspiracy,’” Melley argues, “has come to signify a broad array of 
social controls [and] rarely signifies a small, secret plot anymore. 
Instead, it frequently refers to the workings of a large organization, 
technology or system—a powerful and obscure entity so dispersed that 
it is the antithesis of the traditional conspiracy” (2000: 8, original 
italics). The large abstract systems that surround us every day, these 
authors argue, bring forth an ontological insecurity: all kinds of fears 
and fantasies about opaque and autonomously working structures like 
the bureaucracy, financial markets, or any other modern system that 
seem out of control and out to get us. “Conspiracy theories,” Aupers 
concludes, “are cultural responses to these developments—they are 
strategies to rationalize [such] anxieties by developing explicable 
accounts for seemingly inexplicable forces” (2012: 28). What was 
once a clear and concrete enemy has transformed into elusive and 
intangible webs of conspiring powers: “a rigid and detailed conspiracy 
theory about a small cabal of ruthless agents has given way to a more 
fluid and provisional sense of there being large, institutional forces 
controlling our everyday life” (Knight, 2000: 32).  
Taking this argument one step further, Melley argues that 
“this new model of ‘conspiracy’ no longer simply suggests that 
dangerous agents are secretly plotting against us, on the contrary, it 
implies, rather dramatically, that whole populations are being openly 
manipulated without their knowledge” (2000: 3, original emphasis). 
These scholars contend that in complex risk-societies, the assertion of 
malevolent cabals pulling the strings behind world events simply 
514059-L-bw-harambam
d, dZhd, /^ Khd d,Z 
ϳϰ 
becomes implausible. Knight even goes as far to argue that “the 
contemporary discourse of conspiracy gives narrative expression to 
the possibility of conspiracy without conspiring, with the congruence 
of vested interests that can only be described as conspiratorial, even 
when we know there has probably been no deliberate plotting” (2000: 
32). Just as the notion of conspiracy took hold with the acceptance of 
mechanistic causality in the eighteenth century (Wood, 1982), these 
contemporary forms of conspiracy discourse are validated by 
postmodern understandings of complex causality, chaos theory, and 
interconnectedness, or so Knight suggests (2000: 204-241). 
In contrast to the earlier, comparatively-straightforward 
scapegoating of an outside threat to bolster in-group identities, 
postmodern paranoia lacks all such clarity. Instead, it reverberates 
with an everyday suspicion towards the institutions of modern life 
that we are always and everywhere confronted with. Even though 
these authors interchangeably refer to conspiracy and paranoia, I have 
used the term postmodern paranoia here to circumscribe these new 
forms of conspiracy theories, because this term better captures the 
cultural meanings that are involved. It is, for example, postmodern 
paranoia because these new types of conspiracy theories give 
expression to the uncertainties people experience of living in 
globalized, risk-saturated, and hyper-connected worlds. But it is also 
postmodern because these new forms of conspiracy theories articulate 
a fundamental insecurity about truth and reality, and challenge the 
authority of those allowed to make such claims. It is postmodern 
paranoia, then, because such explanations of the world no longer 
provide the stability they once gave by marking a clear and concrete 
enemy, but instead make the normal order of things suspect, and see 
elusive dangers always around us. In sum, it this radical uncertainty 
characterizing the contemporary culture of conspiracy that grants 
postmodern paranoia its name. 
 
3.3 Conspiracy Theories Today  
In the following section, I will elaborate the conspiracy theories that 
are popular today based on a content analysis of the articles posted on 
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seven major Dutch conspiracy websites (see section 2.3). Since most 
of these websites position themselves as news sites, many of the 
featured articles are about dramatic events like the unnatural deaths 
of important persons or the larger societal catastrophes of plane 
crashes and terrorist attacks. These shocking events are commonly 
characterized by uncertainty and mystery: what really happened is 
often in question. In the conspiracy milieu, this absence of conclusive 
explanations gives rise to suspicions and accusations about what might 
have happened, and about why it might have happened. However, the 
conspiracy theories surrounding each unexplainable event are not 
unique or singular, but they are informed and structured by 
fundamental and institutionalized narratives of conspiracy. In other 
words, each new event that attracts conspiratorial accusations will not 
generate a completely idiosyncratic theory, but is often structured by 
established narratives of conspiracy and deceit.  
I will give here two examples. Conspiracy theories about the 
crash of the MH-17 plane above Ukraine in 2014 clearly have certain 
particularities that apply to this case only, but they are also structured 
by more general ideas of conspiracy that have a longer history in 
conspiracy circles. I refer here to the notion of false flag operations: 
covert, inside jobs designed to make the public believe the enemy is 
behind an event so that a coup or a war can be staged. The MH-17 
crash is often understood in the conspiracy milieu as just such a false 
flag attack,62 just like Pearl Harbor and especially 9/11. On a similar 
note, conspiracy theories about the 2014 outbreak (and persistence) 
of Ebola in West African countries are informed by established 
narratives of bio-warfare well-known in the conspiracy milieu. Similar 
to conspiracy discourses on outbreaks of HIV and SARS, such 
arguments accuse US government agencies like the CIA of secretly 
carrying out research on biological warfare in African labs, and are 
then responsible for leaking the virus.63 It is not my intention to go 
into the details of each of these events and the conspiracy theories that 
surround them; instead, I will discuss such established narratives that 
inform and underpin the conspiracy theories of these singular, 
dramatic events. 
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Although the generic conspiracy narratives that I am 
interested in are quite diverse themselves, there are certain thematic 
continuities by which to order this variety. In line with the emic 
classifications of conspiracy theories that I have encountered on the 
websites detailed above, I distinguish six key categories of conspiracy 
narratives: finance, media, corporatism, science; government, and 
the supernatural. I will show what each category of conspiracy 
narratives entails based on my analysis of the material found on these 
seven websites. I do not strive, however, to compress all such 
conspiracy theories into one narrative that should represent the full 
extent of the category in question, but instead I wish to highlight some 
dominant lines that best illustrate the matter. As these categories are 
ideal-typical, it is evident that some conspiracy theories can belong to 
more than one category. This is more than a mere possibility: 
conspiracy theories are notorious for connecting the dots between 
separate domains, and as such defy precise categorization (cf. Barkun, 
2006: 4; Byford, 2000: 34; Melley, 2000: 2). Besides providing an 
empirically-rich and analytically-clear understanding of the many 
different conspiracy theories popular today, I thus set out to 
investigate the way that these articles resonate with the modern or 
postmodern forms of conspiracy theories. Note that each 
introductory quote in the following sections is cited by authors from 
these seven websites, and are deployed by them to support their 
argument. As such, each section begins with an epigraph that is an 
emic illustration of the central concern of each category. 
 
3.4.1 Modern Finance: The Biggest Scam in the History of 
Mankind 
 
It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand our 
banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would 
be a revolution tomorrow64 
—Henry Ford, 1932 
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Given the historical prominence of a (Jewish) world conspiracy of 
bankers set to bring the world to its knees, it is quite surprising that 
very few of the main scholars on conspiracy theories have paid 
attention to those concerned with money and the finance industry, 
which are especially popular now. Scholars in the cultural studies 
tradition like Melley and Knight do not mention such topics at all, 
while those emphasizing the more traditional forms of conspiracy 
demonology like Pipes and Barkun give occasional, oblique 
references, but never give these theories their due analysis. But if 
conspiracy theories are products of their time, as I will argue in this 
chapter, then it should not be a surprise that the world of banking and 
high finance occupies a dominant place in the narratives circulating on 
conspiracy websites today. The worldwide financial crisis of 2008, 
the public rescue of banks and insurance companies deemed too-big-
too-fail, the resulting economic recessions and depressions, the 
massive expansions of our money supply by central banks in efforts to 
augment economic growth,  the many sovereign debt crises 
throughout Europe around 2011, the austerity measures forced upon 
many countries in response, all have left their mark on the conspiracy 
milieu and the theories in vogue. In the following I will discuss how 
finance plays a role in contemporary conspiracy narratives along three 
major themes: the workings of the Western monetary system, the 
role of central banks in that system, and the historical connection 
between powerful banks and powerful banking families. 
 Many, if not all, conspiracy websites like to start their 
sections on finance by explaining “the mystery of banking”65 and how 
this “well-kept secret”66 is “one of the biggest scams in the history of 
mankind.”67 In short, the story of banking as a source of wide-scale 
fraud is as follows: in the beginning, people used gold and other 
precious metals to make financial transactions, but as this was rather 
unsafe and inconvenient, it became commonplace to deposit these 
metals at the vaults of goldsmiths who gave credit receipts in return. 
Soon, these rights to claim replaced gold altogether in the trading of 
goods, and modern money was born. Because only few people 
actually redeemed the gold, goldsmiths soon started issuing more of 
these receipts to people in need of money for a small fee, called 
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interest, and so modern banking was born. The former goldsmiths 
turned into big multinational banks, but, so the story goes, they still 
acted as mere intermediaries between people with money (creditors) 
and those in need of money (debtors). This “fairytale of modern 
banking” is repeated on conspiracy websites ad naseum, because 
“everything we know about money is not just wrong, it’s 
backwards.”68 Banks do not allocate the money they hold in reserve, 
but instead “create it out of thin air” by issuing loans.69 Money is debt; 
when a debt is made, money is created. Further, because banks are 
legally allowed to issue loans in amounts that are ten-, twenty-, thirty-
fold what they actually hold in reserve, the “biggest secret” is 
therefore that “banks can sell money, without really having it, and 
then charge interest over it! That’s one hell of a business, huh!”70  
The complicated story of how this fractional reserve system 
works is ardently explained on these sites, but the bottom line tends 
to be that we have “a worldwide monetary system completely based 
on hot air.”71 Such articles argue that “only five percent of all the 
money is real money in the form of notes and coins, the rest is 
artificially created by banks and exists only as numbers on bank 
accounts.”72 Others emphasize that even real money is not so real 
anymore, since Nixon announced in 1971 that US dollars could no 
longer be exchanged for gold.73 All we have is trust, faith, or hope 
that people will accept the intrinsically-worthless pieces of paper that 
we call money in exchange for their goods. Money is, in short, “a 
virtual illusion.”74 And while “banks continue to satisfy their greed by 
abusing their monopoly position in the market of illusionary money 
creation,”75 the true winner a top this “pyramid scheme called high 
finance” is the bank of all banks: independent central banks.76 Such 
articles compare the banking system to a game of poker, where the 
central banks “supply the people with (a limited amount of self-made) 
chips, say 50, but they don’t play along. The players win or lose, but 
need to give back those chips they have lent at the end of the game, 
including a 10% interest.”77 It is incredibly paradoxical: “no matter 
what happens, at the end of the game you have to get back 55 chips, 
more than there even exists!”78 The gravity of this worldwide scam is not 
even the exorbitant self-enrichment of bankers at the expense of all 
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ordinary players, but as such articles convey, the “fundamentally 
flawed” and “fundamentally unstable” nature of this monetary 
system.79 
So how did we all end up in this dangerous pyramid scheme 
of greedy bankers, and why do we continue to pay interest to banks 
for money that was never there in the first place? To give one answer, 
articles on my source websites hold, we have to go back to Christmas 
Eve, 1913.80 That evening the US Senate passed the Federal Reserve Act 
after months of fierce negotiations. This piece of legislation would 
permanently reform the monetary system by putting control of the 
nation’s money supply in the hands of a Federal Reserve. Although a 
vote of 43 to 25 seems straightforward, it remains highly 
controversial today, since nearly thirty senators (out of 98) left for 
the coming holiday before the bill finally came to a vote.81 This was 
no coincidence, according to conspiracy articles, but was consciously 
planned to ensure the results that the proponents sought.82 A small 
group of the world’s most powerful bankers devised the plan to create 
this act three years earlier during a secret stay at the private resort of 
Wall Street banker J.P. Morgan on Jekyll Island, Georgia.83 Along 
with Senator Aldrich, attendees of this First Names Club were executive 
bankers associated with the Rockefellers, the Morgans, the 
Rothschilds, and the Warburgs.84 The plan of these wealthy bankers 
was, following such conspiracy theories, “to steal the US dollar from 
the American citizens via the ‘official route.’”85 This meant that in 
order “to be sold to the public and to the politicians, it needed a 
trustworthy name,” and so, the article continues, the name Federal 
Reserve System “effectively diverted attention from the de facto 
concentration of power with New York bankers.”86 The undeniable 
truth is, however, that the Fed was never really federal, nor a full 
reserve system, but was and has always been a privately-owned 
institution controlled by the largest banks.87 Worst of all, these 
authors stress, the Fed is not accountable to anyone, not to the US 
Congress, neither to the US President, nor to the American public. 
Becoming aware of his “disastrous decision to create the ‘Fed 
Monster,’ president Woodrow Wilson allegedly made an apology 
that is widely shared on conspiracy websites: “I am a most unhappy 
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man, I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great industrial nation 
is [now] controlled by its system of credit...in the hands of a few 
men.”88 
These conspiracy theories about the world of banking are 
extremely popular in the conspiracy milieu, and considered by many 
as fundamental to an understanding of how the rest of the world 
works: as one article puts it, “money lies at the base of all wrongs.”89 
This assumption of the financial grid of society determining the course 
of history—further popularized in conspiracy theory documentaries 
like Zeitgeist—clearly resonates with Marxian notions of the Unterbau 
(or Base) structuring society’s Überbau (or Superstructure). Like 
Marx (and many of his followers), conspiracy theorists see the world 
as ruled by a financial elite consisting of powerful banking families, 
central banks, and those other institutions at the top of the financial 
pyramid. But next to such traditional characteristics that resemble 
modern conspiracy theories, these conspiracy narratives about the 
financial world give expression to the more diffuse feelings of awe and 
disquiet that are characteristic of postmodern paranoia. They 
reverberate with an ontological insecurity, an uneasiness and 
discomfort with a system as fundamental as our worldwide financial 
system. What seems straightforward and mundane to many—money 
is, after all, such an unquestioned object in everyday life—appears 
opaque, esoteric, and fragile to conspiracy theorists. Banking looks 
more like magic nowadays. The virtualization of our financial system 
that took off after the gold standard was set loose, but culminated in 
the financial crisis of 2008, only added to such convictions. Just what 
is the material reality of money nowadays? 
 
3.4.2 The Media Masters: Monotony, Manipulation and 
Mind-Control 
 
Whoever controls the media, controls the minds of the masses. 
—Jim Morrison, the Doors90 
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In our mediatized global world where news images have 
unprecedented performative powers, the provision of information 
and entertainment is important weaponry in the battle for the minds 
of people, and is therefore a central concern for many in the 
conspiracy milieu. The ideal image of the media as democratic and 
emancipatory, guarding the political process with constant vigilance 
and providing people with trustworthy knowledge of what goes on in 
the world, has been shattered by scandals and baseness (Herman and 
Chomsky, 2008). Clearly the media is a marvelous instrument of 
mass-manipulation, as media outlets can shape public opinion in 
insidious ways, “so that the public thought such manufactured 
opinions were their own.”91 Articles on these conspiracy websites 
incorporate the thought and cite the works of early mass-opinion 
scholars like Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, and Edward Bernays 
(“a nephew of Sigmund Freud, a fact never mentioned”92) to support 
their views.93 To give an example, in an article on the manipulative 
powers of news and current affairs shows on television, which are said 
to “keep us fearful so that the state can ‘guard our safety,’” one author 
makes explicit reference to the ideas of Edward Bernays:  
[I]n his 1928 book Propaganda, Bernays said that “the conscious and 
intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the 
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who 
manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible 
government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are 
governed, our minds molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, 
largely by men we have never heard of. It is they who pull the wires 
which control the public mind.”94  
The belief that the media controls our minds is central to many 
conspiracy narratives and motivates the independent news platforms 
that regularly spring up from the conspiracy milieu.  
A common starting point of such narratives is the so-called 
“death of the press,”95 referring to the fact that the production of news 
is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few multinational 
corporations. These articles often refer to the US, where only six 
companies own ninety percent of the media: General Electric, 
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NewsCorp, Walt Disney, Viacom, AOLTimeWarner, and CBS.96 Other 
articles report on a similar demise of independent journalism in 
Europe, and in the Netherlands in particular only one independent 
news outlet remains standing while the rest are part of conglomerates 
like Bertelsmann, Sanoma, and other powerful business 
families/investment funds.97 Much to their dismay, such authors 
emphasize, “the cacophony of visions and standpoints in the sixties 
and seventies” has given way to a “homogenous mass of politically 
correct views and no alternatives.”98 Given the consolidation of media 
ownership into a powerful few, these articles hold, what can citizens 
expect from the news? Manipulation in the interest of the rulers is the 
univocal answer that can be heard on all conspiracy websites, and 
articles report on the many ways that the news is biased, ignored, and 
distorted in favor of a powerful elite.99 While some speak of the 
power of international (and privately owned) news agencies like 
Reuters and AP to filter information,100 others point to the “intimate 
relations” between journalists and high-government officials,101 
leading to a situation in which “the mass-media almost always parrot 
the bellicose language of the authorities.”102 The commonly-shared 
conviction that a corrupted media is distributing propaganda instead 
of news has been widely reaffirmed in the conspiracy milieu. A 
concrete example would be the recent revelations of former 
Frankfurter Allgemeine whistleblower Udo Ulfkotte, who wrote a book 
revealing how “journalists are bribed by intelligence agencies like the 
CIA and international think thanks to betray the people by writing 
pro-NATO articles.”103 Such revelations are—surprisingly? —not 
covered by the Dutch media at the time of this writing.  
Besides the obvious forms of manipulation and propaganda 
via the distortion of news, contemporary conspiracy narratives also 
emphasize another, hidden force of the media located in the form of 
entertainment. Much like the Frankfurter critics of the culture 
industry, the articles on these websites describe the hypnotizing, 
mind-numbing, and mind-controlling workings of the entertainment 
industry. The television business is a first target of such conspiracy 
critiques, as “watching TV has proven hypnotizing effects. When you 
watch television, your mind is put into a state of hypnosis and is more 
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suggestible. Why do you think it is called TV programming in the first 
place?”104 Many articles report on the many ways that the 
entertainment industry uses television to “keep us dumb, fearful, and 
docile by appealing to our ‘lower self’: sex, violence, ego, murders, 
looks, fame, wars, and competition.”105 An often-mentioned and 
much-despised strategy to brainwash people is subliminal messaging, 
the covert transmission of images and text “meant to sidestep 
cognitive perception and thus to influence people on a subconscious 
level.”106 “Without you knowing it,” one article warns, “their 
convictions become part of your system.”107 These websites have 
whole exposés written about this controversial technique of 
manipulation in which authors refer to the works of Freud, Jung, and 
Bernays, or to the industry-funded research on the effective use of 
subliminal messaging.108 The awe with which they conclude is 
common: “the subconscious is still a mystery.”109 
Another strategy used by the entertainment industry to 
manipulate us is the very opposite of subliminal messaging, it is a 
tactic used to hide in the open. Future plans of societal changes are 
presented as post-apocalyptic (science) fiction in major Hollywood 
blockbusters so that people can become accustomed to how their 
grim future will look and, when the time comes, accept it more 
readily. Meanwhile, “critics addressing these changes can be pushed 
aside as having watched too many movies, brilliant isn’t it?”110 This 
notion of predictive programming originally developed by Alan Watts is 
now widely shared in the conspiracy milieu, where films like Minority 
Report, The Hunger Games, and The Dark Knight Rises are interpreted as 
such.111 There are also concrete allegations of connections between 
Hollywood and the CIA who “in exchange for insiders advise, know-
how and material [allegedly] demand pro US script changes.”112 
Similar to the brainwashing by Hollywood, the music industry is 
despised because it tends to “glorify debauchery, violence and 
extreme luxury.”113 Such articles explain how artists like Rihanna, 
Jay-Z, Lady Gaga and Nicki Minaj are actually “Illuminati puppets,” 
promoting an agenda of “oversexualization” befitting the greater 
strategy of an “occult elite” to loosen the morals of our populations.114 
The artists are, however, not to blame, since these powerful groups 
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force them to cooperate and hide satanic symbols (rain, snakes, 
triangles, etc.) in their music clips and performances because 
otherwise their career (or life) is in danger.115 
Conspiracy narratives regarding the media industry express 
immense concern about the functioning of an institution that is vital 
to a well-functioning democracy. As the fourth estate is in the hands 
of a few gigantic media conglomerates nowadays, what can be 
expected from their critical analyses and power-checking ambition, 
conspiracy theorists wonder. Instead of news, we get propaganda. 
These critiques of the contemporary media landscape clearly 
resemble the influential work of media scholars (e.g. Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2010[1944]; Champlin and Knoedler, 2002; Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988; Jackson, 2009), but they also resonate with 
modern forms of conspiracy theorizing. Yet, such conspiracy 
narratives of a mediatized world also portray an unmistakable 
postmodern paranoia: without us knowing it, we are brainwashed by the 
manipulative powers of the culture industry. The sentiment of these 
articles is one of existential uncertainty: the unseen mechanisms of 
media masters can shape, mold, and influence what we feel, think, 
and like, and constitute an invisible force. Can we trust our own 
opinions anymore? 
 
3.4.3 Big Bad Business and the Rise of the Corporatocracy 
 
Multinational corporations do control. They control the politicians, 
they control the media, they control the pattern of consumption, 
entertainment, and thinking. They’re destroying the planet and 
laying the foundation for violent outbursts and racial division. 
—Jerry Brown, 34th and 39th Governor of California116 
The contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories has often been 
related to the rise of a global free market in which giant multinational 
corporations increasingly rule the world. For some critics, Willman 
notes (citing Jameson in particular), conspiracy theory is a symptom 
of multinational capitalism (2002: 30). “Conspiracy,” according to 
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Jameson, is a “desperate attempt to represent […] the total logic of 
late capitalism” (1991: 286). He believes that conspiracy theorists 
have a troubled understanding of global economics and wrongfully 
identify secret plots instead of seeing the system itself as the cause of 
oppression (e.g. Mason, 2002: 42). Others are less inclined to 
criticize conspiracy theories for failing to adhere to their own (macro) 
economic ideology, and recognize the comforting or sense-making 
function they might have: “in a world in which the triumph of laissez-
faire capitalism has come to be taken for granted, for many people 
there is no way of framing an analysis of what is happening or 
registering their dissatisfaction other than in the “crackpot” rhetoric 
of the conspiracy theorist” (Knight, 2000: 37). Whether conspiracy 
theorists imagine the global economic system of late capitalism 
accurately or not, what precisely do they have to say about the powers 
of multinational corporations? 
A first and obvious observation is the extensive attention that 
these conspiracy websites pay to such matters of global free market 
capitalism. Zapruder.nl boasts almost five hundred articles on what 
they call “the most dangerous virus on the world: corporatism.”117 
Others speak similarly of large corporations as “a perverted form of 
capitalism, always on the hunt for the world’s most profitable 
projects, natural resources and businesses in an insatiable hunger for 
more.”118 Authors of such articles are eager to demonstrate how the 
yearly revenues of those giant companies often surpass the gross 
national products of whole countries: “Royal Dutch Shell is for 
example just as big as Greece.”119 and “Wall-Mart exceeds countries 
like South Africa, Singapore and Finland.”120 Naturally they question 
their power in light of their economic weight. When, in 2011, a trio 
of Swiss complex systems researchers revealed how out of a global 
network of transnational corporations (43,060 in number) a tightly 
knit core of only 147 corporations controlled a disproportionate 40% 
of that entire economic system (Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston, 
2011), many in the conspiracy milieu felt vindicated in their 
convictions. In the words of one, “a beloved conspiracy theory is that 
the world is ruled by a puissant and super rich elite, scientific research 
now proves there’s a strong kernel of truth in it.”121 Most conspiracy 
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websites were quick to publish articles announcing this scientific 
recognition of what they were always saying.122 If we believe 
governments to rule the world, such articles proclaim, we believe in 
an illusion; multinational corporations are simply more powerful than 
nation states.123 Even stronger put, “corporations do not only have 
governments in their pocket, but complete countries and trade 
zones.”124 In short: “multinationals simply pull the strings.”125 This a 
huge problem, they argue, because “corporations only have one goal: 
profit. Profit at all costs. Profit at the expense of men, animals, rain 
forests, seas and oceans, all life on earth. The corporation is a parasite, 
an all-consuming monster, it has no remorse.”126 
Different from a purely anti-capitalistic discourse, since 
profit is not eschewed per se, the articles on these conspiracy websites 
mostly criticize the monopolization of whole industries by such giant 
conglomerates, their widespread political infiltrations, and the 
corporate colonization of the planet. Where conspiracy theories 
might have spoken before of the military-industrial complex to denote 
these rather unbridled powers of multinational corporations, today 
there is a particular prefix at our disposal to designate the precise 
corporate culprit. Conspiracy theorists speak now of Big Oil, Big 
Pharma, Big Food or Big Agriculture to refer to the group of 
multinational corporations that dominate these markets, and rule the 
planet. Although the conspiracy narratives about each of these Big Bad 
Businesses have their own particularities (and make no mistake: authors 
of such articles go to great depths to explain the precise causes and 
consequences of corporate foul play), there are nevertheless certain 
common trademarks that these websites all address. For example, 
such articles demonstrate how multinational corporations influence 
national and international legislation, such as new trade agreements 
and safety regulations,127 and how they distort the scientific 
knowledge production of new products and technologies.128 They 
investigate how multinational corporations massively avoid taxation 
by a smart funneling of profits through worldwide tax regimes,129 how 
they exploit people all over the world, including their own labor 
force, even to the extent of causing mass suicides,130 how they 
manipulate and deceive their own customers,131 how they take 
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control of natural resources,132 and sometimes even help to stage 
coups and start wars to their benefit here.133 Whether such articles 
are about Big Oil, Big Pharma, Big Food or Big Agriculture, the 
allegations are markedly similar, as is the conclusion: “multinational 
corporations are almost by definition evil.”134  
To give an impression of how such conspiracy narratives look 
in more detail, I will take one industry as an example. While any of 
the Big Bad Businesses would qualify, I will concentrate on the industry 
that “controls what enters our stomachs,”135 that is, Big Agriculture. 
One dominant conspiracy narrative about the oil-intensive 
agricultural industry is specifically about those in the seeds and crop-
cultivation business, including Dow Chemical, DuPont, Cargill, 
Syngenta, and of course Monsanto. In total, they are said to control 
and dominate agriculture worldwide: “they want a monopoly on the 
world’s food supply and on their way suffocate whole continents.”136 
The most despised strategy to achieve this global domination is 
through the so-called privatization of nature. Since the US Supreme 
Court ruled in 1980 that living organisms could be patented if they 
were genetically changed into something new, a worldwide business 
started to develop around genetically-modified crops.137 The next 
step for Big Agriculture was to enforce trade liberalizations, opening 
agricultural sectors worldwide in order to convince governments to 
allow GMOs. Finally they hard to entice farmers worldwide to use 
their unique seeds (and accompanying proprietary fertilizers and 
pesticides), based on the promise of reaping greater harvests and thus 
earning more money.138 Articles on these websites report on the 
“aggressive lobby practices in European countries to break the 
resistance against GMO’s,”139 and make claims about how the US 
military and government are helping such efforts.140 They also report 
on the way American diplomats have put local government officials in 
third-world countries under pressure to use such crops, even to the 
extent of widespread bribery in the case of Indonesia.141  
Despite the promises, such articles hold, farmers using these 
seeds do not always fare well: food production may rise initially, but 
after some years the yields of these crops returns to its former level, 
while the soil on which they grow depletes completely. The long-
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term contracts these (often illiterate) farmers sign with such 
companies leave them with huge debts, as these obligations far 
outweigh their diminishing earnings. Moreover, as newly-developed 
seeds are often made infertile, the traditional strategy to save a part 
of the seeds of one harvest for next year is made obsolete or simply 
illegal by contract. Every year, farmers are obligated to buy new 
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Articles on these websites repeatedly 
emphasize how this spiral of indebtedness forced over 200,000 
farmers in India into suicide.142 These conspiracy websites conclude 
that the hidden agenda of Big Agriculture and their brilliantly-marketed 
green revolution is “the establishment of full control over the very basis 
of human survival: the provision of our daily bread.”143 The allegation 
that Monsanto now (partly) owns the world’s most powerful army 
(Academi, formerly Blackwater),144 and its revolving doors connection 
with top CIA and US government positions, only adds support to 
these convictions.145 
If this closer look at these Big Bad Business conspiracy 
narratives makes one thing clear, it is that they can hardly be dismissed 
as degraded and desperate attempts to imagine our current economic 
system (cf. Jameson, 1991). Many of these analyses are well-
researched; they often draw from studies done in the non-profit 
sector or in academia, and portray an in-depth knowledge of the 
industry at stake. In contrast to the denigrating notion of conspiracy 
theorists as “people try[ing] to gain a handle on the complexities of 
social and economic causation in an era of rapid globalization” 
(Knight, 2002: 8), these conspiracy narratives express concrete and 
well-informed discontent with the way that giant multinationals 
operate at the expense of humanity. They are in this way not very 
different from the analyses of anti-globalist activists or leftist academic 
scholars (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Juris, 2008; Klein, 2007, 
2015). These conspiracy narratives entail, on the one hand, concrete 
plots and schemes by a powerful cabal (in this case, the elites in charge 
of those multinational corporations), and are reminiscent of the 
modern conspiracy theories. But these narratives also involve the 
shadier practices in which it becomes unclear and ambiguous what 
really happens and who is involved. Big Bad Business is everywhere and 
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unavoidable, giving rise to the ontological insecurities so 
characteristic of postmodern paranoia. These multinational 
corporations manipulate our social and economic lives, and even 
penetrate our very bodies: they control what we eat, drink, put on 
our skin, and wash with. Suspicion abounds.  
 
3.4.4 Corrupted Science: Financial Pollution and the 
Suppression of Dissidence 
 
No science is immune to the infection of politics and the corruption 
of power. 
—Jacob Bronowksi146 
In a world where science is the most dominant epistemic authority 
and which relies heavily on scientific expertise to function properly 
(e.g. Brown, 2009; Gieryn, 1999, Harding, 1986), it may be no 
surprise that there is an abundance of conspiracy theories about the 
functioning of this very institution. Dutch conspiracy websites 
accordingly pay ample attention to scientific authorities and 
institutions, each with distinct categories dedicated to “the 
‘TomTom’ of life itself.”147 These categories include articles 
discussing matters as diverse as the risks of new technologies, the 
strategic suppression of (allegedly) groundbreaking inventions, and 
the flaws in certain scientifically-acclaimed truths. A common thread 
in this diverse set of articles is the questioning of the popular image of 
scientists as critical and morally superior collectives on a disinterested 
quest for better knowledge of the world around us.148 In reality, they 
argue, science is often dogmatic, not particularly noble, and easily 
distracted by ulterior motives. Science, thus, features in 
contemporary conspiracy theories most often as a corrupted 
institution. Scientific research, they argue, is all-too-often defrauded 
by “people for whom doubt is not the basis for new research, but 
money, fame and power.”149 Articles with titles like The Cesspool of 
Fraudulent Scientific Publications150 or The Quagmire of Science151 describe 
instances in which scientists manipulated test results, left out 
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inconvenient segments of their research, or even fabricated whole 
datasets (e.g. the Stapel affair). Although these are serious issues, and 
such articles stress that “it is high time to clean up this mess in 
science,”152 the real problem in their eyes is the close connection with 
the corporate world, and the resultant financial interests that “pollute 
the pool of scientific knowledge.”153 Whether it is the food we eat, 
the cosmetics we put on our skin, the technologies we use each day, 
or the medications we take, “if scientific research panders to the 
interests of large corporations,”154 these conspiracy websites argue, 
then the public is in serious peril because private profit is given 
preference over the public good.155 
Although most articles speak of science in general terms, 
most often these critiques from the conspiracy world are targeted at 
medicine, ‘the most visible form of applied science’ (Epstein, 1996: 
6). One particularly virulent example of such conspiracy narratives 
concerns the ‘myth of vaccinations.’156 In general, conspiracy 
websites have a negative stance towards vaccinations because they are, 
in their opinion, “unnecessary and even dangerous because they 
undermine the immune system.”157 Public health officials like to say 
that the widespread eradication of diseases like polio, measles, or 
smallpox is the result of national vaccination campaigns, but, these 
conspiracy websites hold, this is actually the result of better hygiene, 
better living conditions, and better nutrition.158 The correlation 
found in epidemiological research between national vaccination 
campaigns and decreasing communicable disease is therefore a 
spurious one. In fact, the whole scientific foundation on which the 
efficacy of vaccinations rests proves a false one, such articles argue, as 
“immunity does not require anti-bodies”159 and “the innate immune 
system is much more important than the adaptive.”160 However, as 
pharmaceuticals have clear financial benefits to promote vaccinations 
as being socially beneficial, and medical science is heavily dependent 
on their funding, much is done to keep the assumption alive that 
vaccinations protect us from diseases. Such articles speak of the 
manipulation of research designs, data massaging, and outright fraud 
of scientific test results to show the effectivity of vaccinations,161 they 
expose how conflicts of interest influence public health policies,162 or 
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show the propaganda techniques used to manipulate the public to 
maintain their “faith in the religion of sponsored science.”163 But more 
than feelings of being fooled by the pharmaceutical industry to buy 
into smart marketing campaigns, many conspiracy websites point to 
the dangers of vaccinations. They show, with scientific research, 
exposés of whistleblowers, and testimonies of affected parents, that 
vaccinations can lead to all kinds of autoimmune and neurological 
disorders, autism, diabetes, narcolepsy, paralyses and even to 
death.164 These accusations are, of course, fiercely disputed by most 
of the scientific establishment, and the pharmaceutical industry in 
particular. 
A second dominant frame through which conspiracy 
narratives picture science is the suppression of dissident thought. 
Although both mainstream scientists and conspiracy theorists would 
agree that science fares well with critique and skepticism, the latter 
group holds that science has increasingly lost this founding principle. 
As the author of one of such articles explains: “scientific doubt has 
become rather selective, yes, Descartian doubt comes now with a 
‘scientific’ disclaimer.’165 One of these scientific orthodoxies that 
does not allow for fundamental doubt or critique is, following these 
sites, climate change. “Is climate guru Al Gore right,” one of these 
websites wonders,  
when he says that man is responsible for global warming? And if not, 
who profits from that presupposition? More and more critical voices 
are heard, but media and politics do not seem to care. Why not? The 
WantToKnow team believes that critical voices deserve serious 
attention. Or do you want to believe Al Gore on his blue eyes?166  
These websites argue that “the mass hysteria around global warming 
is based on faith and not on science,”167 they point to the many 
manipulations and extortions in the research supporting human 
induced climate change,168 and praise Mr. FOIA, who leaked files 
disclosing a massive scientific conspiracy, later coined Climategate.169 
Besides substantive doubts about Anthropocene global warming, 
these websites express alarm about the treatment of skeptics, arguing 
that one “who dares to express a critical note is aggressively 
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silenced.”170 Such authors are similarly irked when “proponents of the 
global warming swindle use statements like ‘but Science says…,’ as 
if ‘Science’ speaks with one voice. Every scientist knows that every 
theory can always be challenged and refuted.”171 But there are more 
“holy cows” in science,172 these conspiracy websites explain, with 
similar repercussions for dissidents: “try to doubt as a scientist openly 
about HIV as the cause of AIDS. You’ll be fought with religious 
fanaticism until your professional death.”173 Yet, when “Nobel prize 
winners [in HIV research] are not convinced of a direct relation 
between HIV and AIDS,”174 these sites argue, there is considerable 
reason to doubt this “popular and very profitable faith.”175 Especially, 
they argue, since “HIV [science] is religion, and to doubt religion is 
blasphemy.”176 These conspiracy websites criticize the selective limits 
of the methodological principal of doubt in science today, and 
contend that “scientists should not shun away from questioning 
commonly accepted science. That’s what makes it scientific.”177 They 
conclude, however, on a more realistic note of self-awareness: “leave 
it to the tinfoil hatters to question everything.”178  
If we regard these conspiracy narratives about science 
without the normative position of morally prioritizing science and its 
practitioners that many scholars on conspiracy theories take, then a 
lot more than mere emulators of science (e.g. Byford, 2011: 89) 
becomes visible. We could then see such conspiracy narratives as 
forms of proto-professionalization (De Swaan, 1981), pop sociology 
(Knight, 2002: 8), or as laymen gaining scientific expertise (e.g. 
Epstein, 1996). Theoretically speaking, these conspiracy narratives 
also point to some fundamental dilemmas science sees itself 
confronted with. While on the one hand science is apt to advance 
doubt, critique, and dissent as some of its defining criteria and a 
crucial part of its public image (cf. Doyle McCarthy, 1996; Shapin, 
2008; Toulmin, 1990), in practice, most of what it does is normal 
science, making these aspects hard to find (cf. Kuhn, T.S. 2012[1962]; 
Greenberg, 1999). And what of the scientific norm of 
disinterestedness (cf. Merton, 1973: 275), how to explain those 
increasing numbers of public private partnerships in science? Of 
course, this balance between the need for funding and the 
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preservation of one’s own autonomy has always been a delicate issue 
for science (cf. Gieryn, 1999; Martino, 1992; Resnik, 2012), but the 
question of how to communicate this dilemma with a wider public 
acquires particular urgency when all such external influences are seen 
as corruption and pollution of the scientific enterprise.  
After all, what can we expect of a public that has learned to 
see science as the free and disinterested pursuit of inquiry, who then 
finds out that its everyday practice is often far from that? In some way, 
scientists are seen in these articles as a power elite serving their own 
narrow interests, however, in many other ways, the normal order of 
things is suspect. Especially when science speaks with one voice, when 
it becomes one “meta-narrative” (Lyotard, 1984), people of the 
conspiracy milieu turn cautious, and suspect something to be going 
on behind the scenes. Truth can never be uniform, they argue. But 
more than doubting such overarching systems of belief, these 
conspiracy narratives also express a general distrust of scientific 
expertise that is on the rise in complex risk societies (cf. Beck, 1992; 
Inglehart, 1997). Why do some people with elite positions in the field 
have preferential access to truth, knowledge, or reality when others 
do not? These articles show the multiple and often ambivalent 
positions conspiracy theorists have towards science: sometimes 
openly critical, sometimes glorifying its moral project, sometimes 
dreading its current direction, but in general dismayed by perceived 
corruption. This “tendency to alternate between mythologizing and 
demonizing scientists” (Epstein, 1996: 6) is more common in the 
wider public (e.g. Collins and Pinch, 1993) and testifies to the 
complex position science occupies in Western societies. 
 
3.4.5 Greedy States and the Invisible Government: 
“Orwell, Eat Your Heart Out!”179 
 
The truth is that the State is a conspiracy designed not only to 
exploit, but above all to corrupt its citizens… henceforth I shall 
never serve any government anywhere. 
—Leo Tolstoy180 
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Conspiracy theories about the government may be most familiar: 
virtually anybody would know about the conspiracy theories 
concerning government involvement in the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy, or about the secret activities of government agencies like 
the FBI and CIA in covert operations around the world. In the twenty-
first century, the most popular conspiracy theories of this type are 
about 9/11. In fact, many people all around the world believe that 
the US government had some hand in the attacks of September 
eleventh.181 Americans are no different, according to various opinion 
polls, a solid third to one-half of US citizens believe there was some 
form of government involvement.182 These numbers may seem 
enormous, but Fenster shows that these were not that different in the 
post-Kennedy assassination era (2008: 244). Although Americans 
have always had a special relationship to conspiracy theories, Olmsted 
locates the origins of the contemporary popularity of conspiracy 
theories about the government in a more recent era (2009: 4). She 
wonders ‘why so many Americans believe that their government 
conspires against them’, and relates this prevalence to a number of 
factors. Olmsted cites factors ranging from the rise of the modern 
state in the twentieth century, which grew significantly in power and 
reach, to the birth and expansion of intelligence agencies, and even 
includes the U.S. government’s own activities in plotting conspiracies 
and spreading accusations of conspiracy (2009: 8-9). Although the 
Netherlands do not have a tradition of ingrained suspicion towards 
their government, maybe even to the contrary, conspiracy narratives 
about the state and its far-reaching arm nevertheless make up a 
considerable part of these conspiracy websites, to which I will turn 
now. 
Such articles often start from an anarchist-inspired 
perspective that, as for Tolstoy, regards the state as a conspiracy 
against its citizens. They contend, for example, that “democracy may 
appear to give us freedom and a sense of participation and say through 
elections every four years,” but what remains of freedom, they ask us 
rhetorically, when “we give a small group of people enormous powers 
and the unique privilege to use violence against us?”183 Not much, is 
their obvious conclusion: “try to refuse paying taxes and you will see 
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how free you are!”184 It might be hard to believe, they contend, but 
“governments are not at all concerned with serving the public 
interest.”185 It is therefore “puzzling where this belief in the 
government comes from”186 and they are quick to mention that 
neither “terrorism, nor famines, wars or epidemics, but the 
government is the biggest threat to civilians as states are responsible 
for the deaths of 262 million civilians in the twentieth century 
only.”187 The events of 9/11 and subsequent security measures appear 
to have been a serious game-changer as conspiracy websites discuss 
now the many ways the national state infiltrates our lives. Such 
articles speak of ‘the “War on Freedom”’ the Dutch government is 
said to have initiated in order to “limit our civil rights under the false 
pretext of public security without any democratic consultation.”188 All 
websites feature similar articles on the introduction of such “STASI 
practices”189 which transformed this country from “a privacy paradise 
to a control state.”190 They speak with suspicion of the introduction of 
compulsory identification, biometrical passports with RFID chips 
containing fingerprint and facial scans, which are saved in central 
databases, electronic health records (EPD), electronic child records 
(EKD), access to bank details and international payments, the storage 
of traffic records, facial recognition software in public transport and 
CCTV systems, and many others.191 
The Dutch authorities, these sources generally agree, go 
further than most European countries in the obsessive urge to control 
their population, “even though they always tried to hide their role as 
advocates of such control measures in the European Union.”192 It is, 
in the words of the author of this similarly-titled sevenfold series, “the 
end of the Netherlands as we know it.”193 These narratives are 
certainly not reserved for the Dutch nation state, but refer similarly 
to the “many countries in the West [that] have seen an exponential 
rise of technological monitoring and a decrease of parliamentary and 
judicial control over police and secret services.”194 In all cases the 
pessimistic conclusion is similar: “we have built—almost 
imperceptibly—the foundations of an infrastructure no police state 
or dictatorship ever dreamt of. And even when you have done nothing 
wrong, you should worry. Greatly.”195  
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Another dominant conspiracy narrative concerning the 
omnipotent powers of the state refers to the invisible or deep 
government. Such notions of factions within the government that 
covertly rule the country surely have a long history, but the influential 
role of intelligence agencies in the twentieth century gave strong 
impetus to allegations of secret services pulling the strings behind 
world events (Olmsted, 2009: 10). Citing the 1964 work of 
journalists David Wise and Thomas Ross, Knight explains how the 
idea of an invisible government operating as a “permanent political, 
covert force” often in “opposite direction” of official policy firmly 
established itself in post-World War II America (Knight, 2000: 28-
9). The assassination of JFK, although forever unresolved, attracts 
theories of CIA involvement,196 and as do the many coups and 
revolutions since the 1950s in countries all over that are openly 
hostile to the US.197 The assassinations and terrorist attacks in cold 
war Europe perpetrated by “NATO’s secret army,” the CIA funded 
Gladio network, fall under the same category.198 Other examples 
include, of course, 9/11, around which the dubious behavior of FBI, 
CIA, and other US secret services is of central concern.199 The more 
recent allegations of CIA and Mossad involvement behind the rise of 
ISIS in the Middle East show the persisting popularity of secret 
government conspiracy narratives.200 Therefore, when a distinguished 
professor of international law acknowledges that “you can vote all you 
want, the secret government won’t change [...]. [P]olicy by and large 
in the national security realm is made by the concealed institutions,”201 
these conspiracy websites take on an I-told-you-so tone. The 
narratives about the covert influence of intelligence agencies are too 
numerous to discuss here, but there are certain concepts in many of 
theories of secret service involvement that are worth exploring. 
I have spoken before about false-flag attacks, which are a 
central ordering principle of the secret service conspiracy narratives. 
These covert inside jobs, generally said to be executed by secret 
services and designed to make the public believe that an enemy of the 
state is behind the event, often serve as the justification for military 
interventions that can count as such on the consent of the people. A 
related concept in these secret service conspiracy narratives is the 
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PsyOp, or psychological operations, which are planned (covert) 
operations intended to manipulate the emotions and thoughts of 
people in accordance with national interests through the careful 
selection and conveyance of information.202 PsyOps are wars of the 
mind, and images are its primary weapon, such authors stress, “they 
determine our worldview.”203 Based on the science of public relations 
and of propaganda in general,204 PysOps are tailor-made for a fully-
mediatized culture and secret services therefore massively deploy 
them.205 Having had ample opportunity to experiment (these 
conspiracy websites report heavily on MK-Ultra and other CIA mind-
control programs206), we now all believe the Arab Spring revolutions 
to be the real and sincere outbursts of democratic urges amongst 
populations eager for their dictators to be removed, right? The truth 
is, such conspiracy narratives hold, that these so-called democratic 
revolutions were carefully planned and staged by CIA and related 
intelligence agencies years ago.207 Having learned from history that 
grass roots revolts win the hearts and minds of people around the 
globe, the US achieve the same global domination as before, but 
without the ugly and violent coups.208 Following a quoted veteran 
intelligence specialist: “there’s not a single major protest or coup 
d’état that doesn’t have the CIA’s fingerprint on it.” 209 And so, they 
conclude, it is “imperialism under the banner of ‘spontaneous popular 
uprising.’”210 The 2014 demonstrations in Hong Kong, coined in 
mediagenic terms as the Umbrella Revolution, are therefore watched 
with vigilance: is it “another CIA-coordinated ‘revolution’ in the 
making?”211 
Conspiracy theories about a government out to get us could be 
said to be American in character, however, such narratives are 
similarly part of local versions of government intrusions, as this 
analysis testifies. In the Netherlands, conspiracy narratives about the 
government are framed in a broader discourse of cultural 
transformation: the idea that the Netherlands is no longer the tolerant 
and free country of the seventies is widely felt, and is central to the 
many debates over citizenship and national identity in the recent 
decades (cf. Lechner, 2008; Van Reekum, 2014). These Dutch 
conspiracy narratives portray a general distrust towards the state that 
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is anarchist in origin (Sartwell, 2008), and shares as such many 
characteristics with the many anti-globalist movements mobilizing 
‘21st century dissent’ (Curran, 2006). The rise of a totalitarian police 
states as envisioned in many books and film fuels a dominant cultural 
imagery through which technological and bureaucratic developments 
in population control and securitization are interpreted (Kellner, 
1990). The strong emphasis on the secret services within these 
conspiracy articles testifies to the persistence of modern forms of 
conspiracy theorizing: a clear cabal carries out all kinds of covert 
actions hidden from the public. Yet, as these secret services have 
turned into fully-fledged bureaucracies within which nobody seems 
to know what precisely is going on, the fears and worries about the 
pervasive monitoring of ordinary citizens take on the unspecified and 
elusive shapes known as postmodern paranoia. Who, if anybody, 
actually controls these technological and bureaucratic developments 
anymore? Contemporary conspiracy narratives about the omnipotent 
state and their “greedy institutions” (Coser, 1974) appear in many 
forms and draw on a diverse range of anti-government discourses. 
What characterizes them all, however, is the conviction that the 
enemy indeed comes from within. 
 
3.4.6 Exploring the Supernatural: Aliens and Higher States 
of Consciousness 
 
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt 
of in your philosophy. 
—William Shakespeare, Hamlet212 
In addition to all the conspiracy narratives about rather mundane 
matters, a great part of these conspiracy websites is devoted to the 
secrets of the universe. These websites abound with articles on 
extraterrestrial life, supernatural phenomena, and mysterious 
civilizations. Such explorations of the mysteries of nature, life, and 
divinity are generally rejected by the scientific community as 
pseudoscience, but are nevertheless widely popular in conspiracy 
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circles. Barkun argues that the “stigmatization” or exclusion from the 
mainstream canon of accepted knowledge is in fact a big part of their 
appeal (2006: 26-9). This “disdain for orthodoxy,” according to 
Barkun, “is a major characteristic of the culture of conspiracy” (2006: 
26), and he connects it as such with the “cultic milieu” (Campbell, 
2002) and the New Age Movement (Heelas, 1996). Ward and Voas 
give this “hybrid of conspiracy theory and alternative spirituality” the 
name “conspirituality,” and they explore the emergence of this 
“politico-spiritual philosophy” that combines both as “forms of holistic 
thought” (2011: 103-4). Many websites discussing matters of the 
supernatural may indeed incorporate and promote a spiritual 
worldview, but I have found that the opposite is also true, as other 
sites explicitly position themselves in favor of a purely scientific 
approach. Both, however, share an interest in life beyond human 
existence on Earth. The range of these articles is immense, but I will 
highlight here some of these supernatural narratives that tend to be 
favored within the Dutch conspiracy milieu.  
Almost all of the conspiracy websites that I studied start from 
the assumption that humans are not alone in the universe, and that 
there is more to know about extraterrestrial life than we are being 
told.213 The reasons for this cover-up obviously vary considerably, but 
most explanations go back to the early days of the cold war, in which 
the US was caught up in an arms race with Russia “to benefit solely 
from the extraterrestrial technologies found inside the crashed UFO’s 
in New Mexico and Arizona. It is no exaggeration to state what a 
quantum leap in technological progress that would mean. And so 
‘national security’ demanded that this matter was kept a secret at all 
costs […] and the most secretive project of the millennium was 
born.”214 Things are changing today, these websites hold, as “there is 
now an impressive case load gathered of how NASA is withholding 
information [but] official UFO-files are being released around the 
world, and many more whistleblowers who claim to have been part 
of projects with aliens come out in the open.”215 Such articles refer to 
the disclosures of Bob Lazar who has allegedly been working as a 
scientist on the reverse engineering of ET technology at the 
primordial grounds of UFO cover-ups, Area 51.216 Or, per the 
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statements of Apollo 14 astronaut and 6th man on the moon Edgar 
Mitchell, “aliens have contacted humans several times, but 
governments have hidden the truth for sixty years.”217 Other 
revelations by knowledgeable figures such as high-government 
officials from both the USSR and the USA, add to the conclusion that 
extraterrestrial life is real. If we follow, for example, the disclosures 
of former Canadian minister of Defense, it is more than real: “1960’s 
intelligence investigations decided that, with absolute certainty, there 
are at least four species that have been visiting this planet for 
thousands of years [...] but the latest reports say there at about 80 
different species.”218 
These conspiracy narratives about extraterrestrial life, 
however, go further than NASA cover ups and insider testimonies . 
Articles describe, for example, OOPArts (Out Of Place Artefacts), 
which are “historical objects found in illogical or impossible locations 
and therefore directly challenge commonly accepted historical 
assumptions.”219 Although not directly related to extraterrestrial life, 
their unusual characteristics challenge historical chronology by being 
too advanced for the location where they are found, such as “a 
hammer found in rocks over 100 million years old.”220 These 
“OOPArts suggest an alternative course of civilization than we always 
assumed,”221 and give rise to speculations about the existence of “a 
forbidden history”222 of lost civilizations (like Atlantis), giant mythical 
creatures (such as the Nephilim), and ancient aliens (called 
Annunaki).223 Although mainstream science is generally skeptical 
about such assertions, these articles argue instead that “the scientific 
community has no sufficient explanation for the highly advanced 
knowledge of mathematics and astronomy the Sumerians, the 
Egyptians and the Middle- and South American Indians possessed.”224 
The alternative histories of the earth in which extraterrestrial events 
play a significant role, e.g. the works of Erich Von Däniken (especially 
Chariots of the Gods), Immanuel Velikovksy (Worlds in Collision) and 
Zecharia Sitchin (The Twelfth Planet), do provide such explanations and 
are widely popular in the conspiracy milieu.225 Following such works, 
the “conclusion is reached that our DNA is implanted with alien 
genes,”226 and that “aliens are involved in the evolution of the human 
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species.”227 The mysteries of the universe and of life itself, these 
articles conclude, are only beginning to be known. 
Next to these explorations of extraterrestrial life, a 
supernatural topic that receives considerable attention in the 
conspiracy milieu is what is often called “the mystery of 
consciousness.”228 These articles start with the wonder and awe of the 
phenomenon of consciousness, and ask “why are we the only species 
with consciousness? Where does it come from? And why have we 
never seen it with any other living species on earth?”229 In contrast to 
materialist scientific conceptions of consciousness as an illusionary 
product of the mind,230 in which human mental faculties are 
understood as an evolutionarily-developed epiphenomenon of brain 
functions, many of these websites concur that this is too limited of a 
perspective that cannot adequately explain how “consciousness 
continues to exist when the brain is completely inactive, for example 
in a coma.”231 Such articles not only cite the works of 
(pseudo)scientists Rupert Sheldrake and Graham Hancock, who 
explore the non-material dimensions of reality,232 as well as other 
spiritual teachings on the soul and eternal consciousness,233 but 
increasingly feature scientific research on supernatural phenomena. 
Authors draw focus to medical research on near death experiences,234 
and argue that ‘these experiences cannot be dismissed as imaginations 
of a dying person [but] may point to the existence of another reality 
[…] and the possibility of life after death.’235 With titles such as 
Scientists find proof for life after death,236 and Solid scientific proof: 
consciousness after clinical death,237 these articles make clear that 
“scientists are changing their views: the brain does NOT create 
consciousness.”238 They contend that “misleading concepts focusing 
on reductive materialism have kept us in the dark about the true 
nature of the human soul, but now we are entering a phase in which 
science will greatly expand its boundaries […] and reach out to the 
greater cosmos of life.”239 In line with articles that argue for a view 
beyond the materialist paradigm, these websites similarly delve into 
paranormal phenomena like extrasensory perception, remote 
viewing, and telepathy. These “refer to any kind of phenomenon 
where someone obtains information in ways not coming from the five 
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physical senses.”240 Just like experimental research on consciousness, 
such articles argue that “studies on extrasensory perception are 
generally marginalized,” but “parapsychologists have nevertheless 
shown the existence of ESP in 108 publications between 1974 and 
2008.”241 Special attention is paid to Project Stargate, a CIA-funded 
study on psychic phenomena at the Stanford Research Institute, 
where physicists in the 1970s and 80s explored whether clairvoyance 
existed and whether extrasensory perception made remote viewing 
possible.242 One of these websites even translated extensive parts of 
the autobiography of Ingo Swann, one of the psychics who, with Uri 
Geller, was centrally involved with this project.243  The CIA officially 
stopped funding the project in the nineties because it never yielded 
any useful results, although these websites question such a conclusion, 
surmising that “remote viewing is undoubtedly still deployed behind 
the scenes.”244 “Who knows,” they wonder, “if in secret much more 
has been achieved by now?”245 
These conspiracy websites are often sympathetic to the 
supernatural. Whether they speak about the existence of 
extraterrestrial life, delve into the mysterious histories of lost 
civilizations, or hold that human consciousness is a portal to different 
realities, their point is that there is more to life here on earth than we 
commonly think. Such ignorance is not a coincidence, such websites 
argue, but the active result of the covert actions of groups like NASA, 
the CIA, governments, or the broader scientific community, all of 
whom hide proof of supernatural phenomena from the public and 
reject such ideas as illusionary. Theirs is a vision of epistemic 
gatekeepers who repress and stigmatize knowledge when it points in 
the direction of the supernatural. Barkun argues in this respect that 
“the marginalization of such claims by the institutions that 
conventionally distinguish between knowledge and error – 
universities, communities of researchers, and the like” would be, for 
most people, a signal that such ideas have no validity (2006: 26). For 
conspiracy theorists, however, this practice raises suspicion: why are 
the boundaries of legitimate inquiry put here and not there? The 
theoretically fascinating thing about these conspiracy narratives is 
therefore not so much that two worldviews come together (Ward and 
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Voas, 2011), but rather that they (try to) redefine the boundaries of 
legitimate knowledge, and indeed of science. We could denounce 
such “opposition to dominant cultural orthodoxies” as Barkun does 
(2006: 26), or we could empirically study why people contest and 
defend these orthodoxies, and how the lines between official and 
stigmatized knowledge are drawn (cf. Gordin, 2012; Hess, 1993; 
Pinch, 1979). My overall premise is to justify the latter approach, and 
a modest effort in that direction is made towards the end of this 
dissertation when I study how conspiracy theorists and their scientific 
debunkers draw their own lines of legitimate inquiry.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: Modern Conspiracy Theories or 
Postmodern Paranoia? 
The world of conspiracy theories is vast and diverse. In this chapter I 
have made an effort to provide empirical and analytical grip on the 
subject matter of the chapters that follow by offering a systematic 
categorization of the conspiracy theories that are popular today. 
Basing myself on the articles posted on seven major Dutch conspiracy 
websites, I have set out to explore and distinguish conspiracy theories 
by their thematic content, instead of the more problematic criteria of 
scope or plausibility. The guiding questions of this analysis are based on 
circumscribing the community involved and the bases of their 
worldviews: what are these conspiracy theories about specifically, 
who are (allegedly) involved, how are the conspiracies working, and 
what is their overall argument? The theoretical starting point of this 
chapter is the notion that conspiracy culture has radically changed, 
from the rigid convictions of conspiracy and deceit that characterize 
traditional conspiracy theories to the more diffuse suspicions of 
collusion and intrigue that inform postmodern paranoia (cf. Knight, 
2000; Aupers, 2012; Melley, 2000, Olmsted, 2009). Whereas the 
former may have bolstered collective identities by scapegoating an 
allegedly dangerous Other, as scholars argue, conspiracy theories 
today are no longer about an alien force threatening a stable us, but 
are better characterized as radical suspicions about the workings of 
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societal institutions. Leading this exploration of the sheer variety of 
contemporary conspiracy theories is thus the questions of whether 
and how such discourses resonate with modern conspiracy theories 
about an exotic Other, or with postmodern paranoia about the enemy 
from within. 
If we take a closer look at the conspiracy theories circulating 
on these websites, it can first be concluded that most of these 
narratives are indeed more about the workings of societal institutions 
and their role in everyday life than about the scapegoating of some 
exotic Other. They express worry and concern about the 
virtualization of the financial system, about how the media might 
control people’s minds with their propaganda, about what 
multinational corporations do to the health of bodies and the 
environment in their endless search for profit, about how scientific 
knowledge is too easily polluted by ulterior motives, about how 
greedy nation-states monitor citizens with intelligence technologies, 
and about how knowledge of supernatural and extraterrestrial life is 
suppressed by epistemic gatekeepers.  
Indeed, contemporary conspiracy theories have a strong 
institutional focus: they do not so much assume that a small cabal 
deceives us with a masterful plan, but rather point to the fact that the 
very way our routines, procedures, and formal legislations are 
institutionalized indicates conspiracy. The distinguishing line, 
therefore, between contemporary conspiracy theories and critiques 
of academics or activists is a very thin one, the implications of which 
I will turn to later in this book. Moreover, the narratives of conspiracy 
and deceit explored in this chapter clearly point to a widespread 
feeling that the normal order of things is corrupted. No longer 
indicating a temporary disruption of a healthy society, contemporary 
conspiracy theories give expression to the more general discontents 
of life in globalized capitalist societies, they convey feelings of being 
influenced and manipulated by large-scale yet elusive forces, and they 
articulate fundamental doubts about truth and reality in a world 
where it is increasingly difficult to know which fact, expert, or 
epistemic authority to trust. Conspiracy is, in other words, 
everywhere and always around us.  
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Given this apparent turn towards homeland institutions and 
the omnipresence of deceit in everyday life, scholars emphasizing this 
new type of conspiracy theory may be correct in addressing the 
societal surge of postmodern paranoia. The conspiracy theories featured 
on Dutch websites lack the demonizing thrust in which dangerous 
alien forces are said to be set on threatening stable and uniform 
collectives, and instead emphasize uncertainty and ambiguity. Yet I 
cannot help but wonder if such novel conspiracy narratives do not rely 
on a new exotic Other? 
Among all of the categories of conspiracy that I have 
discussed, most still speak of small groups of mighty people 
orchestrating, or at least benefiting from, covert cooperation and 
collusion, despite the institutional focus that characterizes 
contemporary theories. Whether they refer to the elite banking 
dynasties, the Illuminati behind the culture industry, the old-boys-
network ruling multinational corporations, the hotshots in science, or 
those in charge of secret services, most contemporary narratives 
assume power to be in the hands of some ruling class. Does this power 
elite that controls the institutions that govern our world not become 
a new sort of outside threat, a new exotic Other? In a world of 
increasing wealth inequality (e.g. Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012), the 
notion of a power elite, the 1%, as a much-despised cultural Other 
has become widespread (e.g. Graeber, 2013). Contemporary 
conspiracy narratives resonate with and contribute to this idea of an 
increasing concentration and consolidation of wealth and power in the 
hands of the worldwide elite. Such widely shared perceptions of a 
democratic and economic deficit is an important impetus to the 
construction of a power elite as the new exotic Other in 
contemporary conspiracy narratives. These elite circles are not 
understood by conspiracy theorists as isolated islands of power, but, 
like in C. Wright Mill’s original thesis (1956), as having close ties 
with each other. 
Contemporary conspiracy theories share, to conclude, 
characteristics of both types of conspiracy discourse: they are very 
much about the functioning of mainstream societal institutions and 
the contested nature of truth and knowledge in Western societies, but 
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they often also involve suspicions of the (covert) machinations of a 
relatively small cabal, e.g. the power elites ruling the world. Given 
these findings it is hard to make a case in support of a historical 
trajectory from modern conspiracy theories to postmodern paranoia: 
contemporary conspiracy culture simply has a bit of each.246 It is only 
to be expected that conspiracy theories today are different from a 
century ago. Like any other cultural expressions, conspiracy theories 
are products of their time. Thus the real added value of the postmodern 
paranoia theory is analytical instead of historical.  
What I argue here is that the historical argument of scholars 
such as Aupers, Knight, Melley, and Olmsted helps to conceptualize 
an ideal-typical contrast between conspiracy discourses: on the one side are 
clear-cut descriptions of conspiracy, and on the other are radical 
suspicions towards such rigid and totalizing explanations. As such, 
they make it possible to grasp the many different forms that 
conspiracy theories can take today; their intervention expands the 
possible cultural meanings they can have. Instead of understanding 
conspiracy theories only as the products of scaremongering populists 
luring a public into hateful and exclusionary thought, this added 
perspective enables us to understand how contemporary conspiracy 
theories may (also) express anxieties about new forms of social 
controls, inform viewpoints about new technologies, or vent worries 
about private/public collusions. This new perspective shows how 
conspiracy theories are increasingly the products of ordinary people 
who bricolage and reconstruct truth in order to produce social 
critiques that were formerly the exclusive practice of public 
intellectuals. This ideal-type distinction between modern conspiracy 
theories and postmodern paranoia sharpens, in short, our conceptual 
toolkit and opens up an array of possibilities for understanding 
contemporary conspiracy narratives. In the following chapters I will 
build forth on these efforts of the aforementioned scholars to broaden 
the scope of what conspiracy theories can entail and what they mean 
by following the many directions contemporary conspiracy culture 
takes me.
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4. From the Unbelievable to the 
Undeniable: Epistemological 
Pluralism, or How David Icke 
Supports his Superconspiracy 
Theory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter I assessed some of the most persistent categories of 
conspiracy theories that I observed in my research: critical views of 
the media landscape, worries about the far-reaching arms of the state, 
and beliefs in extraterrestrial beings and lost civilizations. Despite this 
broad spectrum of conspiracy theories, I have argued that a focus on 
the workings of mainstream epistemic institutions and their dominant 
role in everyday life is what unites these different types. More than 
mere explanations of events involving the covert action of a malicious 
cabal (e.g. Coady, 2006; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009), 
contemporary conspiracy theories are critical analyses of institutional 
regimes that are often not a far cry from more authoritative forms of 
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knowledge (such as social scientific analyses). A second characteristic 
I have brought to the fore is how these conspiracy theories usually 
point to the people overseeing these institutions as being the culprits 
behind their corruption. The gamut of conspiracy theories may be 
about vastly different domains, but they all assign a global power elite 
as the dangerous Other threatening social order.  
In fact, these seemingly-distinct conspiracy theories are 
sometimes synthesized into a single vast scheme of manipulation, 
what Barkun calls superconspiracies (2006: 6). Barkun stresses the 
increasing popularity of such vast constructs: “superconspiracies have 
enjoyed particular growth since the 1980s” (2006: 6). Knight 
identifies a similar historical development: “over the last decades 
conspiracy theories have shown signs of increasing complexity and 
inclusiveness, as once separate suspicions are welded into Grand 
Unified Theories of Everything” (2000: 204). Moving beyond 
discussions of their actual truthfulness, I explore in this chapter how 
these superconspiracy theories are made plausible instead. One of the 
main and most popular propagators of such all-encompassing 
conspiracies of deceit is the flamboyant David Icke (Barkun, 2006: 
103). He is best known for his controversial reptilian thesis, in which 
“reptilian human-alien hybrids are in covert control of the planet” 
(Robertson, 2013: 28). But he is also known for his synthesis of 
seemingly different or antithetical thought: he combines New Age 
teachings with apocalyptic conspiracy theories about a coming 
totalitarian New World Order (cf. Barkun, 2006; Ward and Voas, 
2011). Lewis and Kahn rightfully note, “Icke’s greatest strength is his 
totalizing ambition to weave numerous sub-theories into an 
extraordinary narrative that is both all-inclusive and all-accounting” 
(2005: 8). In this chapter I analyze his discursive strategies of legitimation 
based, especially, on Icke’s 2011 performance in Amsterdam. I 
sought to understand just how he supports and validates his 
extraordinary claims in order to achieve epistemic authority in the 
conspiracy milieu. 
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4.2 Claiming Epistemic Authority 
The conviction that everything is connected is, according to most 
scholars on the subject, one of the defining characteristics of 
conspiracy theories. Knight regards it as “one of the guiding principles 
of conspiracy theory” (2000: 204), Hofstadter as one of “the basic 
elements of the paranoid style” (1996: 29), and Barkun as “one of the 
principles found in virtually every conspiracy theory” (2006: 3). The 
wide variety of conspiracy theories we have explored in the previous 
chapter, including extraterrestrial ancestries and pharmaceutical 
collusions, is often welded together into one vast scheme in which 
everything is connected. While Knight makes a case for the rationality 
of this adage in a world of global relations (2000: 204-241), a majority 
of scholars hold this unifying quality of contemporary conspiracy 
theories to be their major epistemological flaw (e.g. Barkun, 2006; 
Byford, 2011; Hofstadter, 1996; Keeley, 1999, Popper, 2013; 
Pigden, 1995). They argue that conspiracies may be “typical social 
phenomena” (Popper, 2013: 307) but “these need to be recognized as 
multiple, and in most instances unrelated events which cannot be 
reduced to a single, common denominator” (Byford, 2011: 33, 
original emphasis). They state that to “regard a ‘vast’ or ‘gigantic’ 
conspiracy as the motive force in historical events” (Hofstadter, 1996: 
29) is simply ludicrous: social life is inextricably more complex 
(Barkun, 2006: 7). 
Yet such grand, unified theories are immensely popular in the 
conspiracy milieu. They are present in the ideas of people consuming 
conspiracy theories, they are visualized in colorful diagrams that are 
circulated on conspiracy websites, and they form the thought of major 
conspiracy theorists like Icke. Drawing everything together in one 
master narrative may, for such scholars, involve the notorious “big 
leap from the undeniable to the unbelievable” (Hofstadter, 1996: 38), 
but for many in the conspiracy milieu this the other way around. As 
David Icke argues in his show, “when you connect the dots, suddenly 
the light goes on and the picture forms” (15:00).  The opposite 
strategy of assuming events to be unrelated, which is often called the 
coincidence theory247 is seen as naïve and implausible. Scholars of 
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conspiracy theories may point to the irrationality of these 
superconspiracy theories, but for many people in the conspiracy 
milieu they are very plausible and real. What these scholars tend to 
gloss over in their dedication to debunk conspiracy theories is the fact 
that these overarching theories need to be made plausible if they are to 
have any legitimacy. Underlying conspiracy theorists’ efforts to 
connect the seemingly-unrelated is a need for epistemic validation: 
they want their claims on truth to be believed, after all. But such grand 
unified theories of everything are not your everyday news: in them, the 
world as we know it is often turned upside down and inside out, 
connecting the most outlandish causes and effects to ordinary 
experiences of people. The question is therefore how do conspiracy 
theorists convincingly sell such ostensibly unbelievable theories?  
Sociology has a history of studying the ways that people assert 
themselves as authoritative in making appeals to truth claims. Max 
Weber (2013) already pointed out that one can claim authority 
through charisma, tradition or, in modern societies in particular, 
through rationalized, juridical systems and procedures like the law 
(cf. Hammer, 2001). In the Western world, references to science and 
its systematic markers of truth are, however, the most prevalent and 
powerful way to lend credibility to the claims one is making (Brown, 
2009). “If ‘science’ says so, we are more often than not inclined to 
believe it or act on it – and prefer it over claims lacking this epistemic 
seal of approval” (Gieryn, 1999: 1). The tremendous epistemic 
authority science enjoys today is, however, not uncontested: trust in 
science has gradually declined in most Western countries (cf. 
Achterberg et al., 2015, Beck, 1992; Inglehart, 1997). Other forms 
of knowledge and expertise are on the rise, such as alternative and 
complementary medicine, non-scientific nutritional regimes, and 
New Age philosophies of life (cf. Campbell, 2007; Hammer, 2001; 
Heelas, 1996). Conspiracy culture aligns well with a broader cultural 
trend that turns away from mainstream epistemic authorities. Not 
only do conspiracy theorists openly challenge the epistemic authority 
of science (Harambam and Aupers, 2015), but, like David Icke 
himself, they often advance other epistemic sources as more authentic 
and authoritative. Icke is therefore not just the archetype of the 
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contemporary superconspiracy theorist (cf. Barkun, 2006: 8; Knight, 
2000: 204), but a typical proponent of the broader cultural 
movement discontented with mainstream societal institutions (i.e. 
science, politics, religion, media, etc.).  
 
4.3 Method, Data, Analysis 
In this chapter I will draw on the empirical material from Icke’s 
performance titled Human Race, Get Off Your Knees. The Lion Sleeps No 
More in Amsterdam on December 10, 2011. I have selected this 
particular performance as a strategic case-study to research in more 
detail how the extraordinary claims of today’s superconspiracy 
theories are made plausible (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2013). As one 
of the many attendees of Icke’s show, I observed not just his 
performance, but also his audience, some of whom I spoke with only 
during that day, and some of whom I invited for further conversation 
elsewhere. I made field notes of Icke’s performance, covering both 
the contents and his theatrical portrayal of it, and I noted the reactions 
of the attendees. These field notes, which fall under the designation 
of thick description (Geertz, 1973) were theoretically informative and 
valuable for the research at large, but I found that they lacked the 
precision that I would need to substantiate my claims in this chapter. 
My original fieldnotes capture much of its thematic content and my 
own subjective reflections on them, but are not intended to be an 
accurate transcription of what Icke said. 
Amsterdam was, however, not the only place Icke performed 
this work, and he procured the services of professional videographers 
to document London’s Wembley Arena show on October 27th 2012, 
and London's Brixton Academy show on May 2010. These videos are 
for sale on his website for £28,99 and £25,00 respectively,248 but have 
also been made available for free on YouTube. The latter show is 
predominantly similar to the Amsterdam show, although few minor 
deviations exist. I have therefore chosen to use the Brixton Academy 
video recording as the source for the quotations used in this chapter. 
I have re-examined this show with a theoretical focus on Icke’s 
epistemological strategies, and have transcribed the relevant parts. 
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The analysis presented here is therefore more textual than 
ethnographic. As all excerpts presented here are from that YouTube 
video,249 and are therefore easily accessed by anyone, I have noted 
beside each quotation its time location on the video.  
 
4.4 “The Day That Will Change Your Life”250: David Icke in 
Amsterdam 
David Icke is a true conspiracy celebrity: he holds performances in 
large venues all over the world, attracting crowds of thousands, and 
has published more than twenty books in twelve different languages. 
He founded and runs a popular website with many videos and 
interviews, which maintains an active discussion platform with more 
than 100,000 registered users.251 Icke manages to bring together an 
unlikely range of people (Barkun, 2006; Ward and Voas, 2009). As 
Lewis and Kahn argue: “Icke appeals equally to bohemian hipsters and 
right-wing reactionary fanatics [who] are just as likely to be sitting 
next to a 60-something UFO buff, a Nuwaubian, a Posadist, a Raëlian, 
or New Age earth goddess” (2005: 3). His fan base is, in other words, 
quite diverse: including various new religious movements, political 
anarchists, alternative healers, and anti-government militants from 
the extreme right. All of them, however, share a discontent with the 
current societal order, and specifically with the way our epistemic 
institutions work.  
Despite his massive popularity in the conspiracy milieu, 
Icke’s views are hardly uncontested, nor is everything that he says 
taken as fact. Being a celebrity in conspiracy circles means that one 
can easily become the target of other conspiratorial accusations. Alex 
Jones, another major U.S.-based conspiracy celebrity, recognizes that 
Icke has “good information” but calls him the “turd in the punch 
bowl,” arguing that Icke discredits himself (and others) by “poisoning 
the well” with outlandish claims of alien shapeshifting races.252 Jones, 
as a result, has been accused “by dozens of reliable colleagues in the 
truth movement as being a Judas Goat,” collaborating with the enemy 
to “lead the herd into slaughterhouses.”253 Being “the world's two 
most popular conspiracy theorists,” both Icke and Jones are 
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considered by others in the milieu as major “disinformation agents” 
and part of the “controlled opposition working directly with the 
government/corporate powers that be.”254 Despite critiques and 
suspicions, Icke remains a major player in the conspiracy world, and 
as such enjoys much (epistemic) authority and consent. He may not 
be believed in all that he says, but managing to remain “on stage” for 
over twenty years means that his fan base is both large and loyal in 
support of his opposition to the cultural mainstream.  
Such support was apparent at his 2011 Amsterdam 
performance in the auditorium of the RAI convention center. He 
attracted a 1500-plus person crowd each of whom paid for a sixty-
nine euro ticket to see him speak. It is a full day’s program, from ten 
in the morning until seven in the evening, during which time, Icke 
promised, he would “put all the puzzle pieces together” (13.30). The 
attendees included fathers on a day out with their teenage sons, posh-
looking couples in their thirties talking over coffee, working class men 
smoking rolled cigarettes outside, and groups of middle-aged women 
exploring the New Age bookstands that are provisionally set up in the 
hallways. Outside, a Christian man was handing out leaflets in 
protest, warning that the “New Age prophet” is the “anti-Christ.” 
Inside, I spoke to people about Icke and heard about their motivations 
for coming here today: some are true followers and have read all of 
his books, others share his critique of the contemporary order but are 
at odds with his spiritual leanings; some hardly know him but were 
brought along by a friend. Indeed, diversity of people and (epistemic) 
positions abound. 
The show opened on a large video screen showing a chain of 
iron links passing while we hear gloomy and grim music that increases 
in intensity. The chain wraps around the earth and each link has 
writing on it: “New World Order,” “Rothshild Zionism” “Child 
Abuse”, “Babylonian Brotherhood,” “Bilderbergers,” “Aspartame,” 
“Religion,” Club of Rome,” “Chemtrails,” “Fluoride,” “HAARP,” 
“Satanism,” “Trilateral Commission,” “Mainstream Media,” “Fabian 
Society,” “Intelligence agencies,” “IMF,” “World Army,” “Police 
State,” “Global Politics,” “Big Pharma,” “War on Terror,” “Vaccines,” 
“Tavistock,” “Military/Industrial Complex,” “War on Drugs,” “Mind 
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Control.” As the music became ominous, a lion with an image of the 
earth projected onto its skin, is shown bound in chains. The music 
reached its dramatic climax as the lion breaks out of his bondage and 
while he growls loudly the links fly about the screen. The message is 
clear: The lion sleeps no more, the world liberates itself. Primed by 
the video, the audience received Icke with an overwhelming applause. 
The conspiracy rock star is finally here. 
Over the next seven hours, Icke passionately elaborated what 
he sees as “the elephant in the living room: that there is a multi-
levelled conspiracy to enslave humanity in a global concentration 
camp” (15:30). Before I explore his strategies of legitimation in more 
empirical detail, it will be useful to provide here a succinct summary 
of what Icke’s superconspiracy theory entails. Broadly speaking, he 
distinguished between “the five-sense level of this conspiracy” and the 
levels that transcend the here-and-now. The five-sense level of his 
grand, unified theory of everything sums up what has been described 
in the previous chapter: Icke speaks widely about the corruption of 
inherent in modern institutions. Media, science, politics, religion, 
and the rest are used as a “control system” to manipulate the way we 
experience reality, to “program our minds” into acquiescence (19:00-
25:00). He discussed how these institutions are dogmatic and inward-
looking: “politics, science, education and media. They all stand on the 
same postage stamp. And anyone who wants to step off it and explore 
another area is ridiculed and condemned” (31:00). Icke integrates all 
of these different institutions in one pyramidal view of society in 
which the centralization of power is the organizing principle 
(3:36:00). At the top of this pyramid, which is visualized as an 
illustration, resides the cabal who are leading us into a global 
totalitarian control state. The cabal is described as a network of secret 
societies and powerful families, sometimes captured under the phrase 
“Illuminati bloodlines” and at other times called “Rothschild Zionists.” 
But, Icke explained, this is mere surface, since “there is this other-
dimensional, non-human, level to look at” (1:41:00). 
We now get to the “reptilian thesis” through which Icke 
gained his fame and notoriety (Barkun, 2006: 105). “So yes,” Icke 
explained, “of course on one level [the conspiracy] manifests itself as 
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dark men sitting in suits around the table, but that’s not its origin, it 
goes beyond them, out of this dimension […] beyond the frequency 
range of visible light” (1:43:00). His theory “involves non-human 
entities that take a reptilian form [that] manipulate this reality through 
interbreeding bloodlines” (1:44:00), which become the Illuminati-
hybrid family networks that rule the world. However normal they 
may look to us (Hillary Clinton, George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Barack 
Obama, Queen Elizabeth) they are in fact controlled by an “an 
ethereal reptilian entity locking into their chakra points” (1:55:30). 
Sometimes these entities give themselves away and “this shift can 
happen where the reptilian field comes forward, and then shifts back. 
To our observation then, someone has gone from a human to a 
reptilian and then back to a human again” (2:23:00). This is what he 
famously calls “shape-shifting.” As an explanation for their “evil” 
activities, Icke argued that “their hybrid DNA has eliminated empathy 
– the fail-safe mechanism of all behavior” (1:53:30), “and this lack of 
empathy explains why these guys do what they do” (2:07:00). 
Throughout his show, Icke made it abundantly clear that “the 
road to tyranny began when these reptilian arrived here, before that 
the world was very different” (2:23:00). He sketched an image of a 
time long ago when people lived in harmony with the world around 
them and were connected to higher levels of consciousness. “And then 
there was a sudden change,” Icke explained, when “an energetic 
schism at the level of the metaphysical universe” fundamentally 
altered life on earth “and we became distorted from the magnificence 
and harmony we were before” (1:49:00). Our DNA was changed 
because of this reptilian intervention so that we can no longer access 
the world beyond the five senses. We merely “operate through the 
reptilian brain,” which keeps us in a continuous survival mode of fear 
and aggression (3:10:00). And this is part of the conspiracy: “they 
want to lock humanity in the five senses, so we don’t perceive beyond 
it, we are locked in that prison.” (3:27:30). 
This prison refers to “the nature of reality itself” (17:00), and 
it is of prime importance, Icke argued, because “what the control 
system doesn’t want us to know is that this reality—the one we think 
we are experiencing now—is an illusion!” (31:00). Icke proposed 
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that “the world we think we are experiencing outside of us, is 
[actually] inside of us. We are creating it.” (43:00) Everything around 
us is, according to Icke, our own individual projection of the 
“metaphysical universe,” “eternal consciousness,” or what he often 
referred to as the “waveform base reality” (34:00). Pointing to his 
head, Icke said that “it’s all going on in here” (36:00). This projection 
is, however, not entirely our own as “the control system is 
manipulating 24/7 the way that we decode reality” (32:30), because 
when “you can’t control millions physically, you have to control the 
way they perceive themselves and the world” (21:00). Mainstream 
institutions play an important part in making these “prisons for our 
minds” (19:00-25:00), but Icke pointed to another method of mass 
mind-control: “the moon-matrix.” He argued that the moon is 
actually a hollowed out planetoid brought here by these reptilian 
entities, which is most probably the cause of the energetic schism, and 
emits a frequency which distorts our interpretation of reality 
(2:30:00-3:08:00). And that is “the bottom line of this conspiracy”: 
controlling our perception of what is possible and real so to enslave 
us while we believe ourselves to be free (3:18:00). 
But a change is going to come, Icke told us optimistically 
toward the end of the show, “a totally new era is in the process of 
moving into human experience,” a “new epoch of enlightenment and 
expansion, of love, harmony and respect” (5:12:00). His argument is 
that an “energetic change is coming,” and that “truth vibrations” are 
going “to wake people up from this slumber” and ultimately “heal the 
schism” (5:03:00-5:23:00). And “it’s going to be extraordinary,” we 
are told; “we are going to emerge from the abyss—the suppression 
and all the rest of it—and remember the fantastic potential that 
humans once were and be who we really are” (5:25:30). In order to 
open ourselves to these “truth vibrations” and to “go down this road 
of freedom, we first need to free our minds from the programming 
of a lifetime,” Icke urged us passionately. We need to unlearn what 
we were told in school, school being a primary mode of 
indoctrination:  
It is not there to enlighten us, it’s there to program us with a certain 
perception of reality which we carry through our lives so we will be 
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good little slaves. Free our minds from the belief that the mainstream 
media is interested in telling people the truth about what is going on 
in the world! It’s there to do the opposite! It is there to tell us the 
version of reality the control systems wants us to believe, so we will 
respond and react the right way. Free our minds from the fake 
“change” politics [we are offered]! Free our minds from the fake 
fraudulent false flag terrorist events! Free our minds from the idea 
that Big Pharma is in any way interested in human health, it’s not 
about human health, it’s about Big Pharma wealth! Free our mind 
from the fear that controls the world! Free our minds, more than 
anything else, from the idea that we are just ‘Joe Public,’ that we got 
no power. The choice is to become conscious! (25:00)  
Icke urged the audience “to remove the barriers of belief and 
perception that keep us from enlightenment” (5:27:00) “Enough!” 
Icke shouted as he brought the show to its end, “it is time to fly!” 
(6:42:00). Given the massive applause Icke received, his audience 
seemed ready for it. 
Icke’s superconspiracy theory merges stories of banking 
scandals and institutional corruption with theories about the 
supernatural potential of humankind and globalized networks of 
hybrid reptilian bloodlines. And yet all is put in one surprisingly 
cohesive narrative which captures his audience’s attention for hours.  
In the following sections, I will show which cultural sources of 
epistemic authority Icke draws on to make his extraordinary 
conspiracy theory of everything plausible. 
 
4.4.1 “Just Following the Clues”: Appealing to Experience 
One of the more general ways that Icke lends legitimacy to his 
superconspiracy is through reference to personal experience. 
Virtually the first thing Icke does when opening his show is to give a 
snapshot of his life, “the chain of events that had led to now” (6:30). 
He explained that, “when I look back, I can see very clearly in my life, 
what happens to all of us, you go through a series of experiences and 
they seem to be random, they don’t seem to be connected. But when 
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you look back you see it’s a journey of connected synchronistic 
experiences that are leading us in a certain direction” (06:00). Like 
the opening video of the chained lion, Icke made it clear that 
“everything is connected,” including the course of one’s life, but, as 
we will see later, many other matters as well. He spoke of being a 
professional soccer player having to deal with rheumatoid arthritis, 
“not recommended, by the way,” how he went into television, “what 
that did was show me the inside of media: shite,” and that he got into 
(green party) politics, “and I saw politics from the inside: how it’s just 
a game” (08:00). Or, when he claimed that the global elites are 
actually shapeshifting reptilians, he supported this idea with his own 
personal experience of meeting former UK prime minister Ted Heath 
in television studio years ago. And “as he looked at me, his eyes went 
completely black […] and as I looked into his eyes it was like looking 
into two black holes, it was, as I know now, like looking through him 
into this other dimension where he is really controlled from” 
(2:06:30). In other words, Icke explains that he knows because he has 
been inside prominent institutions and can speak from experience to say 
that it is rotten in there. 
But there is another type of experience on which Icke draws 
to convince us of what he was saying. In search of a way to heal his 
arthritis, Icke told us, he visited a psychic who had a vision in which 
he “was going out on a world stage to reveal great secrets, that there 
was a shadow over the world to be lifted, there was a story that had 
to told” (09:30). And although “this sounded like complete bloody 
craziness” to Icke, his “life started to change, as I started to come 
across information that was pushing me into a certain direction” 
(10.00). To a mountain in Peru, that is to say, where he “went to on 
intuition” and “ended up having extraordinary experiences when 
energy was coming into my head and I was shaking for about an hour 
and after that everything changed…” (10:30). He told how “suddenly 
concepts, information, perceptions, were pouring into [his] mind,” 
and afterward he “was seeing the world in a different way, and I was 
asking the big questions: who are we? where are we? and why is the 
world as it is? And from that time the puzzle pieces started to be 
handed to me in amazingly synchronistic ways” (12.00). Like a true 
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prophet, Icke received the wisdom he wrote down in his books from 
the gods above, “one of the psychic communications that came 
through was: ‘sometimes he will say things and wonder where they 
came from. They will be our words,’ Another one was, ‘knowledge 
will be put into his mind and at other times he will be led to 
knowledge… And that’s how the information for all the books has 
come. Another one: arduous seeking is not necessary, the path is 
already mapped out, you only have to follow the clues” (12:30). 
Following the clues is what Icke has done for the last twenty 
years, he explained, “the first few years all the information was 
coming to me in incredible synchronicity, of meeting people, seeing 
documents, coming across information, having experiences. That 
first few years were about what I call the five sense level of this 
conspiracy: the banking scams, the police state, the Orwellian 
surveillance, the big pharmaceutical cartel, attack on the human body 
and immune system, engineered wars” (16:00). This Jungian concept 
of synchronicity or “meaningful coincidences” is prevalent in the New 
Age movement (Heelas, 1996: 46), and Icke’s explanation of how he 
has gained wisdom is a clear example. The concurrence of seemingly 
separate events and coincidences are seen as meaningfully related: 
they happened for a reason. He continued with his personal narrative, 
‘then after a few years, I started to move, just through the 
synchronicity, just following the clues, I came across this reptilian 
connection to the families that are running our reality. And then the 
most important part: when the synchronicity started taking me into 
the nature of reality itself” (17:00). The knowledge that Icke shared 
with us that day moves between that which had been given to him 
mystically, and that which is the product of his own making. The 
recognition of synchronicity is the active result of “having insights and 
then five sense information—names, dates, places, documents, 
people—coming to support that insight” (13:00). This is what he 
called “putting the puzzle pieces together” (13.30) or “connecting the 
dots” (15:00).  
Icke’s life is full of extraordinary experiences, and it provides 
a rich and powerful source to tap in order to support his extraordinary 
claims. The experiences Icke brought to the fore are of a more 
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mundane nature when he spoke of his past involvements with politics 
and media, having been an insider allows him to insight into how things 
really work. This epistemological trope aligns well with the popularity 
of whistleblowers in the conspiracy milieu. Think of the scientists 
who argue that “most published research findings are false,”255 or of 
insiders in the pharmaceutical industry who address institutional 
corruption,256 or of former FBI officials reporting intelligence 
malpractices.257 Those who have experiential knowledge from the 
inside are considered highly credible, and Icke clearly tapped this 
source of epistemic authority. But Icke appealed also to the 
supernatural in order to support his claims. After all, the knowledge 
Icke shared is not just his, but has been handed down to him. These 
“revelatory experiences in which spokespersons claim to have gained 
privileged insight into those spiritual truths they present in their texts” 
(Hammer, 2001: 369) have been an important source of epistemic 
authority in the history of religious traditions all over the world, but 
are just as often drawn upon by contemporary “prophets” in today’s 
market of New Age spiritualties (cf. Hanegraaff, 1997; Heelas, 
1996). Icke did not just receive his knowledge from above, but was 
actively involved in that he had to “follow the clues” laid out for him. 
Icke’s appeal to revelation and prophecy as a cultural source of 
authority fits into the cultural setting of the conspiracy milieu in which 
“connecting the dots” is an important operational imperative. Icke’s 
appeal to the epistemic authority of experience does not stand alone, 
but epitomizes a broader cultural trend in which the true or inner self 
is the most valuable and trustworthy source of knowledge (e.g. 
Aupers and Houtman, 2006; Heelas, 1996; Van Zoonen, 2012). 
 
4.4.2 “All Across the Ancient World”: Appealing to 
Tradition 
An important part of Icke’s argument is based on the allegedly 
perennial wisdom of ancient cultures. Icke supported his claims 
throughout his show by referring to the myths of African tribes, the 
sagas of Asian emperors, the dreams of Native-American shamans, 
and familiar biblical narratives. The best example of this appeal to 
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tradition, as Hammer (2001) names it, is Icke’s reptilian thesis, for 
which he finds support in virtually all the different ancient cultures he 
referred to in his show, noting that “this interbreeding is talked about 
and recorded all across the world in the ancient accounts” (1:47:30). 
He started with an excerpt from the Old Testament which speaks of 
“sons of Gods coming into the daughters of men who bare children to 
them” (Genesis, 6:4), “but that’s just the biblical version, all across 
the ancient world you see similar stories and accounts of this 
interbreeding” (1:48:30). He said that “these bloodlines were known 
in the ancient worlds under different symbols and codes as children 
of heaven and earth, children of the gods, children of the sky” 
(2:15:00). His first argument is to prove that there is a common 
ancient narrative of humanity as the product of the intervention of 
celestial beings.  
The most dominant symbolization of reptilian interbreeding 
is visible, Icke argued, in the adoration and worship of “the serpent 
gods” all across the world, in all cultures, and in all religions. He 
started off by saying that “the oldest form of religious worship in the 
world has been taken back 70,000 years, to an area of the Kalahari 
desert in South Africa and it is the worship of the serpent or worship 
of the snake” (2:07:30). He supported this point by reference to an 
1833 study of John Bathurst Deane titled The Worship of the Serpent, 
which holds that all cultures/nations around the world worshiped a 
snake or a serpent (2:08:30). Icke quoted extensively from this work, 
but he gave many more examples, such as  
Chinese emperors used to claim the right to be emperor because of 
their genetic connection to the serpent gods. And this is a theme all 
across the world between the serpent gods and royalty, claiming the 
right to rule because of their DNA. (1:58:00)  
He continued with myths of old Mesopotamia, Ancient Egyptians 
(“who have their pharaohs represented as a cobra”), in ancient Japan 
and Asia (“the dragon is the most dominant symbol of that world”), in 
central and south America (“the Mayan ‘Kukulkan’ and ‘Quetzalcoatl’ 
of the Aztecs”), and the Druids, whose “folklore is full of serpents” 
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(2:07:00 – 2:10:00). Icke then told the audience about the 
confirmation he got from an African shaman, saying that he met 
Credo Mutwa, the great Zulu shaman. He contacted me because he 
has read the Biggest Secret in which I introduced this reptilian stuff, 
and he said, “David, how do you know? How do you know about the 
Chitauri?” And I didn’t know about the Chitauri, “tell me about the 
Chitauri.” And he told me story of African history where the Chitauri, 
which translates as the children of the serpent, had taken over the 
world in the very same way as the other parts of the ancient world 
described it. (2:11:00)  
Similar symbols of serpent gods are found everywhere in 
contemporary culture and everyday life, Icke told us. They are in our 
myths and fairytales, in the coats of arms of the aristocracy, and in the 
logos of car companies. Icke saw this as telling, “it’s amazing how 
many times you see the symbols of reptiles and humans, or part 
human, part reptile, overseeing the palaces, castles and churches of 
this elite” (2:17:00). His conclusion put it clearly: “all worship the 
serpent gods” (2:10:00).  
However, Icke told his audience, “something else goes 
parallel with the reptilian story” (1:48:00), by which he refers to the 
rupture or break which he similarly sees represented universally in 
human mythology and religion. Icke said,  
again, not just in the Bible with the Garden of Eden and so, but all 
across the ancient accounts is the connection of the reptilian 
connection and the Fall of Men. And again, this is universal. The 
ancient accounts again talk about a time when humans were so 
unbelievably different to how we are today. And then there was a 
sudden change, the fall of men as it was called, what I call this is 
“the schism.” (1:48:30) 
In addition to framing the “energetic schism” within a discourse of 
technology, I saw here that Icke supported this theory of a “sudden 
change” by appealing to “the ancient accounts.” He started off with 
the Old Testament because the schism was  
of course symbolized by Noah and the great flood. And Noah is 
simply a biblical version of much older stories that tell exactly the 
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same story of how the earth turned over, how there were great 
geological catastrophes and how humans lost their power of the 
connection they had to higher levels of consciousness. (2:24:30)  
Later in the show, Icke introduced the work of Carlos Castaneda, 
“who wrote a book based on the teachings of a Central American 
shaman called Don Juan Matus. Some say he didn’t exist, some say he 
did, whatever, the words put in his mouth are just extraordinarily 
extremely accurate” (3:09:30).258 He continued to quote large pieces 
of text from Castaneda’s book that support virtually his whole thesis 
about “a predator that comes from the depths of the cosmos and took 
over the rule of our lives. Human beings are its prisoners” (3:10:00). 
Later, concerning the fall of man, Icke quoted Don Juan Matus again,  
sorcerers of ancient Mexico reasoned that man must have been a 
complete being at one point with stupendous insights, feats of 
awareness that are mythological legends nowadays. And then 
everything seems to disappear. And we have now a sedated man. 
Man, the magical being that he is destined to be, is no longer 
magical, he’s an average piece of meat. (3:17:00) 
In other words, Icke’s claimed that his ideas about the “schism” or 
“distortion that brought an end to the world we knew before” 
(2:32:30) are supported by most, if not all, ancient cultures. 
Throughout his show, Icke appealed to the wisdom of the 
ancient world to validate his own theories: if they have been saying it 
for thousands of years, it must be true. In a culture wary of modern 
institutions and the knowledge they produce, this makes sense as 
these older traditions represent a more authentic and a more pure 
basis of wisdom (cf. Campbell, 2007; Heelas, 1996; Roszak, 1995). 
This appeal to ancient cultures is what Hammer (2001) identifies as 
the epistemological strategy of tradition which involves basing one’s 
truth claims in the source of non-European (often spiritual) lore. Icke 
appears to share this idolatry of a world before its corruption by 
modernity and therefore does not differentiate between the ancient 
cultures of Asia, Africa, or the Americas. They are all more pure ways 
of knowing, and as Hammer argues, these non-European and pre-
modern cultures become in such circles modernity’s “positive Other” 
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(2001: 87). In line with the “invention of a tradition” literature (cf. 
Shils, 1981; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), Hammer holds that such 
appeals are by no means references to “actual” practices and beliefs of 
“ancient cultures,” but construct a radically “modern” 
reinterpretation of non-European tales and traditions (2001: 23). 
Like those in the modern esoteric tradition Hammer studies, Icke 
takes the legends of ancient cultures as containing factual truths 
(2001: 157). Whether these are in reality true or not—as Icke himself 
said in the case of Carlos Castaneda—is not that relevant: “the words 
put in his mouth are just extraordinarily extremely accurate” 
(3:09:30). Indeed, it all potentially being fiction is “not the point” 
here, as Hammer emphasizes, “the message is clear”, such ancient 
cultures “possessed a vast wisdom, a spirituality lost to us” (2001: 
136). Icke conveniently draws on this widely felt sentiment of cultural 
discontent and his appeal to tradition finds fertile ground.  
 
4.4.3 “Living in the Cosmic Internet”: Appealing to 
Futuristic Imageries 
In contrast to supporting claims by appealing to the wisdom of ancient 
cultures, Icke also looked to the distant future as a source of authority 
when he invoked imageries that are brought to life by science fiction 
and digital technologies. In claiming that the world around us is an 
illusion that we all collectively create inside our heads by tapping the 
metaphysical universe, Icke made abundant use of such factual and 
fictional realities to support his claims.  
Throughout his show, Icke spoke, for example, about human 
bodies as computers, saying that “our DNA is like a universal software 
code,” “just like computers, we have a phenomenal anti-virus system 
we call the human immune system,” and “what we call cultures are 
different sub-softwares of the human software” (1:10:00-1:12:30). 
These analogies were meant to add plausibility to Icke’s argument that 
our bodies decode a universal energy field (the metaphysical universe) 
and bring the reality we experience every day into being. Icke argued 
that this “is just like the wireless internet, where you get a computer 
and pull the whole world wide web, a whole collection of reality, out 
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of the unseen, to appear on a screen, anywhere in the world” (36:30). 
Similarly, when Icke spoke of the “energetic schism” through which 
our “body-computers” became distorted and disconnected from 
higher levels of consciousness, he supported this notion with a 
comparison to digital technologies:  
in China you can’t access vast tracks of the internet because the 
computer system has been firewalled off to stop Chinese people 
accessing that area of the internet that the authorities don’t want 
them to see. What happened as a part of this [reptilian] intervention 
is that human genetics were manipulated to do exactly the same: to 
firewall us off from the levels of reality we could access before. So we 
went into this prison we call visible light that we have been in ever 
since. (2:26:00)  
Such references to digital technologies to support his ideas were 
common throughout his show. For example, when Icke explained 
why life feels and appears “real,” he said that it is “because we are 
living in a virtual reality universe. A fantastically advanced version of 
a gigantic computer game” (32:30). He pointed to new digital 
technologies that have made moving 3D holographs possible, like 
news readers in a television show or Michael Jackson appearing on 
stage long after his death. “[S]ome of these digital holograms look so 
solid,”, Icke held, that “people are afraid to walk through them. And 
that’s what this is: digital holograms are the reality we’re 
experiencing” (1:24:30). These examples of the realness of virtual 
realities were deployed by Icke to convince the audience of his 
understanding of reality as an “illusion” created inside our heads: “we 
live in a very advanced equivalent of the holographic internet, the only 
place that it ‘exists’ is on the screen, we live in the cosmic internet” 
(40:30). 
The futuristic imagery developed in science fiction provided 
a secondary source of epistemic authority for Icke to tap from. When 
he described reality to be an illusion created inside our heads, he made 
an explicit reference to The Matrix: 
this scene from The Matrix—which is absolutely right—where the 
Neo character says, “but this isn’t real!” And Morpheus says “well, 
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what is real? How do you define real? If you’re talking about what 
you can feel, what you can smell, taste and see, then ‘real’ is simply 
electronic signals interpreted by your brain.” That’s all it is…so 
imagine if you can manipulate the way the brain interprets reality 
… think of the potential for manipulating the way we see reality 
individually and collectively. (38:00)  
This obvious reference to The Matrix movie is a popular one—both in 
the conspiracy milieu and generally—and Icke quoted this extensive 
excerpt twice in his show:  
…in the Matrix that scene where Morpheus says, “The Matrix is 
everywhere, it is all around us, even now in this very room. You can 
see it when you look out your window, or you turn on your television. 
You can feel it when you go to work, when you go to church, when 
you pay your taxes. It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes 
to blind you from the truth.” Neo, “What truth?” Morpheus, “That 
you are a slave, Neo. Like everyone else, you were born into 
bondage... born into a prison that you cannot smell or taste or touch. 
A prison for your mind.” I would say that prison for your mind is the 
Moon-Matrix, which has put us in a vibrational prison” (42:30 and 
2:59:00).  
The main idea put forward in that movie—that we all live, without 
really knowing it, in an artificial non-existent simulated world—
resonates remarkably well with what Icke was trying to tell the 
audience, and proved a powerful metaphor in convincing us. The 
irresolvable philosophical quandary on which this movie is based 
entertains many. How to tell, after all, if the world around us is not a 
well-crafted illusion?  
But the appeal to science fiction goes further. Icke supported, 
for example, his claim that the moon is an alien instrument of mind-
control by referencing Star Wars, “in a galaxy far, far away… I don’t 
think so. This is much closer at home” (2:48:00). He also cited John 
Carpenter’s They Live as a reliable representation, “I thought it was 
symbolically accurate when I first saw it, but now I know it’s 
unbelievably accurate” (3:02:00). Icke deliberated on They Live at 
length, arguing that the plot is useful in light of his own theory: the 
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protagonist discovers that people are manipulated to consume and 
accept the dictatorial status quo through subliminal messages in mass 
media and advertisements by a ruling class that are in fact aliens who 
conceal their real nature in daily life. He described the possibility that 
our sensory perceptions are manipulated, “the reason the people 
cannot see [the truth out there] is because there’s a frequency being 
transmitted which is preventing the population from seeing what they 
would normally see” (3:05:00). The moon-matrix “is the equivalent 
of that broadcast dish on the top of TV tower in that movie” 
(3:07:30). For Icke, the film sums up what he argued in his show. The 
same literal truths can be found in Star Wars, Icke revealed: 
the Death Star is very much of course like the moon. And it was 
constructed to move in on planets and take them over. In the same 
bloody way as I am talking about the moon. In many ways this is so 
symbolic of what we are looking at here, and that’s no accident with 
George Lucas involved. (2:50:00)  
Both movies confirm what Icke had been saying all along, and 
referencing them should help Icke convince his audience. 
Virtual reality universes, holographic morphing, and 
indoctrinating frequency transmissions may all sound like futuristic 
science fiction, and in many cases they are. But what was outlandish 
science fiction yesterday, is concrete possibility today. We live in a 
world unimaginable for people living only a century ago: talking to 
moving images of real people on a small device in our hand, or 
spending days in simulated game environments where we fight 
alongside dwarves against other mythical creatures. The merely-
imaginable has become very real. Digital technologies have not only 
fundamentally changed the way we live, but they have altered the way 
we perceive ourselves and the world around us. And just like how 
new technologies for erasing distance in the nineteenth century (like 
the telegraph) made spirit communication apprehensible and popular 
(Stolow, 2008), so too do digital technologies of the twenty-first 
century contribute to the understanding of the world as a virtual 
reality. Icke seemed to give just such a cultural-sociological 
explanation himself, albeit with a curious twist:  
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[T]oday it’s much easier to talk about reality, because technology is 
starting to mirror the very reality we are experiencing: it’s getting 
closer and closer to real. The projection is that not too long from now 
they will have computer games which you can hardly tell the 
difference between that [virtual reality] and this [our virtual 
reality]. (33:30) 
Technological advancements have normalized futuristic imageries 
that Icke can conveniently use to support his ideas about the world-
as-virtual-reality. 
Besides his appeal to once futuristic imageries turned real that 
function to convince people that much more unbelievable stuff has 
potential reality, Icke referred to science fiction as factual descriptions 
of reality. In his own words, “so much of science fiction ain’t fiction 
at all, they’re getting it from facts” (2:51:00). Barkun argues that this 
“fact-fiction reversal” is common, “conspiracy literature is replete 
with instances in which fictional products are asserted to be accurate 
factual representations of reality’ (2006: 29). One can therefore 
critique the fact that popular culture “mainstreams” conspiracy 
thought by further blurring fact-fiction distinctions, as Barkun does 
(e.g. 2006: 33/179-181). But it is hard to deny that works of science 
fiction have established themselves firmly in our collective 
imagination. The appeal to futuristic imagery, I argue here, 
normalizes the rather outlandish ideas that Icke offered. Having been 
exposed to so many exotic stories of outer space and alien realities, 
the notion of living in the cosmic internet seems to many not so 
farfetched. Whether Icke is appealing to these futuristic imaginaries 
as literal, or is using them as metaphors, the role these references play 
is clear: they help people imagine (and believe) what he is talking 
about is. 
 
4.4.4 “What Scientists Are Saying”: Appealing to Science 
In a context dominated by a scientific worldview, anyone trying to 
legitimize their claims to truth would do well to base it in science. As 
Tom Gieryn puts it, “science often stands metonymically for 
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credibility, for legitimate knowledge, for a trustable reality: it 
commands assent in public debate” (1999: 1). Olav Hammer 
convincingly argues that this is just as much the case for spiritual 
advocates proselytizing their claims on truth (2001). He states that 
“one of the most striking characteristics of the esoteric tradition is 
precisely its use of contemporary science as a source of legitimacy” 
(2001: 203). Icke based a great deal of his claims on the epistemic 
authority of science, even though he is very critical of it, “because it 
puts you in the box, on that postage stamp” (1:21:30). Be they natural 
or supernatural forms of knowledge, if one wants their 
understandings of the world to be acknowledged, invoking science 
appears imperative. 
Icke alluded to science first by using scientific works as the 
building blocks of his own theories. When he argued, for example, that 
the moon is not what we think it is, he quoted many different 
scientists to support the conclusion that the moon is a hollowed-out 
planetoid from outer space. He began with scientists who question 
the common understanding of the moon as Earth’s satellite: Isaac 
Asimov, a Russian professor of Biochemistry and Irwin Shapiro from 
the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics both argue, Icke 
noted, that given its size and position the moon should not be there 
(2:36:00). He continued by citing scientists from NASA who 
concluded after seismic experiments that “the moon is more like a 
hollow than a homogenous sphere” (2:36:30), findings that were 
supported, Icke said, by Dr. Frank Press and Dr. Sean Solomon from 
MIT (2:37:00). To argue ultimately that the moon is a construct from 
outer space, Icke extensively quoted two scientists from the Russian 
Academy of Science, Michael Vahsin and Alexander Shcherbakov, 
who “wrote an article in Sputnik Magazine titled, “Is the Moon the 
Creation of Alien Intelligence?” (2:38:00). After presenting their 
findings Icke advanced their marvelous conclusion: “they say it’s a 
hollowed-out planetoid! ‘What we have here is a very ancient 
spaceship, the interior of which was filled with […] everything 
necessary to enable this caravel of the universe to serve as Noah’s ark 
of intelligence’” (2:40:00). Icke’s effort here is meant to give his 
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audience the impression that his theory of the moon is actually 
supported by real scientists. 
Icke also alluded to science as stepping stones to reach his own 
more extravagant ideas. He starts in such cases from a position of 
scientific quandary and then advances his own rather extraordinary 
notions just at the point where science leaves matters unexplained. 
For example, when Icke explained that our “body-computer” can no 
longer reach higher levels of consciousness, he turned to unresolved 
theories in cosmology and astronomy and used them as a starting 
point,  
the range of frequencies our body-computer can decode is 
extraordinarily tiny. We are virtually blind, in terms of [seeing] 
what exist. The vast majority of this universe is what scientists call 
dark energy or dark matter and they call it dark not because it’s pitch 
black, but because we cannot decode it. Therefore it’s not within our 
realm of experience. We have to work it out by its impact on things 
we can see. (59:00)  
Later in the show Icke drew on another scientific mystery in order to 
support his idea that we have been genetically modified to keep us 
away from the truth: 
there was a genetic manipulation to stop us accessing the ranges of 
frequency we did before. It is a major reason why scientists call 95% 
of human DNA junk DNA, because they don’t know what it does. 
Well, they’re switched off! (1:51:00) 
In all such cases, science is the base from which Icke ventured into 
unexplored territories. Scientists may point in the right direction, 
Icke said, but because “they’re focusing on their own discipline, their 
own individual dots, and they don’t connect the dots, they can’t see 
the picture” (1:26:00).  
Icke drew on science lastly for its rich repertoire of cultural 
imagery to make his thoughts intelligible. When he was talking about 
how ethereal reptilian entities are actually controlling people like 
Obama and Queen Elizabeth, Icke turned to the image of the sterile 
laboratory:  
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[W]hen these scientists in a laboratory are working with something 
they can’t touch because it’s too dangerous. What they are working 
with will be in a tank, and they’ll put gloves on, which allows them 
to be outside the tank, but to manipulate inside the tank. Well, that 
is a very good symbol of what I am talking about, these illuminati 
bloodlines, these hybrid bloodlines operate like with those gloves, 
operating inside this reality. (1:56:00)  
Later in his show when Icke discussed the control system that he said has 
trained us into acquiescence and obedience, he made reference to the 
image of a classical conditioning experiment, 
[I]t is a mind game. More and more fine details of our life are being 
dictated. It is to turn us into a version of this [shows picture of a 
mouse in the middle of a maze]. When you put shock equipment down 
different channels [the mouse learns where not to go]. After a while, 
not long, you can take that shock equipment away, that mouse will 
never go down there again, because you’ve changed his behavior 
patterns. And what they are doing is [the same]: giving us 
punishments for doing this, punishments for doing that, so we become 
subservient totally to the system, never challenge it. (5:00:00)  
Science, to conclude, is an important part of our cultural imaginary, 
and Icke draws from it regularly to make his ideas intelligible. 
Despite all the challenges to the institution of science, appeals 
to its epistemic authority remain by far one of the most effective ways 
to lend credibility to knowledge (e.g. Gieryn, 1999). Even 
“spokespersons for religious outlooks” need to position themselves in 
one way or another to the dominant scientific worldview (Asprem, 
2014; Hammer, 2001: 202). Hammer distinguishes multiple ways in 
which such religious advocates relate to science which are similar to 
Icke’s appeals. When Icke drew, for example, on the knowledge, 
methods, and cultural imagery of science to support his arguments, 
he did what Hammer calls “scientism” (2001: 206). This line of 
reasoning proposes, as Icke did, that “good scientific arguments exist 
for accepting [supernatural phenomena]” (Hammer, 2001: 203), or 
in this case, for accepting superconspiracy theories. But Icke also 
drew on science in a way similar to what Hammer identifies as “God 
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of the gaps” arguments when he claimed domains of life that science 
has yet to find an explanation for (2001: 202). In science’s inability to 
provide answers to the mysteries of black holes, dark matter, and junk 
DNA, Icke stepped in and contended that he dares to go further by 
providing explanations. Science performed, in other words, a dual 
role in Icke’s thought: firstly as a positive Other when it confirmed 
what he is saying, and secondly as a negative Other when he framed 
science as the signpost of limitation. Either way it was used, it is 
evident that science proves a resourceful cultural source of authority 
to tap from, if only because it can be invoked rather flexibly. And in 
his show, Icke sure knew how to use it.  
 
4.4.5 “The Incessant Centralization of Power”: Appealing 
to (Critical) Social Theory  
After exploring the multidimensional level of his superconspiracy, 
Icke explained “how it all plays out in this five sense reality” by 
drawing on notions developed in the social sciences (3:27:00).  His 
main question “how do a few control the many?” is unequivocally 
answered in sociological terms, that is, “by the way they have 
structured society” (3:27:30). In the following, I will show that Icke’s 
argumentation of how we are all manipulated into acquiescent and 
obedient slaves to the system draws heavily on sociological theories. 
Although he did not make direct references to the work of social 
scientists, he used their discourse, concepts, and mechanisms, which 
tells us something of their cultural authority outside of academia. 
The allusion to social theory is clear when Icke identified the 
centralization of power/knowledge in hierarchical systems as the 
organizing principle of society:  
[C]rucial all the way through is to structure society as a pyramid. 
The idea is to hold advanced knowledge in the upper levels of this 
structure, where a few at the top are the only ones who know how it 
all fits together, and they keep the general population in ignorance 
of what they know, therefore they have the power to manipulate the 
masses. (3:28:00) 
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Knowledge is power, Icke explained after Foucault. Akin to 
sociological understandings of modern societies, Icke’s “pyramid of 
manipulation” is also 
vertically structured 
along “the major 
institutions that 
affect our daily life,” 
such as religion, 
finance, military, 
education, politics 
(see: Figure 1). Each 
column/institution 
maintains the 
fundamental 
principle of the 
hierarchical centralization of power/knowledge, resulting in an 
image of society as a nested pyramid. In portraying a pyramidal view 
of society, Icke underscores the rationality of functionally 
differentiating society in order to most efficiently control it, which is 
reminiscent of Weber’s bureaucratization theories (2013[1922]). By 
focusing on how such systems operate through hierarchical 
structures, in which, for example, lower level officials need not have 
any idea about what they are part of, but need only do their job and 
follow commands (cf. Arendt, 2006), Icke argued that society can be 
manipulated with the cooperation of those being manipulated: 
[T]hey [just] go to work, earn money, go on holiday, they don’t try 
to manipulate anybody, they don’t try to create a Fascist Orwellian 
totalitarian. But they don’t know how their apparently innocent 
contribution individually connects with other apparently innocent 
contributions around the system. And that’s how they keep what’s 
going on in the hands of the few. (3:30:00) 
Social theory from thinkers like Marx, Weber, Foucault and Arendt 
has found its way to the superconspiracy theories of Icke who reminds 
us of the profound cultural impact these theories have. 
Figure 1 
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The pyramidal image of society is dominant in the conspiracy 
milieu, and although it circulates in many forms259, each has a large, 
uniform base (often called “workers,” “debt slaves,” or “labor units”) 
which is pitted against a tiny elite that dominates them (see Figure 1). 
Besides the obvious populist tenet in such a view of society, the legacy 
of Marxian thought is especially apparent when compared to “The 
Pyramid of the 
Capitalist System” 
(Figure 2), a satiric 
cartoon published in a 
1911 edition of 
Industrial Worker.260 
Although the 
dominant institutions 
may have changed 
slightly, the idea is the 
same. As Icke put it, 
“humans have been 
put in this circular 
lifestyle, just a 
repeating cycle of 
work and sleep and eat 
and work and sleep 
and eat… so that we 
spend so much time 
surviving and do not 
lift our head up to see 
what’s going on” (3:35:30). The ruling class enjoys a privileged life, 
while the major institutions guarantee order and stability.  Even the 
operating logic is similar: just “follow the money” and you will get to 
the cabal.  
The resemblance to Marxian thought goes further. Icke 
spoke, for example, about the “institutions that affect our daily life” 
and how they “program us with a certain perception of reality which 
we carry through our lives so we will be good little slaves” (22:30). 
This is not a far cry from the Marxian mainstay of a “superstructure 
Figure 2 
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of society” (its culture, religion, ideology, values, education, politics, 
media) that maintains and legitimizes the dominant “forces and 
relations of production” by advancing it as normal, just, and legitimate 
(Marx and Engels, 1970[1845]). Icke reiterated Gramscian notions of 
how these institutions, and especially the education system, socialize 
people to obediently serve in their designated (labor) roles in society, 
“which is why the education system is not about educating, it’s about 
programming” (3:28:00). Such acquired “hegemonic beliefs,” 
Antonio Gramsci argues, thwart critical thought and ultimately 
obstruct the “revolution” (2011[1948]). Icke urged us for the same 
reasons to “free our minds from the programming of a lifetime if we 
are to go down this road to freedom” (22:00). The “control system” 
may have been set up in myriad ways “to divert us, to confuse us, and 
to keep us from the understanding that would set us free” (14:00), 
but, so Icke told us in rather Marxian terms, “we can break out of this 
maze” by understanding the reality of the world we live in, “the choice 
is to become conscious!” (25:00). Class conscious? 
When Icke talked about the increasing centralization of 
power, he provided a form of historical sociology as well:  
[W]e started with tribal situations, and as part of this centralization 
process, the tribes came together in what we call nations. And now a 
few people at the center of the nation are dictating to all the former 
tribes that make up that nation. We are now welling to the next stage 
of that, which is bringing nations together under unions, like the 
European Union, so a few people at the center are now dictating to 
all those nations, which are made up of all the tribes of before. And 
the next stage of that, which they are already preparing for, is to 
take us into a world government that would dictate to these unions 
that are building up – European Union, American Union, Pacific 
Union, evolved out of like organizations as the APEC and the African 
Union, already in place. (3:37:00)  
The notion of a coming totalitarian world government is central to 
many conspiracy theories (e.g. Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011), but the 
fears and worries about the increasing centralization of decision 
making in pan-national institutions like the EU are more widespread. 
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They are, for example, held to be a core cause of the rise of populism 
in Europe since the early 2000s (e.g. Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2004), 
or to the 2016 OUT vote in the EU referendum of the United 
Kingdom. Icke clearly drew on such populist sentiments to support 
his claims, saying for example that “what they have done in many of 
these unions is to start off as free trade zones—‘no, no, just for jobs, 
that’s all it is, no worries’—and then they turn them in fully fledged 
dictatorships, which is what happened in the European Union” 
(3:37:30). His discourse is not unlike that of many Western European 
populists.  
More important for my argument here than this recourse to 
a prevalent anti-EU sentiment in Europe, is that Icke essentially gave 
a socio-historical explanation of how we got into the “centralized 
dictatorship [that] the EU is now” (3:43:00). He described the current 
situation by making reference to long-term historical processes that 
are normally the territory of historical sociologists. When Icke 
referred to “globalization” as part of the strategy of the cabal, his 
explanation is noticeably similar vein to those sociological theories 
standing in Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis tradition 
(2011[1974]):  
[G]lobalization is the constant centralization of power. Which is 
more and more power in the in the hands of a few. More and more, 
the globalized economy is making every country dependent on every 
other country, therefore has no power of individual action and 
decision making [and] no self-sufficient ability to make decisions in 
their own lives, own communities, and their own countries. And the 
reason they want to do this is to make everyone dependent on 
something outside their control, because dependency equals control. 
(3:45:30) 
Icke supported his superconspiracy of a coming totalitarian world 
government by reference to socio-historical mechanisms that social 
scientists know as dependency theory (e.g. Ghosh, 2001; James, 1997; 
Wallerstein, 2011). 
In contrast to his appeal to science, where Icke literally 
quoted natural scientists, the reference to social-scientific knowledge 
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is less explicit. But the way he explained our current situation and 
how we got there is clearly reminiscent of sociological thought, 
especially of the critical or (neo)Marxist signature. Obviously, Icke 
gave a conspiracy twist to his socio-historical explanations, and they 
are inevitably simplified in his show, but a full one-to-one similarity 
is not the point here. What is relevant is that Icke unmistakably drew 
authority from a discourse of explanation that has its origins in the 
social sciences, but which is now widespread. Whether he spoke of 
the functional differentiation of society along “the institutions that 
control our daily lives,” how they manipulate us into thinking what 
the control system wants, or how globalization processes decrease a 
country’s autonomy, “because dependency equals control,” his 
arguments are what can be called a form of pop-sociology (cf. Birchall, 
2006; Knight, 2000). Such discourse testifies to the trickling down of 
(social) scientific notions in wider society (e.g. Giddens, 1991). 
Critical social theory seems to have become a popular idiom for 
conspiracy celebrities and ordinary people alike to express their 
discontent with the current social order. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
David Icke brings the heavens and Earth together in one extraordinary 
master narrative of banking scams, multidimensional universes, 
reptilian races, and institutional forms of mind-control. During the 
seven hours in which he connects the dots, Icke taps a multitude of 
epistemic sources to convince his audience that the unbelievable is 
indeed undeniable. His claims to truth are a hodgepodge of discursive 
strategies of legitimation: he draws on personal experience, perennial 
narratives in ancient cultures, futuristic imageries, and science and 
critical social theory to support his superconspiracy theory. And as 
with Hammer’s spokespersons of the esoteric tradition, these 
‘discursive strategies seldom appear in splendid isolation’ (2001: 45). 
Indeed, they follow each other in remarkable speed, and without 
hesitation. Some academics may find this eclecticism problematic and 
deplore how such charlatans unsettle the boundaries between fact and 
fiction, or warn of the political and cultural ramifications of a world 
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that succumbs to relativism (e.g. Barkun, 2006; Pipes, 1997; Sunstein 
and Vermeule, 2009). But this sort of critique from a positivistic 
stance does little to help understand Icke’s enormous popularity from 
a cultural sociological perspective. Based on this analysis, I develop 
two sociological explanations here as to why Icke’s epistemological 
pluralism—drawing from different sources of knowledge—only adds 
to the plausibility of his superconspiracy theory. These hypotheses 
about the cultural reception of superconspiracy theories suggest new 
routes for further research.  
First, I contend that Icke is attractive for epistemological 
omnivores, people who afford credibility to multiple sources of 
knowledge in their search for the truth. Although science may be the 
most commanding epistemic authority (cf. Gieryn, 1999; Brown, 
2009), it faces today decreasing levels of trust and confidence in its 
ability to deliver reliable and truthful knowledge about the world (cf. 
Achterberg et al., 2015; Beck, 1992; Inglehart, 1997). To be sure, 
science is still regarded with great esteem, but it has no monopoly on 
truth. Epistemological purists may believe there is only one superior 
way to arrive at good knowledge or the truth, epistemological omnivores 
find this strict reliance on one system of knowledge suspect and argue 
that it makes more sense to complement it with other sources, such 
as tradition, experience, fictional narratives, and imageries. Icke 
clearly thinks the same, or at least he believes this strategy of 
epistemological pluralism to be most opportune when claiming 
knowledge. If science alone cannot explain it all, for whatever 
reasons, the best one can do is to draw from a multitude of epistemic 
sources (cf. Lyotard, 1984). That is, at least, what epistemological 
omnivores would say. In a culture wary of dominant epistemic 
institutions and their sole reliance on science as the pathway to truth, 
Icke’s bricolage of many different sources of knowledge may therefore 
find much resonance. 
However, Icke’s eclecticism may not just serve the 
epistemological omnivores; his superconspiracy theory would appeal 
equally to different social groups, each with distinct worldviews and 
lifestyles. Many scholars have pointed to the fact that Icke manages to 
bring together a diverse range of people, from leftist spiritual seekers 
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to right wing reactionaries (e.g. Barkun, 2006; Lewis and Kahn, 
2005; Ward and Voas, 2009). This is confirmed by my own 
observations and interviews in the field. On the one hand, I found 
many spiritual seekers in the conspiracy milieu who might be 
particularly fascinated by Icke’s appeal to personal experience and 
ancient mythologies. After all, such sources of knowledge are at the 
core of modern esotericism, New Age spiritualties, and the cultic 
milieu generally (cf. Campbell, 2002; Hammer, 2001; Heelas, 
1996). The references to science and technological imageries may, on 
the other hand, attract quite another audience, like amateur-
scientists, technicians, hackers, and fans of the science fiction genre. 
And what about the references to critical social science, are these 
narratives particularly appealing to social activists or neo-Marxists 
fighting an unfair social system of modern alienation, stratification, 
and globalization? My second suggestion, then, is that Icke’s reliance 
on multiple sources of knowledge attracts distinctly different 
audiences. His text is highly polysemic: each follower can extract from 
all the different ingredients of his superconspiracy theory a particular 
narrative that resonates with her own social identity and subjective 
reasoning. In short, I argue that Icke’s epistemological pluralism 
strengthens the plausibility and explains the popularity of his 
superconspiracy theory, but whether it predominantly attracts the 
epistemological omnivores, or different social groups with distinct 
epistemological preferences, or both, remains an open question for 
further empirical research.  
Icke’s epistemological pluralism should, however, not be 
considered a strictly idiosyncratic enterprise, but has wider cultural 
resonance. Many religious groups operating in today’s globalized 
world have, for example, a similar type of syncretism, blending 
different, often contradictory belief systems and schools of thought 
into one coherent narrative (Stewart and Shaw, 1994). Such 
epistemological pluralism is similarly characteristic of the cultic milieu 
where it has been described as constituting a “common ideology of 
seekership” (Campbell, 2002: 15). Likewise, many postmodern 
religious movements pick-and-mix from different epistemic sources 
such as film, books, mythologies, music, etc. to construct their holy 
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scriptures (e.g. Lyon, 2000; Possamai, 2005). Icke’s fusion of science 
and tradition, folklore and futurism is also found outside the domain 
of religiosity as it reminiscent of the many pastiches in the arts and 
culture (cf. Jameson, 1991; Best and Kellner, 1997). In all these 
ways, it is hard to set Icke’s epistemological pluralism aside as a 
deviant and eccentric way of claiming knowledge, since it aligns well 
with many contemporary cultural trends that unsettle stable 
boundaries between different categories of knowledge. 
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5. Breaking Out of the Matrix: 
How People Explain Their 
Biographical Turn to Conspiracy 
Theories 
 
5.1 Introduction 
With the rapid popularization of conspiracy theories in the last twenty 
years, the question of why people today adhere so strongly to these 
alternative explanations of reality acquires considerable urgency. 
From all corners, academic scholars provide explanations of the 
contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories. Broadly speaking, there 
are three overarching arguments embedded in their particular 
research traditions, but none pays much empirical and conceptual 
attention to those people who are actually engaging with conspiracy 
theories. For a first and rather dominant strand of research that draws 
on the early works of Popper (2013) and Hofstadter (1996), 
conspiracy theories are the delusional ideas of (more or less) paranoid 
minds (e.g. Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; Robins and 
Post, 1997; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). As these scholars a priori 
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dismiss conspiracy theories as irrational and dangerous forms of 
thought, not much conceptual leeway is given to the motivations and 
reasons people might have for engaging with them. They are, bluntly 
put, mentally disturbed. Out of a dissatisfaction with these morally-
tainted, psychopathological accounts, some scholars have sought to 
understand the popularity of conspiracy theories by relating them to 
the uncertainties of living in globalized, risk-saturated societies, and 
argue that “the idea of conspiracy offers an odd sort of comfort in an 
uncertain age” (Melley, 2000: 8, cf. Fenster, 1999; Knight, 2000; 
Marcus, 1999). These cultural explanations may be more compelling, 
but as engagements with conspiracy theories become some sort of 
coping mechanism with a monolithic postmodern condition, they 
similarly gloss over and exclude the diversity of motivations, 
concerns, and experiences that usually underpin those engagements. 
Finally, despite their valuable theoretical contribution, the more 
Foucauldian analyses of Birchall (2006) and Bratich (2008) leave 
almost no room for conspiracy theorists as living people, who instead 
become discursive positions in contemporary regimes of truth, they 
become “subjectivities” produced via discourses on conspiracy 
theories. 
In light of this humanistic lacuna, I want to bring the 
conspiracy theorist back in as an embodied, reflexive, and social being 
by putting her culturally embedded life at center stage. Instead of 
understanding engagements with conspiracy theories as the result of 
some psychological or cultural condition, I believe it is more fruitful 
to take a biographical approach and study how people get involved 
with conspiracy theories (cf. Plummer, 2001; Roberts, 2002). People 
are not born conspiracy theorists, nor are they mere sufferers of our 
times. Conspiracy theories, I argue here, come to make sense over 
the course of people’s lives; they come to make sense in light of 
people’s own experiences of being in the world. But how it happens 
that people turn to conspiracy theories as explanations of reality that 
are more plausible and sensible than those offered by epistemic 
authorities is hitherto unexplored. Drawing on my field research, I 
study in this chapter the stories people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu 
shared, detailing how they got drawn to conspiracy theories. Instead 
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of a strict focus on objective truth and reality, I follow instead 
people’s own (retrospective) understanding of how that process 
unfolded subjectively. My interest lies in how they explain their 
becoming a conspiracy theorist. I intend in this chapter to explain the 
contemporary popularity of conspiracy theories from a sociological 
perspective that is radically centered on the viewpoints and 
experiences of the actual people who are turning to and perpetuating 
conspiracy theories.  
 
5.2 Biographies in Context: On the Fundamental 
Connectedness of Individual Lives and Societal 
Developments 
Biographical research is often said to bring to surface the perspectives 
of marginal groups who may have been excluded from the mainstream 
scientific canon (cf. Becker, 1963; Plummer, 2001, Roberts, 2002). 
This chapter can be seen in the same light, in that the ideas, 
experiences, and histories of conspiracy theorists are similarly hidden 
by their stigmatization as delusional and paranoid. While giving voice 
is a legitimate and laudable effort, there is more at stake in my study 
of lived experiences. Since the early days of the Chicago School, the 
sociological importance of researching “real living human beings,” 
who interpret and give meaning to their lives, has been put forward 
against the dominance of abstract formal theory and bleak empiricism 
in the social sciences (e.g. Becker, 1970; Blumer, 1979; Denzin, 
1989). Scholars in this biographical tradition argue that it is important 
to “study the social world from the perspective of the interacting 
individual” (Denzin, 1997: xv) and to prioritize “human subjectivity 
and creativity—showing how individuals respond to social constraints 
and actively assemble social worlds” (Plummer, 2001: 14). 
(Auto)biographical accounts are thus not mere idiosyncratic life-
stories, but sociologically relevant data in that they show “the 
interrelation between individual and society, and how broader 
perceptions and modes of thought are represented and monitored 
within the situation and outlook of individuals” (Roberts, 2002: 34; 
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Bertaux, 1981). This potential to grasp larger societal developments 
and cultural change from the perspective of the individual is precisely 
why Thomas and Znaniecki argued in their groundbreaking work that 
“life-histories constitute the perfect type of sociological material” 
(1958[1918-1920]: 1832-3).  
Moreover, Becker reminds us, “the life history, more than 
any other technique except perhaps participant observation, can give 
meaning to the overworked notion of process” (1970: 69, original 
emphasis). An important analytical tool that came to be widely used 
in biographical studies of personal development—what Becker calls 
process, is the concept of a career. Introduced to sociological research 
during the early days of the Chicago School in the 1920’s and 1930’s 
(Barley, 1989: 41-65), the deviant career gained real sociological 
currency through the works of Goffman (1959), Becker (1963), and 
Matza (1969). This temporal-phase model consisting of (about) three 
moments along the trajectories of all kinds of avocations has since 
found its way into many studies on deviance, including studies of male 
and female prostitutes, mental patients, nudists, fencers, 
homosexuals, professional criminals, skid row alcoholics, gamblers, 
drug dealers, racists, tattoo collectors, world savors, hit men, and 
terrorists (Clinard and Meier, 2010: 47-74; Faupel, 2011: 195). A 
simple Google Scholar search shows that articles and books with titles 
such as “Becoming a [insert any avocational group imaginable]: A 
Deviant Career” are numerous. Given the deviant status of conspiracy 
theorists and the social stigma associated with that label, it would be 
logical to conceptualize the becoming of a conspiracy theorist as a 
deviant career. 
However, two main problems with the analytical model of a 
deviant career lead me into a different direction. First, its strict 
formalism. The working assumption of this model is that people 
necessarily pass through identifiable stages in their deviant career, or 
else the model requires adaptation (Becker, 1963: 45). Most likely 
burdened by the institutional strains of his time, Becker tries “to arrive 
at a general statement of the sequence of changes in individual attitude 
and experience which always occurred [and argues that] the method 
requires that every case collected substantiates the hypothesis” 
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(Becker, 1963: 45, my emphasis). Although this universalist imperative 
has largely been abandoned by most qualitative researchers, there 
remains a strong tenet of sequentiality in the concept of a career. 
While there can be similarities in the experiences people have had in 
becoming deviant (in my case, how they have turned to conspiracy 
theories), but if such phases need to be applicable to all people 
involved as necessary stages, then it seems to me that biographical 
diversity is sacrificed for the sake of the model. More concretely, the 
life-stories of people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu are markedly 
different, and it is precisely those differences that add, I argue here, 
to the understanding of why so many people are attracted by 
conspiracy theories today (cf. Barkun, 2006; Knight, 2000; Ward and 
Voas, 2011). Moreover, too often the model is no longer a to help us 
understand the trajectories of deviant lives, but is instead a conceptual 
goal in itself, a popular and easy short-cut to conceptualize process, but 
with little reference to the complexity and contingency of actual 
biographical developments. I wonder therefore if the analytical model 
of a deviant career, with its strong focus on temporal communalities, is 
really helpful in the understanding of how and why people move away 
from the mainstream and into the world of conspiracy theories. 
A more important impediment to such an understanding is 
the fact that such analytical models, with their micro-sociological 
focus, ignore and obscure the historical periods in which people live 
and the attendant cultural frameworks of meaning of those points in 
time. Like Becker in his study of the marijuana user, scholars in the 
symbolic interactionist tradition generally focus on the minute details 
of the interacting individuals who drift into deviancy, but leave aside 
the larger cultural contexts that give these trajectories shape and 
meaning. They show (often quite brilliantly) how individuals start 
performing deviant acts, how they then are treated by others, and 
finally, how they manage to live with that stigma, but such accounts 
give little attention to the cultural developments along which those 
acts come to be seen as deviant. Most importantly, they cannot 
explain why these changes occur. If we are to sociologically 
understand how and why so many people turn to conspiracy theories 
now, we cannot focus on the micro-sociological level of the lives of 
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these individuals only. To do so would fail to notice how such 
biographical trajectories are intimately tied in to larger cultural 
developments, encompassing changing perceptions of truth, reality, 
power, inequality, and so on. To an extent, I follow C. Wright Mills 
argument that “neither the life of an individual nor the history of a 
society can be understood without understanding both” (2000: 3). 
The deviant career of a 1960s conspiracy theorist is simply not the same 
as the one living in the early 2000s, and it is precisely those differences 
that give insight into the plurality of reasons that people turn to 
conspiracy theories. Put differently, when biographical developments 
are seen in isolation from the larger contexts of which they are 
inextricably part, we simply miss the bigger picture. A contextualized 
approach is called for. 
In the following analysis, I will therefore delve into the lives 
of the people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu with a focus on 
instances in which where their “private troubles” meet the “public 
issues” of Western societies (Mills, 2000: 8). My research question is 
simple: how do these people explain their involvement with 
conspiracy theories? I am interested in the moments in life they assign 
as significant and meaningful to this process. What are the 
experiences and/or events that pushed them away from the 
mainstream, and how do they frame these? I will show that my 
respondents draw, on the one hand, from a culturally-shared 
narrative of awakening in order to explain their becoming a conspiracy 
theorist (cf. DeGloma, 2010), but I argue that this uniform template 
masks the plurality of culturally embedded life-experiences. If we 
take a closer look at the life-stories people tell, then it becomes 
obvious that their private experiences are empirical exemplars of 
greater cultural changes, and it is to these that I will turn thereafter. 
It is my argument here that the contemporary popularity of 
conspiracy theories is best explained by the societal developments that 
are tangible in people’s personal biographies. Some have argued for 
the historical continuity of conspiracy theories, both in their contents 
and attraction (e.g. Pipes, 1997; Byford, 2011), but I show in this 
chapter how the appeal of conspiracy theories is historically and 
culturally situated.  
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5.3 Beyond the Social Logic of Awakenings: Turning to the 
Richness of Life-Stories 
The world of conspiracy theories often feels like a parallel universe 
hidden from the public. Once you go down that road, or down the 
rabbit hole, as conspiracy theorists often say, everything looks different 
and nothing stays the same. “It’s like taking the red or the blue pill, 
The Matrix, you know. I took the red pill. With the red pill you see 
things how they really are. With the blue pill everything stays the 
same. That’s how it feels” (Neil, 58). It may be no surprise that this 
particular Hollywood blockbuster is an appealing and useful reference 
in the conspiracy milieu. The Matrix, after all, is about the fact that 
we, humans, unknowingly exist in a fully-immersive, simulated 
reality, and it captures for many people in this milieu their 
biographical turn to conspiracy theories and helps them to make sense 
of their current situation. Michael (23) tells me that he likes The Matrix 
because “it gives such a good illustration of the world we are living 
in… you see so much… ‘do you take the blue or the red pill?’ [he 
winks].” The central protagonist, Neo, is the idealized awakened figure 
who takes the red pill to confront the [conspiratorial] truth. “I am 
thankful I have seen the light,” Michael says in line, “that I know now. 
Otherwise I would have still lived in the Matrix. Many people would 
prefer to stay in the Matrix, prefer to be a slave and be ‘happy.’ Well, 
I prefer to be maybe less ‘happy’ but at least more aware, aware of 
the things happening around you.” 
Indeed, it is common in the conspiracy milieu to speak about 
this process of becoming a conspiracy theorist through a discourse of 
“waking up.” One of the major Dutch conspiracy websites is called 
“wijwordenwakker” (we are awakening), and the website of one of 
my respondents is known by the name “slaaptgijnog” (are you still 
asleep?). 261 Many more articles on various Dutch conspiracy websites 
use this metaphor in a variety of ways,262 and it frequently appears in 
the comments section.263 The narrative of awakening is so widespread 
that even critics use it: “conspiracy theorists are convinced to be 
serving the good by ‘waking people up!’”264 My interviewees use that 
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discourse as well. They speak in general terms about “the process of 
waking up” (George, 38), but also in particular, how they themselves 
“woke up one day” (Julie, 31) or were not “awake enough back then” 
(Nicole, 63). Some of them actively “want to wake people up” (John, 
34), whereas others “expect that the masses will wake up soon” 
(Pauline, 67). Some see this process already happening, “people are 
slowly starting to wake up” (Michael, 23). In my research, the 
rhetoric of waking up consistently appears in each conspiracy 
theorist’s life story. 
But what exactly do they mean by waking up? Liam (67) 
explains:  
This is essential, and I also think it is representative for most people. 
Something happens with you that you could describe as waking up. 
That means to open your eyes and really see what is going on. Because 
before you might have been looking, but you couldn’t see anything. 
Because you had the wrong ideas. Ideas wrapped as truth, but which 
are lies instead. And they keep you oriented towards the wrong 
direction. But yeah, first something must happen… But you don’t 
decide it, it happens to you… and I can’t describe it better as 
“waking up.” 
Norman Denzin describes these moments of truth as “epiphanies,” in 
that “they alter the fundamental meaning structures in a person's life” 
(1989: 70). Dwight (25) describes this happening “like a revelation. 
What I experience in my own life. To really see things. As if your 
purview expands. That’s such a moment. Extra food for me. As if 
shutters open in my head. Clear information with which you can 
work.” Waking up is a life-changing event, or so it seems. 
Encapsulated in the metaphor of awakening is the radical 
moment of truth and the consequential sharp separation of a life 
before and after (cf. DeGloma, 2010: 521). And indeed, as these 
quotations show, before encountering conspiracy theories all is dark, 
false, and wrong; while after everything appears clear, right, and true. 
But despite this seemingly radical break implied in the concept of 
waking up, many of my respondents see such awakening as more of a 
gradual development. Yes, Julie (31) says, “it often goes hand in hand 
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with certain events: pregnancies, deaths. [But] it really is a process. 
You wake up one day, and then you head into food, but then you start 
deepening your knowledge vaccinations, and then you see there is 
more and more to start thinking about.” George (38) speaks in a 
similar way about his awakening:  
I gradually woke up, so to say, and then I found out that life can be 
very different, actually. It goes step by step, how do I explain it best? 
It is very difficult to pinpoint one thing as the cause. More and more 
pennies just start to drop as you look further, and that’s why this 
whole waking up process is not something that happens at once. 
Change is… all little changes. That’s the process of waking up.  
Pauline (67) frames this gradual process in terms of personal 
development:  
I read a lot, I read the pros, I read the cons. And then I turn to myself, 
what’s right to my feeling, what resonates with me? You just develop 
a feeling inside yourself for what’s right and it’s just very beautiful 
if you look at it that way. That we are all in this state of total sleep 
in which we only survive, but that we as human beings develop 
ourselves and through that development we wake up.  
Awakening narratives are not particular to conspiracy 
theorists, but are quite prevalent in other cultural milieus as well. 
Thomas DeGloma discusses and compares the awakening accounts of 
many different ethnic, religious, political, psychological, and sexual 
groups, and argues that “the root awakening story formula remains 
fundamentally the same” (2010: 522). Leaving the similarity of these 
accounts aside, a more important argument DeGloma raises is the 
social role of such narratives. He contends that “awakening narratives 
provide story templates and cultural tools that individuals use to 
construct their own personal awakenings accounts” (2010: 522). In 
other words, what we think of as individual stories of personal 
discovery contain a social logic and perform cultural work. It is 
therefore no coincidence that so many of my respondents speak of 
becoming a conspiracy theorist in terms of an awakening. Their 
individual stories are institutionalized ways of accounting for that 
transition from an unknowing citizen to a conspiracy theorist. The 
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discourse of waking up is learned and shared in the conspiracy milieu 
and is constitutive of a shared sense of community. But beyond that 
communal narrative lies a world of experiences that brings us closer 
to an empirically-rich understanding of the contemporary appeal of 
conspiracy theories. People in the conspiracy milieu may have all been 
waking up at some point, but how they got there is complex and rich 
in historical detail. It is to these intersections of biography, history, 
and society that I now turn.  
 
5.4.1 Secularization: Looking for Meaning and Purpose in 
a Disenchanted World 
One of the most drastic changes Western societies have undergone is 
the massive turn away from institutionalized religion since the 1960s. 
When talking about how conspiracy theories started to play a role in 
their own lives, those I interviewed often spoke of a discomfort with 
the Christian church and an emerging disbelief in its teachings. 
Steven, a 28 year old employee of a green energy supplier, is raised 
as a Catholic, he told me that was baptized and that he prayed 
regularly, but “never saw the use of it. Yeah, the texts, beautiful texts, 
of course. But asking for forgiveness? I was so young, I could barely 
imagine why? I mean, I did nothing wrong, so why should I ask for 
mercy?” Many others, like Julie (31), spoke with similar dissent about 
such ideas: “I do believe that there must be a god or something, but I 
don’t believe in the rules and that you go to hell, and all those other 
things based on fear and misery. I don’t believe that God is vengeful. 
I don’t believe that I will be punished later.” Pauline (67) agreed: “I 
mean, if we talk about love, we’re not talking about a vengeful god, 
are we? I always found that very strange.” Robert (43) has a typical 
story:  
I come from a religious background, Reformed Church, my mother is 
absolutely religious. I also went to a religious school, every day 
started with a prayer, every week I had to learn a psalm. I also had 
to go to church, but it never felt right, I could never explain it to 
myself until I knew what it was. It was just hypocrite, a god cannot 
judge. All the stories I learned in school about the crusades and the 
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heathens, and the ‘we’ are good and ‘they’ are wrong. That’s just 
not right. A god cannot judge, for god everybody is equal. Later, of 
course, I discovered that there is a whole different story behind it. 
The strict religious guidelines, the fear, shame, and guilt of Christian 
traditions, and the Abrahamic idea of a vengeful god were all off-
putting elements to most interviewed respondents. 
But there is another point, a “whole different story,” as 
Robert put it, as to why this discomfort with religion led people into 
the world of conspiracy theories. Behind the beautiful façade of 
Christianity, respondents told me, the Church exists as a powerful 
political institution, serving its own interests and indoctrinating 
people into servitude. They told me how they started to question 
religion and in their search came to realize that the stories they are 
told radically differ from their historical origins. To continue with 
Robert:  
I came across the Nag Hammadi writings years ago, in which parts 
of the original biblical scriptures, of the apostles are found. And it 
contains a whole other meaning than what the bible as an instrument 
of power has. Then I started to find out what was wrong. Then 
everything fell in place, this made sense to me, this is right, then I 
could finally identify what I always felt: the hypocrisy, the 
suppression of people, the origins of the Vatican, all the things I 
learned in schools, the indulgence letters, that you can buy off your 
sins, the pope. It’s all just politics. 
Pauline (67) spoke in a similar vein about Christian teachings as “lies, 
all lies… look at the dead sea scrolls, there is a lot on script on how 
it truly was back then, but that has obviously been removed or stored 
somewhere away from us. Luckily the pressure to disclose is rising, 
partly because of the internet.” She understands the powerful men in 
the history of the Catholic Church as having adapted and amended the 
teachings in ways that expulsed certain spiritual concepts and 
marginalized women:  
“so then they decide at the Council of Nicea in the year 350 A.D. 
that reincarnation should be banned, and women, oh, no, women, 
no that’s too much, let’s not do that, and Maria Magdalena, oh well, 
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let’s make a whore out of her. That’s being taught to our children, 
and so humanity keeps lingering in lies. Well, if you wanna talk 
about a conspiracy theory, this is something, huh…? So there it 
starts, that you start seeing things more sharply, that things don’t 
make sense. My god, they made a mess, all religions make a mess. 
Because it’s not about religion, it’s about egos. It’s about time the 
goddesses come to power! 
Besides such archeological findings of old biblical scriptures, other 
(scholarly) sources on themes of lost or manipulated histories prove 
equally important. Neil, a 58 year old real estate project manager, 
told me about a priest he met some years ago through work, to whom 
he  
couldn’t resist asking about the Da Vinci Code. ‘Are those stories 
really true about those treasuries in the Church of Rome?’ He stands 
up and says ‘you don’t wanna know what art treasures are there, 
from all countries of the world, you don’t wanna know how much.’ 
Well, I am not saying the Da Vinci Code is true, but that the power 
of the Church is immense, and they still exercise a lot of influence, I 
do believe. 
Liam (67) described a similar experience based on such a book: 
 I was raised very conservatively and very catholically. Every weekend 
I went to church, was in the board of local church and part of the 
community. But about fifteen years ago I started questioning Jesus 
Christ, who is our spiritual leader, our example. But what do 
actually we know about him? What is told to us? I started looking for 
information and came across books, for example, Holy Blood and 
Holy Grail. Well, that said it all, the Knights Templars and other 
secret societies. Then occurred the drama for the first time, of coming 
to realize that the truth you once held dear is not right, absolutely 
not right even. Everything is totally different, opposite even, from 
what we think it is. Then falls the first domino piece. It could have 
been a different subject, doesn’t really matter, I think, but by looking 
for truth in one area, suddenly you enter a parallel universe: the 
world of seekers, of the independent critical thinkers. 
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The discomfort these people share centers on the hypocrisy of the 
Christian Church, especially considering that its history is anything 
but peaceful and loving. Instead, it is defamed by periods of 
corruption, manipulation, political games, deceit, and a hunger for 
power. As the abovementioned quotes show, this realization led 
people not only to turn away from institutionalized religion, but also 
brought them to see plots and intrigues in other domains of life, or at 
the least, it bolstered their plausibility. 
This negative attitude towards institutionalized religion and 
the societal process of secularization of which it is part did not, 
however, change people’s need for an explanation of the origin of life 
and spirit. Many in the conspiracy milieu search for a spiritual 
understanding of their lives on earth that goes beyond the material 
here-and-now. Pauline (67) described this searching impetus 
explicitly:  
I was about eighteen, nineteen, that I thought ‘this can’t be it, this 
can’t be all… it’s all way too simple, the stories in the bible and 
so’… and I had a friend who put me on that track, knew where to 
go and which bookstores to find… and then I entered a whole new 
world. Donald Walsh, Zecharia Sitchin, Drunvalo Melchizedek, 
yeah, those were the sixties and the seventies. I was reading and 
thinking ‘yes, this is it! This is what I have been looking for, this 
feels right […] I always call it ‘food for the soul’, I need that. If I 
don’t get my soul food I become deeply unhappy, I ask myself then 
what is life all about again? I am someone looking for the big lines, 
and there are always big lines, but where we are here, in the 3D 
world, it’s all small and cramped. I just have this feeling in my body 
that I want to break free, because we are squeezed in this little body, 
but in the end, we are all light beings. So to break out of it I try to 
look for the big lines, because I know there is much more, and that 
makes me really happy. I especially need in times of trouble, that I 
think I need my soul food to get back in balance. 
She refers here to books that explore the mysteries of nature, life and 
divinity that are hugely popular in and characteristic of the “cultic 
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milieu” (Campbell, 2002) or the “New Age Movement” (Heelas, 
1996).  
Dissatisfied with the traditional religious authorities, many 
people look for alternatives, and find an entire industry of post-
Christian spirituality (cf. Aupers and Houtman, 2006; Campbell, 
2007). Although true for Pauline, these works, which often mix 
scientific knowledge with spiritual belief, or else feature alternative 
histories of the earth in which extraterrestrial events play a significant 
role, are generally rejected by the scientific community as 
pseudoscience. They are nevertheless immensely popular within and 
beyond the conspiracy milieu. Lucy, a 54-year-old holistic 
psychotherapist, explained how she got involved with conspiracy 
theories via New Age writings following the death of a loved one: 
[T]hat process to look further started for me when my partner passed 
away in 1994. When I thought, ‘what in God’s name is this good 
for?’ That got me thinking, ‘maybe I should look at life differently, 
experience things differently’. I started reading books, many books. 
Somebody gave me The Celestine Prophecy, that was like, ‘wow, this 
is right, this is how it is!’ So from then on, such information came to 
me. How the universe is built and organized, and how we populate 
Earth as some kind of society of pawns. I read many spiritual books. 
One thing led to another. Reading about how the earth is governed 
and controlled, and from which energies these things are happening. 
I’ve read Zecharia Sitchin, then also thought, ‘man, this is right’. 
And years later, I came across the Pleiadian Scriptures. Well, these 
all give you that helicopter view, so to say. 
For many people I spoke to, such books proved meaningful in times 
of trouble and distress. Like religion once did, these new forms of 
spirituality provide, in many ways, meaning to existence, providing 
answers about the nature of life, death, and suffering. They also 
provide a greater story for human existence on Earth, offering a 
satisfying, birds-eye view of life itself. 
Originating from the countercultural movement of the sixties, such 
works are attractive to younger generations as well. Dwight (25) who 
was raised Christian is a typical example: 
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I developed muscle injuries from football, but instead of only going 
to physiotherapy, I also looked into spiritual matters. I read a book 
by Deepak Chopra, The Seven Spiritual Laws of Success, and was 
busy with yoga, breathing exercises, combining the physical with 
spiritual. It brought me further. I was also busy reading societal stuff, 
where things go wrong, health care, schooling, these sort of things, 
so you start to broaden your knowledge. I don’t shut myself off from 
these matters. I am always interested in the question ‘why would that 
be the case’, that you get a discussion. Because religions are stories 
created many, many years ago. They are stories to convince you of 
the only truth. But then there are multiple religions and then you see 
that that same story exists in many other religions too. So better delve 
into those, than just the bible. It felt like a revelation. 
As Dwight’s excerpt shows, the cultural shift away from 
institutionalized religion not only gives way to new forms of 
spirituality, but makes people aware of the existence of multiple 
(religious) truths. In some cases, people find a more abstract spiritual 
truth to be present in these different religions. George (38) similarly 
spoke of the restrictiveness of having only one truth, of believing in 
one religion only, when he told a story about attending the wedding 
of Christian friends: 
It was all very beautiful, we prayed together for the food, we praised 
the Lord, and out of respect I participated, but it’s not my thing. 
Then comes this guy asking me to convert. So I say, “well, no, 
thanks.” “Do you realize you are restricting yourself enormously 
now,” he says to me. “Well,” I say, “I think I have a pretty decent 
life.” “Yes,” he replies, “but God’s truth is the only truth.” I say to 
him, “well don’t you think you are restricting yourself now? Because 
you only have one truth and I have many!” You know, I believe 
Buddhists are just as right as Christians. I look at the main thread 
in it all. If you put all religions over each other you will see that they 
overlap for seventy to ninety percent. But because we as humans like 
to focus on differences and even fight wars over them, we will never 
come together. 
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Respondents argue how institutionalized religion enforces an 
outdated restrictiveness as it proclaims to hold in its hands the one and 
only truth. Such a limited understanding of religiosity cannot count on 
much support in the conspiracy milieu. 
Our age is a secular one (Taylor, 2007). Ever since Marx and 
Weber, sociologists have argued that religious beliefs, practices, and 
institutions would lose cultural authority and social significance in 
proportion to the rise of modern science and the accompanying 
rationalization of society. This historical transformation of Western 
societies called secularization only accelerated in the past fifty years. 
Propelled by the countercultural revolution of the 1960s (cf. Roszak, 
1995), there has been a widespread societal turn away from organized 
religion and a diminishing societal position of the clergy (e.g. Bruce, 
2002; Casanova, 1994; Norris and Inglehart, 2002; Wilson, 1976). 
Although the secularization thesis has been subjected to diverse and 
well-grounded critiques (cf. Asad, 2003; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; 
Taylor, 2007), fact remains that traditional religious institutions have 
lost much of their moral, political, and epistemic authority in most 
Western societies. But this does not mean that people in the West no 
longer need large-scale frameworks of meaning and purpose that 
transcend the material present. Modernization may have 
disenchanted the world, but it did not eradicate a will to believe. 
Indeed, the despairing feeling of living in a world without any 
existential meaning that Peter Berger et al. describe as “a metaphysical 
loss of ‘home’” (1973: 82) only spurred new forms of religion, 
spirituality, and re-enchantment in Western societies (cf. Aupers and 
Houtman, 2010; Heelas, 1996; Lyon, 2000; Possamai, 2005). 
This fact is apparent in the conspiracy milieu as well. The life-
stories of the people I interviewed show how a disillusionment with 
the Church may have pushed people away from Christianity and into 
the world of conspiracy theories, but this did not lead to an altogether 
retreat from the spiritual world. In fact, part of the appeal of 
contemporary conspiracy theories lies precisely in their fusion of 
spiritual narratives and the more mundane assertions of intrigue and 
deceit by global power elites, a phenomenon called “conspirituality” 
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(Ward and Voas, 2011). Like Icke’s superconspiracy, these people 
talk about works that advance alternative origin stories which situate 
daily life (and humankind more generally) within larger narratives of 
supernatural existence and connect in many ways the ordinary 
everyday experiences with mystical, esoteric, and occult 
understandings of reality. Moreover, as these respondents show, one 
religious master narrative is no longer attractive in a world where 
multiple spiritual traditions are on the market. Instead, people feel 
free and content to pick and choose the thought and practices that 
resonate with them, and create in this way new, pastiche forms of 
religion and spirituality (cf. Flory and Miller, 2000; Lyon, 2000; 
Possamai, 2005). A first explanation for the contemporary appeal of 
conspiracy theories is that its occult, mystical, and spiritual 
components provide for many people in need of existential meaning 
and purpose in a disenchanted world. 
 
5.4.2 Mediatization: Grappling with Fact and Fiction in a 
Mediatized World 
With the proliferation of mass media, we are bombarded today with 
all kinds of messages (texts, photos, videos) about current affairs 
through various mediums (television, internet, smartphones). This 
has made, on the one hand, an objectification of reality possible, in the 
sense that (news) coverage of more or less distant places increases the 
awareness of what is going on in the world. But the reliance on mass 
media also engenders feelings of uncertainty, suspicion, and doubt 
since it appears easy to mold and manipulate (collective) perceptions. 
In chapter three I discussed the fact that conspiracy theory websites 
pay ample attention to the powers of the mass media as marvelous 
instruments of mass manipulation. These articles incorporate and cite 
the works of early mass-opinion scholars like Walter Lippmann, 
Harold Lasswell, and Edward Bernays to support their argument. The 
manipulative powers of the mass-media also appear in the stories 
people told me of how they turned to conspiracy theories. Neil (58), 
for example, took me back thirty years to when he started to doubt 
what the mass-media reports: 
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Or the story why they invaded Iraq [first time, 1991]. Do you 
remember that? Well, US public opinion was against it. So there was 
this story that the Iraqi army was stealing incubators from hospitals 
in Kuwait and left the babies to die. I saw a documentary about that. 
How they showed this woman, a girl, and “oh my child” and so on. 
But what really happened? The Kuwaiti government had hired an 
American PR firm to convince the public that they needed American 
support. So they made this documentary, and reports of what 
happened, because public opinion needed to be turned. So they 
pretended that Iraqi military actually stole incubators from Kuwaiti 
hospitals. But it was all manufactured in the US. The girl testifying 
turned out to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador in the US, 
and other people working at the Kuwaiti embassy. So that incubator 
media campaign was wonderfully done, suddenly there was consent 
for the invasion. So yeah, then you start to wonder. 
The same sort of stories about the possibilities of manipulation and 
the circulation of certain media (photos, videos, testimonies) to 
influence people’s minds and hearts came up when respondents spoke 
about contemporary geopolitical matters. Martin (30) said, for 
example: 
[S]o they say on television that Osama Bin Laden is behind it 
[9/11]. They have a video of Osama admitting that he did it. Well, 
if you have a bit of good sight, you can see that that guy is not Osama 
Bin Laden. He doesn’t even look like him, well, yeah, a little, he has 
a beard and a turban, but that’s it. Check it out! And then there are 
these documents from 1999 0r 2000 that he is in the hospital for 
kidney dialysis. How can you be an effective terrorist leader when 
you have kidney failures? Or there is this interview in 2003 or 2004 
with a minister or something and then something is said about the 
murderer of Osama Bin Laden. She’s found dead months after that. 
I think she spoke the truth. That Bin Laden is dead for a long time, 
that he wasn’t killed just years ago. A strange story anyway. And 
when they “really” kill him, they throw him in the sea. Following 
Islamic tradition. Yeah right. Even more crazy. So yeah, then you 
start looking for all kinds of on YouTube… 
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As Martin’s quotation indicates, many of my respondents seriously 
doubted what the mass media reports, especially since they are 
increasingly owned by a handful of international media 
conglomerates. Since the vast majority of media outlets are in the 
hands of a few powerful groups, my respondents rhetorically ask, 
what can we expect from the information they give us? Not something 
that goes against their interests, is the unequivocal answer. This 
consolidation of media-ownership is not just an ideological issue, but 
plays out in the everyday life of people. Howie (65), for example, 
told me how he used to watch the evening news from different 
countries: “in the early nineties you would still have different takes on 
world events broadcasted in the evening news in France, Germany or 
here. That window to the world would be radically different in each 
country. Nowadays we all get the same video on our evening news 
due to the increasing internationalization of media corporations and 
press agencies. It’s the same piece of film with that same crying 
person.” The flipside, Howie acknowledged, is that “news broadcasts 
don’t need big capital anymore. Nowadays, anyone can broadcast 
their news from a simple studio on the internet.” 
The mass media may be an effective tool of the elite to 
manipulate the public, my respondents argue, but the internet has 
radically changed their possibilities to do so: what was hidden can now 
be revealed and what was staged can be unmasked. Lauren (37) told 
me that “watching videos on the internet opened my mind. Since then 
I am awake. Because that’s the reality you don’t get to see. And then 
you find out why we see reality so differently, why there is a reality 
aside from the one they show us. It’s all manipulated. I discovered 
how the owners of news agencies have interests in portraying the 
news in certain ways, so that people here only see this or that.” But 
these powerful media corporations cannot easily control what is 
circulated on the internet, so these respondents actively browse the 
internet for alternative insights. Michael (23) told me how a friend 
from university who is “really illuminated, who really knows what’s 
going on in the world” told him about chemtrails: “at first I said, 
‘you’re crazy, that can never be true’. But then I started looking on 
the internet and you see all these movie clips of pilots who fly above 
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such an airplane and then you see the spray going on and off. Or you 
see other photos that have been leaked, photos of the inside of such a 
plane, for example.” The internet is a game-changer, respondents 
hold. Dwight (25), told me how it all started for him by “watching 
these documentaries on YouTube. Zeitgeist was a true revelation. 
Man, you can find so much information on the internet. We simply 
become more aware. And that’s because of the internet. That’s why 
I think they want to gain control over the internet. Because I know 
for sure, without the internet I would have not had all this 
information.” 
Photos, videos and films circulating on the internet may play 
an important role in offering proof in opposition to the propaganda of 
the mainstream media, but just like those images and videos shown in 
their newspapers and television broadcasts, what is shared on the 
internet can just as well be manipulated, respondents acknowledge. 
Moreover, the same digital technologies also make it easier to 
fabricate images, so photos, films and videos from whichever source 
cannot simply be taken at face value. Neil (58), for example, tells me 
of his “neighbor [who] makes films for advertising agencies, and he 
consistently tells me: ‘don’t trust any video or film anymore, because 
we can do everything. You don’t know what you’re really looking at. 
You can’t trust images anymore.’ So these comments stick, you 
know.” Faced with the reality that the information we are presented 
can be distorted, manufactured or in any other way manipulated, 
some of these people actively started examining film and videos in 
order to come closer to the truth. “Looking back,” Michael said, “it 
all started with 9/11, that I thought this can’t be true.” It was years 
later that he got really into researching the topic,  
let’s say, five years later, I started learning more about false flag 
attacks… I started analyzing those images again, and again… 
videos from YouTube... I had never done that before, I mean all you 
do is watch television and then you hear from a reporter what you 
need to think. Well now that’s different and because of my technical 
background I knew right away, this is not possible… it was 
physically impossible. I am also good myself in Photoshop, so I can 
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see very well when something is Photoshopped and when not, when 
it’s real or not.  
Michael may be quite confident about his ability to separate truth 
from falsity, but others in the conspiracy milieu acknowledge the 
difficulties in ascertaining the truthfulness of news images and videos. 
When I asked them how they decide what images or videos are real 
and which not, they gave me vague and ambiguous answers, such as 
“yeah, that is a tricky thing” (Lauren), or “you cannot really tell, it is 
so difficult” (Neil). Most people that I interviewed accepted that it 
was not easy to separate fact from fiction in our heavily mediatized 
world, but they were certain on the point that any image can be the 
result of digital manipulation. 
The technological advancements that have made mass media 
communications possible have radically changed the way we 
experience and think of reality. Besides the ordinary, everyday life in 
the physical world, an additional reality has come into being. What 
started with images on print or screen developed into immersive 
virtual reality universes that may soon be indistinguishable from 
everyday reality. This “mediatization of our culture and society” 
(Hjarvard, 2013) unsettles common sense distinctions between fact 
and fiction and alters perceptions of what constitutes reality. As these 
conspiracy theorists told me in interviews, it is increasingly difficult 
to discern real from staged or manipulated depictions of the world. 
The two often collapse or flip sides. Jean Baudrillard has extensively 
written about the pervasiveness of media forms (symbols, signs, and 
sounds) in post-World War Western cultures. Such simulations and 
simulacra of reality are so ubiquitous that they have become more real 
than the world they used to represent; they have become 
hyperrealities (Baudrillard, 1994[1981]). Just like Neil, who cited the 
1991 invasion of Iraq as a significant moment in his biographical move 
towards conspiracy theories because it showed the frailty of our 
reliance on media to access reality, so too did Baudrillard write of the 
war “that didn’t take place” as a turning point in the role that media 
representations have in shaping perceptions of reality (1995[1991]).  
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For many people today, and especially for those in the 
conspiracy milieu, reality is no longer what it seems. The mediatized 
representations we take as real are all too easily manipulated, my 
respondents argue, leaving us vulnerable to the machinations of the 
powerful. Having experienced the run-up to the illegitimate wars in 
the Middle East, they argue that orchestrations of media 
representations are firmly embedded in politics, deployed by those in 
power in order to “manufacture consent” (Herman and Chomsky, 
2008). Following Baudrillard, the reality that the mass media presents 
is not just a distorted representation of the real, but often has no 
reference to any empirical truth. The coverage of the Bush wars of 
1991 and 2003 testifies to this; after all, where exactly are Saddam 
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction but in the representations of 
the mass media? My respondents in the conspiracy milieu seem keenly 
aware of the dissolution of the real in our mediatized age, but find no 
easy way out of this politicized house of mirrors. The one thing they 
do know is that nothing can be trusted at face value anymore.  
 
5.4.3 Democratization: Education and the Cultivation of a 
Critical Citizenry 
A key societal aspect of modernity’s overarching Enlightenment 
project is the emancipation of the masses (cf. Israel, 2006; Bauman, 
1987). After the expansion of political rights and equality before the 
law to all adult segments of society, the democratization of Western 
societies took shape by the massive education of its citizens (cf. 
Dewey, 2004[1916]; Halsey, et al., 1996). With the rise of European 
welfare states came an expansive educational system that cultivated a 
critical, literate, and empowered citizenry. This historical 
development of the democratization of knowledge is clearly visible in 
the life-stories of my respondents, and many of them stress the role 
of their formal education in their turn to conspiracy theories.  
Michael (23), for example, made numerous such references 
to his educational background when he explained to me why he is 
attracted to conspiracy theories. When we spoke about chemtrails, 
Michael acknowledged that it “does sound absurd. A few years ago, I 
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would have laughed at you, but those chemtrails are really true. 
Because I studied mechanical engineering and chemical technology, I 
know all about the relation between pressure, temperature and the 
gas and liquidity phases of matter.” In technical language he explained 
to me how it is “physically and chemically impossible that a contrail 
stays up there for such a long time.” Michael made other references 
to his educational background when we spoke of global warming: 
“that’s one big hoax. In my current study, I have courses in which I 
have to do statistical tests now and I notice now how easy it is to mold 
and to manipulate the data in your own advantage. And all the pieces 
of the puzzle fall into place now. It’s just so easy to cheat… to commit 
fraud.” These allusions to knowledge gained from education surfaced 
as well when we spoke about media and the “culture industry.” He 
told me that “in movies and cartoons that alleged elite, the Illuminati, 
continuously give hints, subliminal messages, to let people get used 
to… to prepare them unconsciously for what is coming, so they 
wouldn’t be shocked… Because I have had marketing and psychology 
courses, I learned about how they can insert for a flash second, an 
image, a logo, a brand, so that people don’t observe it consciously, 
but they do unconsciously!” The theories about subliminal messaging 
and psychological manipulation that he learned during his academic 
studies clearly add to the plausibility of such conspiracy theories. 
Throughout his studies, Michael has learned to adopt a critical gaze 
which he now employs to uncover the hidden realities that remain 
unseen to those without such an education. 
 Other interviewees speak of the role of education in their 
turn to conspiracy theories as it  cultivated a reflexive habitus. William 
(25) told me that he started his conspiracy website after word came 
out that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq: 
That triggered me, like, seriously, we are at war and the reason we 
are at war turns out to be false? So I got this feeling like I need to do 
something. To let people think about it. Yeah, it’s a bit of a heavy 
title, “seekthetruth,” but that was the purpose, to think about the 
truth. Not that I believe there is one truth, but to go into discussion 
about it. ‘How do you see it? And why? And what are your 
arguments?’ To incite others and myself to think about that, to ask 
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questions. Look, in the end, that’s why I went to study philosophy. 
So maybe that’s why I chose that title, I wanted it to keep it as open 
as possible, to advance it as “critically looking for answers,” to think 
about it, and not to accept it uncritically. Not to accept it because it 
comes from established authorities, and neither because it is the 
alternative theory. In both cases I say: don’t just assume things, but 
try to form an opinion yourself! In the end, I studied philosophy 
because I am someone who appreciates looking at things from 
different perspectives. To turn the tables, so to say, and to learn from 
that. That’s what I love about philosophy. That’s what I got out of 
this website too. I got to learn so many different perspectives on 
societal issues from these people. And I just think that is amazing, to 
hear how other people think about: whether that is from a different 
culture, or a different ideological or political standpoint. That’s in 
short why I started that website, yeah. 
William, in other words, sought to do in real life what he learned to 
do for his studies, that is, to “look at things from different 
perspectives” and to learn from it. He even has a societal objective for 
the reflexive habitus that he cultivated through his education: to bring 
people to understand each other’s perspective. Such a relativist 
standpoint stands in stark contrast to those who see hidden truths with 
their critical gaze, like Michael, but both speak about their education 
as formative in their turn to conspiracy theories. 
 The same can be said about Lucy (54). Connecting the dots 
may be a reason why academics discard conspiracy theories (e.g. 
Barkun, 2006; Byford, 2011; Hofstadter, 1996; Keeley, 1999, 
Popper, 2013), but when this mental coach told me about her own 
attraction to conspiracy theories, she brings me back to her student 
days when she learned to “making connections across different 
terrains”: 
[D]uring my studies thirty years ago, I was a big admirer of Michel 
Foucault, the French philosopher. Extraordinary what that man did. 
He opened my eyes as to how to look at things. What did he do? He 
did transversal research. At a certain historical moment, what 
happens economically, what happens socially, what happens 
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technologically? And then look at how these influence each other and 
what the lines of power and influence are. Beautiful! Great work! It 
changed the way I looked at the world, so ingenious. I thought, 
“yeah, yeah, this is what I think, this makes sense to me, to look in 
that way.” Because it yields revelations. […]  I just love Foucault’s 
approach, it’s captivating. So sad he died that young. What a 
phenomenon he was, of standing outside the box, of really breaking 
through. Just by looking, by really daring to look, he could see more 
[…] Foucault never judged. He just showed: “you see what’s 
happening.” He didn’t say what was best or not, just described what 
happened, how the whole thing develops.” 
Lucy continued to speak in much detail about Foucauldian 
mechanisms when explaining her ideas about health care, the control 
state, surveillance, political institutions, and numerous other topics. 
In each instance, she put the idea of making “transversal” connections 
into practice, and thereby showing how her education strongly 
influenced the way she looks at the world today. 
 This cultivation of an educated and critical citizenry obviously 
reverberates in the everyday interactions within school and university 
classrooms, and respondents often speak of such moments where 
knowledge claims are openly critiqued and debated. Steven (28), for 
example, told me of his efforts to discuss his ideas in class, and 
although they were not always appreciated, he felt free to ask 
fundamental questions about what is taught and to have an open 
discussion based on the knowledge he sees as more truthful, e.g. 
conspiracy theories. He explains: 
[D]uring my studies, commercial economics, three years ago, I 
wanted to find out more and ask questions. I noticed that I had 
certain information that goes against their theories. And the 
marketing teacher just says that free markets create equilibria and 
balance. Well, don’t tell me that as a teacher. Then I think, “what 
do you want to teach me?” I wanted to go in discussion about that, 
but in class there’s not really time for that, which I regret, so I 
discussed a bit in the hallway with my fellow students, but that’s also 
difficult. All too easily you get the label of “hey, that’s a conspiracy 
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theory” attached, you know?...Once I gave a short presentation on 
money, and how it worked, in some economics class. I wanted to 
explain shortly how the banking system works. Central banks, private 
banks, and yes, I noticed the teacher was impressed. It was, after all, 
quite new information. She and the classmates thought it was 
interesting. 
Everyday situations, like this class in economics, become the sites 
where opposed worldviews come together and battles for epistemic 
authority are fought.  
The mass education of citizens is commonly seen as 
imperative to the health of democratic societies as it brings forth a 
community of critical thinkers in search for  
truth and justice (cf. Dewey, 2004; Halsey et al., 1996; Nussbaum, 
1997). Those active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu often draw on the 
knowledge they acquired in their education when they criticize 
mainstream institutions and explain the plausibility of conspiracy 
theories. The well-developed and accessible educational systems of 
Western European welfare states have indeed cultivated a critical and 
reflexive habitus which then remains a fundamental trait of one’s 
relation to the world. We are trained to critically assess the integrity 
and truthfulness of all knowledge claims and their bearers. As we will 
see in chapter seven, the challenge conspiracy theorists pose to the 
epistemic authority of science is informed by the democratization of 
knowledge. More generally put, it is fair to say that expertise has, as a 
consequence, become problematic in societies made up of well-
educated and critical citizens. People generally know more about 
topics that were once the exclusive domain of a few experts. 
Professionals of all kinds, including teachers, doctors, scientists, are 
confronted with an ever-more demanding, knowledgeable, and 
critical populace who challenge their authority in myriad ways (cf. 
Epstein, 1996; Martin, 2008; De Swaan, 2009). The contemporary 
popularity of conspiracy theories, I argue here, fits into this historical 
development.  
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5.4.4 Globalization: Experiencing Truth and Reality in a 
Shrinking World 
The world we live in today has never been so small. Tropical fruits 
are shipped to supermarkets in a matter of days, students spend 
semesters at universities on all continents, South American telenovelas 
are broadcasted in the West for our pleasure, Chinese consumers buy 
safe baby milk from the West via the internet, Bengali workers are 
dispatched to the Gulf, and any Average Joe flies with his family to 
exotic beach locations for a winter break. Indeed, the ties that bind us 
today span the globe, which has become a true global village. I argue 
here that the contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories cannot be 
seen separately from these historical developments. My respondents 
emphasize in many ways the ways that globalization plays an 
important role in people’s turn to conspiracy theories.  
 The possibility to travel and see different parts of the world, 
and how such experiences changed the way respondents looked at the 
world, was often brought up in the conversations I had. Robert (43), 
for example, notes that the international travels during his early 
adulthood were an important influence on his later interests: 
I was nineteen, twenty, when I first started traveling, I had seen 
enough of school, and started working for a company that was doing 
international business. They sent me to East Germany right after the 
wall was torn down, and not very long after that to Russia, and you 
know, that was just scary, because it still was the big red danger you 
know, people were telling me like “wow, that’s super dangerous, what 
are you going to do there?” But when I came there, it was all like 
jeez. Just friendly people over here, you know, people who have 
feelings of love and emotions and so on, so I had a great time over 
there. And then I really started travelling, I went to South America, 
different African countries and China, well, everywhere I came, I saw 
it was not like what I had been told. It’s just not true what’s being 
told here about there, and vice versa, it’s just all not true. An image 
is created of there, like with the Cold War, the ‘us and them’ rhetoric, 
the indoctrination of people by the mainstream media, by television. 
So yeah, you can say it really started with the travelling yeah, that 
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I saw that the information we get is not true. That has been the 
biggest eye-opener yeah, that I started searching.  
The experiences Robert had when travelling through distant 
countries, seeing for himself what these places look like, have to be 
situated in a time when the media landscape was more uniform and 
dominated by television. Yet his story also shows how the 
contemporary ease of worldwide travel enables people to see for 
themselves that the world may be quite different from the one 
presented in Western media. Moreover, they see that the world looks 
different from different places. Howie (65), to give another example, 
explained such perspectivism:  
I lived for about twenty years in France. As a result, I saw the world 
from a different point of view. What for others just remained normal 
and the way things are, I had to question. Because nothing really is 
“normal” anymore once you settle abroad. Then everything that was 
once normal, that place from which you see the world, needs to find 
its own new place. And because you compare two different things or 
ways of doing, you can also better identify them. If you only have 
one thing, it is very hard to capture its characteristics. If you have 
multiple things, you can say that one is red and that one is blue. If 
you only have one think you can say it has a color, but you can’t say 
which, because you can’t compare it. I believe that such an 
international experience broadens your horizon. 
Howie traced his turn to conspiracy theories back to his time living in 
France, when he experienced first-handedly that the world can look 
very different from a different place. These experiences made him 
realize that one’s own perspective is only one of many, and therefore 
that explanations of reality or truth might well omit other equally or 
even more convincing perspectives.  
That living abroad and in different cultures expands one’s 
sense of what is possible or real is clearly illustrated by the stories Neil 
(58) told me about a period in the early eighties during which he lived 
in Suriname, a former Dutch colony in South America: 
I experienced a lot of Winti265 ceremonies over there. The Western 
explanation is that these people come into trance. I have seen it myself 
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– chewing glass, eating whole eggs in their shell, or people thinking 
they are snakes – they transform into something else. We call it a 
trance, they think they are seized by a spirit, a winti, and they 
transform instantly, start speaking French, smoking cigars, crazy 
things. It was fantastic to experience, really, I was sitting there with 
my eyes wide open. But especially with an open mind. I never had 
something like ‘this is non-sense’, or connected a truth-value to it. I 
mean, it could be true. What do I know? Can I prove it is not true? I 
just sit back and experience it. So these – and other experiences in 
my life – led me to believe that there is so much more possible than 
we think there is. That door is opened now. I wish I could feel it more, 
but I can’t, I really can’t.  
The exposure to different ways of seeing truth and reality, of 
experiencing different cultural frameworks of meaning while living in 
countries throughout the world engenders personal reflections on 
one’s own way of thinking. As Neil’s example shows, people bring 
back home the experiences they have had while living abroad. The 
beliefs and rituals of exotic cultures do not stay put, but travel with the 
movement of people across the globe. Moreover, such intercultural 
experiences radically change the perceptions and outlooks of people. 
Having been confronted with different ways of seeing the world, 
one’s own ideas of truth and reality are put into perspective and under 
critical reflection. How can it be that they see things that differently, 
and what does that mean for my own understanding of reality?  
Globalization is a much-discussed and arguably over-
theorized concept—it yields 1,570,000 results on Google Scholar 
and many influential scholars have written extensively on it (e.g. 
Appadurai, 1996; Bauman, 1998; Beck, 2000; Sassen, 1998). And 
although globalization as a buzzword might have reached its climax 
years ago, it is undeniable that the cultural effects of a shrinking world 
are immense and far-reaching, yet visible in the tiniest details of life. 
Globalization has, in other words, many faces. In this section I have 
shown how globalization shapes the stories people told me of how 
they got involved with conspiracy theories. They spoke of the way 
global travels made them realize that the world is often rather 
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different from what they were told back home. These culturally 
relativist understandings become even more fundamental when time 
spent abroad is extended to longer spans of time. Living in another 
country, experiencing other realities and participating in local 
cultural and religious practices uproots one’s own cultural 
frameworks and taken-for-granted ways of seeing the world. This 
facet of globalization  proves a true door opener to other—and in this 
case, conspiracy—understandings of the world.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Because most explanations of the contemporary appeal of conspiracy 
theories leave little space for the motivations of the real living beings 
involved, I have made central in this chapter the culturally-embedded 
lives of a sample of people who have turned to conspiracy theories. 
Following a biographical methodological approach (Plummer, 2001; 
Roberts, 2002), I asked people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu to 
narrate their experience of becoming a conspiracy theorist, with a 
focus on their personal motivations. I sought to understand what 
specific moments in life they assigned as significant and meaningful in 
their emerging engagements with conspiracy theories. Although such 
autobiographical accounts are fictional in the sense that they are 
retrospectively constructed narrative expressions of lived 
experiences, I analyze them as “truthful fictions,” in that they are real 
and meaningful to the people involved (Denzin, 1989). This is, after 
all, how they reflect and think about their historically developed turn 
towards conspiracy theories. In contrast to the formalism and micro-
sociological focus of an analytical model of the deviant career (Becker, 
1963; Clinard and Meier, 2010; Faupel, 2011), I have argued for the 
importance of historically contextualizing such biographical 
trajectories. Following C. Wright Mills, who stresses the 
fundamental relatedness of individual lives and larger societal 
developments, I have focused on those instances where the private 
troubles of these people meet the public issues of our societies to explain 
the contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories (2000).  
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Although respondents draw on a culturally-shared awakening 
narrative (cf. DeGloma, 2010), the analysis of their distinct life 
stories showed more complexity and brought four cultural-historical 
developments into relief. The first is secularization: dismayed by the 
(ab)use of power by traditional religious authorities, many 
respondents have left their churches behind, but still look for larger 
frameworks of meaning and purpose that transcend the here and now. 
Conspiracy theories that situate the more mundane analyses of 
corruption and deceit in such narratives of supernatural existence and 
occult folklore clearly provide for those needs. Second, mediatization: 
how we experience and think of reality has radically changed in a 
world where all kinds of media saturate everyday life. Respondents 
spoke of the manipulative role media representations have in the 
shaping of perceptions of reality and grapple with what is fact versus 
what is fiction, even in their everyday lives. Thirdly, democratization: 
this long historical process finds a contemporary expression in the 
cultivation of a critical, literate, empowered citizenry, of which my 
respondents are no exception. They draw on the knowledge acquired 
in their education to challenge the truths put forward by the epistemic 
authorities and to explain the plausibility of alternative theories. And 
finally, globalization: the myriad opportunities to see and experience 
the world from a different place and with different cultural lenses has 
given rise to a cultural relativism that unsettles the stability of the 
normal and opens the door to alternative explanations of reality, like 
conspiracy theories. 
In contrast to the majority of academic explanations that 
explain conspiracy culture in uniform terms, I have shown that it is 
sociologically more rewarding to explore the variety of reasons that 
draw people to follow conspiracy theories—if only because 
conspiracy theories mean different things, perform different 
functions, and satisfy different needs, and do so for different people. 
More specifically, I argue in this chapter that greater societal 
developments taking shape in the private biographies of people best 
explain the contemporary popularity of conspiracy theories, for the 
simple reason that cultural change implies changing perceptions of 
truth, knowledge, and power, thus changing an individual’s 
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perception of the plausibility of conspiracy theories. What is 
remarkable, however, is that these connections between personal 
experiences and larger societal developments are made not just by the 
scholar, in this case myself, but by the interviewed people themselves. 
Unlike those who see it as the “task and promise” of sociologists to 
make these connections between the everyday lives of ordinary 
people and the larger socio-cultural developments of which they are 
part (Mills, 2000: 6, cf. Elias, 1978), my analysis shows that the 
people we study themselves make such references to larger cultural 
developments when they explain their own biographical trajectories. 
Scholars may identify larger cultural processes over the backs of the 
people they study, to put it crudely, but I highlight people’s own socio-
historical sense-making of the lives they lead and the choices they have 
made. What C. Wright Mills famously coined the sociological 
imagination (2000) is therefore not just an operating imperative for 
social scientists, but seems part-and-parcel of how ordinary people 
think and reflect about their historically developed and culturally 
embedded lives.  
On a more theoretical note, what do these four cultural 
changes, which are tangible in the biographies of Dutch conspiracy 
theorists, mean and signify sociologically? How do they explain the 
contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories? It is my argument here 
that all of these historical developments set in motion the dissolution 
of a stable and absolute truth, which opens a cultural space for 
conspiracy theories to thrive. Processes of secularization unsettle the 
religious truths once held absolute, but as the metaphysical longings 
of people remain, a wide variety of alternative spiritual truths are on 
the rise instead. Mediatization speaks of a (digital) world where symbol 
and reference, fact and fiction, are increasingly difficult to distinguish, 
and what we think of as reality can be easily manipulated. The 
democratization of knowledge cultivates a critical and reflexive habitus 
that prompts people to continuously assess the truthfulness of all 
knowledge claims and their bearers. And finally, globalization shows 
how one’s own cultural truths are put in perspective when other 
outlooks on the world are presented. The empirical consequence of 
these four societal developments is that the truth is now out there. No 
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longer fully guaranteed by one epistemic authority, institution, or 
tradition, the truth becomes something people actively grapple with 
by searching, analyzing, deconstructing, and recomposing 
information. In this cultural climate of what I call epistemic instability, 
absolute truths become implausible. Conspiracy theories, on the 
other hand, may be more convincing as they often do the opposite by 
unsettling commonly accepted truths. Instead of deploring how these 
societal developments have led to a situation where commonsense 
distinctions between fact and fiction are blurred and truth is 
increasingly on the table, like Barkun does (e.g. 2006: 33/179-181), 
we should be content as (cultural) sociologists because there are just 
many more ways of world-making and many more many battles for 
epistemic authority to study. 
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6. “I Am Not a Conspiracy 
Theorist” Relational 
Identifications in the Dutch 
Conspiracy Milieu 
 
6.1 Introduction 
When exploring the contemporary appeal of conspiracy theories, I 
have argued in the last chapter for a contextual approach in order to 
emphasize that the personal experiences of people are intricately 
related to larger cultural-historical developments. If conspiracy 
theories are not regarded as a pathological abnormality, then it only 
makes sense to regard people’s engagements with them as situated 
and developing in such cultural contexts. In a time and place where 
the traditional epistemic authorities of religion, media, science, and 
politics have been losing cultural legitimacy, conspiracy theories 
come to make sense in relation to people’s everyday lives. Indeed, my 
interviewees articulate the ways that their private troubles overlap 
with the public issues of contemporary Western/European societies. 
The previous chapter demonstrated already some variety of people 
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active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu, but here I set out to explore in 
more detail the personal differences and similarities between these 
people. My guiding question was this: who are the people actually 
engaging with conspiracy theories, and more precisely, how do they 
see themselves and others in the milieu? 
A common view of the conspiracy theorist is an image of an 
obsessive, paranoid, militant loner who sees fire at every instance of 
smoke and finds coherence between seemingly random events. 
Conspiracy theories may have become mainstream in contemporary 
societies, but their normalization did not alter our cultural 
imagination: the public image of the conspiracy theorist remains 
morally tainted. As I show in the introduction, a minor newspaper 
article on conspiracy theories perpetuates the image of the conspiracy 
theorist as a petty-minded, insecure, socially disenfranchised, 
distrusting, militant, and authoritarian; in short, a stubborn narcissist 
looking for attention and control in a complex and unsettling world. 
Academics have only contributed to this potent public image of a 
conspiracy theorist. A dominant group of academics unambiguously 
taps on and reproduces this pejorative image (Aaronovitch, 2010; 
Barkun, 2006; Berlet, 2009; Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; Robins and 
Post, 1997; Showalter, 1997; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Knight 
confirms that “the usual photofit picture of the conspiracy theorist is 
an obsessive, petty minded right wing paranoid nut, a proponent of 
extremist politics with a dangerous tendency to single out the usual 
suspects as scapegoats” (2000: 3). Such pejorative images of 
conspiracy theorists and their theories are not without their 
consequences. Labelling someone a conspiracy theorist is an easy way 
to “end a discussion” (Knight, 2000: 11). In other words, it is a 
discursive strategy to disqualify an argument and to exclude the 
speaker effectively from public debate, “no matter how true, false, or 
conspiracy-related your utterance is. Using the phrase, I can 
symbolically exclude you from the imagined community of 
reasonable interlocutors” (Husting and Orr, 2007: 127).  
Even though the diverse range of conspiracy theories (see 
chapter 3) might already allude to the difficulty of conceiving of them 
as a distinct social category, academic research has largely glossed 
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over diversity and ideological variation in the conspiracy milieu as 
they construct conspiracy theorists as a coherent collective: internal 
variety in the field is sacrificed for a clear, external demarcation. Even 
those scholars who refute the moral alarmism in academic studies of 
conspiracy theories and seek to explore their cultural meaning still 
tend to portray conspiracy theorists as a single, homogenous group. 
The paranoid is all too easily exchanged for the anomic. In recent 
years, efforts have been made by political scientists and psychologists 
to examine the demographic characteristics and personality traits of 
those endorsing conspiracy theories (cf. Brotherton et al., 2013; 
Oliver and Wood, 2014; Uscinsky and Parent, 2014; Wood and 
Douglas, 2013). These quantitative studies go some way in explaining 
the diversity of conspiracy theorists, but all construct analytical 
categories in which conspiracy theorists are fit. By contrast, I open up 
that uniform identity of the conspiracy theorist by empirically 
studying people’s own self-understanding, and how they deal with that 
pejorative image. In particular, I focus here on the different ways in 
which people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu make distinctions 
between self and other: how do they associate with some and 
disassociate from others? And consequently, what in- and outgroups 
do they enact with these identifications?  
In the study of identities it has long been argued that to 
recognize similarity with some and differences with others is 
fundamental to the formation of meaningful identities, and indeed, to 
social life itself (cf. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Simmel, 1950). The 
idea that identity is always and continuously constructed in relation 
to meaningful others is a mainstay in symbolic interactionalist 
sociology (cf. Becker, 1963; Calhoun, 1994; Elias 1978; Goffman, 
1963; Jenkins, 2014). In the study of conspiracy culture, however, 
this focus on identification and the mechanisms of in- and exclusion is 
completely absent. This may also be the result of methodological 
choices. The majority of studies on conspiracy theories analyze these 
discourses on their own or in secondary sources such as films and 
literature. By doing so, they fail to grasp the interactional context, 
which would foreground the way that conspiracy theorists deal with 
such texts, and their consensus and conflicts with each other. I base 
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myself here on my ethnographic fieldwork in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu, but for the purposes of this chapter I will draw predominantly 
from my interview material. 
 
6.2 Identification: Similarity and Difference 
I situate this chapter on identification processes in the conspiracy 
milieu firmly in the sociology that takes relationality seriously (cf. 
Emirbayer, 1997). Self-identity is, from this perspective, always 
constructed within a broader network of social relations; it is a knot 
in a larger figuration of interdependencies (Elias, 1978). At a micro-
level, theories about the social basis of personal identity have been 
developed by symbolic interactionists like Cooley, Mead, and 
Goffman. In 1902, Cooley wrote about personal identity as a looking 
glass self. Who we personally are, meaning the way that we 
experience, perceive and understand ourselves, is always informed by 
social relations. Our self, he argues, is by and large a mirror image of 
the way others perceive us, or at least the way we think others 
perceive us. Through role-taking in primary socialization and in the 
social interactions with significant others like parents and friends, 
individuals develop a self-identity that is distinctly social (Mead, 
1934). In a more abstract sense, people develop a generalized other, 
understood as a derivate of all social encounters that is internalized 
and functions as a moral compass in everyday life. In line with this 
view, Richard Jenkins (2014: 6) holds identity to be  
the human capacity to know “who’s who” (and hence “what’s what”). 
This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them 
knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on. 
This is a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human 
world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of 
collectivities.  
Such relational underpinnings of identity formation form the 
backdrop of this chapter, but three elements are particularly 
important to highlight here.  
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First, identity is not static nor essential, but is the momentary 
product of a dynamic and never-ending process of identification with 
various meaningful others (Bauman, 1995; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 
1934). At one time, sociologists argue, self-identity was something 
relatively stable since it was firmly embedded in predefined social 
structures, groups, ideologies, and religious values (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Questions about identity – who am I? what do I 
want? what do I believe? where do I belong? what do I stand for? – are 
nowadays more prevalent. Traditional worldviews have lost much of 
their plausibility and the world has become an increasingly plural 
space where choice abounds (Berger, 1967; Campbell, 2007). 
Although we might question just how modern such concerns with 
identity are (Jenkins, 2014: 32), it is undeniable that the rapid changes 
of the Western socio-cultural world uproot previously-firm notions 
of self and other. Self-identity has become a “reflexive project” (cf. 
Bauman, 1995; Giddens, 1991, Turkle, 1995). From this 
perspective, the conspiracy milieu is a relatively open social network 
providing cultural resources for identity construction. Conspiracy 
theorists are not individual loners; their search for the truth out there 
literally relates to others. They come together in both on- and offline 
worlds where they share and dispute each other’s ideas, worldviews, 
and life-styles. As “prosumers” (Ritzer and Jergenson, 2010) they 
critically appropriate conspiracy theories, add elements, produce new 
insights, and offer them for further consumption. In and through 
these inherently social activities, identities are formed by relating to 
some and disassociating from others.  
This brings me to a second important dimension of this 
analysis. Sociological theories about key elements of identity 
formation often stress either in-group cohesion or out-group 
resistance (Jenkins, 2014). This is already prevalent amongst classical 
social theorists: Emile Durkheim emphasized social cohesion as the 
cornerstone of collective identity, whereas Karl Marx located the 
essence of such relationships in the struggle over the means of 
production. But academic discussions about sameness or difference as the 
foundational aspect of identities are just as prevalent today (e.g. 
Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Jenkins, 2014, DuGay, et al, 2000). 
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Following Richard Jenkins, identities are neither the result of in-
group cohesion nor the product of resistance towards an out-group. 
Identity formation is both, and is shaped through processes of 
inclusion and exclusion, of aligning with some and opposing others. 
As Jenkins puts it succinctly, “it does not make sense to separate 
similarity and difference […] we cannot have one without the other 
[…] to say who I am is to say who I am not, but it is also to say with 
whom I have things in common” (2014: 22). This frame of “similarity 
and difference” (Jenkins, 2014: 18), firmly grounded in a symbolic 
interactionalist tradition (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 
1934), guides my analysis of identity formation in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu. Instead of conceiving of conspiracy theorists as one 
uniform social category constructed in opposition to a certain 
normality, I aimed to find out inductively who they think they are, and 
with which collectives, worldviews, and practices they associate. 
Based on such self-identifications, it remains to be seen whether 
conspiracy theorists can be considered an undivided and cohesive 
social group united by their stigmatization. 
The issue of power is a third element important for the 
understanding of identification processes. Implicitly referring to 
Marx, Jenkins differentiates between “a collectivity which identifies 
and defines itself (a group for itself) and a collectivity which is 
identified and defined by others (a category in itself)” (2014: 45; 
original emphasis). Labelling theorists have pointed to the dynamic 
interplay between people’s self-image and the way others perceive 
and define them as being constitutive in the formation of identity (e.g. 
Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963; Matza, 1969). These “internal-
external dialectics of identification” (Jenkins, 2014: 42-3) are 
generally congruous, but they are often fraught with tension and 
struggle over whose definition of a situation counts. Identity 
formations of any kind are thus always subject to the structures in 
which they emerge, even to the extent that people’s self-
understanding is shaped by them (e.g. Foucault, 2006; Hall and du 
Gay, 1994). Identity formation is, in short, inherently political. But 
these power structures are not undisputed. As those labelling 
theorists brilliantly show, hegemonic identities are negotiated and 
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contested in everyday situations and in public discourse alike (Becker, 
1963; Goffman, 1963; Matza, 1969). Appropriating popular culture 
is another means of emancipation, being the ways in which people 
use, abuse, and subvert mainstream and mass-produced products to 
create their own meanings (Fiske, 1993). Conspiracy theorists can be 
understood from this perspective. On the one hand, they are 
categorized as paranoid and dangerous militants. On the other hand, 
they actively fight back, and do not only resist the stigma of being 
labelled a conspiracy theorist, but openly contest the authority of the 
modern state, capitalism, and science (Harambam and Aupers, 2015) 
and are hence involved in ‘interpretive contests’ (Melley, 2000) or 
‘discursive struggles for power’ (Bratich, 2008). In this chapter, my 
objective is not to reproduce the stereotypical image of the conspiracy 
theorist, but to explore instead how they see themselves, and how 
they align with and distinguish themselves from others in the 
conspiracy milieu and beyond. As such, I intend to show the relational 
differences between conspiracy theorists and their resistance to 
practices of exclusion and stigmatization based on their self-
understanding. 
 
6.3 Re-Claiming Rationality: “I Am Not a Conspiracy 
Theorist” 
Although the social sciences have generally depicted conspiracy 
theorists as zealous believers, people in the conspiracy milieu are 
more likely to identify themselves as critical thinkers. Against the 
majority of the population, conspiracy theorists appropriate the image 
of the radical freethinker to differentiate themselves from the 
sheeple266 who simply follow the crowd. Virtually all respondents 
emphasized that they “don’t heave and roll on the grand waves of 
society” (Liam, 67) but instead are “skeptic by nature” (Michael, 23), 
“dare to think differently” (Pauline, 67), “think out of the box” (Lucy, 
54) and “put question marks over nearly everything” (Steven, 28). 
What critical thinking encourages them to do is “to look at things from 
multiple perspectives, to consult multiple sources, but mostly to 
think for yourself and to be able to adjust previously held convictions” 
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(William, 25). Often this self-identification is informed by cultural 
ideals of autonomy and rebellion towards the “system.” As Lauren 
(37) explained: “I’ve always had a desire for freedom, so when you 
feel that certain systems…are oppressive, you start looking for 
something that liberates you, and that’s how I came here.” Julie (31) 
felt similarly, “indeed, there is something rebellious in me, I’ve 
always had that, and maybe therefore I went this way.” In the words 
of Pauline (67), “my father always told me… ‘think for yourself, 
never assume anything to be just true’… he’s ninety-six now and still 
asks me… ‘and have you recently been civilly disobedient?’ 
…fantastic, right?”. Critical thinking is emancipatory, they argue, as 
it serves to “shed the shackles of society,” Michael (23), a student of 
economics, explained. 
The first conclusion, then, is that people in the conspiracy 
milieu collectively distinguish themselves from the mainstream by 
arguing that they are free and critical thinkers. They share a general 
discontent with modern institutions like the state, industries, the 
media, science, and technology, and take as propaganda what most 
other people take as truth. Unlike the sheeple, they are critical of 
what goes on out there. In these self-qualifications, respondents 
reverse the stigma of being irrational dupes and re-claim their 
rationality: it is those in the mainstream who are the gullible ones. 
But as much as they seem to conceive of themselves as critical 
freethinkers, they do not assign this label to others in the milieu. 
Quite the contrary, respondents collectively used the pejorative 
mainstream label of conspiracy theorists to distance them from the 
truly irrational types within the conspiracy milieu. I am not a conspiracy 
theorist, is the collectively-shared adage to stress one’s own 
superiority and/or rationality. Respondents often emphasize how 
stereotypical conspiracy buffs may pretend to be critical thinkers, but 
appear uncritical of their own convictions. Howie, a 30 year old 
blogger on a conspiracy website, argued that “conspiracy theorists 
suffer from tunnel vision: they only see what they want to see. If you 
advance another theory, they start yelling right away that it is not true 
and don’t even want to look at the facts anymore.” “That’s the sorry 
part,” a philosophy student named William (25) told me,  
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they identify much with really thinking about stuff and not following 
the crowd, but in the end they all go with that herd in the same 
direction […] but if you’re really critical, you should not only be 
critical of all that is established […] I am someone who is much more 
nuanced and critical, also of my own convictions.  
This comes much to the dismay of Tom (47) a 9/11 Truther and 
owner of the most visited Dutch website on this topic267, who sees his 
credibility put on the line by  
those stereotypical conspiracy buffs who always think according to 
the same grid and start screaming about bloodlines and so on. That’s 
so confirming the stereotype, exactly what is constantly written in the 
newspapers about conspiracy theorists. A couple of lunatics stand up 
and speak of bloodlines, well, you’re done then. But what I do that’s 
completely different. 
The latter quote makes clear that my respondents are aware of the 
pejorative meaning of the conspiracy theorist label.  
Interestingly, their self-identification as critical thinkers 
functions not only to differentiate themselves from the dormant 
masses, but also from the real conspiracy theorists in the field. This 
relational positioning towards other conspiracy theorists can be taken 
as a first indication that conspiracy theorists are no uniform group. All 
respondents emphasized a desire to be different from the mainstream 
and independent in their way of thinking, which is a distinction that 
is common in modern subcultures that emphasize the ethics of 
individualism and personal freedom (e.g. Houtman et. al, 2011). But 
the interviews also reveal clear internal divisions, in that respondents 
did not hesitate to make distinctions between me and them within the 
conspiracy milieu. They might generally agree that “to look critically 
at what is going on now creates space to imagine alternatives” (Steven, 
28), but principally disagree on how to achieve that change. These 
discussions form the dividing line along which different identities in 
the milieu emerge. 
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6.3.1 Activists: “Get Off Your Knees!” 
A big part of people I interviewed felt that critical thinking is 
necessary, but not sufficient for societal change. They asserted that 
people need to start making a difference by becoming activists. Steven 
(28), a local activist for the Zeitgeist movement, argued that  
it is up to the people and the critical thinkers, it is up to the people 
who resist and long for change to finally unite with each other and 
actually start taking actions, because if everyone would indeed 
remain passive, you will hold back that change.  
And so they do: people in the conspiracy milieu take part in all kinds 
of civil initiatives and social movements because “the feeling I could 
make a difference, make society more peaceful and more just [made 
me] incredibly enthusiastic [...] my passions finally materialized, this 
is what I wanted all of my life" (Daphne, 49). Daphne led a local 
chapter of the SOPN, the newly established political party running for 
Dutch national elections in 2012, which was a spinoff of a popular 
Dutch conspiracy website. I met her on a campaign night in 
Amsterdam where she was actively recruiting people to help promote 
the party. On other occasions we met while she was handing out flyers 
with SOPN enthusiasts at busy inner city transport hubs and when she 
invited me to her house. Daphne (49) described her activities within 
this movement as  
doing things differently, we do not consider ourselves therefore a 
political party, we are a participation movement, we are by and for 
the people, and we go much further, we are more radical, we dare to 
call the problem by its name.  
Activism comes in many flavors. Some people avoid official 
politics and take a journalistic approach by confronting those in power 
and informing the public. Members of WeAreChangeHolland 
regularly hold “creative campaigns without any form of violence” with 
the objective of “confronting politicians and corrupt businessmen by 
asking questions mainstream media do not dare to ask,”268 and post 
such exchanges on YouTube.269 A recurrent topic of concern for them 
is the Bilderberg conferences, where the powerful of the world come 
together behind closed doors. Doors that remain firmly closed, as 
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their reports with Bilderberg invitees show: no one speaks about what 
happens inside. Nicole, a 63 year old psychotherapist, actively goes 
out into the public, “I inform people, I dare to make contact with 
different people, and I don’t mind to tell them the truth. I am not 
afraid to be seen in demonstrations.” Similar efforts, I found, were 
taken by Liam, who at one time was the mayor of a middle-sized town 
and is the founder of a citizen’s platform arguing for governmental 
disclosure of issues like chemtrails, collective vaccinations, and 
European food regulations:  
I am now more politically active than ever before, it’s just no longer 
going along as representative of the government, but to rub against 
the grain, to tell the government: “you guys are not doing the right 
thing, this is going wrong,” and so on. We need to do something, we 
need to go protest and go into resistance. So now I am constantly 
approaching politics, media, science and all other authorities to tell 
them, “guys, open your eyes, because this is serious, it’s not going 
well.” (Liam, 67) 
The activism of the conspiracy milieu can be understood as a form of 
“subpolitics” (Beck, 1997). Modern institutions have since the 1960s 
faced various critiques and can count on much popular distrust. Public 
awareness of ecological issues, the destructive side of technology, and 
corrupt politicians have given rise to a bottom-up form of politics 
outside of the formal political arena, Beck argues. “Subpolitics,” then, 
“questions the status of existing systems, calls for a rethinking of the 
various schemes of classification (…), and asks for the invention of 
new institutional ways” (1997:52). Activists in the conspiracy milieu 
exemplify subpolitics in that they actively try to reform the system 
through public interventions and by establishing alternative political 
parties.  
 
6.3.2 Standing on the Barricades?  
These activist strategies of protest, resistance, confrontation, and 
going against the grain are not appreciated by all conspiracy theorists 
alike. In fact, the radical tone appeared a divisive element in the 
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conspiracy milieu, and mobilized considerable opposition. 
Respondents argued that “resistance only creates more resistance” 
(Robert, 43), and that “fighting has never resulted in anything but 
more fighting” (Lucy, 54). They emphasized that “yelling at the crowd 
how we are being screwed by the big bad world doesn’t get you 
anywhere” (Tom, 47), and suggested that “if you want to generate 
more effect, you’ll maybe just have to be a little bit more mild” (Julie, 
31).  
On the topic of militant activism, the people I spoke to 
frequently made reference to leading figures in the conspiracy milieu 
including Alex Jones, a libertarian, US-based journalist and radio host 
who militantly conveys conspiracy theories on his website; and David 
Icke, the prolific British conspiracy celebrity whose work I 
extensively explore in chapter four. According to my respondents, 
people such as Jones and Icke take too militant of a position and 
unjustly mobilize adherents by tapping into their fears. They argued 
that “these people really go too far, like Alex Jones or so, well, he’s a 
true fear monger” (Michael, 23), and “David Icke for example, I find 
him terrible, I also warn people active with 9/11 to not refer to him, 
please don’t, that man is crazy as a loon, just psychotic, a real 
demagogue” (Tom, 47). Even those who in general admire the work 
of these figures, only accepted it to a certain point:  
well, David Icke for example, a very intelligent man, I think, who 
has really done his homework, has done a lot of research, so with 
eighty percent of what he is saying, I think yes, fine, feels good, I get 
it. But a certain point he completely tips the scales and goes way too 
far, way too fanatic. That’s all based on fear. (Julie, 31) 
Similarly, Robert (43) enjoyed Icke’s performance in Amsterdam 
until the militancy took over:  
So I had that with David Icke at the end of his show, that’s really a 
pep talk, like “yeah, let’s fight, let’s go into resistance.” I don’t agree 
with that, that’s not the way to go, to stand up and “get off your 
knees.” Those are powerful terms […] it’s a shame people are so 
easily lured into resistance, you’ll hear that as the audience applauds 
and whistles when David calls for resistance, revolt and mutiny, well, 
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that’s exactly what not to do, it only works negatively. It generates 
counter-effects. 
Respondents spoke to me of the adverse effects such an 
aggressive attitude generates, and they argue that there must be 
another way than radical activism to bring about change:  
David Icke, I’ve followed him for five years or so, but he is always in 
such a fighter’s mood. That doesn’t generate good responses. I don’t 
agree with fighting, that only provokes counter fighting, provokes 
resistance. The same counts for ArgusEyes270 [a Dutch conspiracy 
website] also in a fighter’s mood, barricade work, barricades never 
worked, well, maybe, but they incite so much resistance, you know, I 
think there are other ways and entrances” (Lucy, 54). 
These examples of opposition to radical activism are relevant not so 
much because they show disagreement over what strategies to take, 
which one would find in every social movement, but because they 
disclose an internal differentiation related to self-identification. 
People active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu position themselves in 
alignment with some and in opposition to others. To repeat: 
conspiracy theorists are not one of a kind. Although the condemnation 
of activist strategies may seem unitary in its opposition, I will further 
demonstrate why these critiques are formulated and how they are 
motivated by two contrasting ideas about social change and reforming 
society. Two other formations of conspiracy identities emerge. 
 
6.3.3 Retreaters: “Be the Change You Want to See in the 
World!” 
The activism that dominates a considerable part of the conspiracy 
milieu was regarded in negative terms by some of the people I 
interviewed because the militancy of resistance and protest does not 
fit with their ideas of how to live life. Although they share with activists 
the importance of awakening oneself, that is, to critically investigate 
and understand what is really going behind the surface of society, they 
nonetheless base their resistance to activism on popular psychological 
grounds. Activism, several argued, comes out of negative emotions 
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like aggression and fear. One respondent’s argument on this point 
was typical:  
[Y]ou can easily turn fanatic, push matters over the edge and end up 
in frenzy. Instead of informing yourself, being aware about things, 
you’re basing your decisions on fear. Basically, you have two choices: 
either you go along with that fear or you go along with what happens 
if your consciousness opens. And well, someone like David Icke for 
example, he drags you into fear. (Julie, 31) 
And that is not good, one person noted, because “fear is our biggest 
enemy. It destroys our own judgment, our feelings and 
discriminatory capacities so that we will comply with the arbitrary 
whims of others” (Lucy, 54). Instead, one should turn away from 
concentrating on the bad things in the world, because  
if you only focus on the negative stuff around you, you will get 
nowhere, you know. You’ll find yourself in a state of stagnation, it’s 
harder to think freely, you cannot grow further, it’s more difficult to 
come to new ideas, all because you’re in a spiral of negativity. 
(Steven, 28)  
Based on these considerations, one begins to wonder just how much 
knowledge one should assemble about the malfunctioning of 
institutions and the secret schemes of powerful elites. Instead of 
enlightening, too much knowledge can damage people. As one 
respondent describes, the effect can be overwhelming,  
so I stopped at a certain moment. I understand it by now, it’s not 
that I know everything, but what difference would it make if you 
would suck up more information? It doesn’t feed me with positivity, 
it feeds only a negative side, a dark side. (Robert, 43) 
But more than merely trying to curtail these undesired states of being 
by limiting the consumption of information, a strategy to deal with 
the negativity of conspiracy theories that many respondents made 
mention of relates to the importance of finding the good within 
oneself first. Here we see a distinct difference between activists and 
what I call retreaters, by which I mean a type who aims to transform 
the world by changing the self first. Referring to himself as “dreamer 
of a better world,” Steven (28) asked, “couldn’t it make sense that 
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whatever you see happen ‘outside,’ is actually a reflection of what 
happens inside? In the end, the revolution that is going on now, truly 
is an inner revolution.” They argued that change is not going to come 
by convincing others of your truth, as activists would seek to do. 
Instead, they see the true transformation of our societies happening 
only if people change themselves. This is firstly so because “people 
don’t accept that [activism] and turn away from you. But also, who 
are you to claim all that? First start feeling and living it, before you 
start preaching” (Lucy, 54). Julie (31) similarly remarked that “if 
you’re imposing things, you’re not doing it right. If you really believe 
in something, you become what you believe, you’ll radiate and don’t 
need to say anything at all.” Indeed, Pauline (67) said, “if I make sure 
to raise my frequency, by being honest, treating people well and by 
loving, the rest will vibrate along, I don’t need to interfere with other 
people’s lives.” In a similar vein, agricultural entrepreneur Robert 
(43) explained  
I don’t think resistance is the right way to go, what I do instead is to 
apply it to myself. And if other people notice it, ask about it, feel 
touched by it, then it will have effect, not by imposing it on people, 
I think that will have much more effect than pushing. To inspire 
others instead of terrifying them. 
Changing the world is, from this perspective, not a matter of 
standing on the barricades. It is primarily about retreating and 
improving yourself instead of converting others to your worldview in 
an aggressive way. Retreaters seek subtle change: they use terms like 
radiation, vibration, and love to spread the message of self-
development. Such ideas and terms indicate a strong affinity with 
countercultural forms of spirituality, which have blossomed since the 
1960s in Western countries and which have been institutionalized 
since the 1980s under the banner of the New Age movement (e.g. 
Houtman and Aupers, 2007; Heelas, 1996). In this milieu, there is 
much emphasis on dropping out, finding the inner self, and the relation 
between personal growth and societal change. Tellingly, an influential 
New Age best-seller like The Aquarian Conspiracy, written by Marilyn 
Fergusson (1980) develops the argument that real revolutions are not 
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built on political protest and activism, like in the 1960s, but on 
personal change and inner discoveries. A new age of peace and 
stability, she claims, can only emerge when individuals exemplify a 
better world through their own thoughts and interactions. An even 
broader perspective highlights the similarity of retreaters with what 
Troeltsch (1992[1931]) identifies in his study of Christian religious 
history as mysticism, which refers to the tradition prioritizing a 
fundamentally individual and subjective religious experience; and the 
tendency to renounce any institutionalized religious authority (cf. 
Daiber, 2002). From this perspective, the difference with activists 
becomes even sharper who, like Weber’s ethical prophets, claim to 
have the truth in their hands and command it to others, whereas 
retreaters, like Weber’s exemplary prophets, disavow such impositions 
and prefer to demonstrate the correct path by going down that road 
themselves (cf. Weber, 1993[1920]).  
 
6.3.4 Mediators: “Start Building Bridges!” 
Retreaters are not alone in their critique of activism and resistance; 
another group of people in the conspiracy milieu oppose such 
militancy as well, albeit for different reasons. George (38), for 
example, was heavily involved in political protests but eventually 
changed his mind. He explained how that change came about: “you 
know, to demonstrate brings you in a negative state, but I want to live 
in a positive state. I no longer want to be against things, I want to be 
in favor of something.” He describes “conspiracy theorists” as 
“extremist descendants of alternative people” who are “so stuck at 
being against something they can’t be in favor of something. They are 
only in favor of themselves. They only see obstacles and think the 
world can only change if the whole system is subverted”. This group, 
like retreaters, explicitly disassociates themselves from activists. As 
Tom (47), owner of the most visited Dutch website on 9/11,271 
explained:  
I don’t behave like an idealistic activist who is anti-establishment, 
what happens a lot in the 9/11 truth movement. What you see is 
that they often scold and adopt an offensive attitude towards the 
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establishment […] You see a lot of hate with them. I don’t need to 
appeal to the feelings of hate of people. I don’t get any further with 
that. I want to show them aspects of the reality they have been 
deprived of. That’s what I want. 
But more than condemning the militancy of those activists, this group 
criticizes their strategies for not being fruitful since they do not reach 
the general public. If you want to inform the people, to wake them 
up, then it does not help to be offensive and rebellious. Activists, they 
argue, merely serve their own public. What George noticed “is that 
while there are so many small parties proclaiming their ideas, they are 
actually very much turned inwards, but don’t try to send their 
message to the bigger public.” How are they going to change the 
world, they wonder, if they only preach to the choir? Tom (47) 
agreed:  
[T]hey trumpet a message that in their own view is perhaps world 
saving, but strangely enough is mostly directed at each other. My 
work is not directed at the people who are already convinced [9/11] 
is bullshit. I aim explicitly at those who are used to the mainstream. 
Otherwise you’ll only get a rumination of the same information and 
a continuous self-confirmation. I want to bring down the wall 
between the mainstream and the critical current in society. 
Transcending these boundaries is, however, easier said than done. 
John (34), a holistic nutritional advisor and owner of the Are You Still 
Asleep website272  acknowledged this challenge: “if I look at the crowd, 
it’s always the same people, well, try to get beyond those people 
outside that clique. How do you reach the wider public?” 
In contrast to both activists and retreaters, the objective of these 
people is to mediate between the truths of hardcore conspiracy buffs 
and the regular public. Hence, I call this group mediators. William (25) 
founded the website Seek the Truth273 solely dedicated to this matter, 
because  
on the one end there are those who fully believe all what they are 
being told on the news, while on the other end there are those who 
firmly oppose all official accounts and come up with the most 
delusional ideas. I find it interesting to pull both groups towards each 
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other, to have them look critically at themselves, and to show them 
that the other is not completely crazy either.  
Against the self-directedness of many conspiracy theorists do mediators 
identify with its opposite:  
[L]ook, a conspiracy theorist gets so caught up in his own ideas that 
the normal person doesn’t get it anymore. So the further you’ll take 
it to the extremes, the more society will disassociate from you. That’s 
the biggest problem of the conspiracy theorist. You need to build 
bridges. That’s the most important thing, that you build a bridge 
between your theory on the one hand and what society knows on the 
other hand. And I am much more of a bridge builder, because I lived 
in both worlds, I understand both worlds. (George, 38) 
They all expressed that this intermediary role is not an easy position 
and feel caught between the hammer and the anvil: “on my right I 
have the establishment, and they hardly listen. But on my left I have 
the activists. The strange thing is that they don’t like me either. I’m 
sleeping with the enemy…” (Tom, 47). They keep trying 
nonetheless, as William (25) shows: 
I feel socially responsible, and I think a lot of our problems come forth 
out of misunderstandings. Of people being stuck in their own ideas. 
I have the conviction that if you can let people really think about 
their ideas, they might become a bit more tolerant towards other ideas 
and other people. 
In this way, George (38) suggested, “we can come together at the top 
of the bridge and understand each other.” 
Mediators, in short, debunk activists as unproductive 
fundamentalists and critique retreaters for being too involved with 
personal growth. They argue that changing the world is primarily 
done by building bridges between the alternative and the mainstream, 
between different perceptions of truth, and between multiple 
perspectives on reality. A worldview that underlies this approach in 
the conspiracy milieu is cultural pluralism: mediators acknowledge that 
different outlooks on the world are fundamental to contemporary 
society and, from this postmodern position, act more as interpreters of 
514059-L-bw-harambam
ϲ͘ ͞I D EOT  OESWIRz THEORIST͟ 
1ϵϯ 
different cultural perspectives than as legislators of one master 
narrative or truth (Bauman, 1987). 
 
6.3.5 Corresponding Epistemological Positions, 
Oppositional Ideas about Truth 
The divergent identifications of people active in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu coincide with distinct epistemological positions. In other 
words: activists, retreaters and mediators think differently about truth 
and profess distinct ways of assessing the veracity of a situation. For 
each of these three subcultural groups, how they see themselves and 
how societal change should come about go hand in hand with 
corresponding ideas about what counts as truth. 
What sets activists apart from the rest is the belief in an absolute 
truth. They spoke of “the real problems” and “the real truth” (Daphne, 
47), and emphasized the uniformity of truth by referring to it in 
singular form. They said to be “looking for the truth” and “finding the 
truth” (Martin, 30), or they wanted to “expose the truth” (Michael, 
23). They told me how “the media don’t give you the truth,” (Nicole, 
63) but “erect smokescreens in front of the truth […] these are no 
conspiracy theories, that’s the solid truth” (Martin, 30) (all my italics). 
An often-expressed aphorism that “the truth will set you free, but first 
it will piss you off”274 alludes to my point. Fundamental to discerning 
truth from falsity for activists is the role of proof and facts. Indeed, as 
Liam (67) stressed,  
I think the truth can be assessed, that it is there. When you start 
thinking and depart from the assumption that what comes from above 
is true, on the basis of authority arguments, if you divert from that 
idea and start thinking for yourself, [then] you’re looking for the 
truth, then you’re looking for objective elements.  
These people argued that solid proofs and hard facts should distinguish 
“the truth they tell you from the truth as it is” (Martin, 30), and that 
such evidence enables us to separate “appearance from actuality” 
(Liam, 67). In some instances, they claimed that “proof… tangible 
proof” is what sets “conspiracy theories [apart] from conspiracy facts” 
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(Michael, 23), herewith ironically reproducing the connotation of 
conspiracy theories as fictitious, because “a theory is not based on 
proven facts, that’s why I prefer to call it a conspiracy praxis” (Simon, 
40). The truth of their beliefs therefore lies in the quality of their case: 
it needs to be “well substantiated” (Liam, 67) and “well documented” 
(Michael, 23). As Martin (30) put it, “bring on the proof!” 
Underpinning activists’ strong beliefs of what is wrong and what 
society should look like instead, is a strong faith in the veracity of their 
ideas. Like Weber’s ethical prophets (1992) in both religious and 
secular (utopian) projects, the conviction that there is an absolute, 
overriding, truth informs their understandings of the current 
situation. The truth may be hidden, but it is out there. In line with their 
positivist ideals, activists believe that the truth can be found with solid 
empirical research. 
Where activists require hard facts proving the truth, retreaters 
speak about feeling what is right and emphasize inner knowing to assess 
the veracity of knowledge claims. Lauren (37) explained:  
I always felt what is pure, pure information. What is right and what 
is wrong. You feel it in your hart. If it resonates or not. If it is right, 
you’ll feel it. If something is wrong, if it is not true, if they are 
manipulative truths to deceive people because there are interests, 
well, somewhere you feel it is not right. Somewhere in your body it 
doesn’t feel right, something is wrong, not in harmony. It’s all 
subjective. 
For Pauline (67) the very notion of truth is personal too,  
I don’t think “truth” exists, it is always colored, it is always colored. 
It always comes through a person. So therefore it is always: what do 
you take out of it? What resonates with you? That’s my only 
criterion, what resonates and what not.  
These epistemological assessments of the veracity of a situation do not 
only relate to mainstream knowledge, but are applied to conspiracy 
theories and their producers as well. Robert (43), for example, 
emphasized that he does not accept everything that David Icke says:  
I don’t just believe his stories. I verify them too. Is it right what he is 
saying? How does it feel? Does it feel right? It’s just like buying a 
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new coat. How does it feel? Does it fit well, does it feel comfortable? 
That’s really how I base my opinions. I follow the feeling.  
Very much in contrast to those activists looking for solid proofs and 
hard facts, retreaters discard the notion that these positivist 
epistemologies should be guiding. Julie (31) explained,  
[Y]ou know, the facts are just not that important. Because you’ll 
never know that way. Not from thinking and facts. You will never, 
you can never really know, because there is always something 
disqualifying it, or research contradicting it, always, always, always, 
with everything. The only thing that is real, that is true, is your own 
self, it is your only advisor. Your higher self, higher knowing, that is 
very important, and that’s the truth. Not all those stories, 
interpretations and researches, that’s just not it.  
Similar to those of activists, the ideas of retreaters concerning how they 
see themselves and the world around them resonate with ideas about 
knowing and truth. Following the New Age imperative of inner change 
and personal growth as a means to achieve social change, they emphasize 
that truth is about knowing from the inside what is right and what is 
wrong. In contrast to the absolute truth of activists, retreaters 
emphasize, in harmony with a long mystical tradition (cf. Troeltsch, 
1992; Daiber, 2002), subjective truth: truth that is personal and that is 
always colored and informed by feeling.  
Mediators similarly oppose the idea of one absolute truth that 
activists hold dear. Instead, they argue, “the truth is the truth only at 
that moment, until a new truth comes along, yes truth is relative, or 
it always changes” (Tom, 47). But the notion of many subjective 
truths of retreaters is similarly discarded, “because then you come to a 
relativism that says that science is the same as religion, or whatever. I 
wouldn’t go that far. But that’s indeed the conclusion many 
conspiracy theorists take,” William (25) explained. He continued,  
it fits our time of course, that postmodern idea of “anything goes”. 
But you don’t need to say that either there is one absolute truth or 
that everything relativistically exists next to each other and they’re 
all equal. I think there are ways imaginable in between.  
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One of the ways to approach matters, mediators argue, is to see the 
reality of a situation from different perspectives, because “truth is 
always multiple” (George, 38). He went on to explain:  
it’s like when you’re at a busy crossroad and there’s an accident and 
you’ll ask twenty people who saw what happened, what you’ll get is 
twenty different truths. And they are all right, you know. Because 
from one angle it might have seemed like that car came from the 
right, so he should have been given way, but that person couldn’t see 
the traffic light was red, so he was right. But the person standing 
there could see he crossed a red light, so he might have come from the 
right, but was nevertheless wrong. So you see, everyone has their own 
truth, it just depends where you stand. If we can come to a common 
conclusion on what happened, then, we’ll get a truth than can be 
shared.  
Towards their objective to bring people and their diverging ideas 
together, mediators understand and value the situated truths of multiple 
actors. Truth is not absolute, not entirely subjective, they argue, but 
always the product of a certain position in time and place (cf. 
Haraway, 1991; Seidman, 1994). 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The prevalent image of the conspiracy theorist as a paranoid and 
militant tinfoil hatter is a true social stigma (cf. Goffman, 1963) and 
a clear stereotype (Pickering, 2001). By conceiving of conspiracy 
theorists as one uniform group, be they paranoid or anomic, 
academics have only contributed to this potent public image. But such 
accounts leave a blind spot for diversity in the conspiracy milieu and 
obscure relational differences between conspiracy theorists. In this 
chapter, I have therefore set out to explore such variation through 
people’s self-understanding. Instead of imposing external 
categorizations, I studied how people active in the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu associate with some and disassociate from others. The frame of 
“similarity and difference” (Jenkins, 2014: 18) proved fruitful in 
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bringing to the surface the distinctions of self and other at work in this 
particular subculture. 
My analysis shows that despite a common opposition towards 
the cultural mainstream, considerable self-assigned variety exists in 
the Dutch conspiracy milieu. I identified three distinguishable groups, 
which were activists, retreaters and mediators. Whereas the militancy of 
activists who are actively trying to change the status quo is vehemently 
rejected by the two other groups alike; these latter two groups 
differed again by either retreating into a psychological-spiritual 
worldview in which change is said to come from within (retreaters) or 
by working to build bridges between clashing worldviews on the road 
to progress (mediators). These three subcultural strands of the 
conspiracy milieu are not only characterized by their distinct 
conceptions of self and other, but, in line with these relational 
identifications, by divergent epistemological positions as well. 
Whereas activists believe in one absolute truth, retreaters prioritize 
their own subjective truths, and mediators explain how all truths are 
situated and, when possible, related.  
Based on this unmistakable diversity, I conclude that it is 
problematic to speak in singular terms of “a distinct culture—
conspiracism—which encompasses a specific system of knowledge, 
belief, values, practices, and rituals shared by communities of people 
around the world” (Byford, 2011: 5). When the effort is verstehen, 
conspiracy culture can hardly be understood as a monolithic whole, 
despite similarities involving distrust towards institutions and the 
elites who govern them. This plurality is confirmed by more recent 
studies as well. Uscinski and Parent, for example, show broad 
demographic diversity and concede that “conspiracy theorists differ 
substantially from their stereotypes” (2014: 86). Ward and Voas, to 
give another example, show how the conspiracy milieu is 
characterized by a “male-dominated, often conservative, generally 
pessimistic’ realm and the ‘female-dominated New Age, liberal, self-
consciously optimistic” realm (2009: 103-4). However, they end up 
homogenizing this cultural milieu by arguing that it forms one “hybrid 
system of belief” they call “conspirituality” (Ward and Voas, 2009: 
103). My analysis shows that there are indeed streams recognizable in 
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the conspiracy milieu (e.g. activists and retreaters), but when looked at 
from the perspective of the interacting individuals, it becomes 
apparent that these people are not easily grouped together into a 
single “politico-spiritual” movement (Ward and Voas, 2009: 103). 
Instead, their moral, political, and epistemological differences 
generate considerable opposition and show lines of conflict and 
disagreement within the conspiracy milieu. The conspiracy milieu can 
therefore better be seen as a fluid network of different groups of 
people, identifying with distinctly different worldviews, beliefs, 
values, and practices.  
It is from such findings that I argued in the Methodology 
chapter to conceptualize the cultural and social worlds of conspiracy 
theorists following Colin Campbell’s notion of the “cultic milieu” 
(2002). The conspiracy milieu is, in its conceptual flexibility, better 
able to encompass the heterogeneity of people, beliefs, practices, and 
ideological orientations that I encountered in my fieldwork, yet 
remains solid enough to acknowledge their shared opposition against 
the cultural mainstream. Such opposition takes shape, besides 
substantively comprising myriad “deviant belief systems and 
practices” (Campbell, 2002: 14), on the level of identification 
processes as well. In this chapter, I have shown ways in which people 
in the conspiracy milieu actively resist their stigmatization by 
distinguishing themselves from the mainstream as critical freethinkers: 
it is not they who are gullible, but the sheeple who simply take for 
granted what the epistemic authorities tell them. The adage I am not a 
conspiracy theorist functions as a trope to reclaim rationality in a 
cultural climate were official truth claims are increasingly contested 
(cf. Bratich, 2008; Gieryn, 1999). One can doubt, however, how 
powerful this resistance is when the exact same label and its pejorative 
meaning is used by people active in the conspiracy milieu to 
differentiate themselves from the real paranoids. This might be an 
effective discursive strategy for some to augment their own 
credibility, but it only strengthens the derogatory meaning of the 
conspiracy theorist label, and threatens to discard the whole group in 
question. As strategies of resistance paradoxically bolster people’s 
own subjection, the difficulty of staging a revolution with the 
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(discursive) weapons of the oppressor can only be confirmed. 
Foucault meets Kafka, or so it seems. In the next chapter, I will show 
that conspiracy theorists make use of other arguments and deploy 
different tropes to resist their stigmatization and to gain epistemic 
authority in battles with science. 
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7. Contesting Epistemic Authority : 
Conspiracy Theorists on the 
Boundaries of Science 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have shown how conspiracy theorists are 
highly critical of the workings of mainstream epistemic institutions 
and in particular about authoritative claims on truth. Conspiracy 
theorists explicitly discard such truth claims of authoritative 
institutions as corrupt, and propose alternative accounts instead. 
Although each institution has its own operational logic and epistemic 
rules, most give their claims on truth credibility by referring to 
science275 and its norms and procedures for arriving at reliable 
knowledge. When politicians hold that 9/11 was no inside job, and 
that the WTC towers indeed collapsed because of the planes, they 
strengthen such arguments with scientific reports proving that theory. 
When food manufacturers say that certain additives in their products 
are not harmful to human health, they put forward scientific research 
confirming that there are no damaging effects. When journalists 
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investigate the consequences of certain oil-drilling technologies on 
the local environment, they quote scientists and their work as 
authorities. Or when medical experts say that vaccinations are safe 
and effective, they refer to scientific research showing their benign 
functionality. To summarize, representatives of institutional regimes 
“all appeal to science as the tribunal of reason and truth” in times of a 
creditability crisis, as Tom Gieryn puts it (1999: 3). And not without 
due reason, because “what science declares to be the case […] is taken 
to be true and relevant to the matter at hand” (Brown, 2009: 4). 
Harding goes further, saying that “neither God, nor tradition is 
privileged with the same credibility as scientific rationality in modern 
cultures” (1986: 16). Indeed, the voice of scientific expertise is 
commonly listened to with assurance and providence: “if ‘science’ 
says so, we are more often than not inclined to believe it or act on 
it—and prefer it over claims lacking this epistemic seal of approval” 
(Gieryn, 1999: 1). Science is, in other words, the most commanding 
epistemic authority in contemporary Western societies, and more than 
any other institution, has the right and ability to establish definitions 
of what is real and what is not, what is true and what is not. 
It is therefore no surprise that contemporary conspiracy 
theories explicitly engage science. After all, if one believes prevalent 
truth claims are wrong, one has to confront the institution that has 
the “legitimate power to define, describe and explain bounded 
domains of reality” (Gieryn, 1999: 1). And so conspiracy theorists do: 
by formulating alternative accounts of the truth they openly contest 
the epistemic authority of science, and resist on a fundamental level 
this dominant “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1970[1966]). For many 
people, conspiracy theories are a plausible and trustworthy 
alternative to explanations authorized by science. Not insensitive to 
these widespread popular critiques, science retaliates both inside 
academia and in public discourse with fierce refutations of such 
competing explanations. Often it finds support from defenders of 
science outside of academia, notably journalists and members of 
skeptic organizations, who partake in similar assaults on conspiracy 
theories (see my Introduction and Methodology chapter).  
514059-L-bw-harambam
ϳ͘ OETESTIE' EWISTEDI UTHORITz 
2Ϭϯ 
In tandem with such refutations comes an argumentation as 
to why science is a superior way of knowing, and scientists the most 
trustworthy deliverers of such knowledge. As can be seen from such 
dynamics of mutual attack and assault, conspiracy theories and science 
have become rivals in a public arena where different claims to truth 
compete with each other for acknowledgement. Science may be 
society’s most powerful epistemic authority, but it surely is not 
uncontested. Ready examples would include the climate change 
debates, discussions about the safety of E-numbers, or shale gas 
fracking disputes. These “credibility contests are a chronic feature of 
the social scene” (Gieryn, 1999: 1). What is at stake in these battles 
for epistemic authority is not only the legitimate power to define and 
explain reality, but consequentially the very contours and contents of 
what we designate as science. 
These battles are not something new. The history of science 
can be characterized as a continuous border war, since the boundaries 
between intellectual activities has never been stable nor permanently 
settled (Haraway, 2001: 29). Since the early modern period, science 
had to fight for legitimacy against the prevailing powers of the church 
and aristocracy, while it simultaneously had to convince ever-
changing publics of its beneficial qualities and practical capabilities (cf. 
Hanegraaff, 1997; Latour, 1993b[1984]; Shapin and Shaffer, 1984; 
Toulmin, 1990). What was once the exploration of a few 
revolutionaries entrenched in local turmoil turned into the 
unprecedented institutionalized network of ideas, objects, people, 
places, and practices we now call “science” (e.g. Brown, 2009; 
Taylor, 1996).  
Unchanged, however, are the continuous battles on its 
tenuous borders for money, autonomy, and credibility, especially 
against competitor claimants on this domain of legitimate knowledge 
and truth (Gieryn, 1999). Religious groups advance creationism as a 
serious alternative to Darwinian evolution; populist currents 
challenge the authoritative status of scientific knowledge by 
designating it just another opinion; governments try to direct the 
orientation of science away from fundamental research into practical 
and profitable domains; business and industry fund and deploy science 
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in all kinds of ways for commercial advantage; and ideological 
opponents of science’s technocratic rationality advance spiritual 
understandings of the meaning of life and death instead. Science may 
have a lot to say today, but it is certainly not the only voice out there. 
Despite all the practical and social advancements it has brought, the 
epistemic authority of science is challenged from more and more 
corners of society.  
It is in this historical context of ever present (but arguably 
increasing) disputes over epistemic authority that I situate the 
dynamics between science and conspiracy theorists, which is what I 
explore in this chapter. In the most abstract sense, I am interested in 
the border conflicts science is embroiled in. How are its contours and 
contents shaped in these battles for epistemic authority? What is 
drawn inside science, and what is incidentally or consistently kept at 
bay? Most interestingly, how are those boundaries established? This 
implies a non-essentialist understanding of what science is, that is, the 
historical product of contingent attributions and local demarcations 
(e.g. Harding, 1986; Shapin, 1986). I conceive of science as the 
momentary and provisional outcome of all such instances of 
“boundary work” (Gieryn, 1999: 4). In this chapter I delve into on 
one of such border conflicts, namely that between conspiracy theories 
and science. Drawing on my interview material, I study how and why 
people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu challenge the epistemic 
authority of science. Taking a symmetrical approach here to the study 
of such battles for epistemic authority as developed in the social 
studies of science (e.g. Bloor, 1991; Gieryn, 1999; Hess, 1993), I 
analyze how academics pathologize conspiracy theories in works that 
operate as de facto strategies of boundary work. I focus on the 
rhetorical strategies deployed by both parties in efforts to 
secure/attack the bastion of science. What arguments and tropes do 
they use to delegitimize each other’s claims to truth? While I am not 
interested here in the truth-value of any of these assertions, I set out 
to explore the meanings and rationales that inform them. These 
should, after all, give a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion that install the provisional boundaries of 
science vis-à-vis conspiracy theories. 
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7.2 Science and Its Boundaries 
Most people in Western societies would understand what is meant by 
science, and would intuitively understand that it is different from 
common knowledge, politics, or religion. I imagine, however, that 
few could manage to define it in unambiguous terms. Who can blame 
them? Even scientists have a hard time articulating the essence of 
science, the unique and invariant characteristics that differentiate it 
from non-science. This issue, which is known as the demarcation problem 
has haunted intellectuals since the Greek philosophers Parmenides, 
Plato, and Aristotle sought to distinguish knowledge (episteme) from 
opinion (doxa) on the basis of some essential criteria (for good 
overviews, see Laudan, 1983; Gieryn, 1995; Taylor, 1996).  
By way of an example, note that scholars belonging to the 
Vienna Circle tried to separate science from metaphysics by reference 
to its unique methodology by which, they argued, only knowledge 
that can be verified through strict empirical observation and/or 
experimental testing counts as science. Karl Popper, to name 
another, refuted their logical positivism and articulated “perhaps the 
most famous demarcation criterion: falsificationism” (Taylor, 1996: 
27). Instead of arguing that science is different from metaphysics on 
its capacity to be proven true, known as the verifiability principle, 
Popper argued precisely the opposite: science is different from its 
imposters because it can be proven false.276 Following Popper, Gieryn 
notes that “science is not a confirmation game (looking for evidence 
to corroborate a generalization) but a refutation game (looking for 
evidence to shoot it down)” (1995: 396). Robert Merton, a few 
decades later, left these matters of epistemology mostly aside and, as 
a true sociologist, sought to distinguish science on the basis of its social 
and normative structure, in other words, its culture, defined as “that 
affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be 
binding on the man of science” (1973: 268-9). He identified “four 
[unique] sets of institutional imperatives—universalism, 
communism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism—which are 
taken to comprise the ethos of modern science,” and which guarantee 
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(and legitimize) the elevated status of its knowledge (1973: 270). But, 
as time and sociological inquiry has shown, these and other 
essentialists efforts never led to any conclusive ways to differentiate 
science from other cultural practices (e.g. Gieryn, 1995: 404; 
Harding, 1986: 41; Laudan, 1983: 112; Wallis, 1979: 6). 
Constructivist scholars in the social studies of science have 
found a way out of this conundrum by shifting attention from 
identifying the unique building blocks of the ivory towers of science 
toward the presentation of science in everyday life (e.g. Barnes, 1974; 
Gieryn, 1983; Haraway, 1991; Shapin, 1986). Science, from this 
perspective, is essentially nothing, yet potentially everything: it is an 
empty cultural space filled with content through episodic negotiations 
and settlements over its unique qualities and the authority it should 
accompany (Gieryn, 1999: 1-31). The contours and contents of what 
we regard as science, in other words, are not intrinsic to the nature 
and practice of the institution itself, but are better thought as the 
provisional result of repeated and endless dynamics of the inclusion 
and exclusion of people, knowledge, and practices; efforts, that is, to 
carve science off from other domains of life.277 This latter practice is 
what Gieryn calls boundary work: “the discursive attribution of selected 
qualities to scientists, scientific methods, and scientific claims for the 
purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and some 
less authoritative residual non-science” (1999: 4-5).  
Taylor advances a similar “rhetorical perspective on the 
‘demarcation’ of science” and argues that “the discursive practices of 
multiple social actors are taken as constructing the boundaries that 
mark off the domain of science from, for example, pseudoscience and 
politics” (1996: 5). To put it differently, what science is in this or that 
historical moment is intimately related to what it is not. As Gieryn 
reminds us, “properties attributed to science on any occasion depend 
largely on the specifics of its [excluded] ‘other’” (1999: 22). As such 
scholars argue, it is of little (sociological) relevance how some 
philosopher of high esteem defines science to a better or worse 
degree, simply because the boundaries of science and its 
accompanying epistemic authority are decided “downstream,” in the 
courtrooms, boardrooms, and living rooms where the jurisdiction of 
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science is being debated (Gieryn, 1999: 27). Within this frame, the 
sociological question does not concern what science really is, but how 
it is advanced and believed as a superior way of knowing. It focuses 
both on public understandings of the distinctive qualities of science 
and on the ways that scientists deploy certain representations of 
science in situations where their authority is contested. 
This constructivist perspective on the boundaries of science 
puts the question of power at center stage. As Haraway reminds us, 
“all drawings of inside-outside boundaries in knowledge are theorized 
as power moves […] scientists and their patrons have stakes in 
throwing sand in our eyes […] science is a contestable text and a 
power field; the content is the form” (1991: 184-5). The privileges, 
such as status, money, and authority, that accompany inclusion in the 
domain of science are massive, making the demarcation problem not 
just an intellectual or analytic quandary, but a matter of politics as 
well. After all, Laudan argues, “the labeling of a certain activity as 
‘scientific’ or ‘unscientific’ has social and political ramifications which 
go well beyond the taxonomic task of sorting beliefs into two piles” 
(1983: 21). Demarcation criteria are performative: they enact a 
domain called science and endow that which is included with power, 
funds, and prestige, while excluding others from those advantages. It 
is therefore no surprise that they are actively deployed in battles for 
epistemic authority. As Laudan argues, “no one can look at the history 
of debates between scientists and ‘pseudoscientists’ without realizing 
that demarcation criteria are typically used as machines de guerre 
between rival camps” (1983: 20). Demarcation criteria are essential 
dimensions of boundary work. They function as cultural repertoires 
or “flexible vocabularies” for scientists (and others) to draw from 
when faced with a need to distinguish science from its others (Mulkay, 
1979: 72).  
Descriptions of science are, as Gieryn makes clear, 
“contextually tailored selections from a long menu defined by the 
players and stakeholders, their goals and interests, and the arena in 
which they operate” (1999: 21). The point here is that “mythical 
‘origin stories’ of science” (Harding, 1986: 197-215), “descriptions 
of science as distinctively truthful, useful, objective or rational” 
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(Gieryn, 1983: 792), or any other beneficial circumscription of 
science for that matter, should be seen and analyzed as professional 
ideologies. That is, optimally-customized narratives about the unique 
qualities of science, deployed in the pursuit of epistemic authority and 
thought to be the most convincing for the public at hand (Gieryn, 
1983). In other words, narratives about the distinctive contents and 
qualities of science are utterly political. From this point of view, 
Haraway argues that “science – the real game in town, the one we 
must play – is rhetoric, the persuasion of the relevant social actors 
that one’s manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired objective 
power” (1991: 184). Knowledge is power, and science is the product 
of power games, the product of battles for epistemic authority.  
Despite the flexibility of how science takes shape, a particular 
set of characteristics historically stabilized into the image of science 
we are most familiar with today: science as skeptical, objective, 
rational, disinterested, and truthful. Although sociologists of science 
generally regard this image to be part of “the PR of science” (Shapin, 
2012: 38), its “professional ideology” as Gieryn would have it (1983), 
this public image of science is the reason why we grant it its superior 
societal position. It is an extremely powerful and authoritative public 
image. Because we believe science to be a pure source of knowledge, 
untroubled by dogma, religion, politics, and material interests, we 
value it with resources and esteem. No wonder that rival parties will 
argue in battles for epistemic authority that they are really scientific 
(cf. Collins and Pinch, 1979; Hess, 1993). Creation scientists, 
parapsychologists, and other claimants of epistemic authority 
operating at the boundaries of science attempt to be more “royalist 
than the king” by elaborately displaying their scientificity, a 
phenomenon Shapin calls “hyperscience” (2012: 38). By contrast, 
Gieryn says, “boundary work to exclude an impostor ‘scientist’ will 
focus attention on the poser’s failure to conform to expected 
methodological standards variously mapped out as necessary for 
genuine scientific practice: proper instrumentation, credentials, peer 
reviews, objectivity, skepticism” (1999: 22).  
On a more abstract note, boundary work is thus the 
amplification of difference. When drawing rhetorical boundaries 
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between us and them, it is of the highest importance and most practical 
usefulness to distinguish oneself from an opposed other. Potential 
similarities must be obscured at all costs, since the perception that 
one might have affinity with that other undermines any efforts to 
justify one’s own distinct societal position. Boundary work entails 
stereotyping in the making of a clear self and other (cf. Bhabha, 1983; 
Pickering, 2001), just like the contentious dynamics between 
conspiracy theorists and science. In this chapter, I study how and why 
conspiracy theorists challenge the epistemic authority of science, 
especially through attacking its esteemed public image. But first I 
show how science defends its boundaries through the 
stereotypification of conspiracy theorists as modernity’s dark 
counterpart. In other words, the concrete rhetorical weapons used to 
obscure similarities and amplify differences in these border conflicts 
are precisely the tropes of that public image of science. I conclude 
with an interpretation of how to understand these dynamics and I 
situate them in a wider cultural context characterized by a 
democratization of knowledge.  
 
7.3 Boundary Work: Construing Conspiracy Theories as 
Modernity’s Dark Counterpart  
In the following section, I use the works of academics who pathologize 
conspiracy theories as data to analyze their rhetorical techniques. 
These scholars come from a wide variety of social scientific 
backgrounds such as political science (Barkun, Berlet, Hofstadter, 
Robins), history (Aaronovitch, Groh, Pipes, Showalter), psychology 
(Byford, Goertzel, Kalichman, Post), law (Sunstein, Vermeule), and 
philosophy (Clarke, Keeley, Pigden, Popper). It might generally be 
assumed that their objective is informed by a scientific interest, but as 
I have argued in the Introduction and as is attested to by other scholars 
on the subject (e.g. Bratich, 2008; Knight, 2000), there is a moral 
alarmism in the way they write about conspiracy theories. This 
alarmism, I contend below, suggests that there is something more at 
stake for these scholars, something which creates an imperative to 
discursively construct conspiracy theories in the way they do. Note 
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that I do not set out here to debunk academic characterizations of 
conspiracy theories, nor to show that there are hidden intents behind 
them, I merely intend to analyze the particular ways these scholars 
frame conspiracy theories as bad science and paranoid politics. As will 
become obvious, these ways of framing conspiracy theories is part of 
a long tradition of distinguishing science from rival epistemic 
authorities.  
Secular Remnants of A Religious Past. In the Introduction I 
discussed academic portrayals of conspiracy theories as bad science and 
paranoid politics. To briefly rephrase that argument, conspiracy 
theories are said to be the delusional thought of radical militants who 
see plots and intrigues where in fact there are none. In their obsessive 
search for evidence, they fall into confirmation bias and ignore 
falsification. Even stronger put, they are insensitive to contrary 
evidence, and have a self-sealing quality. Despite the air of scientific 
rigor, such scholars argue, conspiracy theories are anything but 
proper forms of inquiry as they violate all scientific norms and rules 
for establishing reliable knowledge. They may therefore mimic 
proper scientific practice and flaunt academic credentials to give their 
work respectability, but in the end conspiracy theorists are nothing 
but fraudulent pseudoscientists. More abstractly speaking, these 
academics contend that underlying such flawed, quasi-scientific 
practices is an outdated, premodern worldview that prioritizes design 
above chance and intent above randomness. To do so, they reduce 
highly complex phenomena to simple causes, and ignore the 
unintended and unforeseen consequences of human action. From this 
point of view, the flaw of conspiracy theories is that they think that 
everything that happens is the strategic product of a powerful few, 
but that is not how things really work. Or so they argue.  
What I want to discuss here is the association made with 
religion throughout these characterizations of conspiracy theories as 
bad science and paranoid politics. This is first done rhetorically: words 
with religious connotations feature abundantly in the language they 
use. They commonly speak of conspiracy theories as “irrational 
beliefs” (Berlet, 2009: 5), casually use the verb to believe to describe 
the adherence to conspiracy theories (e.g. “pointing out that some 
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conspiracy theories are true does not show that it is rational to believe 
in those theories” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009: 207)), and pose 
research questions like “why do some people believe in conspiracy 
theories while others do not?” (Byford, 2011: 6).  
The association with religion goes further than a casual usage 
of such words, which could be argued to be the consequence of 
inadequate rhetorical or linguistic alternatives. Examples of how such 
associations with religion are made more substantively abound. 
Barkun argues that “belief in a conspiracy theory ultimately becomes 
a matter of faith rather than proof” (2006: 7). Pipes says that 
“conspiracy theorists devote themselves heart and soul to their faith. 
…[T]he truest believers devote their very lives to their cause” (1997: 
23). Olmsted states that “conspiracists come to believe in their 
theories the way zealots believe in their religion: nothing can change 
their mind” (2009: 11). Berlet argues that “conspiracism is a belief 
system that refuses to obey the rules of logic” (2009: 5). In short, 
scholars argue that conspiracy theorists are just like religious fanatics 
because they are insensitive to skeptical reason and solid 
argumentation. 
But scholars also make a historical argument when linking 
conspiracy theories to religiosity and corresponding worldviews. 
Following Popper, who sees conspiracy theories as “the typical result 
of the secularization of a religious superstition” (Popper, 2013: 306), 
such academics commonly argue that contemporary ideas of hidden 
powers who exercise influence and control over our social worlds are 
a clear remnant of a religious past. In place of the mythological gods 
that once were, conspiracy theorists now see more mundane yet 
equally powerful agents orchestrating worldly affairs. Conspiracy 
theorists, such critics argue, “are some of the last believers in an 
ordered universe [but] such beliefs are out of step with what we have 
generally come to believe in the late twentieth century” (Keeley, 
1999: 123-4). Like the metaphysics of religion, this tendency to 
“order the universe in a comprehensible form” (Aaronovitch, 2010: 
324) is said to run counter to modern notions of how the world 
works.  
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Another remnant of a religious past in the worldview of 
conspiracy theorists, these scholars argue, is their apocalypticism, 
dualism, or Manicheanism. Like those religious cosmologies, 
conspiracy theorists “cast the world in terms of a struggle between 
light and darkness, good and evil, and hold that this polarization will 
persist until the end of history, when evil is finally, definitively 
defeated” (Barkun, 2006: 2). “Although apocalypticism was forged in 
religious belief systems,” Berlet argues, “today it heats up many 
secular movements [and is] a mindset common in conspiracist 
movements” (2009: 10). For Byford “the use of religious imagery to 
capture the essential iniquity of the conspirators is common even in 
the overtly secular conspiracy theories” (2011: 75). He concludes that 
“Manicheanism, as well as being a feature of the conspiracy theory’s 
explanatory style, is also its condition of possibility” (2011: 83). Such 
scholars follow Hofstadter, who wrote about the “deeper 
eschatological significance” of conspiracy theories, and stated how “a 
spiritual wrestling match between good and evil which is the 
paranoid's archetypal model of the world struggle” (1996: 35). 
Conspiracy theories embody an outdated religious worldview, so 
goes their argument, and perpetuate age-old religious cosmologies of 
ultimate conflict. 
Thirdly, these scholars associate conspiracy theories with 
religion by making a functional argument. Through envisioning such 
coherent and grand narratives of good, evil, and suffering in the 
world, conspiracy theorists construct what Max Weber called, a 
religious theodicy (1993). Groh explains that “in the search for a reason 
why such evil things happen to them, they soon come upon another 
group [which] causes them to suffer by effecting dark, evil and secretly 
worked out plans against them” (1987: 1). Like religious beliefs, it is 
argued, “the conspiratorial worldview offers the comfort of knowing 
that while tragic events occur, they at least occur for a reason, and the 
greater the event, the greater and more significant the reason” 
(Keeley, 1999: 124). Such discovered “truths” may be dark and evil, 
but understanding it “makes redemption possible” (Aaronovitch, 
2010: 341) and provides “answers to all questions of and prescriptions 
for salvation” (Pipes, 1997: 22). Conspiracy theories provide just like 
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religious beliefs, these scholars argue, ultimate meaning in a world 
without any real significance and full of injustice and suffering. 
Protecting the boundaries of science. When scholars frame 
conspiracy theories as bad science and paranoid politics, they infuse 
their analyses with implicit and explicit comparisons to religion. I 
have shown that in these scholarly works, conspiracy theories are 
associated rhetorically, historically, and functionally with religiosity. 
Such academics argue that conspiracy theories may look like modern 
scientific endeavors, critically searching for proofs and truth, but on 
closer inspection share more with religion: they have similar origins, 
contents, and functions. This is not to say that these analyses are 
unjustified or wrong, or that the comparison of conspiracy theories 
with religion cannot be fruitful.278 However, what I want to 
foreground is just how this association operates in a field of 
knowledge contestation. What connotations does this analogy 
contain, and what effects does it establish in such battles for epistemic 
authority? 
It is my argument here that when scholars associate 
conspiracy theories with religion, they do more than making a 
comparison. In effect, they situate conspiracy theories in a pre-
modern past prior to the advent of modern rationality. As such, they 
are put on par with mythical beliefs of omnipotent gods as rulers of 
the universe and in stark opposition to rational and scientific 
understandings of how the world works. The association with religion 
thus functions as a trope to widen the gap between modern science 
and pre-modern conspiracy theories; between critical scientific 
analyses and gullible beliefs in conspiracy; and between those who 
base their truth claims on evidence instead of faith. It enacts what 
Bruno Latour calls the “Great Divide” (1993a: 11). The association 
with religion, in other words, is a prime example of scientific 
boundary work (Gieryn, 1999). By writing about conspiracy theories 
as remnants of a religious past, science emerges as radically modern, 
empirical, skeptical, and grounded in proof instead of belief. It is, in 
other words, filled with meaning and content in supposed opposition 
to conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories, on the other hand, are 
expulsed from the domain of legitimate knowledge, thereby deprived 
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of epistemic authority. They are, after all, only unlawful imposters: 
religious beliefs masquerading in utterly modern dress. Associating 
conspiracy theories with religiosity effectuates therefore what Latour 
calls “purification” (1993a): the extraction of belief and other 
irrationalities from the domain of science. And the boundaries of 
science are reaffirmed again (Gieryn, 1999). 
These attributions to science are nothing new, but rooted in 
the history and ideology of the Enlightenment. Historically, science 
had to fight against the powers of the Church, esoteric spokespersons, 
and the spiritual beliefs of their publics. It had to carve its own identity 
and autonomy in opposition to religion through tropes of skepticism 
and empiricism (cf. Bauman, 1987; Gieryn, 1999, Hanegraaff, 1997; 
Toulmin, 1990). Today, the success of these efforts to establish 
science in opposition to (amongst others) religion is such that being 
associated with the latter is an easy way to devalue alternative truth 
claims. While science stands for modern, skeptical, objective, 
rational, disinterested, and truthful, religion stands for premodern, 
dogmatic, irrational, dangerous, and largely false thought (e.g. 
Dawkins, 2006). This dynamic is exactly what can be observed in the 
battles for epistemic authority science and conspiracy theorists are 
embroiled in.  
Academic scholars argue that despite their “heroic strive for 
‘evidence’” (Hofstadter, 1996: 36) and immaculate scientific display, 
conspiracy theories are “just another religion, full of improvable 
beliefs, with nothing but faith to sustain them” (James, 2010). The 
irony is that conspiracy theorists themselves use the label of religion 
(and its accompanying dogmatism) to disqualify science in return. In 
his furious rebuttal of HIV/AIDS conspiracy theories, Kalichman 
shows how denialists “portray science as religion” and argues that “the 
tactic of redefining science as religion aims to reduce scientific 
evidence to faith” (2009: 101). In the next section, I describe a similar 
framing of science as dogmatic by my respondents. The fact is that the 
trope of religion proves an effective rhetorical strategy to disqualify 
an opponent’s claims, and it is consistently deployed in many truth 
wars today.  
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At last, I would like to hypothesize as to why these scholars 
enforce the borders of science in this particular way. We have seen 
that they are clearly dismayed by conspiracy theories because the 
latter blur boundaries between fact and value, evidence and belief, 
and reality and fiction. But why is that? Given that conspiracy theories 
upset the distinctions on which the edifice of modern science is built, 
it is logical that scholars upholding positivist ideals cannot support 
such hybrids theories, lest they see the ivory towers of science 
crumbling down. But given the strong alarmism of these scholars, 
something greater seems to be at stake. This modern divide is after all 
not just fundamental to modern science, but informs our moral order 
as well. Western societies function and thrive on the belief in the 
strict separation of fact from value, and even of science from politics 
(cf. Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993a; Taylor, 2007; Weber, 2009). It 
is my tentative argument here that because conspiracy theories 
unsettle these modern distinctions, such scholars fear the breakdown 
not only of science, but of society at large.  
If conspiracy theories proliferate, then “we are lost and 
degrade to relativism” (Aaronovitch, 2010: 335), and end up in “a 
situation of radical epistemological pluralism in which different 
groups espouse completely different ideas of what is real” (Barkun, 
2006: 188). If such relativism thrives, such scholars argue, then the 
doors are opened to all kinds of horrors: violence, terrorism, 
extremism, totalitarianism, wars, genocide, populism, antisemitism, 
oppression, demonization, and so on (cf. Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; 
Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Postmodernism is therefore similarly 
despised since it popularized and normalized the idea that different 
ways of knowing are equally valid. In fact, as I argue above, 
postmodernism gives conspiracy theories intellectually respectable 
perspectives, to the consternation of positivist scholars. Epistemological 
relativism is, in other words, put on par with moral relativism. 
Defending the bastion of modern science seems therefore less an issue 
of protecting truth from falsity, but more an imperative to save 
humanity from its downfall. 
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7.4 Challenging the Epistemic Authority of Science: An 
Attack on Its Public Image 
How do conspiracy theorists frame science instead, and what 
arguments do they use to characterize science in efforts to challenge 
its epistemic authority? In the following, I show how people active in 
the Dutch conspiracy milieu formulate a threefold critique of science 
that is directed at the powerful and authoritative public image of 
science. As it turns out, this public image in which science is 
portrayed as distinctively objective, disinterested, and truthful – “the 
PR of science” (Shapin, 2012: 38) and its “professional ideology” 
(Gieryn, 1983) – is precisely the object of critique.   
Critique No 1: Skepticism? What about the dogmas of modern 
science? An important trait science often presents itself with is 
skepticism. This characterization can be traced to early modern 
philosophers like Michel de Montaigne and David Hume, who revived 
the spirit of the Pyrrhonic school by putting all truth claims under 
critical scrutiny, both religious truths and scientific knowledge. They 
believe that no form of knowledge can be held as absolutely true and 
that there should always be room for fundamental doubt. The trope 
of skepticism became a powerful tool to set science apart from 
dogmatic belief systems like religion (cf. Brown, 2009: 51; Toulmin, 
1990: 29). In contrast to religious beliefs in a single, all-encompassing 
truth, science takes a critical and incredulous stance towards 
whatever truth claim being presented, or so the story goes. Given the 
disparagement of conspiracy theories as a modern form of religion, 
this trope is still employed now in order to differentiate science as a 
distinctively superior way of knowing. 
Yet skepticism is just as much a part of my respondents’ self-
identifications as it is of modern science. As I showed in Chapter Six, 
the people I interviewed regard themselves as being “skeptic by 
nature” (Michael, 23), as people who “dare to think differently” 
(Pauline, 67), “out of the box” (Lucy, 54), and who “put question 
marks over nearly everything” (Steven, 28). Motivated by a self-
proclaimed skepticism, they criticize every form of dogmatism, 
particularly that which characterizes modern science. On the most 
514059-L-bw-harambam
ϳ͘ OETESTIE' EWISTEDI UTHORITz 
21ϳ 
abstract level, they criticize the materialist foundations of the 
scientific worldview and treat such a worldview as dogma. Their 
critical narratives are centered on phenomena like telepathy, 
consciousness, and healing hands. They argue that modern science 
labels phenomena that are inconsistent with its materialistic 
worldview as illusionary, and they emphasize that parapsychological 
phenomena are discarded not on the basis of empirical research or 
counterfactual evidence (as proper scientists would have it) but 
simply because their materialist worldview does not allow for the 
existence of such phenomena. They just don’t want to see it, respondents 
argue, and hence are such phenomena left unexplained. 
To be sure, my respondents continually emphasize that they 
embrace the scientific enterprise to accumulate accurate knowledge 
about the self, the world, and the universe, but they argue that radical 
skepticism, that is, the free spirit of inquiry, has been smothered by 
dogma. This is why Rupert Sheldrake’s The Science Delusion, which 
explores the non-material world and which is hugely popular in the 
conspiracy milieu, is described by the author as “pro-science” (2013: 
7). Liam (67) explained this position in more detail: 
 [S]o religion has been replaced by modern science in the 
Enlightenment, which in my opinion only obscured matters. Because 
it said: “reality, what is that? That is matter! All that there is, is 
what we can observe. And everything that does not fit this logic is 
speculation, that’s nonsense, that’s for charlatans.” But this is such 
an unimaginable reduction it is sad. If we know that of all there is 
in the universe matter only represents four percent, yet we come to 
the situation that science defines that four percent as the only reality. 
What we do is looking through a keyhole and everything we cannot 
see is simply nonsense.  
Material reductionism not only prohibits explorations into worlds 
unknown, respondents argue, but it simultaneously denies the 
existence of non-physical powers in everyday life. “[T]hat doesn’t fit 
the regular way of thinking,” Lucy (54) explained. She added, 
if only we would start to imagine that when quantum physics shows 
how even the mood of scientists influences their test results, how far 
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reaching this all is. If only we start to realize what this means, we 
would think twice saying what is real and what is not, what is 
ridiculous or not. 
Opinions about the existence and powers of non-physical 
phenomena are often grounded in and validated by personal 
experiences of the supernatural in everyday life. Neal (58), for 
example, told me how he got cured from permanent back aches:  
[S]o there was this woman I knew via work. One day she put both 
her hands on my back. Three minutes or so, very quickly. “Do you 
feel anything?” she asked, I said “no, not really.” The next day I woke 
up without any pain in my back. Just like that, in one strike 
completely over. … If you experience that first hand…what more 
may be possible? So since then much of my reticence towards people’s 
odd stories disappeared. So from that moment on, because for me 
there is no doubt about it, you start looking at things differently. It 
has set the door wide open, because I was really a science kid. 
Despite his technical background, and against his preconceptions, 
something supernatural like hands-on healing proved real to him and 
fed his critique of science: “to know is to measure, and we measure 
nothing, so it isn’t there,” as he said. From a scientific paradigm, 
proper knowledge only comes from material observations, and if 
there is not a material entity to measure, then there is no event that 
could be said to take place. Neal implies that personal experiences of 
immaterial events can only be dismissed by science.  
The dogmatism of science is made worse, my respondents 
argue, by the socialization of scientists into a culture of expertise with 
its own particular set of assumptions and beliefs. This results in the 
social exclusion and stigmatization of other, seemingly deviant forms 
of knowledge. Steven (28) described his encounters with scientists as 
contentious: “You know what it is, they have had a certain education, 
they have already received certain information, they are formed in a 
particular way. Their vision excludes therefore all others.” A much-
debated topic in this context is the effectiveness of vaccinations. 
Because of their education in modern medical science, it is argued, 
medical specialists no longer question the basic foundations of what 
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vaccinations are, how they function, or whether there are 
alternatives. And “if they are being educated like that, and it’s a whole 
industry, there are hundred thousands making a living out of it. Yeah, 
well, that myth continues to exist then” (Liam, 67). John, a holistic 
food adviser (34 years old), encountered similar responses when 
talking about the topic of nutrition with an expert in the field: “I 
notice with this professor, in a simple discussion about vitamin B-12 
deficits. ‘Oh yeah, just buy some pills,’ he replies when I speak of bad 
nutrition as its cause. Completely stuck in his own way of thinking. 
Pills don’t do the same.” Liam (67) who spoke to me in the beginning 
of our interview about his interactions with a philosopher of science 
at a local university who had been extremely critical about Liam’s 
platform for governmental discretion on issues like chemtrails, 
collective vaccinations, and European food regulations: 
I got to know him because he rallied against us and framed us as fools 
and morons and scaremongers. So I asked him to meet me and have a 
conversation. He agreed, and we talked for about four hours. He is a 
very intelligent, reasonable and articulate fellow. But he is totally 
not open to my perspective. Even hostile. And this astounds me, 
because I would say people at the university, scientists, have an open 
attitude. Shouldn’t they say, ‘okay, that man thinks completely 
different than I do, that puzzles me, I want to understand.’ But that 
attitude is not there, at all. So that’s I think the essence of what we 
are going to talk about. 
To conclude, these respondents challenge the public image of 
science as skeptical, and advance instead a version of it as dogmatic 
and narrow-minded. The free spirit of inquiry that once characterized 
science, they argue, has been stifled by the materialistic orthodoxy of 
mainstream scientists. Curiosity is replaced with doctrine and pre-
established beliefs. Respondents, however, do not deny or dismiss the 
relevance of science. Their argument is that modern science is not 
scientific enough, since it has lost the openness and skepticism that 
should inform the habitus of the ideal scientist. If science is all about 
the free spirit of inquiry, they ask, then why don’t we explore all 
unknown realms and let our curiosity run free? There is so much more 
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to find out, such respondents argue. Kuhn’s (2012) normal science is 
an example of what these people rally against, calling instead for the 
more revolutionary version of it.  
Modern science has always had two faces, since “science 
depends not [only] on the inductive accumulation of proofs but [also] 
on the methodological principle of doubt” (Giddens, 1991: 21). 
Although always standing in the shadow of the dominant Cartesian 
quest for certainty, radical skepticism about the epistemological 
foundations and methodological rules of science is just as intricate a 
part of the modern scientific enterprise (Toulmin, 1990). The 
conspiracy theorists that I interviewed argue that science should live 
up to its critical promise and practice the skepticism that it preaches. 
Like those sixteenth-century philosophers such as Montaigne, and 
their twentieth-century counterparts like Feyerabend, they critique 
the alleged dogmatism of science, its core assumptions, rules, and 
methodologies, and instead put question marks over nearly everything.  
My respondents are especially skeptical about the limits of 
legitimate inquiry that science has set itself: materialism, yes; 
supernatural phenomena, no. Such endeavors to stretch the 
boundaries of science using the ethos of skepticism is more common 
on the scientific fringe (cf. Hess, 1993; Wallis, 1979). “Pushing the 
weird and the implausible,” Shapin says, “they bang on about 
intellectual openness and egalitarianism, about the vital importance 
of seriously inspecting all counter-instances and anomalies, about the 
value of continual skepticism” (2012: 38). This discourse is often 
deployed in the conspiracy milieu279. For some scholars, such 
expressions of “hyperscience,” to use Shapin’s term again, is a way of 
designating some as “quacks” (2012: 38). But that seems to me 
another form of boundary work. My point is that the trope of 
skepticism and its accompanying limits is a contentious one. Who the 
real skeptic is, the mainstream scientist or the conspiracy theorist, 
proves far from straightforward.  
Critique No 2: Objectivity? What about the pollution of scientific 
knowledge? Along with the idealized image of science as righteously 
skeptical is the purported neutrality or objectivity of science, which 
is the second object of critique within the Dutch conspiracy theory 
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milieu. As with the characterization of conspiracy theories, science 
(and its allies outside academia) consistently speaks about unique 
methods it has developed to arrive at objective knowledge. But, Lucy 
(54) noted “science may say to find universal and unbiased truths, but 
in practice it is never impartial. Science always tests on the basis of 
certain assumptions, yeah, one needs to start somewhere of course, 
but there are already conditionalities.” Universality is therefore an 
odd sort of ideal because, as William, a 25 year old student explained,   
to look at something scientifically is to look at things in a particular 
way, or from a particular point of view. It is never impartial, so 
there’s no absolute truth either, because that is always approached 
from a certain perspective. It is always… biased.  
Respondents often point out how facts and data presented by the 
scientific community as objective are in fact the product of selection 
and exclusion. The controversy around global warming is a key 
instance, since “these reports showed how these scientists left out 
many data so that global warming figures appeared much stronger 
than it actually is,” according to Neil (58 years old). Day-to-day 
experiences inform such critiques about the construction of facts. 
Michael, a 23 year old Business Administration major, noticed for 
example, “through my own practical experience” that groceries prices 
went up much higher than official inflation numbers like the Consumer 
Price Index accounted for:  
I live on my own for six years now, and if I compare my grocery list 
from back then with today’s, I see that prices went up by thirty to 
forty percent. So good luck convincing me that inflation is what the 
government tells us, two percent a year, ha, nobody believes that! 
 After some research, Michael told me, he found out that some of the 
products used to measure inflation have, over the years, been 
excluded or substituted for lower quality (and thus cheaper) items to 
“artificially keeping inflation low.” It is all too easy, Michael 
concluded, “to make us believe in certain things which are truly 
nonsense.” 
The ideal of objectivity and universality in scientific 
knowledge is built on an image of science as disinterested and free 
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from other interests, but, respondents argue, such is a naïve position. 
This is particularly so because scientists inevitably (and increasingly) 
depend on funding for research projects. John (34), for instance, 
argues that “scientific research is never independent, [because] from 
who do they receive money?” The example most mentioned in my 
interviews was medical research, since it is highly dependent on and 
interconnected with Big Pharma. Respondents argued that “those 
scientific studies [about the safety and efficacy of certain medications] 
are very often financed by the pharmaceutical companies producing 
those medications” (Julie, 31). 
It is, however, not just the need for funding that inspires their 
critique, but more specifically, it is how the objectives of financers 
structurally influence the fabrication of scientific knowledge. What is 
often publicized as the result of scientific research, appears 
manipulated, “those studies that were not positive are ‘coincidentally’ 
left out, you know” (Julie, 31). Knowledge presented as the outcome 
of independent, disinterested, scientific research is, following my 
respondents, the outcome of power and interest structures. To 
understand how it works, they argue, we should look at the context 
in which knowledge is produced and the social, political, and 
economic forces that impinge upon it. As George, a 38 year old care 
giver, explained it, 
You probably know that in all kinds of products there’s a sugar 
replacement called aspartame, which is approved by the European 
Commission. Well, little by little it becomes clear that aspartame is 
really bad for us. But how does it work with scientific research? In 
order to sweeten the products with less costs, research is done to get a 
certain ingredient approved that is cheaper than sugar. Numerous 
studies are done, and if the research agency or university comes with 
results that don’t satisfy the food producer they will look for another 
agency. They will do this until they can prove it is good, or at least 
not bad. That is the odd part: the food industry can command their 
own research and then have solid reports on the basis of which is 
decided whether or not it should be allowed. ‘Hmmm thirty mice 
died, now let’s try it on rats, hey, the rats don’t die, it’s a good 
product!’ That’s how crooked things are. 
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The connection between research findings and financial interests, 
they argue, make it difficult to take an informed standpoint in 
controversies about global warming, food safety, and medications. 
Citizens can never know for sure who is right and who is wrong, or 
what is true and what is not in public debates between scientists. That 
said, it is generally assumed that the established and most powerful 
organizations are the least to be trusted. Robert (43) argued, for 
example, that “the strange thing is that those scientists confirming the 
conventional perspective are paid by organizations who have an 
interest in keeping us believing it as such. Those arguing against, don’t 
have the means and resources to make their findings public”. 
In conclusion, respondents in the conspiracy milieu contend 
that the public image of science as objective, disinterested, universal, 
and impartial is highly problematic. Scientific facts are not so much 
discovered as constructed and this knowledge production is intimately 
related to political power and economic interests. Such popular 
claims resonate with institutionalized assumptions in the social 
sciences. Authors like Berger and Luckmann (1966), for instance, 
have contributed to the sociology of knowledge by theorizing that 
reality in all its manifestations is socially constructed. Postmodern 
theorists, in turn, have radicalized this constructivism by proclaiming 
the end of truth and reality itself (e.g. Baudrillard, 1994). Although 
conspiracy theorists are not radically relativistic, they do point to the 
fuzzy, and messy everyday practice of scientific knowledge production 
which is inherently vulnerable to external interests; a notion long 
articulated by scholars in the social studies of science (cf. Collins and 
Pinch, 1993; Law, 2004; Latour, 1987). The argument that scientific 
knowledge is deeply embedded in politico-economic power 
structures has a strong affinity with critical neo-Marxist theories in 
the social sciences. Herbert Marcuse (1991[1964]) along with Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2010) have extensively argued 
that Reason (science, technology and the bureaucratic apparatus) has 
lost its neutral status since it is increasingly aligned with the cultural 
logic of capitalism. More recently, Stanley Aronowitz contended that 
“science cannot escape capital and has been subsumed under the 
dialectic of the production of needs of capital” (1988: 40). In the eyes 
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of such scholars, scientific objectivity is a legitimation to obscure the 
real interests of the modern capitalistic enterprise, including its 
hegemony, the material interests it strives for, and the social control 
it exerts. Likewise, my respondents argue that scientists have an 
interest in keeping us believing that scientific findings are objective, 
neutral, and uncontested. Not unlike scholars in this (neo)Marxist 
tradition, they hold that the general public—the sheeple—live in false 
consciousness, they consider it their moral task to reveal the operative 
powers behind the scenes, and free citizens from their ignorant views 
on science. 
Critique No. 3: Equality? What about the authority of scientific 
experts? The voice of science, I explain in the introduction of this 
chapter, is primarily listened to with reverence. Building on its 
elevated cultural status, scientific experts enjoy an authoritative social 
position in society, which is, according to my respondents, 
problematic and unwarranted. They challenge therefore the public 
image of scientists as a moral citizenry working for the public good 
(e.g. Brown, 2009: 28; Merton, 1973). Instead, my respondents told 
me, scientists can often better be seen as authoritarian, arrogant, and 
elitist. For example, alternative sources of knowledge are structurally 
undervalued so that modern science can uphold its monopoly on 
truth. My respondents described feeling excluded, mocked, and 
stigmatized as crazy when they proposed alternative ways of looking 
at the world. John (34) experienced the credibility of his knowledge 
constantly disputed: 
I am no medical expert, I am no doctor, so it’s not true, right? They 
ask me what my scientific background is, so I tell them about the 
anthroposophical studies I completed in Germany. But that’s not 
scientific, so it means nothing. Lately I’ve been asking my wife: 
“should I also attend university and get a medical degree? More 
people would believe me.” But why is that? Who decides that? I find 
it ridiculous.  
More specifically, respondents question why the experiential 
knowledge people gather in the course of their life remains 
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unacknowledged by experts who prioritize the abstract and detached 
knowledge of science. As Julie (31) said:  
I am also a human being and I have done my study of life, so why? I 
have my own feelings and emotions and experience so why? Because 
you’ve studied you know how it works, right? When you haven’t 
studied you don’t count in this society… 
The superior epistemological position and accompanying 
moral authority of science finds its translation in everyday interactions 
between laymen and experts. According to respondents, these are 
structured in a hierarchical fashion, making an open and egalitarian 
conversation virtually impossible: 
 It’s all like: “I have studied, I am a doctor, I know more than you, 
so I will enlighten you. You are a layman.” So already from moment 
A there’s a hierarchy, and they just instruct you to have your baby 
vaccinated, because well, that’s procedure. So I said, “listen, I’ve 
done my own research and I have this and that consideration.” And 
the nurse at the clinic just sits there and does exactly what she’s 
learned to do: just copy and paste, having no clue how vaccinations 
actually work. And there you are thinking, “I don’t want to vaccinate 
my baby child, but what can I do?” So I went to this homeopathic 
doctor, who is much more open to discussion, I already appreciate 
that, it should not be like that you are being laughed at when you 
think differently about vaccinations. You know, [at the 
anthroposophical doctor] it’s just more humane, they are less in the 
role of “we know it all and you as laymen don’t know shit, because, 
well, you haven’t studied.” It’s just…more relaxed, more accessible.” 
(Julie, 31)  
Instead of being told what to do in an authoritarian way, respondents 
emphasized a need for personal choice and the possibility of an open 
discussion with experts. They argued that people are well-informed 
nowadays, and oftentimes have read and studied their topic from 
different angles which scientific experts should take into 
consideration when interacting with the public. Pauline (67) 
confirmed:  
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I find it strange that people think: “Oh these white coated people, 
they know it all, so we follow, we surrender.” Because they don’t know 
it all! As a human being I can decide how, I want to stay in charge 
and don’t want to surrender to doctors like that! I would like to have 
conversations about how we are going to fix things, what the other 
possibilities are.  
Lucy (57) spoke similarly about her difficulties with authority, 
“authority in the Western world, is ‘I am the boss, and you are 
subservient, obedient, docile. And I believe that’s not right, that’s no 
good.” When I asked her about concrete situations when authority 
was an issue, she went into detail about her interactions with a 
university professor who remained stiff and authoritarian when faced 
with critique and a wish for discussion:  
[H]e just cut us off, like an ulcer, because we went against him, that 
was, absolutely unheard of back then, “I am the professor,” you get 
me? And before that in high school, my parents, you name it. I hated 
it when people told me what to do simply because they had a different 
status. We may have different roles, but we are equal. It’s not because 
you have a different role, your truth is worth more than mine. There 
are some people I look up to, because I admire and respect how they 
share their knowledge, their capabilities, and their means without 
saying, “this is how it’s done, and that’s not how you should do it.” 
The message of these people is that experts should not coast on their 
scientific credentials and cultural authority in their interactions with 
laymen. Instead, they should have a more open interaction with the 
public and should acknowledge the practical wisdom, subjective 
feelings, and (alternative) knowledge that ordinary citizens may have 
gathered along the way. Most especially, scientific experts should 
treat them as equals. 
In addition, respondents pointed out that the social position 
of scientific experts is legitimated and guarded through practices of 
professional in-group protection. As members of a professional group 
with similar education, assumptions, and norms, medical specialists 
protect one another against outside threats and, collectively, cover up 
for failures. This protection, they hold, is not only a social in-group 
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dynamic but institutionalized in and legitimated by law. The social 
and juridical position of laymen is diminished by all kinds of laws set 
up to protect the medical profession, they argued. According to 
Simon, a 40-year-old self-proclaimed victim, “there’s an oath of 
secrecy, and that oath is purely there for the protection of their 
profession. Even the experts informing the judges can exempt 
themselves, so how can there be any justice? That’s Kafka, you know.” 
The precarious position of laymen is particularly felt when social 
norms of in-group protection collide with institutionalized forms of 
professional protection. John (34) explains that when his baby 
attracted sepsis during a medical treatment, the hospital tried to avoid 
responsibility by reporting the parents to the “Counsel for Child 
Abuse.” Their argument was that the baby was underfed by its parents 
and then brought to the hospital too late,  
of course, the hospital tried to save itself. They know the fault is 
theirs. They just thought, “hey, before we get into trouble because of 
the death of that child, we report the parents and play it like they 
didn’t take care of her, resulting in her death.” Luckily it’s all over 
now: we won in court, they acquitted us from further persecution. 
But are we going to do anything about the hospital? I mean, you 
always see, those in power just want to keep their dominant position. 
And they are very powerful. Doesn’t this tell you something about 
the system? Doesn’t a light bulb go off now? What is actually going 
on here with these hospitals and those in power? 
All stories thus point towards the structural inequalities between the 
educated, scientifically trained experts and ordinary laymen. 
Scientists are considered an untouchable elite exerting social and 
moral power over ordinary people, and are thought to operate in 
alliance with other elitist members of society such as politicians, 
multinationals, and medical industries. Such ideas, typical for 
conspiracy theorists, resonate with what C. Wright Mills called the 
power elite, meaning a small group of people in the higher echelons of 
major institutions and organizations who exert great influence 
(1956). Scientists, my respondents argue, are part of such a 
(globalizing) power elite that protects its own interests. 
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They are not alone in these suspicions. Theoretical-physicist-
turned-sociologist-of-science Brian Martin similarly argues that “the 
dominant group of experts in any field is usually closely linked to 
other power structures, typically government, industry or 
professional bodies. The links are cemented through jobs, 
consultancies, access to power and status, training and other 
methods” (1996: 5). As a result, public interest is often ignored, 
suppressed, or excluded, my respondents argued. Such convictions 
strongly resonate with social scientific critiques of expertise (e.g. 
Haskell, 1984; Laski, 1932; Martin, 1996). These critics concede that 
scientific experts have great knowledge of the field they specialize in 
and have often shown very practically to be worth their credentials. 
They have, in Haskell’s words, “in fullest measure the authority to 
which every expert aspires” (1984: xxvii). But these scholars also 
point out that (scientific) experts tend to become self-referential in 
their ideas and values, resulting in a collective arrogance and 
resistance to outside beliefs and the interests of ordinary people. My 
respondents similarly question the moral authority of scientists as they 
point to what Martin calls the “political mobilization of expertise” 
(1996: 3). They contest the structural under-validation of non-expert 
knowledge and experience, and challenge the hierarchical social and 
moral position of science. Their responses are captured in Martin’s 
query, “what [should be] the role of expertise in a society based on 
equality?” (2008: 10).  
A pop-sociological critique of the public image of science. In 
contrast to the dominant public image of science as skeptical, 
objective, and rational, my analysis demonstrates that conspiracy 
theorists do not accept that description and instead challenge 
epistemic authority. Instead of science’s skepticism, they point to the 
(materialist) dogmatism of science; instead of its objectivity, they 
point to the pollution of its knowledge by external influences; and 
instead of its professed rationality, they point the multiple ways in 
which scientists exploit their expertise. Merton’s “institutional 
imperatives” are not so much “taken to comprise the ethos of modern 
science” (1973: 270), but are seen instead as the efficacy of an ongoing 
scientific public relations campaign. However, conspiracy theorists 
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are not straightforwardly against science in describing and 
understanding the world. More than merely mimicking modern 
science to augment their own epistemic authority (an argument often 
used to debunk them in these credibility contests, e.g. Byford, 2011; 
Pipes, 1997), conspiracy theorists wish to purify science and re-install 
its free spirit of inquiry. Science is at once revered for its intentions 
and demonized for its manifestations. As my analysis has shown, 
conspiracy theorists praise science’s original project, but critique it 
for having become dogmatic, polluted, and authoritative. The societal 
perseverance of the dominant public image of science explains why 
conspiracy theorists are suspicious of science. They question it 
because in our everyday reality, science doesn’t live up to its idealized 
public image.  
Ironically, this critique of science is visible in the discourse of 
the social sciences as well. Academic scholars have shown that that 
dominant public image of science is difficult to maintain when we look 
at the messy back-stage that is vulnerable to political influences and 
professional interests (cf. Collins and Pinch, 1993; Law, 2004; 
Latour, 1987). Many scholars in science studies have shown with 
theoretical and empirical arguments that scientific knowledge is not 
transcendent, but rather is the product of particular people in a 
particular setting at a particular time (cf. Doyle McCarthy, 1996; 
Hardin, 1986; Shapin, 2008). Conspiracy theorists popularize such 
notions as they deconstruct the public face of science and attempt to 
reveal the ideological, moral, social, economic, and political powers 
that complicate its findings. To be more precise: the discourse of 
conspiracy theorists resonates with postmodern skepticism of grand 
narratives, social constructivist accounts of knowledge production, 
neo-Marxist perspectives on the power of capital, and sociological 
research on experts-as-power elites. In all these ways, conspiracy 
theories prove some form of pop-sociology (Birchall, 2006; Knight, 
2000), and show in detail how academic knowledge does not remain 
locked up in ivory tower, but finds its way into everyday life. The 
conspiracy theorists I interviewed exemplify this democratization of 
academic knowledge that Giddens coined the “double hermeneutic” 
(1984:  284). Gieryn would agree, having argued that “interpretations 
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and representations [of science] leak out everywhere and make 
themselves available for ideological projects” (1999: 28). And indeed, 
these conspiracy theorists critique the public image of science with 
arguments provided by the (social) sciences themselves.  
But this elective affinity works both ways. Neo-Marxist 
theories from the Frankfurt School about the manipulative powers of 
capital to indoctrinate people with false consciousness easily conform to 
conspiracist sociology. Adorno and Horkheimer write pessimistically 
about the “culture industry” which is “interwoven” with “the most 
powerful sectors of industry,” and can therefore do whatever it wants 
with consumers, “producing them, controlling them , disciplining 
them” (2010: 122/144). Volker Heins similarly points extensively to 
the “traps of conspiracy thinking” in critical theory when he says that 
“in the society imagined by Horkheimer as little as possible is left to 
chance (or the market), everything is interconnected and nothing is 
as it appears. Critical social theory is conceived as the attempt to 
uncover the coordinates of conspiratorial networks” (2007: 792). 
Martin Parker holds that “Marxism in general has functioned as a 
pervasive conspiracy theory for most of the century” (2001: 198). It 
is not for no reason that Popper saw the historicism of Marx as “a 
derivative of conspiracy theory” (2013: 306). Parker goes as far to say 
that “the holy trinity Marx, Durkheim and Weber all claimed access 
to some level of explanation which was somehow beyond the 
comprehension of ordinary people” (2001: 192). 
The similarity of sociology to conspiracy theory may be 
extended far beyond Marxism: both the conspiracy theorist and the 
sociologist provide explanations of the social world; both set out to 
uncover hidden forces orchestrating the course of history; both 
appear to have access to some hidden plane only visible to their critical 
gaze; and both see it as their job to lift the veil of darkness from the 
gullible masses. Pierre Bourdieu reveals this influence of Marxism 
when he says that “the function of sociology, as of every science, is to 
reveal that which is hidden” (1996: 17). “Of course,” Latour 
acknowledges, “we in the academy like to use more elevated causes—
society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, fields of forces, empires, 
capitalism—while conspiracists like to portray a miserable bunch of 
514059-L-bw-harambam
ϳ͘ OETESTIE' EWISTEDI UTHORITz 
2ϯ1 
greedy people with dark intents, but [there is] something troublingly 
similar in the wheeling of causal explanations coming out of the deep 
dark below” (2004b: 229). Like conspiracy theorists, the self-
identification of sociologists as righteous myth busters working to 
unmask the illusions that ordinary people believe in is widespread 
(Elias, 1978). Latour asks himself quite justifiably then, “what is the 
real difference between [a] conspiracists and a popularized version of 
social critique, inspired by, let’s say, a sociologist as eminent as Pierre 
Bourdieu?” (2004b: 228). Conspiracy theory as (pop) sociology, 
sociology as (intellectual) conspiracy theory: just what is the 
difference? 
 
7.5 Conclusion: Science Wars Democratized 
 
Maybe I am taking conspiracy theories too seriously, but it worries 
me to detect, in those mad mixtures of knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious 
demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation from the 
social Neverland many of the weapons of social critique. Of course 
conspiracy theories are an absurd deformation of our own arguments, 
but, like weapons smuggled through a fuzzy border to the wrong 
party, these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite of all the 
deformations, it is easy to recognize, still burnt in the steel, our 
trademark: Made in Criticalland.  
–Latour, 2004b: 230 
The characterization of science as distinctively skeptical, objective, 
and rational has historically proven a powerful rhetorical gesture to 
secure the epistemic and moral authority of science (cf. Brown, 2009; 
Gieryn, 1999; Taylor, 1996). In opposition to the dogmatism of 
religion, the subjectivity of politics, and the irrationality of the 
common citizen, science effectively created its own cultural niche 
through this powerful public image. And so people generally believed 
science to be the beacon leading us out of the darkness and into the 
light of modernity, rewarding it therefore with money, resources, 
and authority. But they believed that public image of science to be an 
accurate description. Even today, defenders of science from all 
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corners, be they publicists, journalists of science, or those working 
for skeptic organizations, still appeal to this public image when the 
authority of science is challenged. As this chapter showed, it is also 
with that image of science that conspiracy theories are compared, and 
then found wanting. In other words, this public image still proves a 
powerful way to exclude rival claimants of epistemic authority. 
Scholars in science studies have in the last half century started 
to understand that public image not so much as a realistic description 
of science, but instead as “professional ideologies” serving the interest 
of scientists in their pursuit of epistemic authority (cf. Gieryn, 1983; 
Laudan, 1983; Mulkay, 1979; Taylor, 1996). They have shown 
empirically that scientists advance an image of themselves even when 
it is inaccurate to their actual practice; the PR of science is different 
from its everyday backstage workings (cf. Doyle McCarthy, 1996; 
Latour, 1987; Law, 2004; Harding, 1986, Shapin, 1986). And as the 
interviewed conspiracy theorists show in this chapter, such ideas are 
no longer reserved for the ivory tower of academia. The public image 
of science as distinctively skeptical, objective, and rational is 
contested from all corners of society. 
This situation posits conspiracy theories therefore not so 
much outside of science, but right in the middle of its most fierce 
battle: the science wars. These clashes between scientific realists and 
constructivists centered exactly on the reality of that public image (cf. 
Gross and Levitt, 1994; Ross, 1996; Sokal and Bricmont, 1999). But 
although the arguments of conspiracy theorists resonate with those in 
science studies, it appears imperative in these protracted science wars 
for the latter to disassociate themselves from conspiracy theories. 
Bruno Latour, who is one of the most influential exponents of the 
constructivists in these wars, writes about conspiracy theories as “an 
absurd deformation of our own arguments” (2004b: 230). He 
deplores “what has become of critique” now that their “weapons” are 
hijacked  
by the worst possible fellows as an argument against the things we 
cherish […] and yet entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make 
sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts 
are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, 
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unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, 
that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while 
dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social 
construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives. 
(2004b: 227) 
Latour’s plea makes abundantly clear that when “outsiders” are 
starting to behave, talk, and look like “the established”, we can expect 
efforts by the latter to highlight their differences (Elias and Scotson, 
1994; cf. Bourdieu, 1984; Gieryn, 1999). The critiques of science as 
formulated by conspiracy theorists have simply become too similar to 
those in science studies. And so boundary work abounds.  
Again, whether I am worried like Latour about the unlawful 
deployment of the weapons of social critique is not the point. What 
is relevant for the purposes of this study is how conspiracy theorists 
are subjected to a double-form of boundary work: they are excluded 
by academics defending the positivistic ideals of science for making 
soft what is actually hard, and by scholars of the social studies of 
science who see their weapons now being used by myriad imposters 
for all gruesome objectives. But conspiracy theories attract much 
more boundary work. Bratich, for example, shows how leftist 
academics and intellectuals like Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn 
differentiate “their own ‘legitimate conspiracy theories’ (called 
institutional research or structural analyses)” from real conspiracy 
theories, in order to preserve their own epistemic authority (2008: 
127, 123-157). In their view, Bratich notes, “conspiracy theories are 
oversimplifying, distracting … a diversion from real issues [and] 
ignore society’s institutions” (2008: 141)—arguments that sound 
remarkably familiar. Marxists, to add another assaulted party, are at 
pains to show  
what’s wrong with conspiracy theories as a worldview … what the 
fundamental differences are between Marxist analyses and conspiracy 
theories, and why the former are grounded in a much deeper 
understanding of societal structures and how power works than the 
latter. (Molyneux, 2013)  
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Like the conspiracy theorists I encountered in my fieldwork, the 
pejorative connotation and the performative powers of being called a 
conspiracy theorist is reason for anyone who wants to expose the 
hidden forces of powerful groups to proclaim, I am not a conspiracy 
theorist, but….  
The dynamics of boundary work in which conspiracy 
theorists are immersed, I conclude here, are much more complex and 
multilayered than the simple opposition between science and the 
conspiracy theories that I started out with in this chapter. As Nattrass 
argues,  
boundary work in defense of science has not only adapted to the 
modern age by taking place online and with the help of electronic 
media, but it is being undertaken by members of the public. Whereas 
in the past, boundary work was conducted primarily by scholars 
seeking to develop and maintain public respect for science and to 
relegate “pseudoscience” beyond the pale of academia, today the 
battle is more diffuse, public and decentralized. (2012: 158-9) 
Indeed, the present-day defense of science comes from all corners, 
but so do conspiracy theorists and other critics of science. The truth 
wars science is engaged in are far from over; they are part and parcel 
of contemporary Western societies. Much sociological research from 
these battlefields is still to be done as more and more parties are 
involved, each advancing their own images of self and other in pursuit 
of epistemic authority. I question whether the public image of science 
as the impartial carrier of truth has done most of its compelling work. 
Has it lost its magical spell now that so many members of the public 
call out this beneficial self-description as mere PR? If this is so, what 
new ways to secure the epistemic authority of science can we expect? 
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8. Conclusion 
 
In contrast to prevalent notions of conspiracy theories as the 
delusional thought of paranoid and militant minds endangering 
democratic societies, I have set out with this cultural sociological 
study to understand instead of pathologize the contemporary 
prevalence of conspiracy theories. My goal was not to condemn or 
discard them, but to grasp the meaning that these alternative forms of 
knowledge have for the people involved with them. Such an effort 
towards verstehen is largely absent in the academic study of conspiracy 
culture, but is central to the long interpretative tradition of the social 
sciences in which I situate this study. The overall research questions 
that I pursued throughout this study was directed at mapping 
conspiracy culture. What are the ideas, practices, biographies, and 
products of people making up this subcultural world, and how are 
these related to what I provisionally called the mainstream? And 
secondly, how can the contemporary popularity of conspiracy 
theories be explained? 
One of the most distinctive aspects of this study is its 
ethnographic focus. I studied conspiracy culture from the 
perspectives of the people who engage directly with conspiracy 
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theories. To do so, I immersed myself in that subculture for about 
two years, during which time I experienced firsthand how they see 
the world around us. During that period, I became involved with 
many people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu, and studied not 
only who these people are and what they think, but also what they do 
with these ideas. Those practices, then, showed me that conspiracy 
theories are not merely abstract, theoretical ideas, but spur significant 
real life action and incite cooperation among and conflict between 
conspiracy theorists. Following such lines of agreement and 
opposition, clear diversity between people in the conspiracy milieu 
abounds: ideological convictions, epistemological strategies and (self-
) identifications differ markedly among the subculture. In the 
preceding chapters I have made efforts to explore and to demonstrate 
the variety and richness of conspiracy culture, I will now draw my 
findings together to theoretically reflect on my research and my 
project in total. 
What is most common about conspiracy theorists is that they 
distrust the “official” story (always referred to in scare quotes). 
Mainstream society may think that the reality they are presented with 
is true, but conspiracy theorists do not readily accept what our 
epistemic authorities sanction as the real truth. What most of us take 
as self-evident is subject to extreme suspicion and distrust. Whether 
it is the news we see on television, the medications prescribed to us, 
or the heated debates between political opponents, conspiracy 
theorists tell us to think twice, because “nothing is as it seems” 
(Barkun, 2006: 4) and “appearances deceive” (Pipes, 1997: 45). 
Throughout this study I have demonstrated the many ways in which 
conspiracy theorists go against established ideas, norms, and widely-
held assumptions. Terrorist attacks are seen as false-flag operations 
carried out by professional commandos; movies, television, and 
music are not there to entertain us, but to covertly indoctrinate us 
through subliminal messaging and other techniques of manipulation; 
the holy scriptures we read in church have been twisted and adapted 
by powerful men to hide their original meaning; large scale 
vaccination campaigns are not about public health but about securing 
private profit; the moon is not a natural satellite, but an alien 
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instrument of mind-control; the history of mankind we commonly 
learn in schools deliberately obscures our supernatural ancestry; the 
white lines airplanes leave behind in the skies are not condensed water 
molecules but toxic chemicals meant to indoctrinate us; and banks do 
not lend out money because they have it, but rather they create 
money out of thin air and charge us for it. Conspiracy theorists simply 
do not consider the stories that our epistemic institutions tell us to be 
truthful: reality is mere surface appearance, a symbolic facade to lure 
the public and disguise the fact that malicious, covert actions are 
taking place.  
But why is it the case that conspiracy theorists distrust the 
official explanations to such an extreme degree, and why do they 
experience the everyday world we live in so differently? Besides the 
revelations of actual conspiracies in the recent past, which have 
undoubtedly prompted disbelief in the truths we are presented with 
(cf. Knight, 2000; Olmsted, 2009; Uscinski and Parent, 2014), I have 
shown in this work that the current popularity of conspiracy theories 
should be understood from its historical and cultural context. In the 
following, I will elaborate on what I consider the most crucial aspects 
in this understanding of conspiracy culture, namely the contested 
status of mainstream epistemic institutions and the knowledge they 
produce. Further, I argue that these developments feed on a cultural 
logic, a hermeneutic, of suspicion. This way of experiencing or 
reading the world is characteristic of conspiracy culture but has a 
broader intellectual history worth exploring. These three topics all 
direct attention to the fact that objective or unequivocal truths (as 
offered by our epistemic institutions) are for many people implausible 
today. Then again, we need some amount of solid ground under our 
feet, so how do people deal with the epistemic instability that results 
from such skepticism? It is with that topic, the difficulty of living in a 
world with loose foundations, that I will conclude this study.  
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Contested Institutions: Facing Corruption, Desiring 
Purification  
The major institutions of our daily life including science, politics, 
media, and religion feature prominently in contemporary conspiracy 
theories. Throughout this study I have shown that they attract a great 
deal of suspicion and discontent in the conspiracy milieu; conspiracy 
theorists argue that mainstream societal institutions no longer 
function as they should and cannot be trusted. The Christian Church 
(and other institutionalized forms of religion) does not devote itself 
to spiritual matters only, but is seen by conspiracy theorists as a 
sinister organization ruled by men with many more interests instead. 
Conventional politics is similarly despised for being just a game, a mere 
charade to pretend that real choice and democratic influence is 
offered when all politicians care about is their own re-election and 
catering to Big Business. Science is another common target. No longer 
seen as the unfettered collective quest for new knowledge, science, 
for conspiracy theorists, is seen as corrupted by dogma and financial 
interests alike. The mainstream media, too, are seen as propaganda 
machines of the powerful. Instead of objectively informing us about 
what happens in the world and critically challenging those in power, 
they are giving us a version of reality that is beneficial to their 
corporate owners. In general, conspiracy theorists have lost their faith 
in the healthy-functioning of dominant societal institutions, they see 
institutional corruption in every domain and therefore no longer trust 
their activities and products.  
Nor are they alone in their disillusion. It is often argued that 
societal trust in major institutions has been on the decline for decades. 
Many more people in Western European societies believe less and less 
that institutions deliver what they are meant to and therefore turn 
away from them (cf. Inglehart, 1997; Moy and Pfau, 2000; Misztal, 
2013). To give a few examples: institutionalized religion has lost for 
many people its spiritual appeal, leaving once-full churches so disused 
that they are turned into concert halls or design hotels (e.g. Bruce, 
2002; Taylor, 2007; Wilson, 1976). Many people have similarly lost 
their faith in institutionalized politics to adequately represent their 
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interests as evidenced by the decline of party membership and 
electoral turnout (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2008; Mair, 2013). 
Mainstream science can count on much popular resistance as well and 
no longer enjoys the cultural authority it had only half a century ago. 
Science is not the societal panacea but part of the problem today (e.g. 
Beck, 1992; Brown, 2009; Gauchat, 2011). And the most common 
window to the world, the media, has just as well fallen from grace. 
Instead of the highly esteemed Fourth Estate, the mainstream media are 
often seen as aligning too easily with vested interests (be it in 
commerce or government) which results in the loss of their critical 
edge and power checking function (e.g. Gans, 2003; Kiousis, 2001; 
Street, 2011). In short, all of our major institutions face serious crises 
of legitimacy in contemporary Western societies. 
This decline in trust and participation did not mean an 
altogether retreat from the goals and promises of these institutions. 
As Berger et al. (1973) argue in their now classic work, people in 
modern societies may feel alienated from the institutions that once 
provided structure and meaning, but this state of “homelessness” may 
just as well lead to new ways of giving shape to the ideals they once 
embodied. In each of those aforementioned domains we see efforts to 
restore the original meaning and ambition of the institutions at hand 
(cf. Houtman, Laermans and Simons, 2016). New religious and 
spiritual movements have emerged in the wake of the demise of the 
Church such as the Hare Krishna movement, the Star Wars-based 
Jediism, or the New Age movement (e.g. Heelas, 1996; Possamai, 
2005; Wilson and Cresswell, 1999). In the field of politics are many 
civil initiatives and social movements active outside of the traditional 
domain of representative democracies, for example Greenpeace, the 
Occupy movement, and Black Lives Matter movement (e.g. Beck, 
1997; Norris, 2002; Rosanvallon and Goldhammer, 2008). The 
popularity of “citizen science” (e.g. Irwin, 1995; Silvertown, 2009), 
and of the “biopunker” or Do It Yourself Science movements (e.g. 
Wohlsen, 2011), shows that while (mainstream) science as an 
institution may have lost some of its public authority, the scientific 
method and its accompanying principles can still count on wide appeal 
(cf. Achterberg, et al. 2015). The same can be said when science 
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adversaries such as creationists (Locke, 1999) or spokespersons in the 
esoteric tradition (cf. Hammer, 2001; Campbell, 2002) use its 
rhetoric and practice to advance their ideas. Disillusionment with 
mainstream media, at last, has only led to a plethora of new media 
outlets, which often self-identify as independent in direct opposition to 
moneyed establishment. Journalistic platforms like indymedia.org, 
antimedia.org, or the many individual vloggers and bloggers who 
cover world events through social media (e.g. Atton, 2015; Couldry 
and Curran, 2003; Hyde, 2002) are examples of such developments. 
Thus, while Western European societies have experienced strong 
processes of “de-institutionalization,” it could only be expected that 
we would encounter new forms of institutionalization (Hooghe and 
Houtman, 2003), albeit markedly less bureaucratic, less corporate, 
less formal, less stable, and less hierarchical. Indeed, these newer 
institutions of the twenty-first century are, in their dynamism and 
flatness, clearly products of their time. 
Conspiracy culture fits into this dual cultural development, 
considering that mainstream societal institutions are the main subject 
of contemporary conspiracy theories. My study has shown that people 
active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu do not apathetically turn away 
from the aims of those institutions, but often start initiatives to 
counter their malfunctioning. The Catholic Church, for example, is 
widely seen as corrupted, but religiosity is in itself not rejected, which 
is apparent by the fact that myriad forms of contemporary spirituality 
flourish in the conspiracy milieu. Conventional politics is what 
conspiracy theorists generally despise, yet a newly established 
political party for and by the people began with a local conspiracy 
website and was successful enough that it mobilized significant 
numbers in the 2012 Dutch national elections. To top that off, a range 
of diverse demonstrations, (online) petitions, and social movements 
originated in the conspiracy milieu. While mainstream science is 
discarded for being too dogmatic, conspiracy theorists do not reject 
science out of hand, but wish to restore its original meaning and to 
bring back the free spirit of inquiry it once championed. Since the 
mainstream media is always regarded with suspicion in the conspiracy 
milieu, people have established their own news websites and social 
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media platforms to serve the need for independent coverage of world 
events. 
The point is that while conspiracy theorists are highly critical, 
suspicious, and distrustful of mainstream institutions, their purpose 
and function is not at all rejected. Indeed, they often emphasize the 
beauty of religion, the importance of politics, the marvels of science, 
and the relevance of the media. It is all the more unfortunate, 
conspiracy theorists hold, that these institutions no longer fulfill their 
purpose: religion does not inspire spirituality, politics does not create 
a better world, science fails to establish truthful knowledge, and the 
media not a reliable news source. Such institutions have lost their true 
purpose and their real meaning due to myriad forms of corruption 
that include bureaucratization, political strategies, corporate 
alignments, ideological dogmatism, and the list continues. Conspiracy 
theorists emphasize the deplorable situation our institutions are in, 
and they see it as their task and moral duty to restore their original or 
true function. Even stronger put, they wish to purify them from the 
contaminants that have corrupted them in the first place. The 
underlying ideology of conspiracy theorists is ultimately idealistic: 
religion should only be about connecting people to the sacred, politics 
only about serving the public good, science only about the free pursuit 
of true knowledge, and media only about independent coverage of 
world events. Not unlike the modernist aim to protect the relative 
autonomy of these domains so that complex societies continue 
functioning effectively (cf. Latour, 2013; Luhmann, 1995; Weber, 
2013), conspiracy theorists wish to preserve the uniqueness and 
purity of each societal institution.  
It is a mainstay in sociology that processes of modernization, 
most notably that of institutional rationalization, result in widespread 
feelings of alienation. Weber, Simmel, and Marx all argued that the 
increasing formalization and differentiation of modern institutions 
detach people from the traditional assumptions of organized social 
life. In and beyond the conspiracy milieu, such increasingly 
bureaucratized institutions are thought to be iron cages that stifle 
creativity and dissipate human energy. But people do not sit still to 
suffer the consequences of modernity. Instead efforts at restoration 
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become subcultures in search of new ways of doing what these 
institutions were meant to do. Conspiracy culture should be seen as 
one manifestation of this broader societal current of cultural 
purification, which intends to rescue the goals and promises of modern 
institutions from their own degeneration (Houtman, Laermans and 
Simons, 2016). The broad suspicion and distrust of conspiracy 
theorists towards mainstream institutions is therefore not just a 
menace to democratic societies, but an impetus for social and cultural 
change as well.  
 
Contested Knowledge: Popular Incredulity towards 
Objective Truth Claims  
In line with the aforementioned discontent about the functioning of 
mainstream epistemic institutions is a distrust towards the knowledge 
they produce. Conspiracy theorists commonly challenge established 
or “official” claims on truth. When scientists say that vaccinations are 
safe or when politicians say that terrorists are behind certain attacks, 
conspiracy theorists generally doubt the facts on which these 
statements are based. The authorities may claim that conclusive 
scientific research proves that vaccinations are benign, or that 
extensive forensic research points to particular figures as the culprit 
of some malice, but conspiracy theorists doubt those claims to truth 
and call into question what those facts are actually worth. More 
specifically speaking then, my argument is that the distrust towards 
official or objective knowledge has all to do with how we legitimize 
claims to truth in contemporary Western societies.  
Throughout this study, I have emphasized the centrality of 
science as the most commanding epistemic authority (cf. Brown, 
2009; Gieryn, 1999; Harding, 1986). When politicians talk of which 
actions should be taken, or when journalists cover the gravity of a 
disaster, or when corporate communication officers report on the 
safety of their products, all resort to the institution, knowledge, 
methodologies, and ideology of science to support their claims. There 
may be criticism and there may be doubt, but we generally have faith 
that science provides truthful and expedient knowledge to navigate 
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our personal, social, and natural worlds. More than any other source 
of knowledge, we afford credibility, authority, and resources to 
science, for the simple reason that we believe in science to deliver us 
the truth, or at least what comes most close to it. In sharp contrast to 
the subjective ideas and experiences of ordinary people, political 
activists, moral crusaders, or ecstatic prophets, scientific knowledge 
is said to be objective. Science’s unique methodologies and 
institutionalized culture expels social contaminants like feelings, 
values, interests, backgrounds, alliances, and loyalties, and thus 
produces pure knowledge (cf. Merton, 1973; Popper, 2002; 2014).  
Despite a continuing affordance of trust in science, it is 
nevertheless this belief in the possibility of objective knowledge 
engrained in the “metanarrative of science” (Lyotard, 1984) that has 
become problematic in contemporary life. Philosophers (of science) 
assailed the possibility of any universal truth claims about reality, and 
they derailed on theoretical grounds the firm belief in science as a 
method and institution inherently leading to progress, emancipation, 
and ultimately truth (e.g. Feyerabend, 2010[1975]; Foucault, 1970; 
Lyotard, 1984; Rorty, 2009[1979]). Meanwhile, sociologists (of 
science) began to understand that metanarrative of science as a 
professional ideology serving the interests of its practitioners, and they 
focused instead on what scientists actually do to reinforce that public 
image when they fabricate knowledge and mobilize support for claims 
on truth (e.g. Gieryn, 1999; Latour, 1987). Conspiracy theorists, 
then, embody one stream of a wider popular current in contemporary 
Western societies which puts that whole idea of objective knowledge 
under scrutiny. Instead of regarding scientific knowledge, including 
the realities that we are presented with daily, as more or less accurate 
descriptions of the world out there,280 conspiracy theorists emphasize 
that this knowledge is the product of a certain people in a certain place 
and time. Like social constructivists in academia (cf. Hacking, 1999), 
conspiracy theorists prioritize human creativity: reality is not so much 
discovered, but is actively and continually constructed. Our 
knowledge of the world can therefore never be neutral or objective, 
they say, but should always be seen from the perspective of those 
producing it. 
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This understanding of the world as constructed by 
knowledge-producing activities opens up the possibility of 
manipulation. If reality is constructed, then the question not only 
becomes by whom and how, but most importantly for conspiracy 
theorists: with what objective? After all, they argue, the media do not 
just produce certain depictions of reality, they produce depictions of 
reality that are beneficial to certain people, such as those who have 
invested in them financially. Financial experts do not neutrally explain 
how rescue mechanisms for banks too big to fail work, they explain 
such workings according to their own professional position. Scientists 
do not just construct objective truths about global warming, they 
construct truths that align with their alliances and intellectual 
investments. Government officials do not just explain the impartial 
ins and outs of future trade agreements, they explain them in line with 
government objectives. What conspiracy theorists argue, in other 
words, is not only that knowledge is constructed, but that such 
knowledge production is intimately related to interests. In ways very 
similar to social constructivists, conspiracy theorists direct attention 
to the material, social, and historical contexts of knowledge 
production. In order to assess the truth value of knowledge, 
conspiracy theorists argue, we need to understand where it comes 
from, who produces it, and with what intentions. 
The idea that knowledge production is intimately connected 
to interests, as conspiracy theorists would have it, puts the question 
of power at center stage. Who is, after all, capable of constructing 
knowledge about the world for their own benefit? How do certain 
groups achieve epistemic authority so that people believe their 
constructions of reality to be truthful? The answer I would provide 
cuts both ways: because the knowledge that the media, science, 
politics, business, and so on present as reality is predominantly 
legitimized by the metanarrative of modern science, such actors can 
claim the objectivity of their knowledge, while social, cultural, and 
material factors are allowed to play their part (funding, directing, 
altering, guiding, and funneling research). Large corporations can, for 
instance, fund research institutes producing scientific knowledge 
related to their products. As such, they have considerable influence 
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over the realities constructed, which are generally believed as truthful 
because they are scientific or objective realities. This is the power of 
the legitimatizing narrative of modern science: flexible enough to 
allow for profane intrusions, yet rigid enough to remain sacred (cf. 
Gieryn, 1999; Latour, 1993a). 
It is precisely this narrative legitimizing the objectivity of 
knowledge that conspiracy theorists are critical of. Epistemic 
authorities, backed up by the meta-narrative of science, proclaim to 
have access to the truth, but conspiracy theorists doubt that. Instead 
they stage a contest over reality: when stripped of all the rhetoric that 
lends plausibility to claims on truth (a strategy academics might call 
deconstruction) what remains of the quality of your knowledge, 
conspiracy theorists ask? Like Berger and Luckmann (1966) who 
argued against the sociologies of knowledge of Marx and Mannheim, 
cultural elites are not alone in defining reality, despite their more 
powerful position to do so (Seidman, 1994: 81). Even stronger put, 
they encounter active resistance from ordinary people today. 
Conspiracy theories are nothing more than popular challenges to the 
reality constructions of the powerful (cf. Oliver and Wood, 2012: 
953). There are many such truth wars out there today, like the 
controversies around E-numbers, the safety of vaccinations, and the 
dangers of electromagnetic radiation. In each of those cases, 
authoritative institutions contend that they are safe, but conspiracy 
theorists and the population at large refuse to trust those claims. More 
abstractly speaking, agonistic language games (Lyotard, 1984) thus 
abound: creationists advance religious narratives when claiming 
knowledge (e.g. Locke, 2014; Numbers, 2006), and alternative 
archeologists cite ancient mythologies and oral traditions to support 
their historical claims (e.g. González, 2016). These epistemic 
competitors to science are generally dismissed by the scientific 
establishment and its allies in media, politics, and skeptic 
organizations as quackery, irrational hype, and pseudoscience, yet 
embraced by millions of people in the Western world (cf. Campbell, 
2007; Numbers, 2006; Heelas, 1996). Conspiracy culture 
represents, in other words, a broader societal conflict over 
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knowledge and truth in contemporary society, forcing a 
reconsideration of what counts as legitimate knowledge, and why.  
 
Hermeneutics of Suspicion: “Nothing is what it seems” 
Because conspiracy theorists hold that mainstream institutions no 
longer function as they should and suspect that they might be 
infiltrated by a power elite covertly pulling the strings, they have a 
hard time believing what is sanctioned as the “official” truth. Based on 
an understanding of knowledge production as intimately related to 
interests, they point to the ease with which facts can be manipulated, 
and conclude that objectivity is an insidious illusion for deceiving the 
masses. Official explanations of social phenomena are therefore 
seriously distrusted by conspiracy theorists who argue that those in 
power have seemingly limitless resources to create a reality that befits 
their interests. Taken to its extreme, their argument would imply that 
the world we experience as real is a well-crafted and all-encompassing 
illusion installed by the accumulated presence of such official 
narratives. This accumulation of official narratives creates an 
alternative universe which conspiracy theorists often refer to as the 
Matrix. Like that famous Hollywood blockbuster, they emphasize that 
the world as we experience it is one big lie, one giant illusion, one 
enormous simulated reality constructed to fool us into believing that 
we are free, autonomous individuals when in effect we are being used 
as if pawns in a chess game.  
Such an understanding comes close to the work of Jean 
Baudrillard. It is, after all, not a coincidence that a copy of Simulacra 
and Simulation is visible at the start of The Matrix. Baudrillard’s theory 
of simulation argues that Western cultures progressively break away 
from what we considered Real into a world of constructed signs and 
symbol, called simulacra, that need not have any bearing on reality at 
all (1994). Baudrillard suggests that the experiences in a world 
saturated with simulations of reality look and feel even more real than 
real. American consumer culture is replete with examples, including 
the Big Mac, pictures on Instagram, and Baudrillard’s favorite 
example, Disneyland. What is real and what is fake implodes with the 
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proliferation of such hyperreal realities. When fictional movies tell 
historical stories, like Oliver Stone’s JFK, which is more real, that 
well-composed Hollywood production or the dull and dry Warren 
Report? Which creates reality more effectively? The same counts for 
the many mediatized realities like news, documentaries, Facebook 
posts, and blogs. Images can all be PhotoShopped and newsreel 
footage can be staged, so what is real? Conspiracy theorists emphasize 
a world where sign and referent, image and reality, truth and fiction 
are difficult to distinguish. The world has become, to them, as 
Baudrillard says, one “gigantic simulacrum—not unreal, but a 
simulacrum, … an interrupted circuit without reference or 
circumference’ (1994: 6). The truth, or reality, of the world we live 
in has become elusive. As Morpheus says in The Matrix after 
Baudrillard himself: “welcome to the desert of the real.” 
Where Baudrillard contends that there is no way of getting at 
the source, the original reality, that lies beyond all simulations of the 
real because there is none, conspiracy theorists generally hold on to the 
idea of a deeper truth, a deeper reality that explains the simulated 
world we take as real. To get to that level of explanation, they start 
by critically assessing and deconstructing the realities we are 
presented with: what does this simulation of reality look like, who is 
involved in its making, how did that production precisely take place, 
and what does that tell us? In contrast to the sheeple who accept the 
realities we are presented as more or less accurate descriptions of a 
world out there, conspiracy theorists distrust that manifest plane of 
reality, and set out in search of hidden or latent meanings, asking if 
there any clues or symbols pointing to the real truth. Their goal is to 
unveil the illusion and to de-mask its creators. This interpretative 
style of looking for concealed truths hidden behind or beneath the 
ordinary level of everyday experience is not reserved for conspiracy 
theorists alone, but is part of a long intellectual tradition of being 
skeptically and suspiciously oriented towards the ordinary, everyday 
realities that people experience. 
Paul Ricoeur names that style “the hermeneutics of 
suspicion,” and locates it in the thought and writings of Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud all of whom, in his eyes, share a commitment 
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to “demystify” the “lies and illusions of consciousness” (1970: 32). In 
sharp contrast to a “hermeneutics of faith,” which takes seriously the 
manifest meanings of the symbols we encounter, these “three masters 
of suspicion,” Ricoeur argues, refuse to take people’s ideas, actions, 
and realities at face value. They are instead the starting point for other 
meanings and mechanisms at work that are disguised, concealed, and 
repressed. For Marx, such lies and illusions are the social, ideological, 
and ethnic categories that people identify with, which he famously 
names “false consciousness.” Such ideas about one’s identity are 
evidently false and only disguise the true relations between people, 
namely that of class distinctions between those who own the means 
of productions (the bourgeoisie) and those who do not (the workers). 
For Nietzsche, it is the “will to power” that people are unaware of. 
Human motivations of all kinds are covertly driven by a strong “lust 
to rule.” Consciousness is a false illusion for Freud, too, because it 
serves to repress traumatic experiences from early childhood. All that 
we consciously say, think, and do is a skillful yet unconscious coping 
mechanism to disguise the unpalatable truths that hide in the 
unconscious.  
The conviction that “appearances deceive” and that “nothing 
is as it seems,” so often ascribed to conspiracy theorists (e.g. Pipes, 
1997: 45; Barkun, 2006: 4), would also apply to those three masters 
of suspicion. For them, surface realities are viewed as false distortions 
and elaborate concealments of deeper truths. Moreover, conspiracy 
theorists perform a similar interpretative practice as they do, 
considering that “all three begin with suspicion concerning the 
illusions of consciousness, and then proceed to employ the stratagem 
of deciphering” (Ricoeur, 1970: 34). Signs and symbols are not fully 
understood by their manifest content, but are skeptically assessed for 
what they hide, repress, or conceal. Freud’s interpretation of dreams 
is the paramount example, because he established that the images we 
see and the things we do in dreams do not express a straightforward 
meaning but are symbolically distorted by the unconscious to disguise 
their references to repressed experiences. We should therefore not 
take dreams for what they appear to be, as appearances deceive, but 
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we should “suspiciously” assess and analyze them for such disguised 
meanings.  
The same sort of search for hidden symbolism describes the 
methodology of conspiracy theorists, as evidenced by the many videos 
uploaded to YouTube that include elaborate interpretations of various 
signs of conspiracy (cf. Aupers, 2015). Such analysists point to covert 
Illuminati symbolism like the hidden eye or the triangle hand gesture 
in the music videos and live performances of artists like Rihanna and 
Beyoncé, or else they show subliminal and hidden sexual images in 
Disney cartoons, which are supposedly intended to sexualize children 
from a young age and indoctrinate them into black magic. This 
practice of reading between the lines to find hidden signs of 
conspiracy is also present in the analyses of official reports of events 
like 9/11 or about the safety of certain vaccinations. Conspiracy 
theorists do not follow the explicit contents of such official 
statements, but look for the omissions, discrepancies, and 
contradictions in those texts, of what lies beneath and remains hidden. 
In doing so, conspiracy theorists perform a sort of “oppositional 
reading” (Hall, 2006[1980]) or “textual poaching” (De Certeau, 1984; 
Jenkins, 2012) through which the mass-mediatized realities and their 
apparent meanings are read or decoded in culturally particular (read 
suspicious) ways. 
This practice of reading against the grain to expose hidden 
meanings is not particular to conspiracy theorists only. Ruthellen 
Josselson, for example, shows that a hermeneutics of suspicion is 
operative in many different traditions of narrative or life-history 
research, and argues that psychoanalytical, Marxist, Foucauldian, or 
feminist readings of people’s life experiences all take those accounts 
as “not to be transparent to itself: surface appearances mask depth 
realities; a told story conceals an untold one” (2004: 13). Rita Felski 
notes in the same vein that “several waves of literary and cultural 
criticism that have encouraged styles of vigilant and mistrustful 
reading” and she points to “structuralist and poststructuralist modes 
of thought, with their in-built wariness of commonsense or everyday 
meaning,” but also to “the impact of identity politics of race, gender 
and sexuality” that focus on “exposing hidden biases” (2011: 216-7).  
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In such suspicious readings of canonical texts and everyday life stories 
alike, Josselson says, “it is what is latent, hidden, that is of interest 
rather than the manifest narrative of the teller” (2004: 15). The same 
can be said about the field of semiotics more generally, in which 
interpreting or searching for the deeper structural and ideological 
meanings of the signs (of both texts and images) that surround us in 
everyday life is a core business (cf. Barthes, 2013[1957]; Eco, 1976; 
Hall, 2006). In all these academic traditions, Felski argues, “any truths 
to be gained must be wrested rather than gleaned from the page, 
derived not from what the texts says, but in spite of what it says” 
(2011: 223). This interpretative practice is hardly any different from 
what conspiracy theorists do, and applies to sociologists more 
generally as well. As I argued before in this study, sociologists tend to 
be myth busters: claiming to have insight into the real, true, or deeper 
meanings of life, situated behind, beneath, or beyond the everyday 
ideas and experiences of ordinary people (cf. Houtman, 2008; 
Latour, 2004b; 2005; Luhmann and Fuchs, 1994). 
A hermeneutics of suspicion can therefore hardly be seen as 
a pathological interpretative style particular to conspiracy theorists 
alone, as some scholars would have it (e.g. Barkun, 2006: 4; Byford, 
2011: 75; Pipes, 1997: 45). It is, rather, a characteristic of many 
traditions of thought that position themselves critically in relation to 
the given, the apparent, and the manifest. Felski even questions 
Ricoeur’s larger argument that this is a distinctively modern style of 
interpretation, as she traces “a history of suspicious interpretation 
back to the medieval heresy trial” (2011: 219). Challenging what has 
become conventional wisdom on this point, Felski argues that this 
interpretive style should not be seen as the sole invention a “few 
exceptional thinkers” as it has a “larger cultural history that is part of 
the world, rather than opposed to the world … an interpretative 
practice embedded in a variety of institutional structures, tacit 
conventions and local norms” (2011: 220). But this interpretative 
style should not be seen as a pathology either, for the simple fact that 
it constitutes, as Ricoeur, Felski, and Josselson argue, one out of two 
ideal-typically opposed possible ways of interpreting information. 
While the first is animated by a faith in the truthfulness of the manifest 
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plane to transmit and express its real meaning, the other distrusts that 
surface reality based on the assumption that appearances deceive, and 
probes instead for the real meanings that are hidden, concealed, or 
disguised. From the cultural sociological perspective that I take 
throughout this study, it is not that relevant which hermeneutics is 
the right or the most plausible way of interpreting information, but 
rather what these different styles look like empirically, who deploys 
them, and what the reasons and motivations are that people do so.  
Felski argues in this respect not to be “suspicious of 
suspicion”, and in her effort “to understand why it has proved so 
attractive to contemporary scholars,” she directs attention to the 
“pleasures” of this interpretative style (2011: 215). She speaks about 
“the satisfaction of detecting figures and designs below the text’s 
surface, fashioning new plots out of old, joining together the disparate 
and seemingly unconnected, acts of forging, patterning and linking” 
(2011: 228). Such pleasures, she continues, are not only intellectual 
or cognitive but also emotional. Like the Victorian sensation novels 
that induced “visceral responses in its readers,” it is only to be 
expected that the “revelation of shocking secrets, the pursuit of guilty 
parties, and the detection of hidden crimes” stimulates affective 
responses (Felski, 2011: 230). From this perspective, I believe too 
little attention has been given to the emotional dimensions of 
conspiracy theorizing, and future research might seek to find out in 
more empirical detail what sort of satisfactions a hermeneutic of 
suspicion engenders in conspiracy theorists.  
One noteworthy exception is Mark Fenster who argues that 
conspiracy theorizing constitutes “a form of play” that induces “a sense 
of pleasure”: “participants can ‘experience’ the rush and vertiginous 
feelings associated with discovering conspiracy” (2008: 14). 
Conspiracy theorizing is a hermeneutic practice, Fenster shows us, 
that is not purely cognitive, driven by ideological or political 
motivations, but an affective undertaking. The sifting of clues and the 
ferreting out of hidden truths offers satisfaction and excitement. 
Fenster quotes in this respect author Jonathan Vankin who describes 
these pleasures “the conspiracy rush,” which he defines as the “zap of 
adrenaline that hits when you apprehend a higher truth; the revelation 
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of sensation, I call it. Your mind expands, or so you believe. Everyone 
else now appears slower, plodding through life a little stupider than 
you thought they were before” (2008: 157). As telling as this quote is 
about the emotional pleasures of conspiracy theorizing, it also speaks 
to the ways that conspiracy theorists differentiate themselves from 
others, a dynamics which I describe in Chapter Six as a crucial element 
in the formation of identities. By having found out the real truth, 
conspiracy theorists feel different than we ordinary people, who still 
believe in those false truths we call reality. Like some informants of 
mine who described their “waking up” in similar terms, the meanings 
of conspiracy theorizing are evidently multi-layered. Aspects of 
“pleasure” and “play” are something often left underexplored in the 
study of conspiracy culture as attention is mostly given to its “serious” 
or “dangerous” sides. Following the cultural sociological approach 
that I have, we can then ask how such affects explain the current 
popularity of conspiracy theories.  
 
Conspiracy Culture: Living in an Age of Epistemic 
Instability 
A central argument I make in this study is that conspiracy culture 
should be situated within and understood from its proper sociological 
context. By relating the individual with their social, cultural, and 
historical counterparts, we see many more meanings of conspiracy 
culture emerge. Moreover, by showing these relations, it becomes 
difficult to set conspiracy culture apart as a deviant or pathological 
phenomenon. Throughout this study I have shown how conspiracy 
culture relates to mainstream society first on the basis of conflict. As 
alternative explanations of reality operating in a broader field of 
knowledge contestation, conspiracy theories challenge on an abstract 
level the dominant “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1980). Conspiracy 
theorists strive for the public recognition of their ideas by sharing 
information widely and by contesting those officials in power like 
journalists, scientists, and politicians. The latter respond to such 
challenges by dismissing them as paranoid and dangerous allegations, 
in short, as conspiracy theories.281  
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Conspiracy culture does, however, not just stand in conflict 
with mainstream culture but has many affinities with it too. I have 
shown how the critiques conspiracy theorists formulate resonate not 
only with many popular sentiments concerning the functioning of 
mainstream institutions and the knowledge they produce, but also 
with the more professional analyses of critical scholars inside and 
outside of academia. Conspiracy culture shares much with the 
practice, thought, and history of the social sciences, especially those 
of a critical signature. Setting out to debunk the myths that people 
believe in, they see hidden forces at work below the manifest surface 
reality which are visible only to their critical gaze. Conspiracy culture 
may be eccentric and deviant at times, but it is hard and sociologically 
unproductive to deny its relations to mainstream society. 
Based on my empirical material I argue that the historical 
developments of secularization, mediatization, democratization, and 
globalization has added to a mounting disbelief in the possibility of a 
single objective, unequivocal, irrefutable truth. Because of these 
cultural changes, we now live in a world where multiple takes on 
reality exist side by side. Whether these are the different cultural 
perspectives people encounter in their lives or the many different 
mediatized realities we are confronted with every day, the notion of 
one objective take on the world is for many people not plausible 
anymore. Especially because our epistemic institutions cannot 
provide us with a strong sense of security about the truthfulness of the 
knowledge they produce, it becomes difficult to trust the realities 
they present us. Instead, we see a plurality of often-competing 
versions of the real available for consumption; for example we might 
think of the many different scenarios of what really happened on 
9/11, each creating their own more or less convincing reality. Each 
of them could be true. The same counts for the different and often 
opposed perspectives on the safety and quality of the food we eat 
(animal fat is bad for our health/animal fat is good for our health), the 
cosmetics we put on our skin (sunscreen prevents the development 
of skin cancer/sunscreen causes skin cancer), or the medications we 
take (cholesterol-lowering drugs help us live healthy 
longer/cholesterol-lowering drugs make us more sick). The situation 
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is such that we are bombarded today with different and often 
contradictory information and research about what really is the case. 
The truth of any one situation becomes more and more elusive. The 
sociological question that arises is how do people deal with this 
epistemic instability? How do people live their lives in a world where 
truth has become problematic and difficult to ascertain? Based on my 
analyses of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, I contrast here two ideal-
typically opposed ways to do so. 
On the one hand we find typical modernist quests for the 
truth. The world as we know it may be a well-crafted illusion we are 
all fooled to believe in, but solid research and firm logic can disclose 
the real truths that are concealed by the many illusory stories they tell 
us. In this study I show that quite a few in the Dutch conspiracy milieu 
occupy themselves, as true modernists (cf. Bauman, 1987; Giddens, 
1991; Latour, 1993a), by ardently looking for real evidence and hard 
facts in their search for the truth. The mainstream media, 
institutionalized science, and conventional politics may throw sand in 
our eyes with all their gainsaying information, but if we look through 
their propaganda and manipulation, and focus on the bare facts, such 
conspiracy theorists hold, then the real truth will disclose itself. 
Convinced that official explanations are false, these people occupy 
themselves (sometimes obsessively) with detective-like fact finding 
(Boltanski, 2014). Hours are spent in search of information that has 
been left behind, hidden, or repressed, and they comb through the 
archives of government organizations and the websites of NGO’s and 
research institutes. Their exposés are full of references to various 
kinds of research, publications, reports, and other documents that 
serve to support the factuality of their claims. Given their diagnosis of 
failing and corrupted epistemic institutions, these conspiracy theorists 
set out to be better journalists, better scientists, and better 
politicians. In their daily practices of collecting information, analyzing 
raw material, and theorizing about possible scenarios, such people 
profess to be more astute and committed than professional 
investigative journalists. As truly independent researchers, they claim 
to probe more deeply into the malpractices and hidden abuses of 
power that surround us, and they do not hesitate to question the 
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integrity and sincerity of the powerful. The truth may unnerve us at 
first, so they argue, but it will ultimately also set us free. In all of these 
ways, conspiracy culture represents a radicalization of modernity. 
But as I have shown throughout this study, conspiracy culture 
should also be seen a materialization of what has been called the 
postmodern condition. Conspiracy theorists, for example, commonly 
express an incredulity towards objective truth claims, and especially 
towards the metanarrative of science as leading to progress, 
emancipation, and ultimately the truth (Lyotard, 1984). What our 
epistemic authorities sanction as the real truth is no longer taken as 
fact, but instead as forms of knowledge contingent on the context of 
their production (Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1970). As a consequence, 
conspiracy theorists critically assess and deconstruct such truth 
claims, asking who was involved in the making and what does that tell 
us? Living in this age where constructed and heavily mediatized 
realities make up our world, conspiracy theorists often point to the 
dissolution of the real. All that is left to do, they conclude, is “playing 
with the pieces” that are left behind (Baudrillard, 1993: 95).  
In contrast to the modernist focus on facts, we have seen in 
this study that conspiracy theorists prioritize other ways of knowing, 
making up, to quote Rosenau, “all that modernity has set aside, 
including emotions, feelings, intuition, personal experience, custom, 
metaphysics, tradition, cosmology, myth, religious sentiment, 
mystical experience” (1992: 6). One can bricolage from different 
ways of knowing and from different forms of knowledge brand new 
realities, brand new truths that are more appealing because they are 
not based on cold facts alone but also on those warm underpinnings of 
knowing. Truths need to feel right, instead of be right. Conspiracy 
theorists exemplify the legitimation crisis of traditional institutions 
that base themselves on the metanarrative of science, and demand 
from their spokespersons (intellectuals, experts, professionals) new 
and more egalitarian roles (Bauman, 1987; Giddens, 1990; Toulmin, 
1990). Conspiracy theorists consider their own knowledge to be of 
equal value, implying that one’s inner, subjective knowing says more 
than their distant so-called objective knowledge, as I often heard them 
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say. Conspiracy culture, I contend, embodies in all these different 
ways the characteristics of what can be called a postmodern culture. 
When some intellectuals started writing about the arrival of 
a new historical era where modernist ideas about knowledge, truth, 
reality, ethics, and aesthetics seemed increasingly implausible and 
new ways of thinking, seeing, and doing were on the rise, they 
frequently faced laughter and contempt. Postmodernism was seen as 
a “fad,” a “carnival,” and a “freak show” (in: Ritzer, 1997: 1), 
proclaiming “fashionable nonsense” (Sokal and Bricmont, 1999), 
containing “nothing useful or enlightening” (Hitchens, 2005) and 
producing “meaningless buzzwords” (Hebdige, 2006). Even today, 
scholars and intellectuals are apt to regard the thought (and legacy) of 
postmodern intellectuals as a mere elitist fashion for academics that 
will or should go out of vogue. Yet despite the (arguably grounded) 
criticism of inaccessibility and vagueness, I hope to have shown in this 
study the relevance of postmodern theory for the understanding of 
many contemporary phenomena today, and for conspiracy culture in 
particular. After all, the processes of cultural change discussed in this 
study, including secularization, mediatization, democratization, and 
globalization, have made the thought of postmodern scholars not 
plausible from a theoretical perspective, but from the concrete 
perspective of everyday experience.  
Obviously, the historical transition from modern to 
postmodern society is not as clear-cut and linear as impressions might 
give (e.g. Calhoun, 1993; Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1987). I wonder 
if we should speak about a transition at all. Is our contemporary world 
not characterized by the simultaneous existence of both positions? 
The modernist promise of a knowable, controllable, moldable world 
that is made possible through the deployment of science may be 
something we can no longer believe in, but we also cannot seem to 
let go off it. We may increasingly have a relativistic attitude towards 
different types of knowledge, and we might even cherish that 
diversity since it prevents the totalitarian tendencies of grand 
narratives (Lyotard, 1984). And yet we cannot seem to accept its 
radical consequence that anything goes and that all perspectives are 
equally valuable. It is my argument here that conspiracy culture 
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exemplifies the difficulty of living in an age of epistemic instability, a 
historical context where the truth can no longer be fully guaranteed 
by one epistemic authority, institution, or tradition, while its 
consequential relativism and ambivalence cannot fully be embraced 
either (cf. Bauman, 1991). In this study I have shown that modernist 
quests for facts, evidence, and ultimately the truth, coexist with a 
postmodern understanding of the contingency of knowledge and its 
production. But how these two opposed cultural outlooks go together 
in everyday life is something for further research. I have yet to address 
questions such as: in what ways is that coexistence harmonious, 
antagonistic, or up for negotiation? And does that play out at the 
individual or at the collective level, or both? For now, I hope to have 
shown the relevance of studying cultural understandings of 
knowledge and reality, especially in times of epistemic instability. 
Conspiracy culture speaks to us about such a world where the truth is 
no longer assured, but out-there for us to weigh, juggle, construct, 
assess, play with, remodel, measure, combat, analyze, and struggle 
with. And that is not an easy task, for none of us. 
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9. Epilogue: Whose Side Am I On? 
Throughout this study, I have emphasized that I refrain from making 
any judgements on the truthfulness or morality of conspiracy 
theories. I do so, firstly, because I believe it is not within my capacity 
as a sociologist to assess the veracity of such alternative takes on 
reality. But I primarily refrain from making such judgements because 
it is not my intellectual objective to do so. Since I want to understand 
this popular phenomenon, the question of truth becomes irrelevant—
even absurd. After all, if I would want to know why and how the San 
people of the Kalahari Desert in Southern Africa do their rain dance 
rituals, I would not get far by arguing that their beliefs are false or 
superstitious. The same is true for my study of conspiracy culture, 
where holding on to the truth or falsity of conspiracy theories only 
obstructs a sociological assessment of their cultural meaning. The only 
thing that counts for my purposes are people’s own understandings of 
what is real and true, their perspectives on the world, and not my 
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own. My ideas about conspiracy theories—whether I like them or 
despise them, think they are true or false, or consider them to be a 
menace or a blessing to society—are not relevant and should 
therefore play no role in the study of conspiracy culture. Nor do I 
take scientific accounts of conspiracy culture as necessarily true or 
objective, but understand these as distinct cultural ways of 
understanding the world. When studying the interactions between 
conspiracy theorists and science, I approach both positions 
symmetrically, that is, as equally truthful in the sense that they are 
both true for the people involved and should therefore be studied as 
such. 
This position towards research objects, what can be called 
methodological agnosticism, is a central feature of the cultural 
sociological approach. As I discussed in the Introduction, such a 
position takes seriously the ideas, experiences, and practices of people 
without the need to compare or measure them against certain 
standards of normality. It is fully oriented at verstehen, and prioritizes 
the role of culture in the shaping of our worlds (cf. Alexander, 2003; 
Geertz, 1983; Weber, 2013). However appropriate and adequate this 
research strategy may seem in theory, it can be questioned whether 
taking a neutral position suffices in practice. Because all knowledge 
production is situated in fields where the interests, ideologies, and 
institutions of different players interact, influence, and oppose each 
other (cf. Gieryn 1999, Latour, 1987, Toulmin, 1990), so too is my 
own work part of the very dynamics of knowledge contestation that I 
wish to research. This study is situated in that my analytical thoughts 
and methodological practices are shaped by moral and 
epistemological considerations that I developed in relation to certain 
meaningful others along my career; it is driven by interests because I 
want to move conspiracy culture away from the pathological; it is 
performative because it gives shape and meaning to conspiracy culture, 
helps it as such into being, and has empirical consequences; and most 
importantly it stands in direct relation with others who are involved 
with and have a stake in conspiracy culture. I therefore cannot avoid 
being drawn theoretically and practically into the contentious 
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dynamics I set out to explore. As a result, my own work becomes 
another player in the very same battles for epistemic authority.  
It is not my intention to get into a theoretical discussion about 
knowledge production in this epilogue, but I wish to analyze my own 
strategy in which I attempt to remain agnostic about conspiracy 
theories and to stay neutral in their battles for epistemic authority. 
Does such bracketing sufficiently work in my efforts to maintain 
autonomous in my study of conspiracy culture? Can I stay neutral or 
do I need to position myself after all? To assess these questions, I will 
first discuss some of the strategies that other sociologists have 
proposed and reflect on them from my own perspective and based on 
my experience with this study.  
 
The Myth of the Neutral Sociologist  
Because the world is essentially meaningless and all knowledge of the 
world is the product of our own meaning making practices, Max 
Weber argued long ago that nobody can claim to know or have the 
real, objective, and only truth about the world we live in (1993; 2009; 
2013). Following Kant, the world an sich is essentially unknowable, 
and the only thing we can know from a scientific perspective, Weber 
holds, is how we as humans construct and attach meaning to that 
world. Some build elaborate theodicies to explain existence on Earth; 
some create utopian political projects to guide future actions; some 
pursue the sublime with their works of art; some study the world in 
search for general laws following logic and empirical evidence. All 
these institutionalized ways of giving meaning to our world have their 
own distinctive rules, goals, and cultural logic, and in order to 
maintain their autonomy and uniqueness, they should not be confused 
with each other; science is something different from art, politics, and 
religion.  
It is precisely because they are different that they should not 
be judged with the criteria of other modes of existence, nor with any 
assumed universal standard (cf. Latour, 2013). When scientists 
proclaim to know the real or the objective truth, so goes Weber’s 
argument, they become metaphysical and deny the fact that their 
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knowledge production is just as situated and value-laden as all other 
“ways of world making” (cf. Goodman, 1978). As Laermans and 
Houtman (2016) argue, Weber’s plea that science should only speak 
about what is and not about what ought to be (the latter, he said, is 
reserved for politics or religion) should not be understood as a 
modernist belief in the possibility of discovering the true or real 
meaning of the world, but as a professional imperative to preserve the 
autonomy and singularity of each cultural domain. We do so by 
limiting science to its to humble task, that of understanding and 
describing the world by empirical scrutiny only. Moral and political 
opinions of the (social) scientist, Weber argues, should be kept at bay: 
“the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic 
platform …whenever the man of science introduces his personal 
value judgment, a full understanding of the facts ceases” (2009: 146).  
The position that I take throughout this study in refraining 
from making any value judgements about the morality and 
truthfulness of conspiracy theories clearly draws from this intellectual 
tradition. I keep my own opinions about conspiracy theories to myself 
and merely set out to “state the facts” (Weber, 2009: 146). In my 
case, this means that my aim is to describe and explain the contents 
and meanings of conspiracy culture. Obviously, an absolute “value-
free sociology” is a well-crafted myth (Gouldner, 1962) that should 
be seen from the perspective of boundary work (Gieryn, 1999). After 
all, merely stating the facts and not our opinions guarantees our right 
to speak and our claims to truth (and sometimes even to recognition, 
and abundant resources). The choices we, as (social) scientists, make 
to focus on certain topics using certain methodologies are inevitably 
influenced by our moral, cultural, social, political, historical, and 
epistemological position in the world (cf. Foucault, 1970; Latour, 
1987; Putnam, 2002; on Weber see Laermans and Houtman, 2016). 
Our (scientific) constructions of this world may be true in the sense 
of being empirically supported, but not in the sense of being a true 
“mirror of reality” (Rorty, 2009). 
One strategy sociologists sometimes take to mitigate these 
problems of selectivity is known as reflexive confession, whereby one 
stakes out one’s own situated position and explicitly reflects on it. As 
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Alvin Gouldner states, “the only choice is between an expression of 
one’s values, as open and honest as it can be, this side of the 
psychoanalytical couch, and a vain ritual of moral neutrality which 
leaves it at the mercy of irrationality” (1962: 212). But that opens a 
paradox: how can you be aware of your tacit assumptions, implicit 
moral preferences, and ideological blind spots? That seems like an 
impossible task. Moreover, as Gouldner himself later clarified, 
“confession may be good for the soul, but it is no tonic to the mind” 
(1968: 112). We need to do more than explicating our values if we 
are already aware of them in the first place. Confessing one’s moral 
position without assessing its consequences for the research at hand 
“becomes a meaningless ritual of frankness,” to borrow from 
Gouldner (1968: 112). The question is not whether and how a value-
free sociology is possible, but what to do with the problem of the 
positionality of the scholar. 
The interference of scholarly positionality becomes especially 
salient in the study of social problems, when the sociologist finds 
herself studying different groups in conflict with each other. Where 
does she stand in such situations? A starting strategy, as formulated by 
Becker, is something called partisan sociology, in which the scientist 
explicitly takes a side. He argues that since “there is no position from 
which sociological research can be done that is not biased in one or 
another way—we must always look at the matter from someone’s 
point of view—we can never avoid taking sides” (Becker, 1967: 245). 
According to his notion of partisan sociology, we ought to explicate 
the point of view from which we speak and to “use our theoretical and 
technical resources to avoid distortions” (Becker, 1967: 247). 
Gouldner, by way of an alternative strategy, argues that we should 
not take sides, but instead, the “outside standpoint [as] one source and 
possible meaning of sociological objectivity” (1968: 113). However, 
where precisely is that outside standpoint? Obviously not the 
Archimedean meta-position some sociologists have assumed from 
which they claim to objectively describe what is going on, pace 
Bourdieu (2004; cf. Latour, 2005). Gouldner would agree, 
suggesting that “no one escapes a partisan standpoint. But aren’t some 
forms of partisanship more liberating than others? […] It is only when 
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we have a standpoint somewhat different from the participants that it 
becomes possible to do justice to their standpoints.” (1968: 113). 
In this work, I have taken something of a combined or middle 
position, where I study the world from the perspectives of people 
active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu, but analyze those perspectives 
from the standpoint of an outsider. Doing so, I tried to bring to the 
surface a cultural milieu hitherto stereotyped and marginalized 
without necessarily taking their side since I remained agnostic on their 
truth claims. Nor did I side with their opponents as I positioned 
myself outside of and then amidst the battles for epistemic authority 
in which conspiracy theorists and science are embroiled. I merely 
described and analyzed the ideas, practices, and struggles of both sides. 
This neutral position is more common in the social studies of 
science, particularly in the study of “scientific controversies” (Scott, 
et al., 1990) and of “fringe” phenomena on “the margins of science” 
such as parapsychology, astrology, mesmerism, and ufology (e.g. 
Wallis, 1979; Hess, 1993). When studying such contentious 
dynamics between scientists and other parties, the sociologist ignores 
the prevalent hierarchical power relations between scientists and their 
assailers by treating their competing truth claims “symmetrically” 
(Bloor, 1991). Both the scientific account and their alternatives are 
analyzed with the same conceptual tools and with the same moral 
presumptions. Scholars do not side with the position of science and 
do not regard its knowledge claims as the truth (like positivists would 
do), but take a neutral position between rival camps and study instead 
how all claims on truth are assembled, deployed, and contested. To 
give an example, Collins and Pinch study the construction of the 
paranormal as a class of existing phenomena worthy of scientific 
recognition from “a relativistic thesis within which consideration of 
the ‘actual existence’ of a phenomenon is redundant” (1979: 212). 
They merely study the tactics deployed by both parapsychologists and 
orthodox scientists in their efforts to gain/deny recognition for their 
claims. Such constructivist scholars may or may not tacitly side with 
science and accept its understandings as truth, but for the purposes of 
the analysis, the issue of truth is set aside as irrelevant to the study 
itself. The real truth is, in other words, put in brackets. 
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This sounds, theoretically speaking, like an adequate position 
to take when studying contentious dynamics between different social 
groups. I have followed this strategy not without due reason. But the 
practical reality shows that it is often difficult to stay neutral in studies 
concerning battles for epistemic authority. Drawing on their own 
experiences of doing research on scientific controversies, Pam Scott, 
Evelleen Richards, and Brian Martin show “that analysts, whatever 
their intentions, cannot avoid being drawn into the fray” (1990: 474). 
This is so because the sociological study itself will be taken as a 
resource or weapon in such battles for epistemic authority. After all, 
“the combatants have a good deal at stake in the sociologist’s 
interpretation and presentation of news from the war zone” (Scott, et 
al., 1990: 490). Our work simply matters: the authority sociological 
analyses embody make it relevant for rival parties to deploy it to their 
advantage. Scott et al. argue furthermore that “epistemological 
symmetry often leads to social asymmetry,” meaning that neutral 
analyses tend to be more useful to the parties with less credibility and 
epistemic authority (1990: 490). Those latter groups will interpret 
and advance the neutral study as supportive of their cause, while more 
powerful groups will see such studies as threatening to their authority 
and are likely to react in public with hostility. Like Gouldner (1962), 
Scott et al. conclude that “symmetrical analysis is an illusion: the 
methodological claim of a neutral social analysis is a myth that can be 
no more sustained in actual practice than” the widespread belief in a 
value-free sociology (1990: 491).  
Thus, besides the obvious theoretical difficulties, is it also 
practically difficult to maintain neutral and outside of the dynamics 
between conspiracy theorists and their meaningful others. It is only 
to be expected that my study too will be “captured” (Scott, et al., 
1990: 476) in these battles for epistemic authority. Some will say that 
my agnostic stance on conspiracy theories is problematic because it 
legitimizes them by providing conspiracy theorists a platform, while 
others will feel acknowledged in their efforts to destigmatize the ideas 
and practices they are committed to. Although I expect the bulk of 
such capturing to happen after publication of this study, I have already 
experienced such forces. In the following, I advance three scenes which 
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illustrate the difficulties of staying outside of the contentious 
dynamics I explore, even despite my claim to neutrality.  
 
Scene 1 
Around the year 2014, Stef Aupers and I submitted a manuscript that 
was a version of Chapter 7 to the Public Understanding of Science journal 
for publication. As is common in academic journals, our manuscript 
was sent by the editors to two peers (scientific experts in the field) 
who reviewed the anonymized manuscript on the basis of quality, 
originality, craftsmanship, readability, and suitability for publication. 
Several months later we received a “revise and resubmit” decision on 
our manuscript. One reviewer was generally positive and 
recommended that the journal accept the paper with minor revisions. 
The other reviewer was a bit more critical, saying that “the article 
deals with an important and worthwhile topic [and] utilizes 
interesting data [but it] displays important shortcomings that need to 
be addressed before the paper can be published.” It is these alleged 
shortcomings that I will analyze here. To do so, it will be useful to 
quote at length from the reviewer’s feedback:  
[T]he analysis…merely describes (uncritically) the conspiracist point 
of view…the authors fail to analyze the claims made by their 
respondents as essentially rhetorical. For example, they observe that 
many of their respondents’ suspicion of science is based on “personal 
encounters with medical specialists, doctors, university teachers and 
other academics.” However, regardless of whether or not these 
encounters actually occurred, they need to be examined, first and 
foremost in the context of their argument. References to personal 
experience are a well-established rhetorical device used to strengthen 
a particular truth claim, and is used particularly when justifying a 
belief that others might perceive as problematic. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the authors’ engagement with conspiracy theories 
is devoid of any critical edge. Of course, one can read conspiracy 
theories is a way that reveals traces of Collins and Pinch, Latour or 
Bourdieu, but only if one reads them selectively. The key aspect of 
conspiracy theories is that they involve a lot more than skepticism 
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about authority. They will draw on mainstream discourses of 
suspicion and criticism of mainstream institutions, but what 
differentiates them from other types of social critique are precisely the 
features so accurately analyzed by the likes of Hofstadter and Popper: 
conspiracy theories have a pervasive, unfalsifiable quality and the 
conspiracist argument always contains a “leap of imagination” from 
the undeniable (science is imperfect) to the unbelievable (mainstream 
science is fundamentally wrong). The analysis of the conspiracy 
theorists’ view of science must take account of this essential feature of 
conspiracy theories. [my italics] 
 In short, the reviewer argues that our analysis is not critical enough: 
instead of agnostically describing and analyzing the views of 
conspiracy theorists about science from their point of view, we should 
have debunked and de-masked these views as “rhetorical devices” used 
to strengthen their “unfalsifiable truth claims.” We thus failed with 
our agnostic approach to “take into account” that conspiracy theories 
are essentially wrong (making that “‘leap of imagination’ from the 
undeniable to the unbelievable”) and we consequentially legitimized, 
albeit implicitly, their flawed understandings of science.  
We responded with an explanation of why we take such an 
approach and revised our manuscript according to the useful 
comments we received from both reviewers. It is fair to say that this 
particular reviewer ultimately “agreed to disagree about the merits of 
analyzing conspiracy theories ‘non-judgmentally’” and thanked us for 
“taking on board most of [his] suggestions and comments.” And 
because the other reviewer was similarly content with our revisions, 
our neutral manuscript got accepted for publication.  
 
Scene 2 
In the summer of 2012, I wrote an op-ed for SciencePalooza.nl, a 
well-known science blog in the Netherlands titled “Why Conspiracy 
Thinking Should Not Be Discarded Too Easily.”282 I was in the midst 
of my fieldwork when I read an interview in a major Dutch newspaper 
with a well-established professor of Medical Biotechnology, who was 
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also a member of the Dutch Medicines Evaluation Board (CBG). This 
person elaborated the wrongs of the pharmaceutical industry in ways 
similar to the critiques I was hearing from my respondents. These 
latter voices were, however, consistently silenced as conspiracy 
theories. Because of the unmistakable similarity, I decided to write an 
op-ed about to explain my agnostic research approach in more detail. 
I illustrated my point with the empirical example of Anneke Bleeker, 
who runs a citizen’s movement website called Concerned Mothers 
(verontrustemoeders.nl) which advocates against the mass-
vaccination of girls for cervical cancer. The argument made was that 
such popular critiques should not too quickly be discarded as 
(ludicrous) conspiracy theories, since they often point to structural 
inequalities and societal problems that are worthy of an open debate. 
Especially in a time where large corporations like pharmaceuticals 
have tremendously more abilities to produce research for their 
benefit, and in a time when populations are increasingly deprived of 
a means to counter and challenge such market forces, I argued for 
democratic reasons that counter-publics like conspiracy theorists should 
be able to participate in prevalent battles for truth. In other words, I 
argued, let us think of ways to incorporate alternative views in an 
open and public field of knowledge contestations, where factual 
details are assessed and discussed, instead of blanket dismissals based 
on stereotypes. And then, I concluded, may the best truth win. 
The op-ed generated considerable discussion, both on this 
particular blog and elsewhere on the internet. One the one hand, it 
was read as a defense of conspiracy theories, a legitimation of the 
views of certain “certifiable lunatics” who are “anti-scientific, do not 
endorse the scientific method, deny facts,” and “spread misleading 
information which can be dangerous to public health.”283 The choice 
to illustrate my point with Bleeker was met with serious critique, such 
as the comment that read, “that example is really unfortunate, 
because Anneke Bleeker is typically someone who sees conspiracies 
everywhere. A true loonie, with whom there is, by definition, no 
reasonable discussion possible.” Another person wrote, “give us one 
good reason why we should have taken that walking barrel full of 
delusions seriously? Really, again a sociologist who does not know 
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anything, yet loves to publish. Go shame yourself man.”284 My 
argument to democratize knowledge production was received with both 
curiosity (“can somebody explain me what he means??” and “how 
should that exactly look like?”) and contempt (“subsidizing ordinary 
people to direct scientific research will get us into societal mayhem,” 
and “I think that the influence of opinions guided by knee-jerk 
reactions and bigotry is already too large”285).  
On the other hand, conspiracy theorists felt supported by my 
op-ed. Some people posted comments on that blog in praise of 
conspiracy theories: “apparently it is only a minority of highly 
intelligent people who are able to see through the conspiracies,” read 
one comment, and another reader wrote that “facts are today—where 
political and financial interests weigh heavy—only relative. Who is 
right and who is selling crap? That’s hard to say nowadays. I believe 
people generally feel this and therefore start thinking themselves.”286 
I even received emails from some of the people that I interviewed for 
my research. Liam (67) wrote  
I just read your article that was sent to me by our Central Intelligence 
Agency, Citizens in Action, [the civil initiative he runs]. You are 
more than right: everything that we try to raise awareness about is 
invariably dumped as “conspiracy theory” or “internet phantasy.” 
Rarely, if ever, are the facts themselves discussed. That you have the 
intellectual courage to think nuanced about it and come out does you 
great credit.287  
One of the major contributors to the Dutch conspiracy theory website 
Zapruder.nl linked to my op-ed on his personal blog.288 Even Bleeker, 
who was not part of my research, wrote to me by email that I 
“expressed it well. We will publish this on our site, you deserve it.”289  
 
Scene 3 
During my visiting scholarship at Northwestern University (Illinois, 
USA), which was awarded jointly by the Fulbright Program and the 
Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, I was invited to attend a four-day 
seminar with fellow Fulbright grantees from all scientific disciplines 
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in Baltimore, Maryland (March 25-28, 2015). The seminar was 
intended “to feature the unique interplay between Baltimore’s public 
health infrastructure and the city’s urban life challenges.”290 Across 
those four days we made several field trips to local non-profit 
organizations and listened to many different speakers who work in 
various ways on public health in that challenged city. It was truly a 
wonderful experience of getting to know that unmistakably American 
way of dealing with those unmistakably American public health 
problems in more detail, and I was amazed by the progressive, holistic 
approach most of these people pursued. One particular lecture 
proved relevant for my research on conspiracy theories. On that 
Thursday, Dr. Robert Gallo, director of the Institute of Human 
Virology at the University of Maryland School of Medicine at 
Baltimore, came to speak about his co-discovery of HIV as the cause 
of AIDS in 1984. I was particularly excited about the lecture not only 
for the fact that he is a world famous and widely esteemed scientist, 
but more precisely because Gallo features in some of the conspiracy 
theories that I was acquainted with.  
In his lecture he explained the historical pathway leading to 
his successful discovery of the virus causing AIDS, and after we had 
ample opportunity to ask questions. I could not resist, and I explained 
who I was and what my research was about. I told him that there are 
many conspiracy theories about HIV as the cause of AIDS, for 
example that the virus had actually never been found or properly 
isolated, that our immune system can get rid of HIV within a few 
weeks, or that anti-retroviral medication actually causes AIDS. But 
before I could even ask a question, Gallo exploded in fury about these 
“AIDS denialists” who “don’t have their facts straight” and “just don’t 
understand how virology science works.” I noticed that I hit a raw 
nerve, which I did not expect, since conspiracy theories about 
HIV/AIDS are widespread. Unexpectedly, I was then made the target 
when Gallo shouted with equal agitation that I wasn’t doing my job right! 
“You have to tell these people that what they think is completely 
wrong. There is no controversy, the facts are clear, there is a wide 
scientific consensus that HIV causes AIDS.” I responded that my job 
as a sociologist is not to tell people what is true or right, but instead 
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is to understand people’s views and their practices. I explained that 
they speak to me about the French virologist Luc Montagnier291 who 
argues that one can be exposed to HIV many times without being 
chronically infected if one has a good immune system, which is why 
so many Africans attracted the virus. Again, Gallo responded 
furiously that Montagnier’s ideas “are not backed up by scientific 
research” and that he “has lost his credibility in the scientific 
community.” Before the microphone was given to somebody else, 
Gallo continued by saying that “these people create the illusion of a 
debate among scientists that simply doesn’t exist. I repeat, HIV is the 
sole cause of AIDS. That’s a matter of fact!” I was stupefied.  
 
Conclusion: Taking a Stance without Taking Sides 
I hope to have shown that my agnostic stance on the truth of 
conspiracy theories and my neutral position in their battles for 
epistemic authority is a productive sociological strategy to take. But 
what makes a good intellectual stance does not always work in the 
real world, where other parties have interests in drawing such 
research into their own political struggles. As Scott et al. (1990) 
argue, symmetrical analyses will be more favorable for the underdog. 
The above reactions are therefore precisely what can be expected. 
Those in favor of science “react with hostility and suspicion,” 
interpreting my neutral analysis as lending support for conspiracy 
theories (Scott et al., 1990: 490). I am not critical enough and I fail to 
debunk conspiracy theories as essentially unfalsifiable, unreasonable, 
and unscientific. Conspiracy theorists, on the other hand, “react more 
sympathetically to the analysis” and interpret my neutral stance as 
support for their cause (Scott et al., 1990: 490). They feel recognized 
and acknowledged by my study since I discuss the fact themselves, and 
they congratulate my efforts. Given that these scenes all occurred 
prior to the publication of this study, I can only expect that such 
efforts to draw my work into people’s own political campaigns will 
increase. The disinterested claims that I make throughout this study 
will in the outside world be taken up and deployed in real struggles 
for epistemic authority and public legitimacy. Science, in other 
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words, may proclaim to be impartial, disinterested, and neutral, in 
practice that stance is hard to maintain. Our knowledge is easily 
captured and we are not infrequently forced to take a side.  
What to do? We can continue to insist on our neutrality as 
scientists, proclaim even more emphatically that we only describe 
what is and refrain from making any moral or political judgements, 
but this seems rather naïve and smug to me. Naïve because it assumes 
that we can actually stay neutral, and smug because it assumes that 
such neutrality is the moral thing to do. As Hess argues in his study of 
parapsychologists, skeptics, and New Agers, “in a postconstructivist 
world there are no neutral positions, and therefore one must 
eventually articulate a position lest someone else do it instead” (1993: 
155). Scott et al. argue in a similar line of reasoning that “the political 
role of the researcher must be addressed…since the social scientist is 
automatically part of the controversy…the analyst should be critically 
involved, in the role of citizen” (1990: 491). I quite agree: whereas I 
still believe that an agnostic stance on the truth of conspiracy theories 
is the best position to take when empirically studying them, and while 
I still believe that a neutral outsider position is the best one to take 
when studying battles between different social groups, we cannot 
afford to stay insensitive to the forces dragging us into this or that 
political struggle. That stance will leave us at the mercy of whoever 
sets out to take advantage of our analyses. 
The question is therefore not how to stay neutral, but how to 
give shape to our situated position as sociologists in society. Zygmunt 
Bauman (1987) argues that with the transition from modernity to 
postmodernity, intellectuals should no longer take the role of 
legislators (saying what is right or wrong by siding with epistemic 
powers), but instead should interpret the many different and 
competing value- and belief systems we are confronted with today. 
This is, generally speaking, what I have tried to do with this study, 
e.g. to make the cultural world of conspiracy theorists intelligible for 
others. Bruno Latour (2013) makes a similar argument when he 
proposes that with the demise of science as the high arbiter of truth, 
sociologists should be more like diplomats by taking seriously the 
ontological claims of the people we study and to negotiate between 
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the different claims they make: “when there is no common 
overarching principle that would allow for agreement … the only 
solution is to set out as precisely as possible why the account given of 
such and such a value is shocking, admissible, compatible, or 
incompatible with some other account.”292 Following Gouldner, the 
objective then, is not “to bring parties together, but to do justice. 
Doing justice does not mean, as does mediation, [to] distribute costs 
and benefits equally between the parties, but rather, that the 
allocation of benefits and costs is made in conformity with some stated 
normative standard” (1968: 113). 
The normative standard that I put forward as a way out of this 
science is neutral/science is politics stalemate is our most cherished way 
to settle disagreement peacefully: democracy. This is no simple 
slogan to complacently flaunt, nor a hollowed-out phrase used to 
legitimize imperialism, but democracy in the original sense of the 
word is a workable and morally justifiable value on which to position 
ourselves as social scientists. As an institutionalizable procedure to 
deal with difference and conflict in a productive and non-violent 
manner, I contend that democracy, and the open debates that underlie 
it, is what social scientists should strive for as the implicit moral goal 
of their academic work. We should not need to take sides, we should 
not say what is true or just, but we ought to make sure that the best 
available truth—whatever we define as best—will prevail.  
To do so, we need to think about how all different parties can 
properly participate in such open and public battles for knowledge. 
This is vital to the future of social science itself, recalibrating the 
legitimacy of our societal position and of our knowledge claims, just 
as it is vital to our future as open societies. Because scientific 
knowledge increasingly plays a major role in any political dispute it is 
of utmost importance to have fair possibilities of engaging in such 
debates about what is true and what not. In a world where nation 
states and large multinational corporations have tremendously more 
possibilities to produce knowledge to their advantage, we need to 
think about ways of giving scientific voice to the interests of us, 
ordinary citizens and all other inhabitants of the world who lack such 
possibilities. Otherwise, the scales always tip to powerful. I do not 
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have any concrete answers on how to do this, although viable efforts 
have been made by some (e.g. Latour, 2004a), but I firmly believe 
that this moral goal—the democratic participation of different publics 
in knowledge contestations—is one worth striving for.  
Just what does this mean for my position as a scholar on 
conspiracy culture; where do I stand; whose side am I on? Clearly, I 
am not on the side of those critical of conspiracy theories, since I argue 
against objectives to debunk and pathologize them. But although I 
have predominantly studied conspiracy culture from the perspective 
of conspiracy theorists and have striven to bring their cultural milieu 
to the surface, I do not side with their objectives either. What I do 
believe is that it is important for our public and private well-being 
that critique and dissent are not marginalized, ridiculed, or 
suppressed. In that way, I champion and welcome conspiracy theories 
since they actively challenge the most dominant powers. Some 
conspiracy theorists may, in my personal opinion, go wrong in this or 
that direction, and other conspiracy theorists may be stubbornly 
unapproachable for debate, but in light of the aforementioned moral 
goal of science, I can only be content that there are people willing to 
go against the stream of dominant ideologies.  
The price we ultimately pay for societal obedience is far 
greater than price we pay for the public distrust of epistemic 
authorities. As Brian Martin argues,  
[S]ociety will be better off if more people are able and willing to 
openly question standard views. This holds true even if critics, by 
later judgement, turn out to be wrong. What is important is the 
process of open debate. When debate is inhibited or squashed, the 
potential for abuse of power is magnified enormously. (1996: 7) 
I couldn’t agree more.  
With this study I hope to have contributed to the moral goal 
of science that I outlined earlier, to facilitate conspiracy theorists in 
their democratic participation of knowledge contestations by making 
intelligible their ideas, worldviews, and experiences to a wider 
public. This does not mean that I endorse all of their ideas. While I 
may side with conspiracy theorists on procedural terms, I do not 
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(necessarily) side with them on substantial terms. In light of this 
argument, I would like to close this epilogue with a quotation by Sir 
Karl Popper: 
 
O]ne of the best senses of “reason” and “reasonableness” is openness to 
criticism—readiness to be criticized, and eagerness to criticize 
oneself; and I tried to argue that this critical attitude of 
reasonableness should be extended as far as possible…implicit in this 
attitude is the realization that we shall always have to live in an 
imperfect society… There always exist irresolvable clashes of values, 
which are insoluble because moral principles may conflict. 
[However,] clashes of values and principles may be valuable, and 
indeed essential for an open society.’ (1992: 132/3) 
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English Summary 
Conspiracy theories—explanations of social phenomena involving the 
covert actions of certain (powerful) people—are everywhere today. 
Narratives about the real truth behind terrorist attacks (like 9/11 and 
the November 2015 Paris attacks) or behind collective vaccination 
campaigns (for example, the Swine flu, or the HPV-virus) feature 
widely in Western societies. Conspiracy theories have become, for 
many, a normalized idiom to account for what actually happens out 
there. They also feature widely in popular culture: films, books and 
TV- series like The Matrix, The Da Vinci Code, or The X-Files attract 
immense crowds. But although conspiracy theories have moved from 
the cultural margins to the center, our understanding of them remains 
limited. Both inside and outside of academia, the prevalent 
assumption is that conspiracy theories are paranoid, delusional, and 
irrational interpretations of reality. And the people who believe in 
them must, therefore, be similarly delusional.  
This pathological understanding of conspiracy theories draws 
from the seminal works of Karl Popper (2013[1945]) and Richard 
Hofstadter (1999[1966]), and undergirds much scholarly work on the 
subject ever since their respective publication (e.g. Barkun, 2006; 
Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; Robins and Post, 1997; Sunstein and 
Vermeule, 2009). Following Popper, conspiracy theories are firstly 
seen by such scholars as bad science: they reduce complex phenomena 
to simple explanations, make flawed use of evidence, selectively look 
for confirmation instead of falsification, and are resistant to contrary 
evidence. Conspiracy theories are, following this argument, a secular 
remnant of our religious past: they envision a universe governed by 
design instead of randomness. Following Hofstadter, conspiracy 
theories are secondly seen by these academics as paranoid politics: they 
are the systematized, delusional fears of conspiracy and deceit, and 
they cast the world rather unproductively in an apocalyptic battle 
between absolute good and absolute evil. Going against the political 
virtues of moderation, deliberation, and consensus, conspiracy 
theorists do not do good politics, or so they argue. Given this twofold 
pathological framing of conspiracy theories, scholars warn for the 
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societal dangers if conspiracy theories proliferate and paranoia 
thrives: demonization, scapegoating, cultural conflicts, political 
extremism, radicalization, violence, terrorism, and more. From this 
perspective, conspiracy theories threaten the health and functioning 
of democratic societies.  
This pathology frame which dominates academic work of 
conspiracy theories is problematic for a number of reasons. It can, 
first of all, be questioned how illusory and paranoid conspiracy 
theories really are when there are so many cases of state-run 
conspiracies in the past that have actually happened. Think of the 
Watergate scandal, the CIA mind control program MK-Ultra, FBI’s 
counter intelligence program COINTELPRO, the Iran-Contra Affair, 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments, and more recently the LIBOR 
scandal or the NSA intelligence operations revealed by WikiLeaks and 
Edward Snowden. More important than their potential veracity is that 
the pathology frame does not help in any way to understand the huge 
appeal conspiracy theories have for many people. Unless one wants 
to contend that we are surrounded by a bunch of delusional and angry 
minds set out to destroy us (and regress in a conspiracy theory of one’s 
own), this rather dominant perspective gives no sociological grip on 
a cultural phenomenon as prominent as conspiracy culture. Thus, if 
we want to grasp why so many people today engage with these 
alternative forms of knowledge, then we should explore such 
conspiratorial understandings without the need to disqualify or 
compare them to certain moral or epistemological standards. This is 
what I set out to do with this ethnographic study of what I call the 
Dutch conspiracy milieu: to see the world from their perspective and 
to grasp their motivations, practices and products. Such an effort 
towards verstehen is largely absent in the academic analysis of 
conspiracy culture, but is central to the long interpretative tradition 
of the social sciences in which I situate this study.  
I build on the work scholars who have similarly moved away 
from such psycho-pathological accounts (Dean, 1998; Fenster, 1999; 
Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000). Mostly coming from the field of 
cultural studies, such scholars dissect and analyze the many cultural 
forms in which the themes of paranoia and conspiracy theory surface 
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in Western societies: from alien abduction stories to major 
Hollywood movies, and from rap music that discuss life in the hood, 
to highbrow tales of Kafkaesque bureaucratic entrapment in postwar 
literature. Deploying a discourse of conspiracy is, according to these 
scholars, a broad, cultural attempt to grapple with the complexities, 
anxieties, and inequalities induced by large-scale social developments 
(globalization, mediatization, technocratization, corporatization) and 
the autonomous workings of opaque systems (bureaucracies, 
capitalist systems, mass-communication technologies). The idea of 
conspiracy offers an odd sort of comfort: it makes sense of 
unexplainable, complex events. However ingenious their analyses 
generally are, their sole reliance on conspiracy texts (books, films, 
social theory, music lyrics, newspapers, urban legends, TV-series, 
etc.) leaves a blind spot for the variety of people, meanings, practices, 
and experiences that one might assume exist in the conspiracy milieu; 
let alone for the disagreement, opposition, and conflict within that 
subcultural world itself. 
I therefore depart from this line of research by sociologizing 
the study of conspiracy culture. This means, firstly, that I explore it 
as a culture in its own right: conspiracy culture should be seen as a 
relatively autonomous constellation of categories of meaning that are 
shaped by (and direct) social behavior (Alexander, 2003; Houtman 
and Achterberg, 2016). It also means that I follow an ethnographic 
approach, whereby I research the actual people engaging with conspiracy 
theories. Who are they and what do they think and do? The explicit 
goal is to get into the lives of these people: to understand their ideas 
of what the world looks like, to understand their ways of making sense 
of reality, and to understand their experiences of being in this world. 
This brings me to my overall research question: what does conspiracy 
culture empirically look like? What are the ideas, practices, 
biographies, and products of people who inhabit this subculture, and 
how are these related to the mainstream? And secondly, how can the 
contemporary popularity of conspiracy theories be explained? 
To answer these research questions, I immersed myself in the 
Dutch conspiracy milieu for about two years, during which time I got 
acquainted with a range of different people, attended many of their 
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social gatherings, built rapport, and was recognized by insiders as a 
trustworthy person. I read their posts, articles, and books; held in-
depth interviews with them in the safe surroundings of their own 
homes; visited their performances in public venues; participated in 
the (political) activities they organized; watched their documentaries; 
and stayed connected and informed through their social media. I 
immersed myself into this subculture in order to gain as much of an 
insider’s perspective as possible. I studied not only who these people 
are and what they think, but also what they actually do with these 
ideas. Their various practices, showed me that conspiracy theories are 
not merely ideas formulated in the abstract, but that they spur much 
real-life action and incite both cooperation and conflict between their 
adherents. In the following, I will draw the many different findings of 
this study together along the three conceptual moves that I advance in 
the introduction towards a more complex and empirically rich 
sociological understanding of this phenomenon: a focus on meaning, 
diversity and relationality. 
Meaning. To take into account the sociological problematics 
of pathologizing conspiracy culture, I have studied the thought and 
practice of conspiracy theorists without the need to measure these 
against certain (unquestioned) standards of normality. My argument 
is that when the effort is verstehen, the question whether conspiracy 
theories are in fact illusory, paranoid, or dangerous is simply not 
relevant. As with anthropological studies of non-Western cultures, in 
which it would be considered an error to measure beliefs and 
practices against one’s own conceptions of causality, truth, and reality 
(e.g. Geertz, 1973; Taussig, 1987), so too is it not important for my 
research to determine whether conspiracy theories are actually right 
or wrong, true or false, rational or delusional. What is relevant to 
study—and empirically feasible—is what people (and, in this case, 
conspiracy theorists) think and do in their everyday lives; in other 
words, how they make meaning in an essentially meaningless world 
(cf. Alexander, 2003; Berger and Luckman, 1966). This is then 
exactly what I have done throughout this study by focusing on how 
people active in the Dutch conspiracy milieu construe and understand 
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themselves (chapter five and six), others (chapters six and seven) and 
the world around them (chapter three and four). 
The first and foremost meaning that conspiracy theories have 
in a contemporary post-industrial Western world is the expression of 
a clear discontent with the way our societies work, and in particular 
with how modern institutions such as finance, media, business, 
science and politics function (chapter three, four, and five). 
Conspiracy theorists are bothered by the fractional reserve system 
virtualizing the money supply, they deplore what has become of the 
watchdog function of journalism as media ownership consolidates, 
they are worried about the powers of large multinational corporations 
in a globalized market, they mourn the pollution of science by other 
interests than a pure quest for knowledge, and they follow anxiously 
the long-arm of the (Orwellian) state when surveillance technologies 
proliferate. Moreover, conspiracy theories provide a framework for 
people to formulate and channel their criticism and discontent about 
the incessant concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a 
mighty few—a concern that is now quite widespread (cf. Piketty, 
2014; Stiglitz, 2012).  
However, when looked at from the perspective of the 
interacting individual, it becomes clear that conspiracy theories mean 
much more than the channeling of societal discontent (chapter five). 
For example, the occult, mystical, and spiritual components of many 
conspiracy theories provide existential meaning and purpose in a 
disenchanted world. Alternative origin stories, narratives of 
supernatural and extraterrestrial existence, and Eastern philosophies 
of life make up an important part of the conspiracy milieu and fill the 
existential gap for those who have separated from traditional religious 
institutions. But conspiracy theories also speak to changing ways of 
experiencing reality. In this digitalized and mediatized world, fact and 
fiction easily collide and manipulated depictions of reality are often 
difficult to separate from truthful ones. The practices of many 
conspiracy theorists, such as searching, watching, analyzing, 
deconstructing, and reassembling news items and videos, might be 
seen as popular ways to grapple with this dissolution of the Real. 
Likewise, conspiracy theories signify the cultivation of a critical 
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citizenry and the democratization of knowledge. Many of us are 
trained to critically assess the integrity and truthfulness of all 
knowledge claims, as well as their bearers. People active in the 
conspiracy milieu often pointed to their education as formative in 
their position of skepticism towards official explanations. Many of us 
no longer readily accept the knowledge claims that experts make, and 
such professionals can expect instead an ever more demanding, 
knowledgeable, and critical populace challenging their authority. The 
contemporary ease with which we can travel and experience different 
people and cultures engenders, furthermore, personal reflection on 
one’s own way of thinking about truth and reality. Some of my 
respondents spoke of these intercultural experiences as radically 
changing or uprooting their own taken-for-granted ways of seeing the 
world. In a globalized world, where cultural relativism becomes 
increasingly sensible, conspiracy theories are just another way of 
understanding reality.  
Lastly, I argue that we should assess the meaning of 
conspiracy theories from the perspective of identity formations 
(chapter six). Since traditional worldviews have lost much of their 
plausibility and the world has become an increasingly plural space 
where choice abounds (Berger, 1967; Campbell, 2007), identity is no 
longer stable, given, or destined, but has become a reflexive project (cf. 
Bauman, 1995; Giddens, 1991; Turkle, 1995). We now need to 
actively think, choose, reflect on, buy, oppose, experiment, and play 
with the elements that make up our sense of self. The conspiracy 
milieu is, from this perspective, a relatively open social network 
providing cultural resources for identity construction. By following 
conspiracy theories, and by being active in that milieu—sharing and 
disputing each other’s ideas, worldviews, and life-styles; adding novel 
elements; producing new insights and offering them for further 
consumption—people position themselves in the world as certain 
human beings, as conspiracy theorists. In and through these inherently 
social activities, identities are formed. My respondents are well aware 
of the social stigma surrounding the particular identity of conspiracy 
theorist, but they are not passive victims. Instead, they appropriate 
the image of the radical freethinker to differentiate themselves from 
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the dormant masses or sheeple who simply follow the crowd. As such, 
they reverse the stigma of being irrational dupes and re-claim their 
rationality: they in the mainstream are in fact the gullible ones. 
Despite the active reversal of the stigma surrounding conspiracy 
theories, people in the Dutch conspiracy milieu nevertheless reclaim 
that pejorative label to distance themselves from the truly irrational 
ones. Conspiracy theories are, in other words, multifunctional tropes 
for identity formations.  
Diversity. Whereas the majority of scholars homogenize 
conspiracy culture by focusing on its alleged uniformity (in terms of 
style, thematic content, narrative structure, and explanatory logic), I 
have argued that this is not a sociologically productive strategy as it 
obscures diversity in the conspiracy milieu, leads to stereotypes, and 
enables processes of Othering (cf. Bhabha, 1983; Pickering, 2001; 
Weis, 1995). Instead, I explicitly set out in this study to explore the 
diversity of conspiracy culture following my ethnographic approach. 
There is, first of all, variety in the conspiracy theories themselves 
(chapter three). Although quite some of them share the notion of a 
secret group pulling the strings of world affairs behind the scenes, the 
designation of who exactly constitutes that secret group leads to a 
diversity of opinions. Some speak of a worldwide network 
shapeshifting extraterrestrial reptoids, whereas others assign the 
relatively mundane cabals of an international power elite. But, as 
Knight (2000) and Melley (2000) argued some time ago, 
contemporary conspiracy theories also often lack a concrete and 
clearly-defined enemy or cabal, and instead tend toward more elusive 
and intangible webs of conspiring powers. In the Dutch conspiracy 
milieu, I encountered conspiracy theories that detailed the 
functioning of entire societal systems like the banking, 
pharmaceutical, and food industries in which there were no concrete 
conspiring agents, yet the often bizarre alignments of interests “can 
only be described as conspiratorial, even when we know there has 
probably been no deliberate plotting” (Knight, 2000:32). Moreover, 
where some scholars argue for the historical continuity of conspiracy 
theories (e.g. Byford, 2011; ; Pipes, 1997; Uscinski and Parent, 
2014), I have observed that many conspiracy theories that are popular 
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today detail societal and political issues that are unmistakably 
contemporary, such as the 2008 financial crisis or advanced 
surveillance technologies. Diversity in conspiracy theories exists, in 
other words, across history and location. Like any other cultural 
phenomena, conspiracy theories are products of their time and place.  
A second feature of diversity in the conspiracy culture is in 
regards to epistemology. While conspiracy theorists are often said to 
be obsessively searching for facts and evidence, my study suggests that 
besides such modernist quests for proofs, there are many more 
epistemologies popular in the conspiracy milieu, such as feeling, 
experiencing, and imagining. As David Icke’s super-conspiracy 
theory shows (chapter four), conspiracy theorists do not base their 
claims on scientific facts alone, but treat a variety of sources of 
knowledge as reliable: the perennial knowledge of ancient cultures, 
the practical wisdom of gained experience, or the emotive imageries 
technology and science fiction are examples. This epistemological 
pluralism, drawing from different sources of knowledge, is 
characteristic of the contemporary world of conspiracy theorists. In 
an age where no epistemic authority has a monopoly on truth, the best 
one can do is to draw from a multitude of epistemic sources.  
Nevertheless, there are certainly divergent ideas of truth in 
the Dutch conspiracy milieu. Some people prioritize solid facts and 
clear evidence, and hold firm beliefs in an absolute truth. Others are 
more permissive towards other ways of knowing and may see truth as 
something subjective or situated (chapter six). They argued that truth 
is personal, and is measured according to what resonates with 
somebody. People are therefore free to pick-and-mix from various 
epistemic sources of knowledge that are available. By contrast, others 
argued that all knowledge of the world is the product of local 
circumstances and there can therefore be no privileged truth. The 
best one can do is assess and compare the different truths and 
underlying epistemologies. Thus, while some prioritize the scientific 
method in their search for truth, others allow for epistemological 
strategies when claiming knowledge. Whether and how this 
epistemological pluralism operates at the level of the individual 
(fusing multiple sources of knowledge) or at the collective level 
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(different subcultures prioritize different epistemologies) is a matter 
of future research. 
This brings me to a third feature of diversity in the conspiracy 
milieu, which has to do with the people themselves. In contrast to the 
dominant stereotype of the conspiracy theorist as a petty-minded 
paranoid espousing hatred and bigotry, the Dutch conspiracy milieu 
harbors many kinds of people. Over this period of fieldwork, I came 
into contact with young urban do-it-yourselfers, baby boomers drawn 
to eastern philosophies of life, technical pundits, libertarian 
vagabonds, and many more. As recent quantitative studies affirm, the 
popularity of conspiracy theories cuts across age, gender, ideological 
conviction, religion, income, education, and ethnicity (e.g. Oliver 
and Wood, 2012; Uscinski and Parent, 2014). There is not a typical 
conspiracy theorist, but as the saying goes, “we are all conspiracy 
theorists now” (Fenster, 2008, Knight, 2002). Basing myself on 
people’s understandings of themselves and others, I have further 
explored this diversity in the Dutch conspiracy milieu (chapter six). 
Following their own ways of associating with some and opposing 
others, three types of conspiracy theorists emerge: activists, retreaters, 
and mediators. Although these three subcultures of the conspiracy 
milieu are alike in their opposition to the cultural mainstream, they 
have radically different ideas about what conspiracy theories mean to 
them and integrate those ideas into their daily lives in distinctive ways. 
Bringing people with different ideas together (mediators) or improving 
oneself first so as to be a model that others can emulate (retreaters), 
are ideals to live by formulated against the militant activism of some 
conspiracy theorists. A focus on diversity brings these lines of 
agreement and dispute to the surface, which otherwise would have 
remained hidden under the header of one uniform and deviant 
culture. 
Relationality. Whereas most scholars have studied conspiracy 
culture in isolation by focusing on inherent characteristics, I have 
argued for the need to take a relational perspective and study 
conspiracy culture in its social, political, and historical contexts. 
Conspiracy culture does not exist in a cultural vacuum, but is shaped 
and formed by the interactions with these meaningful others. When 
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studied in isolation, such relations with other actors (e.g. media, 
politics or science) are obscured and larger contexts within which 
they operate are neglected. My relational perspective took practical 
shape in this study first by conceptualizing the research object, that is, 
the conspiracy theory/ist, as the product of labelling practices (cf. 
Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). I have 
taken lists from both conspiracy theory debunkers and conspiracy 
theory adherents as tools to delineate my research object on the basis 
of a relational instead of an essentialist understanding of what 
conspiracy theories are (chapter two and three). Much agreement 
exists about what sites can be considered conspiracy theory websites. 
Surprisingly, both lists largely coincide and the selection of websites 
I took is hardly controversial. Controversy, I would say, exists much 
more on the level of each particular conspiracy theory and on the level 
of identification processes.  
The dominant, stereotypical image of the conspiracy theorist 
is, after all, vehemently contested by people active in the Dutch 
conspiracy milieu. They actively resist definitional practices of 
marginalization and stigmatization by distinguishing themselves from 
the gullible mainstream as critical freethinkers and by identifying others 
in the milieu as the actual conspiracy theorists (chapter five). 
Moreover, by following the ways in which people identify with some 
and disassociate from others, I have shown that there are considerable 
lines of disagreement within the Dutch conspiracy milieu, especially 
about the militant activism that is often ascribed to conspiracy 
theorists. Following these divergent views on how to live with 
conspiracy theories, three different types or subcultures of the 
conspiracy milieu become apparent: the aforementioned activists, 
retreaters and mediators. The point here is that a relational 
perspective on identity formations, focusing on people’s own ideas of 
self and other, led me to see beyond the stereotypical image of the 
paranoid conspiracy theorist.  
This relational perspective also helped me to conceive of the 
popularity of conspiracy theories in the light of larger societal 
developments. When people are asked to explain their turn towards 
these alternative forms of knowledge, they situate their biographic 
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trajectories firmly in larger processes of cultural change: 
secularization, mediatization, democratization, and globalization 
(chapter five). They show, in other words, how biography, society, 
and history are fundamentally connected (cf. Elias, 1978; Mills, 
2000). I argue that these historical developments set in motion the 
dissolution of a stable truth, opening a cultural space for conspiracy 
theories to thrive. Processes of secularization unsettle religious 
truths, but as the metaphysical longings of people remain, a wide 
variety of alternative spiritual truths are on the rise. Mediatization 
speaks to a (digital) world where fact and fiction are increasingly 
difficult to distinguish and truth is able to be manipulated by those 
making representations of the world. The democratization of 
knowledge cultivates a critical and reflexive habitus that stimulates 
people to continuously assess the truthfulness of all knowledge claims 
and their bearers. Globalization, at last, shows how one’s own 
cultural truths are put into perspective when other outlooks on the 
world are encountered. These large-scale sociological processes, 
tangible in the life stories of my respondents, explain the 
contemporary popularity of conspiracy theories for the simple reason 
that cultural change implies changing perceptions of truth, 
knowledge, and power, and thus changing perceptions of the 
plausibility of conspiracy theories.  
The relevance of a relational approach to the study of 
conspiracy culture is perhaps greatest when situating conspiracy 
theories in a broader field of knowledge contestation. Following such 
a perspective as developed in the social studies of science (e.g. Bloor, 
1991; Gieryn, 1999; Martin, 1996), conspiracy theories are 
agnostically put on par with other (e.g. scientific) claims on truth and 
sociological attention is directed to the rhetorical and practical 
strategies of both parties whose efforts are partly to secure epistemic 
authority. In chapter seven, I have shown that social scientists appeal 
to the positivist virtues of modern science when discarding conspiracy 
theories, while conspiracy theorists challenge that potent public 
image of science with constructivist arguments coming from the social 
sciences themselves. This elective affinity between conspiracy 
theories and sociological theories comes back time and again when 
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studying conspiracy culture, and although I could only treat it 
marginally here, it is surely worthy of more sociological research, if 
only because such affinity fuels the boundary work against conspiracy 
theories in the first place. 
Since I have only started situating conspiracy theories in 
broader fields of knowledge contestation, I believe further research 
on the more acute instances of such battles for truth and authority 
could particularly benefit from this relational perspective. The 
popular resistance against vaccinations which are thought to be 
harmful, possibly causing autism; the idea that chemicals are spread 
by airplanes over clear skies; or the efforts made by some to put the 
banking system on the political agenda are all ways to challenge the 
official explanation of a situation. To be sure, each approach can count 
on steep resistance from established parties who deploy myriad 
strategies in their defense. However, this approach to the study of 
such truth wars would, sociologically speaking, be sensitive to the 
arguments and tropes deployed by all parties involved, whether they 
are socially sanctioned or culturally marginalized. If I will not be 
doing such empirical research from the battlefields myself, I hope to 
see others doing it because the proliferation of such societal battles 
for truth demand an agnostic instead of a privileged sociological 
approach. 
Conclusion. The question of truth plays a central role in this 
study. Conspiracy theorists commonly distrust the official story: 
while mainstream society may think that the reality we are presented 
with is true, they have a hard time believing what epistemic 
authorities sanction. What most of us take as self-evident and true is 
subject to suspicion and distrust among conspiracy theorists. In the 
conclusion, I elaborate further on what I consider to be crucial aspects 
in the understanding of conspiracy culture, namely the contested 
status of institutions, the knowledge they produce, and a 
hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Throughout this study I have shown that major societal 
institutions such as science, politics, media, and religion attract a 
great deal of suspicion and discontent in the conspiracy milieu. 
Conspiracy theorists argue that our institutions are corrupted by 
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bureaucratization, political games, corporate alignments, ideological 
dogmatism, and many other consequential things. They hold that 
social institutions no longer function as they should and cannot be 
trusted. And they are not alone, as societal trust in major institutions 
has been on the decline for decades (cf. Inglehart, 1997; Moy and 
Pfau, 2000; Misztal, 2013). But while conspiracy theorists are highly 
critical towards mainstream institutions, the purpose and function of 
those institutions is not entirely rejected. Indeed, they often 
emphasize the beauty of religion, the importance of politics, the 
marvels of science, and the relevance of the media. There are all kinds 
of initiatives in the conspiracy milieu to purify these institutions from 
the contaminants that have corrupted them in the first place. For 
example, new political parties and media platforms are erected and 
myriad forms of alternative spirituality flourish. This is a broader 
trend, since Western European societies have experienced strong 
processes of de-institutionalization which allow for new forms of 
institutionalization to appear. Conspiracy culture should be seen as 
part of that broader societal current of cultural purification: protecting 
our institutions from their own degeneration into meaningless form 
(Houtman, Laermans and Simons, 2016). The broad suspicion and 
distrust of conspiracy theorists towards institutions is not just a 
dangerous menace to society, as some would have it, but an impetus 
for social and cultural change as well.  
Along with a discontent about the functioning of institutions, 
is a distrust towards the knowledge they produce. I argue in the 
conclusion that this has all to do with how we in the Western world 
legitimize claims on truth, namely supporting them with the 
“metanarrative of science” (Lyotard, 1984). Yet it is precisely this 
belief in the possibility of objective knowledge or truth that has 
become problematic in contemporary societies (Seidman, 1994). 
Like social constructivists, conspiracy theorists emphasize that 
knowledge is always the product of a certain people in a certain place 
and time. This understanding opens up the possibility of manipulation 
and puts the question of power at center stage: if reality is constructed, 
then the question not only becomes by whom and how, but also with 
what objective? Conspiracy theorists stage a contest over reality. Stripped 
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from all the rhetoric that gives plausibility to your claims on truth, a 
strategy academics might call deconstruction,  what remains of the 
quality of your knowledge, conspiracy theorists ask. There are many 
such truth wars out there today, such as the controversies around E-
numbers, climate change, vaccinations, the dangers of 
electromagnetic radiation, and many more. Conspiracy culture 
represents this broader societal conflict over knowledge and truth in 
contemporary societies in which questions of what counts as legitimate 
knowledge and why are frequently posed. 
Given the corruption of mainstream institutions and the easy 
manipulation of facts, conspiracy theorists distrust official 
explanations and look for a deeper truth, an alternate reality that 
explains what is really the case, since “nothing is what it seems.” To 
get to that level of explanation, they start by critically assessing and 
deconstructing the realities we are presented with: what does that 
simulation of reality actually look like, who is involved in its making, 
and are there any clues or symbols pointing to another truth? Their 
goal is to unveil or de-mask the official story, which most people 
uncritically accept as the truth. This interpretative style of looking for 
concealed truths hidden behind or beneath the ordinary level of 
everyday experience is not reserved for conspiracy theorists alone, 
but stands in a long intellectual tradition by which people approach 
the ordinary and mundane with skepticism and suspicion. Paul 
Ricoeur calls that style “the hermeneutics of suspicion” and locates it 
in the thought and writings of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (1970), 
but it drives many contemporary scholarly approaches in a wide range 
of academic traditions as well, including literary and cultural studies, 
narrative research, semiotics, feminist theory, critical theory, and 
sociology as a whole (cf. Birchall, 2006; Felski, 2011; Houtman, 
2008; Josselson, 2004; Latour, 2004b).  They all tend to be myth 
busters, claiming to have insight into the real, the true, or the deeper 
meanings of life, which are situated behind, beneath, or beyond the 
everyday ideas and experiences of ordinary people. Given this larger 
cultural history, it is hard to set conspiracy theorists aside as deploying 
a pathological interpretative style, as most scholars have (e.g. Barkun, 
2006: 4; Byford, 2011: 75; Pipes, 1997: 45).  
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These three topics all direct attention to the fact that the 
objective, unequivocal truths offered by our epistemic institutions are 
for many people quite implausible. Based on my empirical material, I 
argue that historical developments of secularization, mediatization, 
democratization, and globalization add to a mounting disbelief in the 
possibility of a single objective, irrefutable truth. Because of these 
broad cultural changes, we live in a world where multiple takes on 
reality are able to exist side by side. Especially because these epistemic 
institutions cannot provide us as before with a strong sense of security 
about the truthfulness of the knowledge they produce, it becomes 
difficult to trust the realities they present us. Instead, we see a 
plurality of competing versions of the real available for consumption. 
For example, one might think of the many different scenarios of what 
happened on 9/11, each of which creates its own more or less 
convincing reality—each of them could be true. Since we are 
bombarded today with different and sometimes even contradictory 
information about what is the case, the truth of the situation becomes 
more and more elusive. The sociological question that arises is, how 
do people deal with that epistemic instability, living their lives in a 
world where truth has become problematic and difficult to ascertain?  
Based on my analyses of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, I 
conclude this study by contrasting two ideal-typically opposed ways 
to do so. On the one hand is a modernist quest for the truth in which 
people ardently look for real evidence and hard facts. This strategy holds 
that solid research and firm logic can disclose truths concealed by the 
many illusory stories we are told (cf. Bauman, 1987; Giddens, 1998; 
Latour, 1993a). But conspiracy culture embodies many postmodern 
characteristics as well, such as an incredulity towards objective truth 
claims, a prioritization of other ways of knowing (emotions, feelings, 
intuition, personal experience, custom, metaphysics, tradition, 
cosmology, myth, religious sentiment, mystical experience), the 
bricolage of new realities from different forms of knowledge, and a 
demand for egalitarian roles in relation to the experts (cf. Bauman, 
1991; Ritzer, 1997; Rosenau, 1992). Conspiracy culture, so goes my 
last argument, speaks to us about a world where the truth is no longer 
assured, but “out there” for us to weigh, juggle, construct, assess, 
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remodel, measure, combat, analyze, play with, and struggle with. 
And that is no easy task, for none of us. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting  
De waarheid op losse schroeven: complotdenken in een 
tijd van epistemische instabiliteit 
Complottheorieën—verklaringen van sociale verschijnselen door te 
wijzen op de verborgen handelingen van bepaalde (groepen) 
mensen—af zijn alomtegenwoordig vandaag. Zulke verhalen over de 
echte waarheid achter terroristische aanslagen (denk aan 9/11 of Parijs 
2015) of achter collectieve vaccinatieprogramma’s (denk aan de 
Varkensgriep of het HPV virus) zwermen massaal rond in onze 
Westerse samenlevingen. Ze zijn voor velen een genormaliseerde 
manier geworden om te begrijpen wat er daadwerkelijk gebeurt in onze 
wereld. Complottheorieën komen ook veelvuldig voor in de 
populaire cultuur: films, boeken en tv-series zoals The Matrix, De Da 
Vinci Code of de The X-files trekken enorme publieken. Maar ondanks 
dat complottheorieën zich van de marge naar het hoofdpodium van 
onze maatschappij hebben bewogen is het begrip van dit verschijnsel 
nogal beperkt. Zowel binnen als buiten de wetenschap heerst het idee 
dat complottheorieën paranoïde waanvoorstellingen zijn, irrationele 
lezingen van de echte realiteit. De mensen die erin geloven moeten 
daarom wel net zo gek zijn.  
Dit gepathologiseerde begrip van complotdenken leunt sterk 
op het werk van wetenschapsfilosoof Karl Popper (2013[1945]) en 
geschiedkundige Richard Hofstadter (1999[1966]) en het 
onderbouwt veel academisch werk sindsdien (e.g. Barkun, 2006; 
Byford, 2011; Pipes, 1997; Robins and Post, 1997; Sunstein and 
Vermeule, 2009). Zulke geleerden zien complottheorieën, in 
navolging van Popper, ten eerste als slechte wetenschap: ze reduceren 
complexe verschijnselen tot simpele verklaringen, maken verkeerd 
gebruik van bewijs, zoeken selectief naar bevestiging van hun ideeën, 
zijn ongevoelig voor tegenstrijdig bewijs, enzovoort. 
Complottheorieën zijn, volgens deze redenering, seculiere 
overblijfselen van onze religieuze geschiedenis: ze zien een wereld die 
met opzet in plaats van willekeur geordend is. Deze wetenschappers 
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zien complottheorieën, in navolging van Hofstadter, ten tweede als 
paranoïde politiek: ze zijn de gesystematiseerde imaginaire 
angstbeelden van samenzwering en bedrog, en bezien de wereld als 
een apocalyptische strijd tussen absoluut goed en kwaad. Omdat 
complotdenkers tegen de politieke deugden van gematigdheid, 
overleg en consensus in gaan, bedrijven zij geen goede politiek, zo is 
hun argument. Aan de hand van dit tweevoudig gepathologiseerde 
beeld van complottheorieën waarschuwen deze denkers voor de 
maatschappelijke gevaren van een populairder wordend 
complotdenken: het zou leiden tot een demonisering van bepaalde 
groepen, culturele conflicten, politiek extremisme, radicalisering, 
geweld, terrorisme, en ga zo maar door. Complottheorieën zijn, 
volgens dit perspectief, een groot gevaar voor de gezondheid en het 
functioneren van onze democratische samenlevingen. 
Maar deze gepathologiseerde, en nogal dominant aanwezige 
lezing van complottheorieën is voor een aantal redenen problematisch 
in de wetenschappelijke studie naar dit fenomeen. Het kan, ten 
eerste, sterk afgevraagd worden in hoeverre complottheorieën nu 
echt ingebeeld en paranoïde zijn wanneer er zo veel voorbeelden te 
noemen zijn van daadwerkelijk gebeurde samenzweringen. Denk aan 
het Watergate schandaal, het CIA hersenspoelprogramma MK-Ultra, 
FBI’s staatsveiligheidsprogramma COINTELPRO, het Iran-Contra 
schandaal, de Tuskegee syfilis experimenten, en meer recent, de 
afluisterpraktijken van de NSA die door Wikileaks en Snowden 
onthuld zijn of het LIBOR schandaal waaruit bleek dat banken 
jarenlang belangrijke rentepercentages in hun voordeel 
manipuleerden. Maar misschien nog wel belangrijker voor mijn 
betoog is wel dat zo’n gepathologiseerd begrip geenszins helpt bij het 
begrijpen van waarom zo veel mensen nu aangetrokken zijn tot 
complottheorieën. Tenzij iemand wil beargumenteren dat we 
tegenwoordig omgeven zijn door grote groepen gekke en gevaarlijke 
mensen die erop uit zijn om ons te vernietigen (en zo af te dwalen in 
een eigen complottheorie), geeft dit dominante beeld geen 
sociologische grip op een cultureel verschijnsel zo populair als 
complotdenken vandaag. Als we willen begrijpen waarom zo veel 
mensen vandaag met deze alternatieve vormen van kennis omgaan, 
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dan moeten we de beweegredenen van deze mensen onderzoeken 
zonder deze te (willen) meten aan bepaalde epistemologische of 
morele standaarden. Dit is dan ook wat ik precies van plan ben met 
deze etnografische studie van wat het Nederlandse 
complotdenkersmilieu genoemd kan worden: de wereld (laten) zien 
door de ogen van deze mensen en hun motivaties en praktijken 
begrijpen. Deze poging tot verstehen is grotendeels afwezig in de 
wetenschappelijke studie naar complottheorieën, maar staat centraal 
in een lange interpretatieve traditie binnen de sociale wetenschappen 
waarin ik deze studie situeer.  
Ik bouw voort in deze studie op het werk van een andere 
groep academici die eveneens wijzen op de tekortkomingen van zulke 
psychopathologische verklaringen (Dean, 1998; Fenster, 1999; 
Knight, 2000; Melley, 2000). Deze geleerden, voornamelijk 
afkomstig uit de cultural studies discipline, ontleden en analyseren de 
verschillende verschijningsvormen waarin de thema’s van paranoia en 
complottheorieën in onze cultuur voorkomen: van getuigenissen over 
buitenaardse ontvoeringen tot grote Hollywood producties, en van 
rap muziek uit de achterbuurten van Amerikaanse steden tot 
Kafkaiaanse verhalen over bureaucratische beknelling in de moderne 
literatuur. Het inzetten van complottheorieën is, volgens deze 
auteurs, een veralgemeende culturele manier om om te gaan met de 
moeilijkheden, angsten en ongelijkheden die voortgebracht zijn door 
grote sociale veranderingen (denk aan globalisering, mediatisering, 
technocratisering, commercialisering, etc.) en de autonome werking 
van ondoorzichtige sociale systemen (bureaucratieën, kapitalisme, 
massa media en informatietechnologieën). Het idee van een complot 
geeft, volgens hen, een eigenaardige vorm van troost en gerief: het 
maakt het onverklaarbare in deze wereld begrijpelijk. Hoe vernuftig 
deze verklaringen ook zijn, hun nadruk op complot teksten (zoals in 
boeken, films, sociologische theorie, muziekteksten, kranten, mythes 
en tv-series) laat een blinde vlek voor de veelzijdigheid van mensen, 
betekenissen, praktijken en ervaringen die verwacht kunnen worden 
te bestaan in het complotdenkersmilieu, laat staan voor de 
onenigheden, tegenstelling en conflicten binnen die subculturele 
wereld. 
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Ik vertrek daarom van deze groep wetenschappers door de 
studie van complotdenken te sociologiseren. Dat betekent ten eerste dat 
ik het onderzoek als een cultuur op zichzelf: complotdenken moet 
gezien worden als een relatief autonome constellatie van betekenissen 
die gevormd zijn door sociaal gedrag en deze ook weer beïnvloeden 
(e.g. Alexander, 2003; Houtman and Achterberg, 2016). Het 
betekent eveneens dat ik een etnografische benadering volg en de 
daadwerkelijke mensen die zich bezighouden met complottheorieën ga 
onderzoeken. Wie zijn deze mensen, wat denken ze nu precies en wat 
doen ze eigenlijk daarmee? Het expliciete doel is om in de levens van 
deze mensen te kruipen: om hun ideeën van hoe de wereld in elkaar 
steekt te begrijpen, om hun manieren van betekenisgeving te 
begrijpen en om hun ervaringen van bestaan in deze wereld te 
begrijpen. Dit brengt mij tot de algemene onderzoeksvraag van deze 
studie: hoe ziet de cultuur van complotdenken er empirisch gezien nu 
eigenlijk uit? Wat zijn de ideeën, praktijken, biografieën en producten 
van de mensen die onderdeel zijn van dit milieu, en hoe verhouden 
deze zich tot de mainstream? Ten tweede, hoe kan de huidige 
populariteit van complottheorieën verklaard worden? Om deze 
vragen te beantwoorden heb ik mijzelf twee jaar lang 
ondergedompeld in het Nederlandse complotdenkersmilieu. In dit 
tijd heb ik een hoop verschillende mensen ontmoet, veel van hun 
sociale ontmoetingen bijgewoond, vertrouwen in het milieu 
opgebouwd waardoor ik langzamerhand gezien werd als een 
betrouwbaar persoon, hun websites, Facebook posts, artikelen en 
boeken geanalyseerd, geparticipeerd in de (politieke) activiteiten die 
zij organiseerden, hun optredens in publieke ruimtes bezocht, diepte-
interviews gehouden in de veilige omgeving van hun eigen huis, hun 
documentaires gezien en was ik verbonden aan en werd ik 
geïnformeerd door hun sociale media. Ik bestudeerde niet alleen wie 
deze mensen zijn en wat zij denken maar ook wat ze nou met die 
ideeën doen. Deze praktijken lieten mij zien dat complottheorieën 
niet enkel ideeën in het abstracte geformuleerd zijn, maar 
daadwerkelijke handelingen in het echte leven stimuleren en zowel 
samenwerking als strijd opleveren tussen complotdenkers. In het 
volgende zal ik de verschillende bevindingen van mijn studie 
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bijeenbrengen langs de drie conceptuele bewegingen die ik in de 
introductie uiteenzet om de wetenschappelijke studie naar 
complotdenken op een empirisch en theoretisch hoger niveau te 
krijgen: deze bewegingen leggen een nadruk op betekenis, diversiteit en 
relationaliteit.  
Betekenis. Gezien de sociologische problematiek van het 
pathologiseren van complotdenken, bestudeer ik de ideeën en 
praktijken van complotdenkers zonder deze te willen vergelijken met 
bepaalde (onbevraagde) morele en/of wetenschappelijke 
standaarden. Mijn punt is dat wanneer we dit fenomeen willen 
begrijpen het simpelweg niet relevant is om ons af te vragen of 
complottheorieën nu echt ingebeeld, paranoïde of gevaarlijk zijn. Net 
zoals het onzinnig zou zijn om in de antropologische studie van niet-
westerse culturen hun ideeën en praktijken af te meten aan onze 
ideeën van causaliteit, waarheid en werkelijkheid (e.g. Geertz, 1973; 
Taussig, 1986), zo zou het voor het sociologische begrip van 
complotdenken eveneens onzinnig zijn om te onderzoeken of 
complottheorieën goed of fout, waar of vals, rationeel of irrationeel 
zouden zijn. Wat wel relevant is om te onderzoeken—en bovendien 
empirisch haalbaar—is wat mensen (en in dit geval complotdenkers) 
denken en doen in hun dagelijks leven. Met andere woorden, hoe zij 
betekenis maken in een in essentie betekenisloze wereld (cf. 
Alexander, 2003; Berger and Luckman, 1966). Dit heb ik dan ook 
voortdurend gedaan in deze studie: hoe construeren en zien mensen 
in het Nederlandse complotdenkersmilieu zichzelf (hoofdstukken vijf 
en zes), anderen (hoofdstukken zes en zeven) en de wereld om hun 
heen (hoofdstukken drie en vier).  
De eerste en meest voorname betekenis die 
complottheorieën hebben in onze huidige postindustriële wereld is de 
uiting van een helder ongenoegen met de manier waarop onze 
samenlevingen, en in het bijzonder hoe onze moderne instituties zoals 
de media, wetenschap, politiek, handel, en zo voort functioneren 
(hoofdstukken drie, vier en vijf). We hebben gezien dat 
complotdenkers zich storen aan het financiële systeem van fractioneel 
bankieren wat onze geldvoorraad virtualiseert, het betreuren wat er 
over is van waakhondfunctie van de journalistiek nu vele media zich 
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consolideren in enkele grote bedrijven, bezorgd zijn over de macht 
van grote multinationals in een geglobaliseerde markt, de vervuiling 
van de wetenschap door andere belangen hekelen en de lange arm van 
de (Orwelliaanse) overheid kritisch in de gaten houden nu allerlei 
surveillance technologieën in opkomst zijn. Complottheorieën 
voorzien bovendien in een raamwerk voor mensen om hun kritieken 
en ongenoegen over de toenemende concentratie van macht en 
rijkdom in de handen van een kleine groep te kunnen formuleren en 
kanaliseren, een zorg die nu wijdverspreider is (cf. Piketty, 2014; 
Stiglitz, 2012). 
Maar wanneer we complotdenken bekijken vanuit het 
perspectief van het handelende individu, dan zien we dat het veel 
meer behelst dan simpelweg de uiting van maatschappelijk onbehagen 
(hoofdstuk vijf). Om een paar voorbeelden te noemen: de occulte, 
mystieke en spirituele componenten van veel complottheorieën 
voorzien voor nogal wat mensen in de behoefte naar existentiële 
betekenis en zingeving in een onttoverde wereld. Alternatieve 
oorsprongsverhalen, narratieven over bovennatuurlijk en buitenaards 
leven, en Oosterse levensfilosofieën beslaan een groot deel van het 
complotdenkersmilieu en vullen de existentiële leegte die overbleef 
nadat men de traditionele religieuze instituties de rug toekeerde. 
Maar complottheorieën spreken ook over veranderende manieren 
van het ervaren van realiteit, zo botsen feit en fictie in onze 
gedigitaliseerde en gemediatiseerde wereld makkelijk met elkaar en 
zijn gemanipuleerde beelden van onze wereld maar moeilijk te 
onderscheiden van waarachtige. De praktijken van complotdenkers 
(zoeken, kijken, analyseren, deconstrueren, en herschikken van 
nieuwsonderdelen en video’s) moeten dan ook gezien worden als 
populaire worstelingen met deze ontbinding van het Echte. Op 
eenzelfde andere manier wijzen complottheorieën op de cultivering 
van een kritische bevolking en de democratisering van kennis. Velen 
van ons zijn opgeleid om de integriteit en waarachtigheid van 
kennisclaims en hun producenten kritisch te beoordelen. Mensen 
actief in het complotdenkersmilieu refereren vaak naar hun opleiding 
als vormend in de sceptische houding naar officiële verklaringen. Men 
accepteert de kennisclaims van experts niet zomaar meer, en zulke 
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professionals kunnen op een steeds kritischere, veeleisendere en meer 
geïnformeerde burgers rekenen die hun autoriteit als zodanig 
betwisten. Het gemak, ten slotte, waarmee tegenwoordig gereisd kan 
worden en verschillende volkeren en culturen aan de levende lijve 
ondervonden kunnen worden leidt tot persoonlijke reflecties over 
onze eigen ideeën over waarheid en realiteit. Sommige van mijn 
respondenten spreken over zulke interculturele ervaringen als 
radicaal veranderend of ontwortelend in de manier waarop zij tegen 
hun eigen, vanzelfsprekende, manieren van de wereld interpreteren 
aankijken. In onze geglobaliseerde wereld waar cultuurrelativisme 
steeds aannemelijker wordt, betekenen complottheorieën simpelweg 
een andere manier om de werkelijkheid te begrijpen.  
Ik beargumenteer ten slotte dat de betekenis van 
complottheorieën bekeken moet worden vanuit het perspectief van 
identiteitsvorming (hoofdstuk zes). Omdat traditionele overtuigingen 
veel van hun plausibiliteit hebben verloren en de wereld in 
toenemende mate een veelvoudige ruimte is waar keuze overvloedig 
is (Berger, 1967; Campbell, 2007), is identiteit niet langer iets 
stabiels, gegeven of voorbestemd, maar het is een reflexief project 
geworden (Bauman, 1995; Giddens, 1991; Turkle, 1995). We 
moeten nu actief bezig zijn met het nadenken over, kiezen tussen, en 
experimenteren met de elementen die ons idee van wie we zelf 
(willen) zijn—onze identiteit—vormgeven. Het complotdenkers-
milieu is vanuit dit perspectief bezien een relatief open sociaal 
netwerk dat voorziet in culturele hulpbronnen voor 
identiteitsconstructies. Door het aanhangen van complottheorieën, 
en door actief te zijn in dat milieu, dat wil zeggen, door het 
overnemen, betwisten en herschikken van elkaars ideeën, 
wereldbeelden en leefstijlen, positioneren mensen zichzelf in de 
wereld als bepaalde personen, als complotdenkers. In en door deze 
inherent sociale praktijken worden identiteiten gesmeed. Mijn 
informanten zijn zich terdege bewust van het sociale stigma dat aan 
de identiteit van de complotdenker kleeft, maar zij zijn geen passieve 
slachtoffers. Integendeel, ze eigenen zich het beeld van de radicale 
vrijdenker toe en onderscheiden zichzelf van de slapende kudde 
mensen—of sheeple in hun terminologie—die maar gewoon met de 
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meute mee gaat. Complotdenkers draaien zo het stigma van 
irrationele dwazen om en herclaimen tegelijkertijd hun eigen 
rationaliteit. Zij, de mainstream kudde makke schapen, zijn nu de 
onnozele goedgelovigen. Ondanks die actieve omkering van het 
stigma, gebruiken deze mensen merkwaardig genoeg datzelfde 
pejoratieve label om zichzelf van de echte complotdenkers in het 
milieu te onderscheiden (hoofdstuk zes). Complottheorieën zijn, in 
andere woorden, multifunctionele figuren voor allerlei 
identiteitsconstructies.  
Diversiteit. Waar de meerderheid van wetenschappers 
complotdenken homogeniseert door zich te richten op de 
(vermeende) uniformiteit in stijl, thematische inhoud, narratieve 
structuur en verklarende logica, beargumenteer ik dat dit niet een 
sociologisch productieve strategie is om te volgen daar het diversiteit 
in het complotdenkersmilieu verdoezelt, tot stereotypen leidt en 
processen van Othering mogelijk maakt (cf. Bhabha, 1983; Pickering, 
2001; Weis, 1995). In plaats daarvan zoek ik door middel van mijn 
etnografische benadering juist variëteit op in deze studie. Een eerste 
manier waarop verscheidenheid geobserveerd kan worden is op het 
niveau van de complottheorieën zelf (hoofdstuk drie). Ook al delen 
velen het idee van een geheim groepje dat de touwtjes van het 
wereldtoneel in handen heeft, er zit volop variatie in de toewijzing 
van wie nu precies die geheime groep nu precies is. Waar sommigen 
over een wereldwijd netwerk van gedaanteveranderende 
buitenaardse reptielen spreken, doen anderen dat over een meer 
wereldse elite van internationale bankiersfamilies. Maar zoals ook 
Knight (2000) en Melley (2000) beargumenteren, het ontbreekt 
hedendaagse complottheorieën vaak aan een duidelijk omschreven 
vijand of kliekje kwaadwillenden. In plaats daarvan zien we veeleer 
meer ongrijpbare bewegingen van samenzwerende krachten waar het 
maar onduidelijk is wie of wat er achter zit. In het Nederlandse 
complotdenkersmilieu zien we bijvoorbeeld complottheorieën over 
het functioneren van abstracte sociale systemen zoals het bancaire 
stelsel of de farmaceutische industrie waarin concrete 
samenzwerende personen ontbreken, maar waar de verontrustende 
samensmelting van belangen ‘alleen maar beschreven worden als 
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samenzweerderig, ook al weten we dat er waarschijnlijk geen 
opzettelijk plan aan voorafgegaan is’ (Knight, 2000:32). Waar 
sommige wetenschappers de historische continuïteit van 
complottheorieën benadrukken (e.g. Byford, 2011; ; Pipes, 1997; 
Uscinski and Parent, 2014), heb ik juist gezien dat veel huidige 
complottheorieën spreken over sociale en politieke zaken die 
onmiskenbaar hedendaags zijn, denk bijvoorbeeld aan de financiële 
crisis of nieuwe surveillance technologieën. Diversiteit in 
complottheorieën bestaat, in andere woorden, ook in tijd en plaats. 
Net als elk ander cultureel fenomeen zijn complottheorieën 
simpelweg producten van hun plek in de geschiedenis.  
Een tweede dimensie van diversiteit in het 
complotdenkersmilieu betreft epistemologie. Waar van 
complotdenkers gezegd wordt dat zij obsessief bezig zijn met het 
zoeken naar feiten en bewijzen, laat mijn studie zien dat naast zulke 
modernistische zoektochten naar de waarheid (welke er ongetwijfeld 
zijn) er nog vele andere epistemologieën populair zijn in het 
complotdenkersmilieu zoals voelen, ervaren en verbeelden. Zoals 
David Icke’s super complottheorie briljant laat zien (hoofdstuk vier), 
baseren complotdenkers zich niet alleen op (wetenschappelijke) 
feiten, maar leunen zij ook sterk op de vereeuwigde kennis van 
antieke culturen, de praktische wijsheid van opgedane ervaring, of de 
vervoerende beelden voortgebracht door technologie en science 
fiction als betrouwbare bronnen van kennis. Dit epistemologisch 
pluralisme—het zich baseren op verschillende vormen van weten—
is karakteristiek voor het hedendaagse complotdenkersmilieu. In een 
wereld waar geen epistemische autoriteit een monopolie heeft op de 
waarheid, is het beste wat men kan doen leunen op verschillende 
bronnen van kennis. Er zijn, desalniettemin, duidelijk verschillende 
ideeën over de waarheid te vinden in het Nederlandse 
complotdenkersmilieu. Waar sommigen inderdaad een voorkeur 
hebben voor harde feiten, duidelijk bewijs en sterk geloven in een 
absolute en onomstotelijke waarheid, zijn anderen meer toegeeflijk 
naar andere manieren van weten en zien zij waarheid als iets 
subjectiefs ofwel gesitueerd (hoofdstuk 6). Wat waar is, is volgens die 
eerste groep wat waar is voor jou, wat resoneert met jou. Men is 
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daardoor vrij om te kiezen en plukken van welke epistemische bron 
van kennis dan ook, zo vertellen zij mij. In contrast hiermee 
beargumenteren anderen in het complotdenkersmilieu dat alle kennis 
van de wereld het product is van lokale omstandigheden, er kan 
daardoor geen bevoorrechte of echte waarheid zijn. Wat volgens hen 
overblijft is het beoordelen en vergelijken van zulke verschillende 
waarheden en onderliggende epistemologieën. Waar sommigen een 
voorkeur hebben voor de wetenschappelijke methode in hun 
zoektocht naar de waarheid, laten anderen in het claimen van kennis 
meer epistemologische strategieën toe. Ofwel en hoe dit 
epistemologisch pluralisme nu voornamelijk werkt op het niveau van 
het handelend individu (het mengen van verschillende vormen van 
kennis) of op dat van het collectief (verschillende subculturen met 
verschillende epistemologische voorkeuren) is voor toekomstig 
onderzoek om uit te vinden.  
Dat brengt mij tot een derde dimensie van diversiteit in het 
complotdenkersmilieu: mensen. In tegenstelling tot het dominante 
stereotype van complotdenkers als paranoïde aluminiumhoedjes 
dragende gekkies, huisvest het Nederlandse complotdenkersmilieu 
veel meer typen mensen. Gedurende de lange periode van veldwerk 
kwam ik in contact met jonge stedelijke do-it-yourself’ers, 
babyboomers aangetrokken tot Oosterse levensfilosofieën, digitale 
techneuten, vrijzinnige alternatievelingen, en ga zo maar door. Zoals 
recente kwantitatieve studies laten zien: de populariteit van 
complottheorieën slaat dwars door categorieën heen als leeftijd, 
geslacht, ideologische overtuiging, religie, inkomen, opleiding, 
etniciteit en zo voort heen (e.g. Oliver and Wood, 2012; Uscinski 
and Parent, 2014). Er is, in andere woorden, niet één typische 
complotdenker, maar zoals tegenwoordig vaker gezegd wordt, zijn 
we misschien allemaal wel complotdenkers vandaag (Fenster, 2008, 
Knight, 2002). Mij baserende op het eigen begrip van zelf en ander, 
heb ik diversiteit in het complotdenkersmilieu nog verder onderzocht 
(hoofdstuk 6). Volgens deze eigen manieren van zich identificeren 
met sommigen en distantiëren van anderen worden drie duidelijk te 
onderscheiden typen complotdenkers zichtbaar: activisten, terugtrekkers 
en bemiddelaren. Ook al delen deze subculturen van het 
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complotdenkersmilieu de weerstand en het verzet tegen de culturele 
hoofdstroom, zij hebben desalniettemin radicaal verschillende ideeën 
over wat complottheorieën voor hen betekenen en hoe deze kennis 
in het dagelijks leven te integreren. Mensen in contact brengen met 
andere ideeën (bemiddelaars) of het verbeteren van jezelf zodat 
anderen volgen (terugtrekkers) zijn idealen om naar te leven in 
tegenstelling tot het militante activisme van sommige 
complotdenkers. Een nadruk op diversiteit brengt niet alleen zulke 
lijnen van overeenstemming en conflict naar voren die anders 
verborgen zouden zijn gebleven achter het uniforme en deviante 
beeld van deze subcultuur, maar opent ook mooie ingangen voor 
fascinerend toekomstig sociologisch onderzoek. 
Relationaliteit. Waar de meerderheid van wetenschappers 
complotdenken gewoonlijk bestudeerd in uitzondering, zich richtend 
op zijn vermeende inherente eigenschappen, beargumenteer ik om 
een relationeel perspectief te nemen en complotdenken in zijn 
sociale, politieke en historische contexten te bestuderen. 
Complotdenken bestaat natuurlijk niet in een of ander cultureel 
vacuüm maar is gevormd en vormt zich door de interacties met 
betekenisvolle anderen. Wanneer complotdenken wordt bestudeerd 
in uitzondering, worden de relaties met andere actoren (zoals de 
media, politiek of wetenschap) verduisterd en de grotere verbanden 
waarbinnen het opereert genegeerd. Mijn relationele perspectief 
krijgt allereerst praktisch vorm doordat ik mijn onderzoeksobject—
de complottheorie/denker—conceptualiseer als het product van de 
labellingspraktijken van verschillende partijen (cf. Becker, 1963; 
Goffman, 1963; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). Ik heb aan de hand van 
lijsten van zowel tegenstanders als van aanhangers van 
complottheorieën mijn onderzoeksobject omschreven in relationele in 
plaats van een essentiële definitie van wat een complottheorie/denker 
zou zijn (hoofdstukken twee en drie). Overeenstemming is er over 
welke websites als complotdenkerswebsites gezien kunnen worden. 
Verrassenderwijs komen beide lijsten goed overeen en is de selectie 
van websites die ik genomen heb amper controversieel te noemen. 
Controverse, zou ik zeggen, bestaat vooral op het niveau van elke 
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afzonderlijke complottheorie en op het niveau van 
identificatieprocessen.  
Het dominante (en stereotype) beeld van de complotdenker 
wordt namelijk grondig bestreden door mensen in het Nederlandse 
complotdenkersmilieu. Zij verzetten zich actief tegen deze 
marginaliserende en stereotyperende benoemingspraktijken door 
hunzelf te onderscheiden van de goedgelovige massa als kritische 
vrijdenkers en door anderen in het milieu te bestempelen als de echte 
complotdenkers (hoofdstuk vijf). Door de verschillende manieren te 
volgen waarmee men zich identificeert met sommigen en distantiëert 
van anderen, heb ik belangrijke lijnen van onenigheid in het 
complotdenkersmilieu laten zien, vooral betreffende het militante 
activisme dat zo vaak aan complotdenkers toegeschreven word. 
Volgens deze verschillende ideeën van hoe met complottheorieën te 
leven, heb ik drie verschillen typen of subculturen van het 
complotdenkersmilieu zichtbaar gemaakt (de hiervoor genoemde 
activisten, terugtrekkers en bemiddelaars). Mijn punt is dat een relationeel 
perspectief op identificatieprocessen—zich richtend op de eigen 
ideeën van zelf en ander—meer laat zien dan het stereotype beeld van 
de paranoïde complotdenker.  
Maar dit relationele perspectief maakt het mij ook mogelijk 
de huidige populariteit van complotdenken te begrijpen vanuit 
grotere sociologische ontwikkelingen. Wanneer ik mijn 
respondenten vroeg om hun wending naar deze alternatieve vormen 
van kennis te verklaren, situeerden zij hun levenspad stevig in grotere 
processen van culturele verandering: secularisering, mediatisering, 
democratisering en globalisering (hoofdstuk vijf). Zij laten hiermee 
goed zien hoe biografie, samenleving en geschiedenis innig met elkaar 
verbonden zijn (cf. Elias, 1978; Mills, 2000). Ik beargumenteer dat 
deze historische ontwikkelingen de ontbinding van een stabiele 
waarheid in gang hebben gezet waardoor er een culturele ruimte is 
ontstaan waarbinnen complottheorieën kunnen floreren. 
Seculariseringsprocessen ontmantelen religieuze waarheden, maar, 
blijkend uit de vele alternatieve spirituele praktijken die in deze leegte 
zijn ontstaan, niet de behoefte naar metafysica zelf. Mediatisering laat 
een (digitale) wereld zien waar feit en fictie steeds moeilijker van 
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elkaar te onderscheiden zijn en waarheid eenvoudig te manipuleren is 
door hen die behendig films en video’s maken kunnen. De 
democratisering van kennis spreekt over de cultivering van een 
kritische en reflexieve habitus welke mensen stimuleert om continu 
de waarachtigheid van alle waarheidsclaims en hun dragers te 
onderzoeken. Globalisering, ten slotte, laat zien hoe de eigen 
culturele waarheden in perspectief worden geplaatst wanneer andere 
zienswijzen zich aandienen. Deze grote sociologische processen, 
tastbaar in de levensverhalen van mijn respondenten, verklaren de 
huidige populariteit van complottheorieën het beste, zo concludeer 
ik in hoofdstuk vijf. Dit om de simpele reden dat culturele 
ontwikkelingen veranderende ideeën over waarheid, kennis en 
macht, en dus veranderende ideeën over de plausibiliteit van 
complottheorieën met zich mee brengen.  
De relevantie van een relationele benadering in de studie van 
complotdenken is wellicht het grootst wanneer complottheorieën 
gesitueerd worden in een breder veld van kennisstrijd. Volgens zo’n 
perspectief, zoals ontwikkeld in de wetenschapsstudies (e.g. Bloor, 
1991; Gieryn, 1999; Martin, 1996), worden complottheorieën 
agnostisch gelijk gesteld aan andere (bijvoorbeeld wetenschappelijke) 
waarheidsclaims en wordt de sociologische aandacht gericht op de 
retorische en handelingsstrategieën van verschillende partijen in hun 
inspanningen om hun waarheid en epistemische autoriteit veilig te 
stellen. In hoofdstuk zeven laat ik zien dat sociale wetenschappers zich 
beroepen op de positivistische deugden van de moderne wetenschap 
wanneer zij complottheorieën afwijzen, terwijl complotdenkers juist 
dat krachtige publieke beeld van de wetenschap aanvallen met 
constructivistische argumenten afkomstig uit de sociale 
wetenschappen zelf. Deze innige affiniteit, of Wahlverwandtschaft in 
Max Weber’s bewoording, tussen complottheorieën en sociologische 
theorieën komt veelvuldig naar voren in deze studie van 
complotdenken. Helaas heb ik dit slechts marginaal heb kunnen 
bestuderen, maar het is duidelijk meer sociologisch onderzoek waard, 
alleen al gezien deze affiniteit grenswerk tegen complottheorieën lijkt 
aan te wakkeren (hoofdstuk zeven).  
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Omdat ik slechts begonnen ben met het situeren van 
complottheorieën in een breder veld van kennisstrijd geloof ik dat 
toekomstig onderzoek naar de meer acute voorbeelden van deze 
gevechten om de waarheid vooral kan profiteren van een dergelijke 
relationele aanpak. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de groeiende weerstand 
tegen vaccinaties welke gezien worden als schadelijk voor de 
gezondheid en mogelijk zelfs leidend tot autisme, het idee dat 
chemicaliën door vliegtuigen over onze hemel verspreid worden om 
onze bevolkingen kalm te houden, of de inspanningen van sommigen 
om het financiële systeem op de politieke agenda te zetten daar het 
een grote oplichterij betreft. Al deze pogingen om de officiële 
verklaringen te betwisten kunnen rekenen op veel weerstand van de 
meer gevestigde partijen die in hun verdediging verschillende 
strategieën hanteren. Deze meer gelijkwaardige conceptualisering 
van zulke gevechten om de waarheid (truth wars) zou sociologisch gezien 
het meest gevoelig zijn voor de ingezette argumenten en strategieën 
van alle betrokken partijen, of ze nou sociaal bekrachtigd zijn of 
cultureel gemarginaliseerd. Als ik zelf niet dit soort empirisch 
onderzoek ga doen vanuit deze epistemologische slagvelden, dan 
hoop ik dat anderen dat in mijn plaats zullen doen, want de groei van 
dit soort maatschappelijke gevechten om de waarheid vereist een 
agnostische in plaats van een geprivilegieerde (lees: modernistische) 
sociologische blik. 
Conclusie. De waarheid staat centraal in deze studie. 
Complotdenkers wantrouwen gewoonlijk het officiële verhaal: de 
massa’s mogen geloven dat de werkelijkheid die zij gepresenteerd 
krijgen waar is, complotdenkers hebben meer moeite met het geloven 
van wat onze epistemische autoriteiten bekrachtigen als de echte 
waarheid. Wat velen van ons als vanzelfsprekend en waar zien, is voor 
complotdenkers onderwerp van achterdocht en wantrouwen. In de 
conclusie werk ik een drietal, in mijn ogen cruciale, aspecten voor het 
begrip van complotdenken verder uit: de betwiste status van onze 
instituties, de kennis die zij produceren, en de hermeneutiek van 
wantrouwen.  
Door deze studie heen heb ik laten zien hoe onze 
voornaamste maatschappelijke instituties, zoals de wetenschap, 
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politiek, media, religie enzovoort, een hoop wantrouwen en 
ongenoegen oproepen in het complotdenkersmilieu. Deze mensen 
beargumenteren dat onze instituties gecorrumpeerd zijn door 
bureaucratie, politieke spelletjes, verstrengeling met het 
bedrijfsleven, ideologisch dogmatisme en ga zo maar door. Als gevolg 
hiervan functioneren deze instituties in hun ogen niet naar behoren en 
kunnen zij hen niet langer vertrouwen. Complotdenkers zijn niet de 
enigen. Het maatschappelijke vertrouwen in onze instituties is al 
decennia tanende (cf. Inglehart, 1997; Moy and Pfau, 2000; Misztal, 
2013). Maar waar complotdenkers zeer kritisch zijn over onze 
instituties wordt hun doel en functie niet verworpen. Integendeel, zij 
benadrukken vaak de schoonheid van religie, het belang van politiek, 
de wonderen van de wetenschap en de relevantie van de media. En zo 
zien wij allerlei initiatieven binnen het complotdenkersmilieu om 
deze instituties te zuiveren van de verontreinigers die deze 
gecorrumpeerd hebben: nieuwe politieke partijen en mediaplatforms 
worden opgericht en verschillende vormen van alternatieve 
spiritualiteit floreren. Dit is een bredere maatschappelijke trend. 
Waar West-Europese samenlevingen sterke processen van de-
institutionalisering hebben gekend, zien we tegelijkertijd nieuwe 
vormen van institutionalisering. Complotdenken moet daarom gezien 
worden als onderdeel van deze bredere maatschappelijke stroom van 
culturele purificatie: het beschermen van het doel en functie van onze 
instituties tegen het verval in betekenisloze vorm (cf. Houtman, 
Laermans and Simons, 2016). Het wantrouwen van complotdenkers 
tegenover instituties is daarom niet alleen maar een gevaar voor de 
samenleving, zoals sommigen beamen, maar evengoed een impuls 
voor sociale verandering.  
Naast dit ongenoegen over het functioneren van onze 
instituties, wantrouwen complotdenkers de kennis die zij 
produceren. Ik beargumenteer in de conclusie dat dit alles te maken 
heeft met hoe wij waarheidsclaims legitimeren in onze huidige 
Westerse samenlevingen, namelijk door het te ondersteunen met het 
‘meta-narratief van de wetenschap’ (Lyotard, 1984). Het is echter 
precies dit geloof in de mogelijkheid van objectieve kennis welke 
problematisch is geworden in onze huidige samenlevingen (Seidman, 
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1994). Zoals de (sociaal) constructivisten in de wetenschap, zo 
benadrukken (veel) complotdenkers dat kennis altijd het product is 
van bepaalde mensen in een bepaalde tijd en plaats. Dit begrip opent 
uiteraard de mogelijkheid van manipulatie en zet het onderwerp van 
macht stevig op de kaart want als de werkelijkheid geconstrueerd is, 
dan is de logische vraag niet alleen door wie en hoe, maar ook met 
welk doel. En zo voeren zij een strijd over de werkelijkheid op: 
ontdaan van alle retoriek die de plausibiliteit van jouw 
waarheidsclaims moeten ondersteunen, een praktijk die academici 
deconstructie zouden kunnen noemen, wat blijft er over van de 
kwaliteit van jouw kennis, zo vragen complotdenkers zich af? Er zijn 
nog veel van dit soort “gevechten om de waarheid” vandaag, denk aan 
de controverses rondom E-nummers, klimaatverandering, de 
veiligheid van vaccinaties, de gevaren van elektromagnetische 
straling, en ga zo maar door. Complotdenken representeert, in 
andere worden, een breder maatschappelijk conflict over kennis en 
waarheid in onze huidige samenlevingen: wat geldt als legitieme 
kennis en waarom? 
Gegeven de corrumpering van onze instituties en de al te 
gemakkelijke manipulatie van feiten, staan complotdenkers 
wantrouwend tegenover het officiële verhaal en zijn zij op jacht naar 
een diepere waarheid, een diepere werkelijkheid welke zou verklaren 
wat er echt aan de hand is. Niets is namelijk wat het lijkt. Om tot dat 
verklarende niveau te komen beginnen complotdenkers met het 
analyseren en deconstrueren van de werkelijkheden die wij 
gepresenteerd krijgen: hoe ziet die simulatie van de werkelijkheid er 
eigenlijk uit, wie is er bij de productie ervan betrokken en zijn er 
enige aanwijzingen of symbolen te vinden die wijzen naar de echte 
waarheid? Hun doel is om het officiële verhaal wat de meeste mensen 
voor waar aannemen te ontmaskeren. Deze interpretatieve stijl—het 
zoeken naar verborgen waarheden achter of onder de gewone, 
alledaagse werkelijkheid—is niet voorbehouden aan complotdenkers 
alleen, maar past in een lange intellectuele traditie welke sceptisch en 
wantrouwend staat tegenover de alledaagse realiteit die mensen 
ervaren. Paul Ricoeur noemt deze stijl de hermeneutiek van wantrouwen 
en situeert deze in het werk en gedachtegoed van Marx, Nietzsche en 
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Freud (1970), maar het is evengoed te vinden in de verschillende 
academische tradities van vandaag de dag: literatuur en cultural 
studies, narratief onderzoek, semiotiek, feministische theorie, 
kritische theorie en niet in de laatste plaats, de sociologie zelf (cf. 
Birchall, 2006; Felski, 2011; Houtman, 2008; Josselson, 2004; 
Latour, 2004b). Wetenschappers in al deze tradities neigen echte 
mythejagers te zijn: beweren dat zij inzicht hebben in de echte, ware of 
diepere betekenissen van het leven, welke achter, onder of voorbij de 
alledaagse ideeën en ervaringen van gewone mensen liggen. Door 
deze grotere gedeelde culturele geschiedenis is het moeilijk om 
complotdenken apart te zetten als een pathologische interpretatieve 
stijl, zoals sommigen doen (e.g. Barkun, 2006: 4; Byford, 2011: 75; 
Pipes, 1997: 45).  
Deze drie aspecten wijzen allemaal op het feit dat objectieve 
of vaststaande waarheden (zoals aangeboden door onze epistemische 
instituties) voor veel mensen onwaarschijnlijk zijn geworden. 
Gebaseerd op mijn empirisch materiaal beargumenteer ik dat de 
historische ontwikkelingen van secularisering, mediatisering, 
democratisering en globalisering geleid hebben tot een groeiend 
ongeloof in de mogelijkheid van één objectieve, eenduidige en 
onweerlegbare waarheid. Door deze culturele veranderingen leven 
wij tegenwoordig in een wereld waar verschillende waarheden naast 
elkaar bestaan. Vooral omdat de epistemische instituties ons niet 
meer kunnen voorzien (zoals vroeger wellicht) met een sterk gevoel 
van zekerheid over de waarachtigheid van de kennis die zij 
produceren, wordt het moeilijk om hun koers te volgen en de 
werkelijkheden die zij produceren te vertrouwen. In plaats daarvan 
zijn er tegenwoordig meerdere vaak wedijverende versies van de echte 
werkelijkheid voor consumptie beschikbaar. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan 
de vele verschillende scenario’s van wat er echt gebeurd is op 9/11, 
welke allemaal hun eigen, min of meer overtuigende, werkelijkheid 
creëren. Ze kunnen elk waar zijn. Omdat we elke dag gebombardeerd 
worden met verschillende en soms zelfs tegenstrijdige informatie 
over wat er “echt” aan de hand is, wordt de werkelijke gang van zaken 
steeds ongrijpbaarder. De sociologische vraag die deze ontwikkeling 
oproept is, natuurlijk, hoe gaan mensen dan om met deze 
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epistemische instabiliteit? Hoe leven mensen in een wereld waar de 
Waarheid problematisch en moeilijk vast te stellen is geworden? 
Gebaseerd op mijn analyses van het Nederlandse 
complotdenkersmilieu, contrasteer ik twee ideaaltypisch 
tegengestelde manieren. Enerzijds vind ik typisch modernistische 
jachten op de “echte” waarheid: vurig zoekend naar bewijzen en harde 
feiten, deze strategie komt voort uit het idee dat gedegen onderzoek 
en sterke logica de waarheden kan openbaren die verborgen blijven 
achter de vele misleidende verhalen die ons verteld worden (cf. 
Bauman, 1987; Giddens, 1998; Latour, 1993a). Maar de cultuur van 
complotdenken belichaamt ook vele postmoderne eigenschappen: een 
ongeloof ten opzichte van objectieve waarheidsclaims, ruimte geven 
aan andere manieren van weten (emoties, gevoelens, intuïtie, 
ervaringen, gewoontes, metafysica, traditie, mythe, religieuze 
affecten, mystieke ervaringen, enzovoort), het “knutselen” van hele 
nieuwe werkelijkheden uit al deze verschillende vormen van kennis, 
en een eis tot meer egalitaire persoonlijke, sociale en culturele 
verhoudingen met experts (cf. Bauman, 1991; Ritzer, 1997; 
Rosenau, 1992). De cultuur van complotdenken, zo is mijn laatste 
betoog, spreekt over een wereld waar de waarheid niet langer 
verzekerd is, maar op losse schroeven is komen te staan waardoor wij 
haar continu moeten wegen, opgooien, deconstrueren, beoordelen, 
herschikken, meten, bestrijden, analyseren, bespelen en 
beworstelen. En dat is geen gemakkelijke taak, voor geen van ons.  
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2015. 
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7 http://www.ninefornews.nl/duitse-minister-syrisch-paspoort-dader-parijs-was-
mogelijk-valse-vlag-om-mensen-bang-te-maken-voor-vluchtelingen/ 
8 As I explain later on, the terms conspiracy theorists and conspiracy theory are far 
from neutral but are powerful in and off themselves: they discard the referent as 
irrational and untrue. I speak in more detail about the power of language, i.e. 
labelling certain people/forms of thought as conspiracy theorist/y, in the 
introduction and the methodology section, but the problem boils down to the fact 
that using these terms without any reflexivity simply reproduces the stigmatized 
connotations they have. However, for reasons of clarity and esthetics I have 
chosen to use these terms nonetheless. This does not imply that I am insensitive to 
or ignorant about the effects of calling the people in my study and their beliefs 
conspiracy theorists/ies, but simply that any other term, or putting the 
“conspiracy theorists/ies” within brackets (which I tried before) would make the 
reading less clear and more difficult to read. One could even say that my usage of 
these terms neutralizes or lessens the negative connotations they have, as I write 
about them in neutral ways. 
9http://www.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed- conspiracy. 
aspx,  
10 http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_National_ 
ConspiracyTheories_040213.pdf 
11 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/15/alien-believers-outnumber-
god_n_1968259.html 
12 http://www.quest.nl/artikel/ruim-40-procent-gelooft-de-overheid-volgt-
stiekem-alles-wat-we-op-internet-doen 
13 Think of the militant rhetoric of Senator McCarthy and later Senator 
Goldwater, and reactionary groups like the John Birch Society. 
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14 Hofstadter states: ‘I have neither the competence nor the desire to classify any 
figures of the past or present as certifiable lunatics. In fact, the idea of the 
paranoid style would have little contemporary relevance if it were applied to 
people with profoundly disturbed minds. It is the use of paranoid modes of 
expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant’ 
(1996: 4) 
15 Hofstadter’s historical treatment of political movements exemplifying this 
paranoid style – from the anti-Masonic and anti-Catholic movements of the 
nineteenth century through the anti-communist right-wing groups gaining 
popularity in the middle of the twentieth century – often moves from describing 
‘paranoid modes of expression’ in the history of American politics to classifying 
such ‘figures of the past or present’ as paranoid persons. Or when Hofstadter 
explains how ‘the paranoid’ conceives of the enemy, Freudian presumptions 
surface: ‘the enemy seems on many counts a projection of the self: both the ideal 
and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him’ (1996: 32). He goes 
on to speak of how ‘the fantasies of true believers serve strong sadomasochistic 
outlets’ as they can ‘project and freely express unacceptable aspects of their own 
minds’ onto the enemy: their ‘sexual freedom’, their ‘lack of moral inhibition’ 
and ‘a preoccupation with illicit sex’ (1996: 34). 
16 Pipes speaks about conspiracy theories as ‘phobias’ (1997: 25), Showalter as 
‘psychogenic syndromes’ (1998) and Robins and Post (1997) at last use words like 
‘parasite’, ‘bacillus’, ‘infection’ and ‘virus’ to describe the ‘epidemic’ of 
conspiracy theories that allegedly encroach our societies. But also more recently: 
when Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) speak in their title of ‘causes and cures’ they 
simply allude to conspiracy theories as a pathology. 
17 These are no hypothetical assertions, but refer to real world happenings: the 
NSA scandals, the global war on terror, Bush and Blair on the (inexistent) 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the powerful lobby industry in Brussels and 
Washington, the corporate financing of research institutes, and so on. 
18 The same sort of political function of conspiracy theories is found in the works 
of John Fiske (1996) and Patricia Turner (1993) who particularly focus on the 
African American communities and their suspicions of a “black genocide” through, 
most notably, the spread of HIV/AIDS as a bio-warfare weapon. Given the 
systematic discrimination of African Americans in the United States, and a history 
of intentional abuse against them (think of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment), 
these scholars argue that such fears of white aggression are well justified. 
Moreover, like Dean, they hold that their conspiracy theories can be politically 
affirmative: they provide ways to account for the economic and social exclusion, 
and offer strategies for political resistance. Knight (2000: 143-167); Fenster 
(2008: 279-289) and Bratich (2008: 97-122) provide additional and interesting  
analyses of conspiracy theories in the African American communities, and of the  
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works of Fiske and Turner in particular.  
19 Of course, I realize that my selection of their descriptions of the world is 
theoretically informed. This is however, something different from any normative 
or moral considerations.  
20 Such experimental psychologists test for the existence of such a general and 
systematized way of thinking and follow Goertzel’s notion of ‘monological belief 
systems’ (1994) to argue that the belief in conspiracy theories becomes a ‘unitary, 
closed-off [and] self-sustaining worldview comprised of a network of mutually 
supportive beliefs’ (Wood et al, 2012: 767; cf. Brotherton, et al, 2013: 12; 
Lewandowksy et al, 2013a) 
21 Byford, for example, argues how ‘tales of conspiracy – whether expounded in 
Washington, London, Moscow, Damascus or Beijing and regardless of whether 
they purport to explain a political assassination, the cause of a disease or a financial 
crisis – are marked by a distinct thematic configuration, narrative structure and 
explanatory logic, as well as by the stubborn presence of a number of common 
motifs and tropes’ (2011: 4, my emphasis). 
22 http://nl.hoax.wikia.com last retrieved October 21, 2014. 
23 www.wikia.com/about last retrieved October 21, 2014. 
24 http://nl.hoax.wikia.com/wiki/Complotdenkers last retrieved October 21, 
2014. 
25 http://nl.hoax.wikia.com/wiki/complottheorieënwebsites last retrieved 
October 21, 2014 
26 http://skepsis.nl/ last retrieved October 21, 2014 
27 http://skepsis.nl/mainsite/inhoud/uploads/2015/10/Stichting-Skepsis-
Financiele-verantwoording.pdf last retrieved October 21, 2014 
28 www.nieuwemedianieuws.nl (last retrieved October 21, 2014) 
29 The difference between the new and mainstream media is further specified as 1) 
being independent, instead of dependent; 2) researching events instead of 
reporting events; 3) having a critical attitude towards information from the 
government, instead of trusting it; (4) being critical towards press agencies like 
ANP and Reuters, instead of trusting them; (5) actively researching suspicions 
towards the government instead of ignoring them; (6) being financially 
independent instead of relying on government funds or commerce 
(www.nieuwemedianieuws.nl, last retrieved October 21, 2014). 
30 I need to make one disclaimer here, however, as I have chosen to omit a 
particular type of conspiracy website: namely the solo projects of certain 
“conspiracy theorists.” As personal interests and old enmities often fuel these 
projects, and the thematic relevance of these rather idiosyncratic websites is 
questionable, I believe this omission is legitimate. 
31  http://zapruder.nl/portal, last retrieved  March 4, 2014 
32 As they say on their site, last retrieved  March 4, 2014 
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33 http://niburu.co/, last retrieved October 21, 2014 
34 http://www.ninefornews.nl/over-ons/, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
35 http://www.ninefornews.nl/over-ons/, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
36 http://www.wijwordenwakker.org/intro.asp, last retrieved  October 25 2014 
37 http://www.marcelmessing.nl/content.asp?m=M6andl=NL, last retrieved  
October 25, 2014 
38 http://argusoog.org, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
39 http://argusoog.org, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
40 http://www.wanttoknow.nl/about/, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
41 http://www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/over/#.Vs7vzJwrLIU, last retrieved  October 
21, 2014 
42 http://anarchiel.com/, last retrieved  October 21, 2014 
43 “Ostrich Politics” is a Dutch expression for politics that turns away from the real 
problems by ignoring them (that is, sticking one’s head in the sand, like an 
Ostrich). 
44 http://www.pateo.nl/PDF/PartijprogrammaSOPN.pdf, last retrieved 
February 29, 2016  
45 http://www.pateo.nl/PDF/PartijprogrammaSOPN.pdf, last retrieved 
February 29, 2016  
46 http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1012/Nederland/article/detail/3246108/2012/ 
04/25/UFO-partij-rekent-op-tientallen-Kamerzetels.dhtml; 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/20045066/___UFO-
partij__wil_tientallen_zetels__.html; http://www.volkskrant.nl/politiek/ufo-
partij-sopn-rekent-op-minimaal-76-zetels-op-12-september~a3288796/; 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/07/19/deze-lijsttrekker-gelooft-niet-zozeer-
in-ufos-wel-in-76-zetels (last retrieved February 24, 2016) 
47 www.frontierworld.nl, last retrieved February 25, 2016  
48 http://wearechange.org/about/; http://www.wacholland.org/; 
https://www.youtube.com/user/wearechangeholland/about (last retrieved 
February 24, 2016) 
49 http://wearechange.org/about/ 
50 https://www.youtube.com/user/WeAreChangeRotterdam 
51 http://barracudanls.blogspot.nl/2009_05_01_archive.html; 
http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Luke_Rudkowski (last retrieved February 24, 
2016) 
52 http://www.thezeitgeistmovement.com/mission-statement, last retrieved 
March 3, 2016  
53 E.g. http://www.hpdetijd.nl/2011-10-15/occupy-amsterdam-voorman-911-
was-een-complot/, https://www.olino.org/articles/2011/01/21/wat-is-de-
zeitgeist-movement/, last retrieved March 3, 2016  
54 http://www.davidicke.com/about-david/, last retrieved February 25, 2016  
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55 E.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitgeist_(film_series); 
https://skeptoid.com/episodes/4196; http://peterjoseph.info/top-five-
zeitgeist-movie-myths/ (last retrieved February 24, 2016) 
56 http://www.thrivemovement.com/the_movie, last retrieved March 3, 2016 
57 http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Thrive, see for more criticism: 
https://www.quora.com/Who-is-Foster-Gamble-who-presents-the-
documentary-Thrive, last retrieved March 3, 2016 
58 Partij voor de Dieren was founded in 2002 and currently has two of the 150 
seats in the Dutch House of Representatives and one of the 75 in the Senate. 
Among its main goals are animal rights and animal welfare, but it claims not to be 
a single-issue party, and should be seen as part of the environmental and 
sustainability movements.  
59 Website known to me. Anonymized by request of the owner (last retrieved 
November 18, 2014) 
60 Although this criterion is often used to demarcate the research object itself and 
not so much to categorize conspiracy theories. 
61 E.g. William S. Burroughs, Joseph Heller, Margaret Atwood, Betty Friedan, 
Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo, and William Gibson. 
62 E.g. www.ninefornews.nl/rampvlucht-mh17-een-false-flag-operatie, last 
retrieved November 5, 2014 
63 E.g. www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/is_ebola_a_mass_mediated_fraud, 
last retrieved November 5, 2014 
64 E.g. www.ninefornews.nl/britse_centrale_bank_geeft_toe_geld_gebakken_ 
lucht or www.wanttoknow.nl/economie/geld, last retrieved 18th of November 
2014) 
65 E.g. www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/weg_met_geld_weg_met_de_banken, 
www.argusoog.org/2011/09/banken-zijn-overbodig-tenzij..., last retrieved 
November 18, 2014 
66 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M26ands=M69andss=P2098 
andI=NL, last retrieved November 18, 2014 
67 www.ninefornews.nl/de-grootste-zwendel-aller-tijden-video, last retrieved last 
retrieved November 18, 2014 
68 www.ninefornews.nl/britse-centrale-bank-geeft-toe-geld-gebakken-lucht, last 
retrieved last retrieved November 18, 2014 
69 Such notions are popularized in the conspiracy milieu by Paul Grignon’s 
documentary “Money as Debt.” Each of these sites has links to it—and is present 
in the works of David Icke (e.g. “The Biggest Secret”). Ad Broere is the most 
active Dutch exponent of this standpoint, who wrote a book “Geld komt uit het 
niets: de financiele goocheltrucs ontmaskerd” (“Money Out of Nothing: The 
Financial tricks of Magic Revealed”). He presents these ideas on the conspiracy 
websites, see for example: www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P2254,  
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www.wanttoknow.nl/inspiratie/john_consemulder/john-en-ad-broere-over-
geld-economie-en-de-bankenzwendel, last retrieved last retrieved November 18, 
2014 
70 www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2012/02/recht-op-geldcreatie-afnemen-van-de-
banken, last retrieved last retrieved November 18, 2014 
71 www.argusoog.org/2011/10/van-staatsschulden-naar-staatsgulden, or 
www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/kapitalistisch_bankieren_volgens_complotters, 
last retrieved last retrieved November 18, 2014 
72 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P2098, last retrieved last 
retrieved November 18, 2014 
73 www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2013/11/het-wijdverbreide-misverstand-over-het-
begrip-geld, last retrieved last retrieved November 18, 2014 
74 This is the title of the section “Geld” (money in Dutch) of the 
www.wanttoknow.nl website, www.wanttoknow.nl/economie/geld, last 
retrieved last retrieved November 18, 2014 
75 www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2012/02/recht-op-geldcreatie-afnemen-van-de-
banken, last retrieved last retrieved November 19, 2014 
76 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M26ands=M69andss=P1480 
andI=NL or  www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2012/11/ex-bankier-doet-boekje-open-
over-het-geldsysteem, 
www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/de_macht_van_de_centrale_banken, last 
retrieved last retrieved November 19, 2014 
77 www.anarchiel.nl/display/het_pokerspel_van_de_centrale_banken_deel1/2, 
last retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014 
78 www.anarchiel.nl/display/het_pokerspel_van_de_centrale_banken_deel1, last 
retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014  
79 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/the_great_depression_is_coming, last 
retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014 
80 A similar and more recent story could be told about the how the European 
Stability Mechanism was ratified in the countries of Europe. Many people in the 
conspiracy milieu have expressed serious doubts about a system of “economic 
dictatorship” that would indebt the people ever more. E.g. 
www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/het_esm_paard_staat_binnen, or 
www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M26ands=M69andss=P1411andI=
NL or  www.argusoog.org/2012/05/esm-een-zwarte-dag-voor-de-democratie, 
last retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014 
81 These articles almost all refer to the work of G. Edward Griffin, especially “The 
Creature of Jekyll Island,” and to the work of Dutch (financial) journalist Willem 
Middelkoop, especially his book Als de dollar valt (When the Dollar Collapses). 
82 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P268, or  
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www.wanttoknow.nl/hoofdartikelen/de-us-dollar-sterft-een-roemloos-einde, 
last retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014 
83 See, for example, the work of Neil Irwin, a senior economic correspondent at 
the New York Times and author of “The Alchemists,” particularly his blog on the 
washingtonpost.com of 21st of December 2013 (www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/21/the-federal-reserve-was-created-100-years-
ago-this-is-how-it-happened) , last retrieved last retrieved November 20, 2014 
84 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M26ands=M69andss=P1690 
andI=NL or www.ninefornews.nl/connectie-tussen-fed-en-jekyll-island-
ontmaskerd-video, last retrieved last retrieved November 19, 2014 
but the attendees are nowadays not so secret anymore. 
85 www.wanttoknow.nl/hoofdartikelen/de-us-dollar-sterft-een-roemloos-einde, 
last retrieved last retrieved November 19, 2014 
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overheid-gaat-toch-niet-veranderen, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
202 E.g. www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/mediaster_al_zarqawi, or www. 
wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P2575, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
203 www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/mind-control/psy-ops-manipuleren-ons-
wereldbeeld, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
204 E.g. www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/psywar_-_wake_up, last retrieved 
November 27, 2014 
205 E.g. www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/zap_cinema_the_war_on_ 
democracy_2007, www.ninefornews.nl/amerika-het-land-van-bedrog-en-
massahypnose-video, www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P1706, 
www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/anonymous_government_controlled_opp
osition_psyop, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
206 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/worstelaars_geitjes_en_mkultra, www. 
ninefornews.nl/overheid-vs-experimenteerde-op-veteranen-onder-mk-ultra, 
www.argusoog.org/2012/06/het-rapport-van-iron-mountain-illuminati-mind-
control, www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/mind-control/the-secrets-of-mind-
control, www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/must_see_docu_blackops_human 
_experiments_mindcontrol_torture_political_con, last retrieved November 27, 
2014 
207 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/de_marskramer_van_de_arabische_ 
revolutie, www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/media/midden-oosten-revoluties-
spontaan-mooi-niet, www.argusoog.org/2011/04de-oorzaak-van-de-orgie-aan-
destabilisaties-in-2011, www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/de_door_het_ 
westen_geregiseerde_arabische_lente_otpor_etc, last retrieved November 27, 
2014 
208 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P1442, last retrieved 
November 27, 2014 
209 www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/media/midden-oosten-revoluties-spontaan-
mooi-niet, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
210 www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/media/midden-oosten-revoluties-spontaan-
mooi-niet, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
211 www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2014/11/12-stappen-van-vrede-naar-burgerooglog, 
last retrieved November 27, 2014 
212 Hamlet to Horatio, Hamlet (1.5.167-8). This quote is often cited or used in 
articles on conspiracy websites, e.g. “we understand that there is more between 
heaven and earth than our scientists would like us to believe” on www.zapruder. 
nl/portal/artikel/intro_weird_science_week, or “like Hamlet said in the  
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similarly titled play of William Shakespeare: ‘there’s more between heaven and 
earth.’ Science cannot explain what happens on all these places” on www. 
ninefornews.nl/de-m-driehoek-geeft-russisch-area-51-zijn-geheimen-prijs , or 
“the winged expression ‘there’s more between heaven and earth’ is an apt 
description here” on www.wanttoknow.nl/inpsiratie/gastcolums/werkelijkheid-
of-fictie, last retrieved November 27, 2014 
213 E.g. www.zapruder.nl/portal/rubriek/buitenaards, last retrieved December  
8, 2014) 
www.wijworderwakker.org/content.asp?m=M53ands=M92andI=NL, 
www.wanttoknow.info/dossiers/universum, www.anarchiel.com/dossiers/ufo-
aliens, last retrieved December  1, 2014) 
214 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M53ands=M92andss=P713andI 
=NL, last retrieved December  1, 2014) 
215 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/wat_we_van_nasa_niet_mogen_weten, last 
retrieved December  1, 2014) 
216 E.g. www.ninefornews.nl/video-de-man-die-de-geheimen-van-area-51-
blootlegde, last retrieved December  1, 2014) 
217 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M53ands=M92andss=P446 
andI=NL, last retrieved December  1, 2014) 
218 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M53ands=M92andss=P2241 
andI=NL, or www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/aliens_could_share_more 
_tech_with_us_if_we_warmonger_less, last retrieved December  1, 2014) 
219 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/ooparts_deel_1_onbekend_en_onbemind, 
last retrieved December 2, 2014 
220 www.ninefornews.nl/deze-hamer-100-miljoen-jaar-oud, last retrieved 
December 2, 2014 
221 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/ooparts_deel_3_buitenaardse_schedels_en 
_astronauten, last retrieved December 2, 2014 
222 www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/de_verboden_geschiedenis, last 
retrieved December 2, 2014 
223 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M6ands=M135andss= 
P1745andI=NL, www.wanttoknow.nl/universum/documentaire-mayas-en-
buitenaards-contact,  www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/mysteries_of_ 
the_gods_1977_-_William_shatner, last retrieved December 2, 2014 
224 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/ooparts_deel_2_verloren_wetenschap, last 
retrieved December 2, 2014 
225 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M26ands=M90andss 
=P427, www.argusoog.org/2009/10/mysterious-world-search-for-ancient-
technology-strange-archeology, www.wanttoknow.nl/inspiratie/alternatieve_ 
archeologie, last retrieved December 2, 2014 
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226 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=P58, last retrieved December 2, 
2014 
227 www.wanttoknow.nl/nieuws/franse-dna-onderzoekster-en-astronaute-doet-
zelfmoordpoging-wat-heeft-ze-ontdekt, last retrieved December 2, 2014 
228 www.argusoog.org/2007/07/bewustzijn-zelf, last retrieved December 9, 
2014 
229 www.zapruder.nl/protal/artikel/zelfbewustzijn_is_onnatuurlijk, last 
retrieved December 9, 2014 
230 They refer here to the works of philosopher and cognitive scientist Dan 
Dennett, who argues that “human consciousness and the free will are the result of 
physical processes in the brain […] the brain’s circuitry fools us into thinking we 
know more than we do, and that we call consciousness—isn’t” on: 
www.ted.com/speakers/dan_dennett, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
231 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M3ands=M122andss=P2429 
andI=NL, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
232 E.g. www.ninefornews.nl/wetenschap-wordt-beperkt-door-aannames-video, 
www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M6ands=M64andss=P2075I=NL, 
or www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/graham_hancock_-_the_war_on_ 
consciousness_banned_ted_talk, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
233 E.g. www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M3ands=M122andss= 
P2425andI=NL, www.wanttoknow.nl/inspiratie-bewustzijn-en-creatie, 
www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/het_pleiadisch_perspectief_uit_de_doofp
ot, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
234 For example, the works of Dutch cardiologist Pim van Lommel, who wrote the 
international bestseller Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death 
Experience, or those of the American neurosurgeon Eben Alexander, are often 
cited and circulated. 
235 www.wanttoknow.nl/hoofdartikelen/hard-wetenschappelijk-bewijs-
bewustzijn-na-klinisch-dood, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
236 www.ninefornews.nl/wetenschappers-vinden-bewijs-voor-leven-na-de-dood, 
last retrieved December 9, 2014 
237 www.wanttoknow.nl/hoofdartikelen/hard-wetenschappelijk-bewijs-
bewustzijn-na-klinisch-dood, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
238 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M3ands=M122andss=P2429 
andI=NL, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
239 www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M3ands=M122andss=P2429 
andI=NL, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
240 www.ninefornews.nl/toegang-krijgen-tot-buitenzintuiglijke-waarneming, last 
retrieved December 9, 2014 
241 www.ninefornews.nl/buitenzintuiglijke-waarneming-wetenschappelijk-
bewezen, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
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242 E.g. www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/cia_en_de_mensenrechten_part_3, 
www.wijwordenwakker.org/content.asp?m=M6ands=M85andss=P714, 
www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2014/09/de-aanslagen-van-9-september-en-remote-
viewing, www.anarchiel.com/stortplaats/toon/helder_zien_als_wapen, last 
retrieved December 9, 2014 
243 www.wanttoknow.nl/universum/ingo-swann, last retrieved December 9, 
2014 
244 www.gewoon-nieuws.nl/2014/03/remote-viewing-en-de-piramide-van-
gizeh, last retrieved December 9, 2014 
245 www.zapruder.nl/portal/artikel/cia_en_de_mensenrechten_part_3, last 
retrieved December 9, 2014 
246 These scholars are ambiguous about this historical change in conspiracy culture: 
Knight, for example, argues that “alongside these familiar demonologies there have 
emerged significant new forms of conspiracy culture, which operate in very 
different ways to the more traditional modes of the conspiratorial style. 
Moreover, even those traditional forms of right-wing extremist conspiracy 
thinking take on new meanings and serve new purposes” (2000: 23, my 
emphasis). Whether they see this change as all-encompassing and without 
exceptions is therefore unclear. Despite these small caveats, their argument in 
favor of such a historical change remains significant. 
247 E.g. www.wakingtimes.com/2014/01/27/conspiracy-theorist-vs-
coincidence-theorist-importance-alternative-media/, last retrieved May 9, 2015 
248 www.davidicke.com/shop/dvds, last retrieved February 27, 2015 
249 www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2vlegEBuO0, last retrieved February 27, 2015 
250 This was one of the slogans that David Icke used to promote his show, e.g. 
http://www.purityevents.nl/david-icke-the-lion-sleeps-no-more, last retrieved 
March 4, 2015 
251 www.davidicke.com, last retrieved May 7, 2015 
252 www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtVyrayu7Tc, last retrieved May 7, 2015 
253 www.atlanteanconspiracy.com/2012/11/alex-judas-goat-jones.html, last 
retrieved February 15, 2016 
254 www.atlanteanconspiracy.com/search/label/David%20Icke, or 
www.acceler8or.com/2012/09/shocking-shocker-alex-jones-david-icke-are-
illuminati-disinfo-agents/, last retrieved February 15, 2016 
255 E.g. Ioannidis, JP (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS 
medicine, 2(8), e124. 
256 E.g. John Virapen, MD, who has worked over 35 years in the pharmaceutical 
industry and was general manager of Eli Lilly and Company in Sweden, wrote the 
best seller Side Effect: Death. Confessions of a Pharma Insider (2010); or Peter Rost, 
MD, who has been vice-president of Pfizer, one of the world's largest  
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pharmaceutical companies, wrote The Whistleblower: Confessions of a Healthcare 
Hitman (2006). 
257 E.g Sibel Edmonds, a former FBI translator and founder of the National 
Security Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), and the Boiling Frogs Post, a site 
offering nonpartisan investigative journalism, published a memoir in 2012 called 
Classified Woman: The Sibel Edmonds Story.” 
258 Indeed, this anthropological work is very much disputed for being 
fraudulent/fictional and a perfect example of scientific controversy. See 
Plummer, 2001: 219 or Hammer, 2001: 136. 
259 Although who or what makes up the top parts of the pyramids differs between 
each conception, they all share several characteristics. The first thing to note is the 
fundamentally populist nature of these pyramids, as they all conceive of a general 
population as the big and uniform base pitted against a tiny elite. Slightly different 
from the nationalism in most populist conceptions of the “people,” the big 
uniform base is called “workers,” “debt slaves,” or “labor units: a.k.a. the 
unthinking, hard-working, law-abiding, tax-paying, god-fearing, death slave.” 
Above this level, one generally finds a layer called “population control,” which is 
horizontally differentiated by the major institutions: corporate media, law 
enforcement, religion, and education. These institutions are there to “keep the 
people manageable”: they “indoctrinate us with propaganda and censorship” 
(media), “teach untrue principles and doctrines” (religion) and “brainwash the 
people into ‘what’ to think, not ‘how’ to think” (education). One layer up, the 
multi-national conglomerates are depicted as controlling the world’s resources, 
and above these corporations are the institutions that control all finances (the big 
banks, central banks, World Bank and the IMF, a.k.a. “the financial elite”). 
Ultimately, on top of the pyramid, we find the real cabal who controls these 
financial institutions. 
E.g. http://files.abovetopsecret.com/files/img/sa4f476a9d.jpg; 
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/c0sJx2ZgYpQ/Uw4VFRGWXnI/AAAAAAAAAdw/
OUvjtI-YclI/s1600/illuminati%20pyramid.jpg;  
http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_m5x8dvmKns1qkwdrko1_500.jpg;  
https://s3.amazonaws.com/thrivemovementassets/resources/images/000/000/
535/original/FollowTheMoney-Bank-Pyramid.jpg, last retrieved 8th of April 
2015 
260 The Industrial Worker, "the voice of revolutionary industrial unionism," is the 
newspaper of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), published by The 
International Publishing Co., Cleveland, Ohio, USA. 
www.iww.org/projects/IW, last retrieved March 5, 2015 
261www.wijwordenwakker.org; www.slaaptgijnog.nl, last retrieved September 3, 
2015 
262 E.g. http://www.ninefornews.nl/zwarte-zwanen-over-gesjoemel-met-je- 
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pensioengeld-nederland-zou-wakker-moeten-worden/, zaplog.nl/zaplog/article/ 
wat_is_wakker_worden, www.argusoog.org/2007/04/hallo-wakker-worden/, 
last retrieved September 3, 2015 
263 E.g. www.wanttoknow.nl/overige/het-complot-van-de-complot-theorieen/, 
www.ninefornews.nl/ijsland-overweegt-radicale-ommezwaai-het-moderne-
geldwezen/, last retrieved September 3, 2015 
264 http://nl.hoax.wikia.com/wiki/Complotdenker, last retrieved September 3, 
2015 
265 Winti is a traditional Suriname religion that was brought over there by African 
slaves and got mixed with Christian and indigenous American beliefs, a central 
feature is the belief in a pantheon of spirits, called Winti, its rituals contain magic 
and sorcery. Winti shares with Vodou in Haiti and Candomblé  in Brazil. 
266 Sheeple, e.g. sheep combined with people, is a commonly used portmanteau to 
describe the gullible mainstream who do not think for themselves, but just go 
with what everyone else is doing. 
267 www.waarheid911.nl , last retrieved October 2, 2015 
268 www.wacholland.org/content/acties-demonstraties, last retrieved February 
10, 2013 
269 http://www.youtube.com/user/wearechangeholland, last retrieved February 
10, 2013 
270 http://www.argusoog.org/, last retrieved February 10, 2013 
271 http://www.waarheid911.nl/, last retrieved June 17, 2013 
272 http://www.slaaptgijnog.nl/, last retrieved August 11, 2013 
273 http://www.zoekdewaarheid.nl, last retrieved August 15, 2013 
274 This aphorism is allegedly from feminist Gloria Steinem, although whether the 
conspiracy theorists who invoke it know about that history and identify with her 
project is unexplored. David Icke and his followers commonly proclaim this 
phrase as a truism.  
275 For reasons of clarity, I use science in this chapter as a singular whole as if it 
designates a clear and bounded reality, but I am obviously aware of the continuous 
discussions about what and whoever counts as science, as well as the plurality of 
topics, methods, practices, institutions, and so on that can be grouped under this 
uniform header. In fact, this is exactly the topic of this chapter.  
276 Popper argued that proponents of Marxism, astrology, and psychoanalysis have 
no difficulties finding confirming evidence. In their eyes “the world was full of 
verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it” (Popper, 
2014: 45). 
277 This does not mean, of course, that science can be “made up” in any which way: 
boundary work can be a very creative practice, but is inevitably restricted (egg. 
yet not determined) by (pre)existing repertoires of attributable meanings and 
qualities (Gieryn, 1999: 18-23). Taylor similarly sees an “inexorable elasticity of  
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the multiple discursive formations constituting science,” but “historically 
productive patterns, norms and assumptions, do constrain the future discursive 
outlines of the culture as they accumulate epistemic and practical presumption” 
(1996: 6). Science, these scholars hold, can be many—but not an infinite amount 
of—things. 
278For example: the session I attended at the 2013 Conference of the European 
Association for the Study of Religion, which intended to explore the “intersection 
between conspiracy theories and contemporary religious and spiritual narratives,” 
“focus on the common epistemological features of religion and conspiracism,” and 
“analyze the complex cosmologies of conspiracy theorists as religious systems, 
which could elucidate both their social function and internal dynamics” (panel 
abstract, “Conspiracy Theories and Religion,” EASR Liverpool 2013). Another 
good effort is a 2013 article of LSE scholars Bradley Franks and Martin Bauer, or 
the article by Stef Aupers and myself in the Brill Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and 
Contemporary Religion (forthcoming). 
279 Take, for example, the debate about whether the TED talks of Rupert 
Sheldrake and Graham Hancock should be removed from the site: 
http://blog.ted.com/graham-hancock-and-rupert-sheldrake-a-fresh-take/, last 
retrieved August 10, 2015. 
280 In the sense of being guaranteed by the modernist belief in the progressive 
accumulation of objectivity through competition in scientific knowledge 
production. 
281 An interesting case of such dynamics is documented by some of the social 
psychologists mentioned before: these scholars put their study about the rejection 
of (climate) science and conspiracist ideation (Lewandowksy et al, 2013a) on a 
number of climate blogs to incite reactions which were studied in another article 
(Lewandowski, et al, 2013b). They performed a content analysis of the responses 
of “climate skeptics” in the “climate denialist blogosphere,” which critiqued that 
particular first study. These responses ranged from complaints to the university 
alleging academic misconduct, submissions of freedom-of-information requests, 
and the posting of multiple re-analyses of the data showing that the effects 
reported in that study did not exist. When funding for this research was publicized 
in the media, the research proposers received many emails from people who were 
critical of their approach. The interactions between conspiracy theorists and other 
actors are numerous and have continued throughout this study.  
282 www.sciencepalooza.nl/2012/08/waarom%E2%80%9Ccomplotdenken%E 
2%80%9D-niet-zomaar-afgeserveerd-moet-worden/, last retrieved May 2, 2016 
283 See the comments section underneath the article, http://www.sciencepalooza. 
nl/2012/08/waarom%E2%80%9Ccomplotdenken%E2%80%9D-niet-zomaar-
afgeserveerd-moet-worden/, last retrieved May 2, 2016 
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284 https://cryptocheilus.wordpress.com/crypto-nieuwsbox/comment-page-2/, 
last retrieved May 3, 2016 
285 See the comments section underneath the article, www.sciencepalooza.nl/ 
2012/08/waarom%E2%80%9Ccomplotdenken%E2%80%9D-niet-zomaar-
afgeserveerd-moet-worden/, last retrieved May 2, 2016 
286 See the comments section underneath the article, http://www.sciencepalooza. 
nl/2012/08/waarom%E2%80%9Ccomplotdenken%E2%80%9D-niet-zomaar-
afgeserveerd-moet-worden/, last retrieved May 2, 2016 
287 Personal email by Liam, August 22, 2012 
288 http://zaplog.nl/zaplog/article/waarom_complotdenken_niet_zomaar_ 
afgeserveerd_moet_worden, posted August 26, 2012, last retrieved May 3, 2016 
289 Personal email by Anneke Bleeker, August 21, 2012 
290 Fulbright Enrichment Seminar Invitation Letter, February 6, 2015 
291 Dr. Montagnier discovered the HIV virus with his team at the Pasteur Institute 
Paris, around the same time as Dr. Gallo. The two virologists ignited a major 
scientific controversy about who actually was the first and sole finder of HIV, 
which led to serious diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and France until the 
dispute was resolved at the end of the 1980s by co-crediting both scientists and 
splitting the royalties from their discovery equally.  
292 http://modesofexistence.org/, under the header: “Phase Three. For the 
negotiators: how can we find the most acceptable account through a series of 
‘diplomatic’ negotiations?”, last retrieved May 10, 2016 
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The truth is out there. What was once the motto of an American science fiction TV-
series is now ordinary reality. Millions of people in the Western world no longer trust 
their epistemic authorities (be it science, media or the government) and resort to al-
ternative explanations to account for what actually happened. Conspiracy theories are 
formulated about the terrorist attacks of 9/11, about Big Pharma aggressively selling 
their malign products, or about the Illuminati secretly ruling the entertainment indus-
try. They feature in popular culture as well: films, books and TV- series like The Matrix, 
The Da Vinci Code, or The X-Files have attracted millions. And at any random party one 
is bound to encounter someone who will not believe what the authorities tell us. Con-
spiracy theories and their followers are simply everywhere today. 
But although conspiracy theories become more and more mainstream, a good socio-
logical understanding of their popularity remains limited by their consistent patholo-
gization in and outside academia. The stereotypical image of conspiracy theorists as 
paranoid fanatics is prominent, and the ideas they have about reality are easily put aside 
as irrational and preposterous. But is the suspicion of a conspiracy orchestrating world 
affairs that farfetched when secretive government operations and corporate collusions 
are a clear reality? Moreover, and this is the argument throughout the book, if we are 
to understand why so many people engage with conspiracy theories nowadays, then 
we need to explore the meanings they have for them.
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the Dutch conspiracy milieu and following a 
cultural sociological approach, Jaron Harambam explores such meanings in this book. 
He shows what contemporary conspiracy theories are about, which people are in-
volved in the milieu, how they see themselves and what they actually do with these 
ideas in their everyday lives. Reality turns out to be much more complex than com-
mon stereotypes would suggest… and yes… the truth really is out there…
Jaron Harambam works at the Rotterdam Centre for Cultural Sociology of the Erasmus University Rot-
terdam and defends his PhD thesis on conspiracy culture in the Netherlands in October 2017. He was 
a Visiting Fellow at Northwestern University near Chicago, US (2015) and has published on conspiracy 
culture, digital culture and online games in international journals like Cultural Sociology (2016), Public 
Understanding of Science (2015), Information, Communication and Society (2013) and European Journal of 
Cultural Studies (2011). He is editor of the Dutch peer-reviewed journal Sociologie where he co-edited a 
special issue on actor-network theory (2014). Jaron is mostly interested in sociological phenomena at 
the crossroads of science, religion, popular culture and media. 
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